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1. CHANGING MEDIA, CHANGING 
PUBLIC SPHERES: THE CONCEPTUAL 
GROUNDS FOR STUDYING MEDIA 
POLICY
1.1. An Introduction
Media and communication policy can be studied following two parallel 
paths: one aiming at understanding the role, function and structural de-
velopment of communication media in contemporary societies, the other 
tracing the development of a public policy, largely manifested in the in-
tended actions of political institutions that respond to strategically de-
fined problems. These two paths meet especially in one territory: it takes 
shape when the communication media become objects of public policy. 
This book aims at mapping a territory of this intersection in the context 
of the enlarged geopolitical space of the European Union and new media 
environments shaped by technological, economic and cultural transfor-
mations.
The first important question to start with is: why are the media and 
communication in general objects of public policy? For almost one hun-
dred years, the mass media and the concept of mass communication have 
captured the attention of media and communication scholars in Europe 
and around the world. These concepts evolved as an intellectual reaction 
to the industrialisation of news and print press production, as well as 
the emergence of ‘new’ channels and modes of communication including 
film, radio and television. It does not seem to be a historical coincidence 
that the period of the rise of terrestrial linear television and broadcast-
ing in general, induced a perception of this ‘new’ media environment at 
that time, as an interconnected system. Particularly Marshall McLuhan’s 
(1967) theoretical attempt to aggregate disparate media of communica-
tion into a synthetic whole of a media system, proved to be highly influ-
ential. Denis McQuail (2002: 4) argues that such theorising about the 
mass media had its origins in a consciousness of the changed character of 
a society. In other words, the mass media and system of communication 
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media were seen as the lifeblood of society, playing a principal role in 
the processes of social change. An everyday operation of the system, was 
perceived as fundamental in terms of consequences for the way in which 
social life is organised, how societies function and how they construct 
their sense of collective identity. 
Although both mediatisation and media-centric approaches have 
met a wave of criticism, especially from audience studies, they seem to 
justify the high interest of political institutions in incorporating commu-
nication media systems into the more complex network of public poli-
cies and governance. Moreover, nowadays, with the rise of new forms of 
communication and media architecture, we face similar intellectual reac-
tions underlying the pivotal role of the new media for social life. They are 
seen pervasive and ubiquitous, penetrating all aspects of contemporary 
life (Deuze, 2011), intrinsic to the functioning of modern societies (Craig, 
2004). A new communication environment is recognised as ‘post-mass 
mediated’ and ‘post-industrial’. The fundamental changes that societies 
and individuals undergo, are once again in history proclaimed to result 
from the spread of new communication technologies and the use of new 
media. At the same time, the concept of ‘the media’ is less obviously and 
frequently associated with a coherent and centrally institutionalised mass 
media. New media and communication environments crystallise, on the 
one hand, around the legacy media, that have existed for centuries and 
evolved before the advent of the Internet, on the other hand, they thrive 
through networks and contents generated by users, new platforms and 
forms of content and services. The provision of news and information is 
increasingly fragmented, elusive, delivered in many forms, formats and 
combinations of media and communication networks. Mining, collect-
ing and aggregating of information almost instantly from a vast array of 
sources, reached a scale never experienced in media past. A predominant 
perception of the media as ‘external agents’ providing the technological 
infrastructure for transferring the content to masses of users, is being re-
placed by the concept of ‘networks’ through which users compose their 
own individualised and singularised information spaces. These ‘individu-
alised media systems’ are invisible, and at the same time, indivisible from 
all aspects of everyday life (Deuze, 2011).
The new media architecture of communicative abundance is not only 
increasingly invisible but also plural. This move towards a plurality of 
mutually-opaque networks (each of which presents different problems 
of inclusion and exclusion) demands new skills and capacities from me-
dia users and different forms of literacy (Nieminen and Sparks, 2012). 
Do these changes and new evolving structures transform rationales and 
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justification for public policy in the area of media and communication? 
In order to answer this question, it would be instructive to consider and 
reconsider the specific roles and functions of the communication media 
in contemporary societies. This will subsequently lead us to the ques-
tion: Why do we have policies? And how are objects of policies defined 
and constantly adapted to changing social and technological conditions? 
An important perspective to study policies in this respect is a process. In 
other words, how the field of policies developed, changed and how did 
research on media policies react to these changes? And finally, all these 
reflections will be linked to the geographical and geopolitical context of 
this book. The methodological approach and scope of the book will be 
briefly explained in the later sections of this chapter. 
1.2. Media are so specific: five functions and five 
arguments 
One of the leading justifications across changing paradigms of media and 
communication policies has been the assertion of the specificity of the 
media. In other words, the communication media have played multiple 
functions in societies, each of which grew from a particular field of social 
life and action such as economy, politics, culture and education. At the 
same time, the media are so specific that they seem to be conducive and 
indispensable for the operation of these particular fields. For example in 
the field of politics, the system of a well-functioning democracy and full 
exercise of citizenship rights presupposes an informed and participant 
body of citizens that can access, validate and negotiate their preferences 
and understanding of social reality through the communication media. In 
the economic field, effective models of production and distribution uni-
versally depend upon a media function to advertise commercial products. 
Evidently, the media are businesses, but they are also ascribed a special 
function in the democratic health of a society (Craig, 2004: 3), education 
and yet they are technologies and cultural institutions disseminating and 
reproducing cultural expressions. 
Communication scholars have distinguished various sets of functions 
(McQuail, 1992; Schulz, 2004) some of which are seen as fundamen-
tal, others (e.g. integrative and unifying) as supportive. These resonate 
with certain expectations and responsibilities that ultimately, restrict the 
operations and performance of the media (Voltmer, 2013: 25). Hence, 
the media are not seen in isolation from their social environment, but 
as a means to various societal ends, and consequently, justifications for 
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media freedom, independence and autonomy – as leading policy ratio-
nales – are derived from a shared sense of importance of the media and 
agreement on the functions they play in other fields of social life. The 
arrangement and hierarchical ordering of the functions might depend on 
the preferences and leading paradigms of institutions developing and en-
acting communication policies. The section below summarises the five 
main functions and arguments for a media and communication policy.
Technological argument – one of the specific functions of the media is to 
transfer, disseminate and channel various forms of communication over 
spatial and/or temporal distances according to their channel and storage 
capacities (Schulz, 2004: 90). In this sense, technological solutions and 
infrastructures broaden human communication capacities, act as tech-
nological ‘extensions of a man’ and improve the natural limits of human 
communication (McLuhan, 1967; Schulz, 2004). 
One has to recognise, however, that the forms of mediation, relay, 
transfer, dissemination, delivery, bridging and storage have evolved and 
changed fundamentally over time. Also, it became apparent from com-
munication studies that media technologies are not neutral, but their 
structural features shape the meaning of the messages they convey as 
well as patterns of interactions of those who are using them (Voltmer, 
2013: 60). The scale of mediation has reached unprecedented ubiquity, 
while the change is also qualitative. Opposite forms of communication 
(interpersonal, mass and mass-self communication) coexist, interact and 
complement each other (Castells, 2009: 55). These also rearrange the 
very nature of mediation among individuals and between individuals and 
a larger society, encompassing mass communication and self communi-
cation at the same time: mass communication because it can potentially 
reach a global audience and self-communication because the production 
of the message is self-generated and the retrieval of specific messages or 
content self-selected (Livingstone, 2009; Castells, 2009: 55). The techno-
logical implications are that media connect and isolate users at the same 
time, make the world concurrently larger and smaller (Deuze, 2011: 142). 
The ‘technological argument’ for a media and communication policy 
seems to be operational and assisting in the fulfilment of other functions. 
In other words, technological infrastructures and solutions have to be 
established, put in place, and have to be made openly accessible before 
other functions are exercised. In this respect, the basic values justifying 
policies in terms of access to enabling technologies, are those of freedom, 
universality and equality. Free and universal access to new communica-
tion and media technologies, and the Internet in particular, is consid-
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ered to be a basic condition and communication right in the world. It 
can be illustrated by the new UNESCO concept of Internet Universality 
proclaimed at the WSIS 10+ summit in Paris in 2013. Likewise in Eu-
rope and the US, the policy initiatives aiming at eliminating the digital 
divide and the broad resonance of such concepts as ‘knowledge-based 
societies’, ‘an information society for all’ and ‘e-inclusion’ demonstrate 
that importance of access to the physical infrastructure necessary for the 
use of new technologies is perceived as an instrument of societal progress 
and development. 
Yet, the question of technological access is directly linked with tech-
nological use: how does it vary among those who are better skilled and 
more competent to use advanced technologies and those who are not? 
Christian Katzenbach (2012: 125) stresses that technology in use does 
not blindly follow any inherent logic but is always appropriated, reinter-
preted and domesticated by its users. Media technologies seem to appear 
‘naturally’, but they reflect the social relations and needs of the society 
in which they are used (Voltmer, 2013: 58). Moreover, technological pre-
requisites may impact different forms of use and control by users. These, 
as is the case of AVMS Directive (European Parliament and the Council, 
2010a) may justify differentiated regulation. Thus, for example, non-
linear or on demand audiovisual media services are regulated differently 
than linear services on the grounds of the fact that it is the user who 
decides what services are chosen and when are they being used.1
Freedom, universality and equality as guiding principles for the access 
and use of communication technologies may be understood differently 
in various societies. Jan van Dijk argues that in the developed countries, 
universality of access usually means household access for all:
For those not connected at home, public access and public service in commu-
nity and government buildings, libraries, telecenters and Internet cafés are the 
second option. In developing countries household access is a luxury that is far 
beyond reach. Here public access is the first option; access in public buildings, 
community centres and commercial telecenters or cafés is the only achievable 
aim of access in a short or medium term (van Dijk, 2008: 289–290). 
As it comes to the value of equality, equal access is usually addressed 
in terms of settlement, geographical location and costs of connecting to 
new media technologies such as digital TV or broadband Internet. Equal 
access to technologies by users regardless of place of residence (whether 
it might be a big urban agglomeration or remote countryside) or material 
1 For more on this issue, see in the Chapters 2 and 4.
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status, can be seen instrumental in terms of structuring and framing of 
social communication, and thus also the exercise of communication rights. 
Cultural argument – a cultural function of the communication media al-
lows for the reproduction of cultural expressions and representations, 
content processing and validation of knowledge in a particular cultural 
environment. Specifically, it is linked to the process of encoding, decod-
ing and formatting of communication forms in a way suitable for hu-
man perception, thus also entailing acts of interpretation, recognition and 
evaluation (Schulz, 2004: 92). It goes without saying that the media do 
not operate in a cultural vacuum, likewise culture does not evolve in 
a communication void. To paraphrase a well-known sentence of Edward 
T. Hall: the communication media determine culture, culture determines 
the communication media.2 Culture is mostly embedded in the processes 
of communication, and reciprocally, the media enable social perception 
and information processing through cultural encoding, decoding and 
formatting. The communication media reproduce fundamental catego-
ries, values and norms, according to which communities of culture con-
duct their lives and construct their identities and sense of being (Cottle, 
2000). Thus, cultural identities do not seem to be completed in the pri-
vate sphere and then simply applied to the public sphere of the communi-
cation media. Communication contents, flows and practices incorporate 
and recognise a myriad of identity layers that individuals and communi-
ties bring to them from their manifold roles and activities in society. 
In a similar vein, cultural diversity is not only manifested in the me-
diating cultural differences through media contents, services, activities, 
etc., but it is also embodied in media institutions and their practices. 
In that sense the communication media are cultural institutions shaping 
a symbolic environment in which cultures thrive. Culture and the com-
munication media are linked through a networked infrastructure, and op-
erations of common institutions and practices providing their users with 
meaningful ways of life. These need to be socially and spatially transmit-
ted to guarantee cultural self-sustainability over generations. Yet despite 
self-sustainability, societies transform culturally. 
No contemporary society is characterised by a single culture, and 
spatial boundaries of societies and cultures now rarely coincide (McQuail, 
1992: 276). Joseph Straubhaar argues that the movement from tradition-
al press and national broadcasting mass media to the use of Internet and 
2 Edward T. Hall, a ‘founding father’ of intercultural communication, formulated the 
key maxim: “Culture is communication and communication is culture” (Hall, 1959: 186).
15
multi- and cross-media services has produced identities that are multi-
layered with cultural, geographic elements that are local, regional, na-
tional, transnational and global. As in geology, the layers often interact, 
they sometimes break and form new layers out of the pre-existing ones 
(2008: 12). Manuel Castells (2009) distinguishes four cultural patterns 
shaped by communication flows that illustrate the currents of cultural 
evolution and change. These patterns are characterised by the opposition 
between globalisation and identification, and by the tension between in-
dividualism and communalism (2009: 136). The patterns and layers of 
cultural identity are present in media and communication environments 
across different markets, geographical spaces and media structures. At 
the same time, alongside this restless dynamics of cultural change with an 
ongoing hybridisation and possibilities of cultural bypassing and trans-
verse, the view that mediated communication should maintain symbolic 
cultures characteristic for particular societies, still marks cultural policies 
related to the media and communication processes. 
Policy implications in the field of culture are often guided by the val-
ues of diversity, uniqueness and authenticity. On the one hand, they may 
cover such structural aspects as balancing asymmetries in cultural flows 
through protecting transnational media spaces against external players 
(e.g. against external ownership, capital flows), supporting domestic 
players (e.g. with subsidies for media production), co-production treaties, 
must-carry obligations that favour the distribution of domestic channels 
(e.g. in cable networks or on digital platforms). Relevant policy initiatives 
often resonate with political debates and originate within the frameworks 
of supra-national governmental organisations such as the European 
Union. At the same time, national states, although significantly weaker, 
still play a leading role in designing policies that seek to protect national 
cultures within the globalised communication sphere. Hallin and Mancini 
(2004: 43) see a crucial form of such an intervention in the institutionali-
sation of the public service media (PSM) that have been “present in every 
country in Western Europe and North America except the smallest”, and 
in most countries public service media have until recently served as the 
primary source of broadcasting. Examples of the BBC, France Télévisions 
and others prove likewise that the PSM are viewed in many countries as 
an integral part of national cultural heritage and national cultural brands 
attracting worldwide respect. 
The PSM have certainly not been the only media institutions, through 
which national states as well as supranational institutions sought and 
seek to defend cultural identity, cultural expressions and language. In 
addition to structural and institutional arrangements, communication 
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policies in this regard often focus on the matters of content and perfor-
mance: promotion of cultural works (especially works produced by do-
mestic, indigenous producers or produced in a given country), language 
requirements (e.g. quota or proportions of works originally produced in 
a national/regional/minority language), support for locally-oriented or 
locally-produced content or media services for ethnic and national mi-
norities. In addition to structural and content-related solutions, culturally 
motivated policies may also involve tax policies supporting minority own-
ership and employment policies designed to stimulate an active recruit-
ment, retention and advancement of minorities (Gandy, 1998).
Educational and knowledge-generating argument – An educational func-
tion of the communication media has been frequently associated in past 
policy initiatives with the role and performance of the PSM. This partly 
resulted from a paternalistic model of the PSM, developed particularly in 
the UK and successfully exported to some other parts of the world (e.g. Ja-
pan). Yet, also in countries with a predominantly commercial model of 
media landscapes (USA), the educational and knowledge-generating me-
dia function has been used as an argument supporting, e.g. broadcasting 
licence policies requiring from broadcasters in the early years of radio 
and TV broadcasting to comply with ‘public responsibility’ or a ‘fairness 
doctrine.’ This has gradually been replaced with a pro-competition, non-
interventionist policy imposing a minimum information requirement for 
licence renewals (Noam, 1994). The trend of deregulatory policies in the 
media environment, that has gained influence in the course of the last 
30 years in most European countries and the US (but also other parts 
of the world), washed away most of the pro-educational commitments 
placed upon the commercial media by relevant policy-makers.
At the same time, increasingly commercial media systems tend-
ed to disappoint those seeking more ambitious performance satisfying 
knowledge- generating expectations. The mechanisms in the commercial-
ly-dominated systems are generally based on maximising audiences valu-
able to advertisers not on the grounds of the users’ ability to mindfully 
acquire media contents but on the grounds of attracting their attention. 
As a result, the media use and reuse well-proven schemes serving popular 
culture, omit social and cultural controversies, and minority interests, by-
pass imbalances in the programmes and avoid antagonising any segment 
of the population that may be potentially appealing to advertisers. 
A renewed interest in the educational and knowledge-generating 
function of the media has spread with new modes of media delivery and 
use. In media and communication policy, it found its manifestation in 
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such concepts as media literacy, the protection of minors and a safe In-
ternet. An important turning point in this respect has been the shift from 
a passive media user, to the person who is not only able to actively in-
teract with the media, but more significantly, who is fully aware, autono-
mous, and has a strong personal locus in his/her media use and choices. 
The concept of ‘personal locus’ reflects the personal motivation of media 
users, and is composed of personal, autonomous and intentional goals 
of the users (Potter, 2011). These personal cognitive goals and reasons 
are usually very different from the political, economic, cultural and tech-
nological goals of the media institutions being composed of the goals of 
owners, producers, journalists and other actors contributing to, or influ-
encing media performance. 
Naturally, the communication media cannot be seen as substitutes for 
universities or educational institutions in general. At the same time, the 
way how we acquire and use the information in the media and through 
the media influences our organisation of knowledge. This information re-
sides in messages and is composed of facts. Knowledge is formed in a per-
son’s mind and requires structure to provide context and thereby exhibit 
meaning (Potter, 2011: 17). Thus, media literacy starts with mindful-
ness. The point is to be rather reasonable than reactive. With a conscious 
attention to media use and constant linking it with personal purpose, 
information can be more thoroughly transformed into subtle knowledge 
structures. Mindful and fully conscious media use prevents an automatic 
processing of the information that lacks clear intentions and purposes. 
Why then, all these mental efforts of selection and meaning construction 
seem to be so important in new and dynamic media environments? 
James Potter puts forward this explanation: “The information prob-
lem has shifted from one of gaining access to one of protecting ourselves 
from too much” (Potter, 2011: 3). Moreover, current media users face at 
least three false impressions. First, a high saturation with information 
and communication is often wrongly identified with huge variety and 
diversity. Second, there is a false sense of being well-informed and third, 
a false sense of control (Potter, 2011: 8). Paradoxically, having a greater 
control on the time and form of media use, users spend increasingly more 
time on searching and using the content that does not necessarily meet 
their personal purpose. 
This becomes even more evident with younger segments of the popu-
lation. Undoubtedly, as content consumption opportunities have multi-
plied and increased in thematic specialisation, minors have emerged as 
one of the most financially viable target groups for increasingly differ-
entiated media products (Füg, 2008: 165). At the same time, exposure 
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to various forms of media content acquired through manifold platforms 
became significantly higher. This also implies a different risk profile of 
children’s media consumption. As the risk profile evolves mainly due to 
new technological possibilities, the issue of protection of minors and safe 
internet became more frequently addressed as salient areas in the media 
and communication policy.
At the same time, media literacy has been conceived more frequently 
by the public service media in some countries as a quite blanket concept 
combining informal learning with formal education concerning various 
age groups in societies. Interestingly, the BBC understands this part of 
the remit as covering a wide range of factual subjects that ultimately 
help audiences to form their knowledge (including natural history, sci-
ence and medicine, leading to scientific literacy; history, art, music and 
religion leading to cultural literacy; the democratic process, business, law 
and consumer affairs leading to civic literacy; parenting, health, nutrition 
and gardening leading to life literacy; and an understanding of how and 
why the media are made and presented in the way that they are, leading 
to media literacy). On the other hand, the mere provision of facts, is to 
be completed by selecting, organising and interpreting them to spark de-
bate and deepen understanding.3 Thus, the educational and knowledge- 
generating function seems to be much broader than a quite limited un-
derstanding of media literacy itself. Additionally, the function wouldn’t 
work as ‘one size fits all’. The services with particular educational purpos-
es and knowledge-building are to be adjusted to specific target audiences 
in ways and in subjects which are most relevant to them. For example, 
services for teenagers or young adults are to tackle relevant topics such as 
health, body image, careers and personal finance. Children are to be en-
couraged to find out more about the world around them through drama, 
comedy and entertainment, as well as factual programming on the CBBC, 
and pre-school children are to be provided with the opportunity to learn 
through play on CBeebies.4
Immersing oneself in the contemporary media environment some-
times resembles an overindulgence. It leaves us with the feeling of 
consuming too much, and of satiation with unwanted products. There 
is no doubt that ‘media nutrition’ affects our mental health and over-
all emotional and cognitive balance. One of the great strengths of the 
educational/knowledge-generating function of the media is that it makes 





the users aware and conscious of their personal goals, and eventually of 
what might be ‘healthy’ as regards their communication needs on the 
one hand, and communication habits, on the other hand. A healthy me-
dia diet is a choice. As taste in food can be changed, so can be taste in 
certain media contents, services and products. Thus, being curious and 
brave enough to go outside given and ready-to-use media frameworks, to 
look for a solution that meet personal locus, ultimately leads to better-
informed political choices, more engaged citizenship, cultural creativity 
and personal experience of knowledge. This however requires abandon-
ing certain expectations and prejudgments. The appropriate media ‘diet’ 
should be proportionally composed of a great variety of content types, 
yet this diversity needs to be reasonable. As with quality food, sometimes 
a quite small proportion of ingredients of high quality can better replace 
the empty calories of a large quantity of junk food. 
Economic argument – an economic function of the communication media 
is closely linked with the development of media industries that have been 
customarily defined in terms of mass production by large scale organisa-
tions of a distinct product – such as a TV programme or news content – 
distributed in particular ways (Hoskins et al., 2004). The communication 
media are predominantly seen as businesses and in the words of Manuel 
Castells they operate mostly according to a business logic, regardless of 
their legal status (Castells, 2009: 71). In other words, they depend on 
economic mechanisms of supply and demand that include financing from 
sales, subscription, advertising, corporate sponsors and are expected to 
generate a profit. At the same time, the communication media are not the 
same businesses as other economic activities. This happens because the 
media perform other important societal functions (including the politi-
cal/democratic function), but also because their economic operations are 
specific and incomparable with other businesses. First, the economies of 
scale shape comparatively low costs of mass media production, especially 
the costs of multiplying and distributing messages. Second, the commu-
nication media have two types of clients: advertisers and media users. In 
fact, the costs of media products are hidden in the prices of goods and 
services for which the media carry advertising (Kleinsteuber, 1997, quot-
ed in: Schulz, 2004: 93). Thus in some respects, the media market is not 
responsive to audiences (Croteau and Hoynes, 2006: 27). Some authors 
even argue that the media, selling in fact the attention of their audiences, 
are primarily answerable to their ‘advertising clients’ and there is no ef-
fective process that makes the media accountable to consumers of their 
contents (Voltmer, 2013: 166).
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Ideally, market mechanisms should provide a continuous mecha-
nism of trial and error, of innovation, product improvement and flex-
ible response to changing needs of media users (McQuail, 1992). Yet in 
practice, the communication wants and needs of users are not always 
congruent as they do not coincide with the interests of the users and 
advertisers. In other words, media products are ‘merit goods’; they have 
significant social value, but individual consumers, if let to themselves, 
are likely to under-invest in these products, thus underestimating their 
long-term interests (Graham et al., 1999: 5; Freedman, 2008: 9). Many 
authors have frequently addressed the failures of communication media 
markets, that cannot be corrected from inside the system of economic 
operations and may lead to an under-serving of media users as well as 
may have an impact on other media functions (e.g. democratic, cultural) 
(Graham et al., 1999; Baker, 2002; Croteau and Hoynes, 2006; Freed-
man, 2008). 
First, media content is a public good. In the case of these types of 
products, one person’s use does not affect its use by another person. 
(Baker, 2002: 8). Second, media performance often produces significant 
externalities, including e.g. the advance or destruction of someone’s rep-
utation, strengthening or weakening of a democratic debate, promoting 
or discouraging a healthy lifestyles, etc. Third, media markets display 
a strong tendency towards concentration because of the economies of 
scale and scope; and the Internet is not excluded from this norm. Fourth, 
unlike in other industries, a certain number of media companies tend to 
target the same middle ground of consumers with relatively homogenous 
services, rather than distance themselves from the mainstream. Fifth, 
media systems are most productive when seen as distribution networks 
rather than the producers of discrete products (Freedman, 2008: 8).
Moreover, the definition of media markets, as well as industries is 
becoming more elusive. In economic terms (justifying e.g. competition 
policy), markets usually refer to structures and entities supplying substi-
tute goods or services to a common group of users. In addition, to a prod-
uct dimension, the market has a geographic dimension (Hoskins et al., 
2004: 142). Yet, in a changing communication environment the notion 
of ‘substitute goods’ becomes less clear. Can e.g. news content based on 
investigative journalism be seen as a substitute for user-generated news? 
As regards the geographic dimension, the current trends of globalisation, 
digitisation, networking and deregulation – have removed most of the 
limits to corporate media expansion allowing for the consolidation of 
control by a relatively small number of companies benefiting mainly from 
their ability to build and use global media networks (Castells, 2009: 72). 
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In the current circumstances of communicative abundance and grow-
ing availability of content from alternative sources, traditional business 
models, especially of news production by the legacy media, are facing 
many challenges. In the last five years, print press circulation has declined 
by 17% in Western Europe and the US (Kilman, 2012). At the same time, 
newspaper advertising revenues have been declining as revenues lost in 
print have not been replaced by digital advertising. Audiovisual markets 
have been affected by audience fragmentation, while technological con-
vergence has accelerated ownership consolidation across platforms, and 
has been widely used to justify further de-regulation of ownership (OSF, 
2012a). These new economic conditions and trends will determine great-
er differentiation among media users willing (and able) to pay more or 
less for new technological devices and content, more frequently tailored 
for individual needs. Some analytical findings already suggest that high-
quality (and often specially targeted) news is becoming more expensive, 
and to a certain extent, restricted to elitist users that are able to pay for 
it (OECD, 2010: 61). These new emerging communication divides reveal 
a twofold challenge of a market operation in the new media environ-
ment: on the one hand, the business models will lead to cheaper solutions 
in production of news for mainstream users (implying greater standardi-
sation and routinisation in news production, less original content, the-
matic recycling of news). On the other hand, more sophisticated packages 
and portfolios of news and analyses will be prepared for the elite users 
paying the extra costs for quality and match of these packages with their 
individual needs.
So far, economic rationales that justify media and communication 
policy are mainly built on the values of economic freedom, equality and 
diversity, and more specifically they involve such notions as pluralism of 
media ownership, fair and effective competition, and fair or reasonable 
pricing for media and communication services. It is worth mentioning in 
this context that an economic logic has been a main driving force in media 
and communication policy in recent years. This has been mainly caused 
by the fact that both governments and supranational institutions (the EU 
in particular) have perceived – as their prior interest – well- developing 
communication media markets with a stable, eventually increasing em-
ployment. Denis McQuail and Jan van Cuilenburg observe that there has 
been a tendency to resign from “regulation where it interferes with mar-
ket development and giving relatively more priority to economic over 
social-cultural and political welfare when priorities have to be set” (van 
Cuilenburg and McQuail, 2003: 198). At the same time, even in commu-
nication media policies framed by economic criteria (e.g. media specific 
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ownership policies, merger controls, state aid rules, subsidies), economic 
justifications are often combined with or weighed against cultural and 
political arguments.
Political, democratic argument – a political or democratic function of the 
communication media has long been viewed as overriding in importance 
all other functions. In traditional liberal theory, the pivotal role of the 
media is to act as a check on the state and to monitor systematically all 
aspects of state activities, including failures, wrongdoings and abuses of 
power (Curran, 2002). Yet, a sole ‘watchdog’ or critical function does not 
certainly cover all the complexities of communication media involvement 
in a political and democratic process. 
A minimalist approach to democracy in national politics is tradition-
ally built around the arrangement of competitive and free elections. So is 
the role of the media that are largely expected to offer a source for well-
informed choices that reflect citizens’ preferences and provide guidance 
for political participation. Yet, democracy can also be seen as a struc-
ture of power rather than a procedure of method (Ringen, 2007). Such 
a structure of power is based on collective exercise and trust of citizens, 
that decisions are made and will continue to be made on the basis of 
respect for their interests (2007: 25). The method by which democracy 
works is not only elections, but more generally, it is maintained by struc-
tures of power, including a structure for public communication. 
In normative terms, such a structure should ensure the formation of 
a plurality of “considered public opinions” (Habermas, 2006: 416), “en-
lightened understanding” (Dahl, 1979) and the “simultaneous presence 
of innumerable perspectives and aspects in which the common world 
presents itself” (Arendt, 1958: 57). Plurality and variety is thus condi-
tionally linked to the public sphere. It is this diversity of perspectives 
and constant bargaining, in which shared social and political meaning is 
constructed and social reality defined. Moreover, the exchange of infor-
mation and views of common concern are conducive to the formation of 
public opinion that can act as a political will. Reconsidering the classi-
cal concept of the public sphere, Jürgen Habermas argues that it can be 
best described as a network for communicating information and points 
of view, which enables the streams of communication to be filtered and 
synthesised in such a way that “they coalesce into bundles of topically 
specified public opinions” (Habermas, 1996: 360). Public opinion, how-
ever, does not seem to be representative in the statistical sense, nor does 
it seem to be an aggregate of individually gathered, privately expressed 
opinions (1996: 362). The process of its formation involves a shared 
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practice of communication, collective experience, and process of imagi-
nation and representation. In Hannah Arendt’s words it is an ‘enlarged 
mentality’ that validates the opinion: the very quality of an opinion as of 
a judgment depends upon careful consideration of other people’s stand-
points, on imagination of their preferences, and thus, ultimately, upon 
its degree of representativeness and impartiality (Arendt, 1969). Though 
collectively forged, the formation of public opinion has an important indi-
vidual dimension: Robert Dahl emphasises that a concept of enlightened 
understanding implies adequate and equal opportunities of citizens for 
discovering and validating what their preferences are on the matter to be 
decided (Dahl, 1979: 104–105). In other words, to take autonomous and 
well-informed decisions, citizens need access to alternative, essentially 
diverse, but also trustworthy sources of information. 
As the public sphere has become more and more separated from the 
public’s physical presence and extended to the virtual presence of dis-
persed media users and communities, the communication media have 
evolved into central channels carrying, locating and constructing shared 
public meaning. Ideally, these communication structures ensure that 
a structure of power is democratic, and create the conditions for the le-
gitimate exercising of power: power that crystallises in and through the 
process of deliberation and that is centred around the values, interests 
and choices citizens articulate by means of their debate. In democratic 
and media practice however, the exercise of the process of deliberation 
through the communication media has various limits, as supporters of 
critical theories observe.
First, the users of media content and services cannot be easily identi-
fied with the public or citizens. Publics emerge through a more complex 
processes of information collecting, discursive interaction and perfor-
mance of citizens (Meyer, 2002: viii). 
Second, the blurring the boundaries between discursive media prac-
tices, e.g. between news journalism and entertainment, public relations 
and advertising, news and advertising, leads to the erosion of a rational 
explanation and exchange of views, and thus ultimately to citizens’ inabil-
ity of political judgement and validation of their preferences (Postman, 
1985; Bourdieu, 1998). Jaap de Wilde argues that in today’s television 
democracy, in which arguments are defeated by sound bites and slogans, 
“the concept of democracy has been hollowed out” (de Wilde, 2011: 8). 
Numerous studies on news contents have demonstrated directions that 
seem to confirm these critical observations: they depict a growing trend 
of depoliticisation and commercialisation (McQuail and Siune, 1998; 
Lucht and Udris, 2010); a weakening of the divide between editorial 
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and advertising content, particularly in local newspapers (OSF, 2012a) 
and redirecting funding from the production of content to technology and 
marketing (Baldi and Hassebrink, 2007: 10).
Third, communication media do not just reflect political life or the 
democratic process, but generate a political ‘reality’ that is tailored to 
their own requirements (Meyer, 2002: viii). This leads to a profound 
functional transformation of democracy in media societies that touches 
not merely the level at which politics is portrayed or represented, but al-
ters the political process itself in every one of its aspects. Thus, media de-
mocracy is a new political regime with its own rules, options, resources, 
channels of influence, and limitations (Meyer, 2002). These critical views 
exposing the limitations of media performance in a democratic process 
are few examples of many similar observations. Even though they detect 
discrepancies between normative expectations, and actual practices, they 
do not undermine the validity of normative approaches. 
Some authors argue that the age of communicative abundance 
changes the logic of democratic involvement. Compared with the era of 
representative democracy, when print culture and broadcasting media 
were much more closely aligned with political parties and governments, 
the age of monitory democracy witnesses constant public scrutiny and 
spats about power where it seems that “no organisation or leader from 
a political system is immune from affects of public surveillance” (Keane, 
2009: 15). In this view, the process of deliberation seems to be less sys-
tematic, less organised, more spontaneous, and focused on constant scru-
tiny. Michael Schudson emphasises that in monitory democracy “citizens 
scan (rather than read) the informational environment in a way so that 
they may be altered on a very wide variety of issues for a very wide vari-
ety of ends and may be mobilised around those issues in a large variety 
of ways” (Schudson, 1998: 310). Thus, monitory democracy modifies 
citizens’ engagement in a democratic process and it does modify commu-
nicative practices shared through the use of the communication media. At 
the same time, the civic mobilisation and call for forging public attention 
into some form of action or changed decision becomes more difficult due 
to a particularistic fragmentation of media user communities.
There is no doubt that the communication media play a decisive role 
in functioning democracies. Individuals are tremendously affected by 
collectively made decisions. The quality of these decisions depends, to 
a certain extent, on the politically-relevant qualities of the communica-
tion media: how they contribute to the formation of the public sphere, 
construction of the public opinion, the quality of political participation, 
general welfare, the adherence to ideas of community, togetherness and 
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interdependence, the exercise of human rights (and communication rights 
in particular), maintenance of conditions that allow the sustainability of 
collective life and social order, and importantly, how they contribute to 
preserving the integrity between political rhetoric, media expression of 
political goals on the one hand, and the political action and decision – 
and realisation of these goals – on the other hand. 
Because the communication media influence the qualities of demo-
cratic societies, they also enjoy a high status in terms of legal protection 
incomparable to other institutions of business or culture. Freedom of the 
press, broadcasting media, as well as the right to engage in these areas, 
safeguards the media infrastructure of public communication (Habermas, 
1996: 368). Thus, basic implications in media and communication poli-
cies involve those rights and liberties that aim to preserve an openness 
and diversity of media systems and ultimately, facilitate deliberative le-
gitimation processes. Most scholars agree that such operations are pos-
sible only if a self-regulating media system gains independence from its 
social environment (Habermas, 2006: 411–412). At the same time, the 
independence of the communication media is to be particularly protected 
against state power and political pressure as for their immediate politi-
cal importance. The sheer function of providing information should be 
fulfilled only outside the political realm strictly speaking, and no political 
action and no decision should be involved in this process (Arendt, 1969: 
131). Following this argument, there are reasons for public policies pro-
tecting the democratic/political functions of the communication media: 
these, mainly derived from values of freedom and diversity, are needed to 
guarantee the independence of the media and journalistic autonomy in 
order to facilitate the potential of democratic deliberation. 
The five main functions and arguments for media and communica-
tion policy have painted the main paths delineating a specific territory of 
media policy for decades regardless of changing technological, societal, 
geopolitical and economic conditions in which the communication media 
have operated so far and continue to operate. This is not to say however, 
that these are the only functions and only policy rationales. Moreover, 
the changing conditions make policy recognition of a particular norma-
tive conceptual framing enormously difficult. This happens because nor-
mative policy considerations have to be translated into concrete actions, 
and as such, they often attempt to catch up to a ‘moving target’ of actual 
communication, cultural, political and economic environments. An elusive 
character of contemporary societies linked by communication networks 
puzzles policymakers: how to define the risks, problems and threats in 
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such fluid environments? How to conceptualise, operationalise, measure? 
What ‘framing’ perspective to choose in order to crystallise a right under-
standing of a problem? How to achieve pragmatic coherence about a defi-
nition of the problem as well as about the claims made by relevant groups?
In this connection, it is important to start from the description of the 
key elements of a media and communication policy and ask: what specifi-
cally is/are the object/objects of these policies? The answers might not be 
as easy as they seem to be at first sight. With rapid technological changes, 
mediated communication more frequently migrates to the channels and 
performances that are not controlled by traditional legacy media insti-
tutions, but often by the media users themselves. Karol Jakubowicz ob-
served that in these circumstances, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish 
between ‘media’ and ‘non-media’ or to know the scope of policy and regu-
lation and what regulatory regime to apply to which service (Jakubowicz, 
2012a: 240). The section below reflects on these important questions. 
1.3. Media systems, media environments and other 
objects of media and communication policy
The term mass media has been used for decades to name and define the 
technologies, modalities, institutions, contents and services as well as 
forms of performance with a primary aim to mediate communication. 
Thus, broadly understood, the media are intermediate agencies that en-
able communication to take place (O’Sullivan et al., 1994: 176; Craig, 
2004: 3). Niklas Luhmann pointed out, that the term mass media includes 
all those institutions of society which make use of copying technologies to 
disseminate communication (Luhmann, 2000: 2). It is the technology of 
dissemination that plays a fundamental role in differentiating the media 
from other spheres of social activities – the technology constitutes a medi-
um which deals with information, or more precisely distinguishes between 
information and non-information (Luhmann, 2000). The growth and evo-
lution of the communication media is significantly marked by the emer-
gence of new technologies. Newer segments of media landscapes grew at 
an extraordinary pace with new technologies and social forms of media 
use, thus resulting in the omnipresence of the new media in social life. 
Disregarding for a while the whole dispute about the changing na-
ture of contemporary communication media, and the questions whether 
they still (or not) constitute coherent institutions and technologies, we 
can observe that the media compose various structures – from macro to 
micro societal levels. These include multiple hierarchical layers that em-
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brace environments, systems, networks, practices, forms of performance, 
contents and services with a global, transnational, national, regional and 
local relevance. Thus, both media and communication policies are multi-
level as all the media structures addressed by policies are interdependent. 
Yet, there are media systems and communication environments at a macro 
level that attract the ultimate policy focus manifested in organising prin-
ciples, prevailing order or paradigms of communication. It is the overall 
quality of such a system as a whole that should be examined by what it 
offers to users and citizens, and how it addresses their communication 
needs. In other words, media systems have various potentials (e.g. poten-
tial of diversity) but taking full advantage of these potentials depends on 
actual media use and on the way this use affects the lives of individuals 
in general.
Some scholars argue that media systems do not emerge spontane-
ously from the logic of communication technologies, or from the business 
strategies and actions, but are instead purposefully created by compet-
ing political interests (Freedman, 2008: 1). Others point out that media 
systems are as much the outcome of chance (or self-organisation) as of 
policy design and there are always gaps and inconsistencies (McQuail, 
1992: 152). Certainly, both assertions hold a grain of truth. The forma-
tion of particular media systems results from various factors – endogenous 
(historical, political, legal, cultural), exogenous (globalisation, techno-
logical convergence, transnational economy and governance), empiri-
cal (population size, demographic structure, density of population) and 
normative (cultural and political values, distinctive social imaginaries, 
historical traditions, legal principles and norms). In other words, media 
systems grow from a common historical-cultural ground, and are formed 
by a concrete constitutional and legal framework, they reflect manifold 
views and orientations and economic relations in an ever-changing social 
context (Golka, 2004: 6). 
Even though media systems posses certain distinctive organisational 
and regulatory features (Humphreys, 1996), they do not constitute single 
uniform systems with single purposes or philosophies, but are usually 
composed of many separate elements including diverse normative expec-
tations (McQuail, 1994: 240). At the same time, we may quite clearly see 
intrinsic differences between the French and British media systems, or 
French and German model of media regulation. Thus, media systems are 
distinct, unique and nonreplicable, but not uniform or internally homog-
enous. They resemble living organisms in their dynamics and originality, 
while they also share certain characteristics with other systems or media 
environments. To state that the media systems constantly change, trans-
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form, develop and evolve, is self-evident. This development is usually 
seen by scholars as a progressive evolution or the process of increasing 
capacity of the media system to fulfil perceived communication needs at 
progressively higher levels of material and cultural well-being (Tehra-
nian, 1994: 276). Yet, the realities of media system transformations show 
that change may be progressive as well as regressive: sometimes periods 
of media proliferation, increasing quality and diversity of offerings are 
followed by media decline. Media policies then may be seen, in norma-
tive terms, as potential corrections of such a volatile development.
Media systems are macrostructures, in which media entities, opera-
tions and performances are arranged together in a particular way, also 
(but not only) due to the fact that media systems have been, histori-
cally, objects, and thus also the results of communication policies. At the 
same time, media systems exhibit a reasonable autonomy: they differenti-
ate themselves from other spheres of social actions, are constituted and 
reproduced through their own operations, or more precisely ‘observing 
operations’ (Luhmann, 2000). Thus, media systems are characterised by 
a certain degree of coherence (and thus also internal selectivity) and at 
the same time by sufficient redundancy and variety. Both forces – au-
tonomy and dependency of media systems on political, cultural, historical 
and geographical circumstances – are integrated into media and commu-
nication policies, sometimes as ends (e.g. autonomy from political inter-
ferences), sometimes as conditions to be preserved (e.g. dependency on 
distinct cultural and linguistic characteristics). 
The most frequently studied media systems are national systems. 
Though the forces of economy and technology tend to produce quite con-
vergent patterns in the development of media systems, nationally spe-
cific political, social, and cultural factors explain much of the divergence 
(Lowenstein and Merrill, 1990; Kleinsteuber, 1993; Humphreys, 1996; 
Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Humphreys, 2012). The phenomenon of con-
vergence refers to both technological and geographical boundaries. On 
the one hand, convergence of media systems leads to the fading of the 
once clear boundaries between print, broadcast and telecommunication-
based media (McQuail, 1994: 240). On the other hand, the boundaries 
of national media systems become more permeable due to globalisation, 
a widespread use of new technological applications and economic forces. 
The converging forces caused by technological development create 
certain characteristics of new media types such as online media that tend 
to unite media systems in terms contents and performances across na-
tional boundaries (Deuze, 2003; Benson et al., 2012). Such character-
istics include e.g. a dominance of promotion and advertising as well as 
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a more prominent presence of deliberation, opinion and excessive com-
menting in the online media (Barnhurst and Nerone, 2002; OECD, 2010; 
Benson et al., 2012). Hallin and Mancini (2004: 261) point out that 
the homogenisation produced by technological innovation involves the 
spread of a global culture of technical expertise that gradually replaces 
professional journalism once rooted in national cultures. The economic 
forces of media system homogenisation include not only trends in media 
commercialisation and development of global media markets (with trans-
national ownership structures, modes of financing, organisation, produc-
tion and distribution activities and use), but also the deregulation and 
harmonisation of media policies. This trend reduces the distinctiveness of 
the media experience in any country and extends perceived policy prob-
lems and solutions over an area wider than the nation state (McQuail, 
1994: 241). 
Still, the distinctiveness plays an essential role in the variation of me-
dia systems. Among the relevant factors geographical and demographic 
variables should be mentioned in the first place – these embrace e.g. size 
of media markets (correlated usually with the size of a population), den-
sity of settlement, proportion of urban population, and proportion of 
Table 1: Factors of convergence of media systems
Technological Economic
interconnectedness of media produc-
tion and distribution across various 
media platforms and sectors
commercialisation of media systems
formation of media and communica-
tion networks without boundaries 
between print, broadcast, online and 
telecommunication
harmonisation and deregulation of 
media policies
new media forms (both in terms of 
content and performance)
globalising media markets (with trans-
national ownership structures, modes 
of financing, organisation production 
and distribution networks)
globalising pattern of professional 
journalism and technical expertise 
resulting from the spread of new tech-
nologies
Sources: Elaborated on the basis of: Klimkiewicz (2010b), Castells (2009), Hallin and 
Mancini (2004).
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a population settled in a capital city. Larger systems are likely to generate 
more varied media structures, while in smaller systems, internal differen-
tiation might be stalled by consolidation processes or other market deter-
minants (Klimkiewicz, 2010b). Hallin, however, warns of oversimplifica-
tions and points out that a state’s size interacts with other variables (such 
as linguistic boundaries, the level of GDP, etc.), and therefore, its effects 
are not consistent (2009: 101). Variations in media distribution may be 
caused by the density of settlement (e.g. an early entry and dominance 
of cable) or the proportion of an urban population, while centralisation 
of the media system might also be a result of a significant proportion of 
population settled in a capital. These factors do influence and are influ-
enced by policymaking process – it can matter greatly whether such a pro-
cess is centralised or decentralised as is the case of Germany or Spain 
(Humphreys, 2012: 165).
Socio-cultural factors are equally important for an explanation of 
media system variations. Media systems are not only organised according 
to certain visions and cultural cleavages, but they do play a crucial role 
in sustaining, reproducing and transforming the forms of socio-cultural 
inclusion and exclusion (Downey and Mihelj, 2012: 7). The forms of me-
dia segmentation in this respect differ from country to country and they 
reflect various ways of acknowledgement of ethnic and cultural diversity. 
This great variety stems not only from the fact that countries are composed 
of different proportions of minority groups (some are relatively homog-
enous, some have significant proportions of historical  autochtonous mi-
norities while others are multicultural due to the presence of allochtonous 
immigrant groups), but also from the fact that there is lack of agreement 
on what are the ethnic, national minorities, cultural and regional commu-
nities and moreover, what are the communication rights of these groups. 
Thus, media services and adequate media provision for various ethnic 
minority groups are debated not only in demographic terms (how big are 
these minority groups) but also in terms of historic settlements, politi-
cal arrangements, migration flows developing over time. The question of 
political recognition or nonrecognition draws a main defining line as the 
appropriate media provision is rarely satisfied by pure market forces. 
Political factors determining the variation of media systems were 
comparatively analysed by Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini (2004) in 
their groundbreaking work on comparing media systems. In addition to 
political systems factors (majoritarian versus consensual democracies, the 
role of rational-legal authority) the dimensions of scrutiny included the 
extent to which the media reflected political orientations in a society (po-
litical parallelism), the degree of professionalism and the scope of state 
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intervention. Peter Humphreys (2012) argues that other relevant factors 
in terms of the political and legal tradition should also reflect histori-
cal disjunctures. They refer to different legacies that disconnect the his-
torical paths of political development. In Europe, for example, countries 
having their experiences with dictatorial or authoritarian regimes adapt 
different ways of media system democratisation (Humphreys, 2012: 166–
167). This can be illustrated by the example of Germany, Spain, as well 
as the post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 
Other important political/legal factors include legal system traditions. 
Common law and civil law traditions suggest quite different approaches 
to the media, especially in legal terms, the former being conducive to 
‘judge-made law’, the latter being conducive to a codified body of a spe-
cial press law (Humphreys, 1996). Moreover, the role of judicial review 
also impacts functioning of the media system and policy-making process 
(Humphreys, 2012). In addition, a specific ‘logic’ or ‘climate’ of media 
policy affects a dynamic process of media system architecture. For ex-
ample, applying market logic to media regulation results in prioritising 
economic qualities, such as economic efficiencies or healthy competition, 
over other normative goals, including the qualities of democracy, cultural 
values, social inclusion, etc. Peter Humphreys (2012) also mentions the 
relevance of national regulatory approaches and ‘styles’ in their implica-
tions.
Finally, economic factors do not only generate forces of convergence 
but also contribute to national variations. Some media systems may be 
economically quite self-sustainable in their particular environments, others 
might highly depend on external resources in terms of financing, know-
how, human capital, but also policy schemes (imposed directly or indirect-
ly) and the rules of action. Manuel Puppis rightly observes that a high pen-
etration of foreign media has implications for the media landscapes (2009: 
11). Greater dependence on external forces might negatively influence the 
system’s own ability to generate the necessary diversity, but one has to be 
sensitive to historical nuances in this process. In cases of important turning 
points, some media systems have a capacity to reorganise their structure 
according to available resources, while others absorb solutions from outside 
(Klimkiewicz, 2010b). Also, patterns of media ownership and strategies of 
concentration vary from a system to system. Numerous and highly complex 
symbiotic relationships between media owners and politicians might lead 
to fundamental structural changes, cementing, for instance, the positions 
of principal media players in the media system. Besides, in some media 
systems advertising by state or public institutions crucially shapes the con-
ditions under which the media operate. There seems to be a great affinity 
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between the modes of financing and functions performed by media outlets 
within a system. Structural diversity generated by different funding sources 
may be more proportionate, e.g. when it does involve the coexistence of 
the public service media (PSM) financed predominantly from licence fees, 
privately owned entities financed by advertising or subscription, as well as 
community or alternative media supported by public grants and donations. 
Factors of convergence and distinctiveness of media systems are in-
volved simultaneously in developments of media systems. Yet, it is also 
apparent that some factors of distinctiveness make factors of convergence 
more influential. An interesting example to illustrate this is media trans-
formation in the CEE.5 Both types of factors as well as their balancing play 
a decisive role in the formation of media policies.
5 More on this issue see in the Chapter 3.
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Although media systems are ultimate policy objects, they are rarely re-
ferred to and defined as such in policy and regulatory instruments. These 
often tend to minimise and precisely delineate the object of regulation. 
The manner and form in which the objects are recognised and defined 
are important determinants of how they will ultimately be addressed by 
policymakers (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995: 104). Clarification of a lan-
guage, the narrowing of a concern in question as well as an exclusion of 
specific categories stem usually from a gradual reconciliation of various 
interests. On the other hand, an acceptance of a broad definition of the 
objects leaves policymakers with a greater freedom of deliberate actions. 
The two examples below illustrate how policy and regulatory definition 
of the media – the object of public policies – can serve as a battleground 
for clarifying various interests of involved actors. 
The first, demonstrates a gradual narrowing of the ‘media’ definition 
for regulatory purposes. An adoption of the concept of (audiovisual) me-
dia service in the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) (Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council, 2010a) leaves no doubt that ‘the media’ 
component is confined to a particular kind of media services. The Recitals 
5, 21, 22 and 28 of the Preamble and Article 1(a) bring up the following 
criteria:
 – audiovisual media services are as much cultural services as they are 
economic services,
 – the definition covers mass media in their function to inform, enter-
tain and educate the general public, 
proportion of a 


























Sources: Elaborated on the basis of: Klimkiewicz (2010b), Humphreys (2012).
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 – the definition includes audiovisual commercial communication but 
excludes any form of private correspondence, such as e-mails sent to 
a limited number of recipients as well as electronic versions of news-
papers and magazines,
 – the definition refers to a service, thus requiring an economic activity 
that is under the editorial responsibility of a media service provider 
(hence excluding e.g. private websites),
 – the definition covers services, which are mass media, that is which 
are intended for reception by, and which could have a clear impact 
on, a significant proportion of the general public.6
Taking into consideration also the ‘audiovisual’ component of def-
inition, the media as the object of eventual regulation would be even 
more severely confined to a relatively limited number of services. Yet, as 
it comes to policy goals and rationales justifying the adoption of AVMSD, 
these certainly aim to reach a more general level of media operations in 
European societies.7 
The second example sketches a critical discussion concerning the 
adoption of a broad definition of the media by the US Federal Communi-
cation Commission (FCC) in the case of measuring media diversity in lo-
cal markets. In its critical analysis of FCC policies Mark Cooper quotes the 
discussion of the Supreme Court regarding the Prometheus Radio Project 
versus FCC (2004) that aimed to correct the definition of the media for 
regulatory purposes: 
Media outlets have an entirely different character from individual or organisa-
tions’ websites and thus contribute to diversity in an entirely different way. 
They provide an aggregator function (bringing news/information to one place) 
as well as a distillation function (making a judgement as to what is interesting, 
important, entertaining, etc.) (quoted in Cooper, 2007: 203).
Thus, the concept of the media is not only technologically deter-
mined, but has also functional relevance in a given society. Both cases 
prove that the conceptual approach to the object of the media policy is 
quite complicated and largely depends on weighing various interests in-
volved. The next section will examine the field of media and communica-
tion policies. 
6 See Jakubowicz (2012a) for a similar discussion on defining the object of media/
communications policies.
7 See more on this issue in the Chapter 4.
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1.4. Media and communication policy: a conceptual frame-
work and evolving paradigms 
Media and communication policy as other thematically distinguished pub-
lic policy fields stands for conscious (public) projects that aim to achieve 
chosen goals with the proposed forms and means of action, available re-
sources and in a foreseen time horizon. Pioneering public policy research, 
Harold Lasswell conceptualised the complexity of policymaking by break-
ing its process down into a number of distinct stages: intelligence, pro-
motion, prescription, invocation, application, termination and appraisal 
(Lasswell, 1956). The cyclic model integrating various consecutive stages 
and phases of action inspired a vast number of scholars. Michael Howlett 
and M. Ramesh (1995:11) summarised these variations of scholarly scru-
tiny into five phases of applied problem-solving and corresponding stages 
in a policy cycle:
 – Problem recognition – agenda-setting,
 – Proposal of a solution – policy formulation,
 – Choice of a solution – decision-making,
 – Putting the solution into effect – policy implementation,
 – Monitoring results – policy evaluation. 
Although the concept of ‘cyclic’ policies has been one of the most 
popular in theoretical terms, a vast number of other approaches has of-
fered a helpful catalogue of systematising the relatively opaque and of-
ten impenetrable field of public policies. Peter Levin (1997: 24) argues 
that two aspects have to be borne to mind when conceptualising policies. 
First, an equating a ‘policy’ with ‘action’ may be sometimes misleading 
as it results in the inability to explore the relationship between policy and 
action. Second, the policymakers use the term ‘policy’ as a label to de-
note the belongingness, commitment and status of a proposal. Thus, the 
appropriate question should be: what do policymakers mean by ‘policy’ 
(1997: 24)? Scholarly approaches to studying policies have revolved 
around various dichotomies: 
 – ‘thematic’ versus ‘analytical’, 
 – ‘administrative’ versus ‘critical’, 
 – ‘processual’ versus ‘problem-oriented’, 
 – ‘comparative’ (usually cross-national) versus ‘one case’ (national),
 – ‘paradigm-oriented’ versus ‘action-oriented’.
For the purpose of this book, the first two dichotomies deserve a brief 
explanation, as they overlap to some extent. The distinction between 
a ‘thematic’ versus an ‘analytical’ approach is derived mostly from their 
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goals: the ‘thematic’ approach seeks generalisations that reveal certain 
regularities, while the ‘analytical’ approach follows elaboration and de-
scription. Hence, the ‘thematic’ approach employs theories to explain pol-
icies, while the ‘analytical’ approach focuses on mechanisms and circum-
stances (Levin, 1997: 30). The methods used in the ‘thematic’ approach 
operate with norms, values, and offer rather normative significance. The 
methods of the ‘analytical’ approach often seek to provide hard evidence 
for a case and are rather descriptive.
The distinction between an ‘administrative’ and ‘critical’ approach 
was originally introduced by Paul Lazarsfield (1941) (quoted in Puppis 
and Just, 2012:17). The ‘administrative’ approach denotes research car-
ried through in the service of some kind of administrative agency and is 
often associated with positivist, analytical methods (2012: 17). Thus, ‘ad-
ministrative’ research seems to be less autonomous, mainly descriptive, 
analytical, evidence-driven, to a large extent based on quantitative data. 
The critical approach on the other hand, “develops a theory of prevailing 
social trends of our times” (Lazarsfield, 1941: 9; quoted in Puppis and 
Just, 2012: 17) and aims to explain the logic behind the policy process 
and values involved. Thus, the critical research seems to be more autono-
mous, mainly evaluative, often discourse-oriented, value-driven, to the 
large extent exploring historical narratives and using qualitative data.
Media policy as a specific type of public policies is usually seen as 
a set of goals, modes and measures by which public authorities shape, or 
try to shape, the structures and practices of the media (Freedman, 2008: 
10; Psychogiopoulou, 2012: 5). Thus, media and communication policy 
embraces a totality of enforced laws, settled norms and principles that 
govern activities of the communication media on various levels (Goban-
Klas, 1999: 173). A complex media policy process can be divided into 
various stages, but two are substantive: setting down the policy goals 
(agenda-setting, formulating and framing of policy issues) and realisa-
tion. The policy process is always determined by leading values, the so-
cietal needs and actual resources that can be invested into the policy 
enactment (Goban-Klas, 1999: 173). Much of the media policy research 
has followed these elements tracing how media policy goals are chosen, 
how policy outcomes come about, what factors shape different policies in 
different countries, why certain interests and priorities rather than others 
prevail, what actors are involved in policymaking and decision making 
process and how power is distributed amongst them (Humphreys, 1996; 
Fischer, 2003; Freedman, 2008; van den Bulck, 2012). 
As a complex field of social and political action, a media and commu-
nication policy is often studied through media regulation. Yet, there is an 
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important difference between a ‘policy’ and ‘regulation’. While a ‘policy’ 
denotes a broader field, where various ideas and assumptions about the 
expected structure and performance of a media system circulate (Freed-
man, 2008: 13) and are shaped into a more consistent way of action, 
regulation refers to the specific actions and mechanisms, in which policy 
makers require or proscribe certain desired activities and behavior on the 
part of individuals and institutions (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995: 87). In 
this sense, a policy precedes regulation (Psychogiopoulou, 2012: 8). Me-
dia regulation takes various forms including rules, standards, forms of 
protection, prohibition, legal measures, executive orders and other forms 
of intervention (e.g. distribution and redistribution of resources in the 
form of subsidies) that are composed in a regulatory regime or regulatory 
pattern. Such a regime or pattern counts for one of the principal four 
building factors in the framework for communication policy: the underly-
ing goal, the medium, the technology and the policy/regulatory regime 
(Bar and Sandvig, 2008; quoted in Jakubowicz, 2012a: 239). Referring 
back to the two distinctive stages in a media policy process, media regu-
lation would come to the shape in the second stage focusing on policy 
realisation. In other words, media regulation implies the application of 
rules developed through the policymaking process, it also deals with the 
operation of specific, often legally binding tools that are deployed on the 
media structures and performance (Freedman, 2008: 14). 
The concept of media governance has a broader relevance than the 
terms ‘regulation’ and ‘policy’. Media governance incorporates various in-
fluences, claims, demands, forms of control and encouragement used by 
different actors in society (also beyond national authorities), including 
guiding principles and values that aim to shape media structures and 
performance (Karppinen and Moe, 2012: 188). In this sense, the concept 
of media governance reflects the increasing importance of informal net-
works, non-governmental actors, supranational bodies, as well as mecha-
nisms affecting media structures and performance that combine diver-
gent objectives and logics of action. Media governance covers the totality 
of mechanisms both formal and informal, national and supranational, 
centralised and dispersed, that aim to organise media systems along with 
media policy strategies (Freedman, 2008: 14). 
Another interesting current that spurs conceptual debates concerns 
the terminological choice between a ‘media policy’ and ‘media policies’. 
A media policy serves as an overarching term to embrace a totality of 
various public projects, visions and collective forms of action, guided by 
manifold principles and values, often with different objectives that aim to 
shape media structures and performance at multiple levels. Media poli-
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cies on the other hand refer to specific projects, visions and forms of ac-
tions. They may depend on the distinct medium under consideration (the 
press, broadcasting, online) or sector (public, private, community) or 
function (economic, educational, cultural, democratic) or collective actor 
(media owners, content producers, content providers, journalists, media 
users). Thus, both designations are seen relevant in their own terms and 
are used in this work. 
Finally, terminological concerns have to be completed with some re-
flection on a ‘media’ policy and a ‘communication’ policy. Van Cuilenburg 
and McQuail (2003) associate media policy with a traditional under-
standing of policies focusing mainly on newspapers, broadcasting and 
cable, and other similar means of general public distribution, directed 
towards political welfare goals while by contrast, a ‘communications’ or 
‘telecommunications’ policy involves more attention to infrastructure 
and architecture, market conditions, regulation of monopoly, etc. (2003: 
186). Other authors (Puppis and Just, 2012) replace the term ‘media’ 
with a mere ‘communication’ policy marking a new policy trend that 
responds to technological and economic convergence in the media and 
communication sector. This volume focuses on media policy as it is exam-
ining forces that shape or aim to shape media system architecture rather 
than telecommunication architecture, but both terms ‘media’ and ‘media 
and communication’ policy are used to denote either a policy field dealing 
with the communication media or a more broader policy area tackling the 
media operations that interact with electronic communication networks.
Media policy discourse is shaped to the great extent by various ratio-
nalities and theoretical understandings of the communication media and 
their roles in a society. The way how these understandings and perceptions 
are formed, activated, used and institutionalised affects the evolution of 
media policy paradigms. Two paradoxes or ambiguities characterise the 
field of media and communication policies: the state as a principal actor 
in media and communication policy has been historically perceived as the 
main agent of press freedom restriction. In other words, there is a genuine 
ambivalence in the historical and expected role of the state in shaping 
a socially desired media architecture. The state, that has been responsible 
(and is still responsible in many autocratic and non-democratic regimes 
throughout the world) for constraining freedom of expression and the 
free operations of the media, is also expected to actively guarantee this 
freedom through constitutional, legal arrangements and other comple-
menting policy measures in conditions of functioning democracies. Sec-
ond, although media and communication policies are viewed by many 
authors as essential for sustaining functioning democracies (Habermas, 
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1996; Napoli, 1999), the related policy issues are often low profile, and 
do not receive the same attention as budgetary decisions or tax policies 
(Puppis and Just, 2012). These two paradoxes are obviously interrelated 
and prove again that the communication media are special objects of, and 
media policy a special type of, public policies.
Media policy paradigms, are to certain extent, formed within these 
limits. In their groundbreaking work on media policy paradigm shifts, van 
Cuilenburg and McQuail (2003) explain the change of paradigms by the 
transformation of underlying goals. The three distinguished paradigms 
(communication industry policy until World War II, public service media 
policy 1945–1980/90 and a new communication policy paradigm – since 
1990) were guided by a different – and unique for each phase – set of 
goals. These were conceptualised by van Cuilenburg and  McQuail as po-
litical welfare, social welfare and economic welfare. Though a media pol-
icy has been directed towards political welfare goals traditionally, a cur-
rent search for a new communication policy paradigm is mainly driven 
by an economic and technological logic, even when enriched with certain 
normative elements. These are in fact more ‘communicative’ and less ‘po-
litical’ and ‘cultural’ in character. They can be summarised by the follow-
ing principles:
 – freedom of communication;
 – access – understood as the possibility for individuals, groups, organ-
isations and institutions to share society’s communication resources, 
both as senders and receivers;
 – control/accountability – accountability meaning the possibility of 
securing from those who control and make use of access; control 
in a sense of deciding who gets access to what communication re-
sources, when, where, how, and on what conditions (van Cuilenburg 
and McQuail, 2003: 203–205).
It should be also added in this respect that the paradigm shift reflects the 
changing weights of actors involved in the media and communication 
policy process, the state in particular.
The next section of this chapter attempts to develop a model for 
studying the media policy in this book. 
1.5. Polyvalent media, polyvalent policy: 
A methodological note
Media policy research deals interchangeably with a dual subject of ex-
amination: on the one hand it aims to scrutinise the policies, on the other 
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hand it studies media structures and performance – either as part of these 
policies, or independently. Thus, methodological choices should resonate 
with this duality and provide a framework that logically connects both 
elements. The model below attempts to incorporate both policies and me-
dia, together with normative and empirical perspectives. A media policy 
is perceived both as a collective conceptualisation and collective action: 
it does involve various groups of actors with various positions, roles and 
levels of control over the action and conceptualisation, which interact in 
order to shape communication media structures and media performance. 
In normative terms, any policy should be justified by rationales. In 
the case of the communication media, these rationales are derived from 
five specific functions the media play in societies. In other words, media 
policies do support (or should improve) certain qualities of the media that 
facilitate these functions. Qualities can be seen in comparison of one level 
with the other or through the interplay of potential and realisation (Rin-
gen, 2007: 31). It is this second understanding that seems more relevant 
for studying a media policy. In other words, a media system may contain 
various potentials: for example of media freedom, media pluralism, ac-
cess for all, inclusive representation of various social groups, etc. But only 
when the system allows for freedom, performs diversity, guarantees access 
and inclusive representation of media users, the qualities take shape and 
come to terms with plural expectations of the public vis-à-vis the media, 
and as such, they respond to communication needs. 
Communication needs reflect both the collective and individual as-
pects of mediated communication. They do not only strengthen political 
and civil rights, but manifest manifold purposes for which individuals 
and communities interact with the media. Thus, communication needs 
can be divided into three broad categories. The first embraces the need 
for knowledge, information and orientation that affect society as a whole. 
These needs are associated with the processes of collecting, receiving in-
formation, learning about social realities, interpreting politics and distill-
ing views that resonate with various orientations. The second category 
of needs involves the processes of representation, exchange and sharing. 
These are the needs for an understanding, representation, deliberation 
and expression of social and cultural communality. Finally, the third cat-
egory of needs demonstrates the need to understand and express oneself, 
and is linked with the process of self-expression (Stevenson, 1995). To 
accept that communication needs have to be met in societies is to rec-
ognise communication rights that imply obligations and responsibilities, 
and that can be demanded. Although these rights have been internation-
ally agreed upon and confirmed in different arenas, they have not been 
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collected into a unified framework and thus, also not adopted as a part of 
international law (Nieminen, 2010).8 
In normative terms, media and communication environments should 
proportionally balance the five functions media play in societies, respond 
to communication needs and guarantee the fulfillment of communication 
rights. Media policy rationales are usually distilled from this polyvalent 
normative view. In other words, the media and communication policy is 
a polyvalent phenomenon as are the very objects of the policy – the com-
munication media themselves. Stein Ringen (2007: 272) observes that 
if the job of the media was only to inform, we could judge the media on 
a single standard. But if the purpose is a mixed one, we need to consider 
several criteria at the same time, criteria which may well be in conflict 
with each other (2007: 272). Thus ideally, the polyvalent media policy 
aims to shape desired media functions and prioritise qualities that help to 
meet the communication needs and exercise communication rights of in-
dividuals and communities proportionally. In practice though, the policy 
is a product of rationales that may be contradictory or complementary. 
In other words, policy rationales exhibit a certain degree of elasticity as 
they have to be adaptable to very specific projects. Hence, the polyvalent 
media policy is always a selective, and at the same time a complex and 
sophisticated process. It may be seen as an outcome in itself, but also as 
the process balancing various goals and leading to multiple ends. 
The process itself involves a set of actors with various positions and 
roles played as well as different levels of control over the selection of al-
lowable actions. Policy actors hold different positions to decide how are 
media functions balanced or whether they are balanced at all, what are 
the proportions among them, and what issues are prioritised. In such 
a dynamics of balancing, an imagined media architecture plays an im-
portant role as the policy ends are marked by a will to correct perceived 
asymmetries. Thus, it is important how factors of distinctiveness and con-
vergence of media systems are incorporated in this imaginary, eventu-
ally whether they are seen important at all. Ulrike Klinger (2012: 142) 
8 Hannu Nieminen (2010: 15) summarises the concept of communications rights in 
four dimensions: 
–  the right to information concerns the claim for factuality and accuracy of public 
representations, 
–  the right to orientation concerns plurality and diversity of opinions that are publicly 
offered or available, 
–  the right to social and cultural communality refers to the availability of a rich vari-
ety of cultural representations, including those of both art and entertainment, and 
–  the right to self-expression includes an access to channels and platforms where 
citizens can make themselves heard and seen, and also listened to.
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notices that usually, a media policy evokes little mass public mobilisation 
and is negotiated among political elites, media owners, journalists and 
media activists. An important aspect, that distinguishes policy from other 
collective actions is the commitment (Levin 1997: 31) and willingness 
to translate norms and beliefs held by the actors into the policy process 
(Sabatier, 1988).
The actors in the polyvalent media process use a vast array of strate-
gies for the selection of particular courses of action. Naturally, the core 
decision-makers occupy a central position in this process: their consent is 
indispensable to change the status quo of a previous policy pattern. Some 
scholars describe these decisive actors as veto players (Tsebelis, 2002; 
Klinger, 2012). The core decision-makers as collective actors represent 
public institutions and their position often results from specific politi-
cal configurations that reflect a given political system. Yet, the decision-
making process involves another strong collective actor representing the 
media industry. Klinger (2012: 149) argues that media owners in particu-
lar have strong incentives to influence media policy but also “convincing 
means of doing so: as they can control access to the mediated public 
sphere and the qualitative appearance of political actors in this arena, 
they are crucial partners and gate-keepers of political parties”. Paradoxi-
cally, though one of the functions of the media is to hold accountable 
those who exercise political power, the strong dependency relationship 
between the core political decision-makers and the core media actors de-
termines collective consideration of selected policy actions, the desired 
outcomes and outcomes to be avoided, the costs, benefits, means and 
resources associated with each possible action and outcome. 
Thus, the key component of the polyvalent media policy is collec-
tive conceptualisation of a policy problem, and the greatest challenge 
coherence between policy actors and congruence of their policy choices. 
When the decisions in the polyvalent media policy are set, potential out-
comes defined, means linked with expected ends, the collective action 
completes conceptualisation. In principle, the action should be consistent 
with the objectives adopted. In empirical terms, it often faces numer-
ous constraints marked by available resources, co-operation in imple-
mentation, and formal versus factual exercise of standards. Moreover, in 
a  supra-national policy framework, as is the case of EU media policy, 
possible policy constraints are evoked by a discord between the supra-
national and national level of policymaking and harmonisation. 
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The figure above outlines the conceptual framework used for the 
analysis of policies in this book. In this model, polyvalent media policy 
rationales are derived from the normative categories of media functions, 
media qualities, communication needs and communication rights. The 
polyvalent media policy process encompasses collective conceptualisa-
tion (policy problem) and collective action (decision-making, allocation 
of means and resources, implementation and evaluation) controlled to 
various extents by the actors involved, among which the core actors make 
decisions on allowable actions.
Figure 1: The model for studying communication media policy
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Using this conceptual framework, the present volume seeks to sys-
tematise major media policy developments related with the European 
Union, through the perspective of younger EU member states. The role of 
other international institutions (Council of Europe and UNESCO in par-
ticular) will be considered as well. The historical fifth, sixth and seventh 
EU-eastward enlargement waves generated institutional change both at 
the EU macro-level and the level of Central and East European media reg-
ulatory institutions and regimes (especially in terms of opening media 
markets for EU ownership, promotion of EU audiovisual contents and ser-
vices, control of state aid provided to the public service media and tele-
com industry, and privatisation of the communication sector). A constant 
adoption of EU media policy and Council of Europe’s standards affected 
various facets of media systems that shared some specific features from 
the past (Klimkiewicz, 2010a). Yet to assess how deep, substantial and 
ultimately successful these changes were, and to what extent previous 
legacies of media transformation and path dependency overshadowed 
these processes, various thematic, diachronic and sectoral strands in the 
policymaking will be studied in this volume. 
To understand the conditions in making, an analytical approach has 
been chosen to study media policy as a polyvalent phenomenon consist-
ing of collective conceptualisation and collective action regarding main 
problem areas (as perceived by policy actors). In terms of techniques, 
the research combines various methods. Most importantly, it builds on 
document analysis using various types of documents including legal, 
policy, strategic documents, background and evaluation reports, annual 
reports, position papers, statements, press releases. The documents are 
treated mainly as sources expressing political commitment, interests and 
the goals of actors involved, yet they are also seen as symbolic fields 
where the vocabulary used, a way of reasoning and operationalisation of 
policy problems denote policy conditions. These may be understood as 
particular circumstances (for instance a supportive political climate), but 
also reflect the positions and levels of control of the actors involved. In 
analysing selected media and communication policy problem areas, vari-
ous case studies are adopted to illustrate the situation in one or more new 
CEE member states. Also, in studies, data collection and analysis com-
bines several techniques, such as a secondary analysis of the quantitative 
data, the document research and semi-structured interviews with various 
actors involved in relevant media policy processes. 
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1.6. Outline of the Book
This introductory chapter focused on conceptual and methodological con-
cerns that provide some ground for studying media policies in the context 
of profoundly changing media environments and in an enlarged geopolit-
ical space of the European Union. The second chapter, following on these 
theoretical introductory thoughts, explores nine main problem areas that 
emerge from current policy and regulatory developments in the European 
Union, including among others: audiovisual media services regulation, 
support for the European media and audiovisual works, media pluralism 
and digital agenda. The aim of the chapter is to provide a map, both in 
terms of timeframe and institutional involvement that helps to navigate 
through a highly complex field of policies targeting media structures and 
performance. The third chapter addresses an issue of EU enlargement as 
a specific condition for the development and implementation of a polyva-
lent media policy. The process of conditionality during the fifth EU acces-
sion and especially the Commission’s monitoring exercise in the area of 
media policy was marked by a certain tension between formal monitoring 
and enforcement of coherent criteria.
The next section of the book examines selected media policy areas. 
The fourth chapter elaborates on efforts to form the EU audiovisual land-
scape, especially through content and service-related regulation. The 
chapter follows policy conceptualisation leading to the introduction of 
Television Without Frontiers (TWF) Directive and analyses rationales justi-
fying far-reaching modernisation through the Audiovisual Media Services 
(AVMS) Directive. It also gives an overview on the implementation of the 
Directive in the new CEE EU member states, especially with reference to 
the European quota. The fifth chapter explores the issue of media plural-
ism – one that has been perceived as a big failure of EU institutions (both 
the Commission and Parliament). Despite raising the need for harmonised 
European rules on media pluralism and various new initiatives brought by 
new policy actors at the EU, media pluralism still remains to be dealt with 
in the national context. This might, indeed, result in fundamentally diverg-
ing practices, mechanisms and even anomalies. In this respect, the chapter 
studies empirical examples of the structural developments of ownership 
patterns, functional and geographical diversity in the CEE countries. The 
sixth chapter focuses on the independence of media regulatory agencies 
and public service media. First, it seeks to explore the field of harmonis-
ing regulatory regimes and the role of national media and communication 
regulators that are largely responsible for the implementation and moni-
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toring of EU regulation. These institutions are expected to carry out their 
work in full autonomy, impartially and transparently, in accordance with 
their professional remit (defined by the administrative, supervisory, rule-
making and monitoring functions), eliminating a potential risk of political 
or economic interference. Second, the chapter considers policies affecting 
the position of the PSM in the EU especially in the context of substantial 
challenges these institutions currently undergo. These are related on the 
one hand to an increasing regulatory pressure from the European Com-
mission in terms of clarifying the PSM’s remit and financial relationship 
with the respective states, but also to the new political choices inspired 
by commercial incentives or populist reasons. The situation in CEE coun-
tries seems to be instructive in many respects, as PSM have been created 
through a far-reaching media system reform only 25 years ago (formerly, 
the same institutions served as state-controlled media) and since then, 
in conditions of ‘compressed time’ they went through similar challenges 
and regulatory changes as their older European counterparts. The seventh 
chapter summarises the conclusions of the volume. 
To sum up this chapter, three points should be mentioned: first, 
studying media and communication policy as a polyvalent phenomenon 
enables a reconsideration of the normative grounds for policymaking in 
a broader context of the interplay of various social fields where the me-
dia play specific roles rather than seeing policy as a battlefield between 
economic or cultural/political values. Second, examining the policies 
through policy conceptualisation and action as well as media structures, 
reopens the possibility to compare the changing object of policies with the 
policies themselves. Finally, the combination of supra-national (EU) and 
national level of the media governance helps to see the policy as a con-
stant flow between the potential and its realisation. 
2. EUROPEAN MEDIA POLICIES: STAGES 
OF HARMONISATION AND DISCORD
2.1. Three introductory observations
As has been observed in the previous chapter, one of the paradoxes of me-
dia policy is that although the communication media are attributed high 
importance in the cultural, political, economic and technological develop-
ment of contemporary societies, the related policy issues are often ranked 
lower than is the case of other sectors. Due to their specific role and poly-
valent character, the communication media are also seen as one of the 
most challenging object of regulation. This seems to be one of the reasons 
why this policy field still remains predominantly the domain of member 
states. Yet, with the evolution of the European Union (EU) and its compe-
tencies, the mandate of EU institutions – and in particular the European 
Commission (EC) – grew considerably into the area of electronic media. 
Some authors even argue that over the last 20 years, EU policy initiatives 
have steadily increased in number and expanded to cover a wide range 
of issues, effectively limiting the capacity of member states to frame their 
national cultural and media policies (Ariño, 2011: 328).
Many scholars argue that there has been a fundamental divide or 
asymmetry between a reliance on economic arguments and a techno-
cratic approach to media policy, and on the other hand, consideration of 
communication needs based on cultural, political (democratic) and social 
values (Ward, 2002; Harcourt, 2005; Humphreys, 2008; Psychogiopou-
lou, 2012). Thus, mainly due to the legal confines in the Treaties and pre-
vailing concept of the single market, communication media, as a policy 
object, have been predominantly defined in economic terms – as markets 
or services delivered to consumers. In a similar vein, rationales justifying 
regulation have sought to correct failures in the effectiveness of the me-
dia’s economic functions. Although certainly well-grounded in empirical 
terms, a critique of asymmetry tends to create an opposition of economic 
to all the other media functions putting them in one overarching category 
of non-economic goals. And even though other accounts seek to contrast 
industrial/economic and cultural approaches in EU policy concerning the 
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media, one grand line of distinction still points to the asymmetry of eco-
nomic goals. Schlesinger and Doyle (1995: 26) observe that: 
We are being offered two quite distinct images: one of a society of consumers 
founded in notions of economic choice, the other – increasingly marginalised 
in respect of media and communication policy – of a society of complexity 
rooted in persistent cultural difference.
Michalis (quoted in Humphreys, 2008: 152) connects industrial/
cultural distinctions with sectoral divides and with diverging national 
interests:
On the one side, a cultural policy coalition of interests embracing public ser-
vice broadcasters, the European production industry and countries like France, 
which have been very concerned about the impact of the market – and globali-
sation – on cultural identity. On the other side, pro-liberalisation coalition of 
interests aligning the advertising industry, the private broadcasting lobby, the 
telecommunications industry, new media operators and aggressively deregula-
tory pro-market countries like Luxembourg and the UK.
Various national courses of action in media policy, and thus also na-
tional preferences at the EU level, evidently reflect the distinct composi-
tions of functions attributed to the media and qualities expected to be 
achieved. Some of these may be thought to resonate better with what 
Fritz Scharpf (1999) defines as ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ integration. In his 
well-known and extensively quoted work, Scharpf (1999: 45) addresses 
the unbalance between pro-market deregulatory ‘negative integration’ 
and market-correcting regulatory and ‘positive integration’ in EU policies. 
Scharpf argues that ‘negative integration’ refers to the removal of barriers 
to free and undistorted competition. ‘Positive integration’ on the other 
hand concerns the reconstitution of an economic system of regulation 
through market-correcting measures. Scharpf emphasises the structural 
asymmetry of EU governance, gravitating toward ‘negative integration’, 
while ‘positive integration’ has little contributed to the increase of institu-
tional capacity and problem solving and remains tied to the national level 
(Sharpf, 1999: 157). In this manner, Scharpf observes that ‘negative in-
tegration’ has been transposed to the European level, while ‘ positive inte-
gration’ encompassing the need to fulfil communication rights resides at 
the national level.
The assumption of asymmetry of economic functions in EU media 
and communication policy is not disproved by an empirical assessment, 
and after all also by the recognition of the EU institutions themselves. Still, 
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conceiving media functions in a more multidimensional way may open 
a plausible course to reflect not only on policy outcomes but also policy 
conceptualisation; not only intended engineered actions but also more 
spontaneous strands in policymaking evoked by unexpected problems 
and risks. It also allows us to observe how EU institutions exercise their 
powers in informal ways (e.g. through the promotion of certain concepts 
such as digital agenda), or offer soft law instruments (e.g. guidelines, 
recommendations, green papers, communications). Along this vein, the 
second chapter will test policy responses of the EU institutions to the core 
five media functions described in the previous chapter. 
It should be also mentioned in this context, that views vary whether 
the EU has a media, audiovisual or communication policy at all. To quote 
Karol Jakubowicz (2004a: 277): “The EU does claim to have an audiovi-
sual policy (…), but it is doubtful whether it has a media policy properly 
so called”. Many scholars, indeed prefer to analyse the audiovisual policy 
leaning towards a safe territory mainly framed by the Audiovisual Me-
dia Services (AVMS) Directive and other corresponding regulations and 
policy programmes. The fact that certain policy issues are omitted is also 
part of a policy; the actions taken are as important as solutions ignored 
and after all, an unequal and non-proportionate distribution of a policy 
attention among various media sectors, or even discouragement regard-
ing certain services, epitomises the policy as a dynamic process. More-
over, referring back to the policy model described in the previous chapter, 
this largely complex field does not only include ‘hard’ policy actions such 
as legal measures and their implementation, but also policy conceptu-
alisation, standard-making, soft means that might ultimately lead to the 
change or shift in previous policies. In this sense, the use of media policy 
or media and communication policy is justified in the EU context. Besides, 
media and communication-related issues are officially recognised within 
the range of key policy areas administered by the European Commission. 
Among the 15 principal policies of the Commission, media-related activi-
ties are exposed under the two policy categories: Culture, education and 
youth and Science and technology. Both policy areas cover media-related 
issues in four aspects:
 – Audiovisual and media policies,
 – Media coordination MTF (Media Task Force),
 – Media Literacy,
 – MEDIA Programme.1
1 European Commission: The policies, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/policies/; 
 retrieved 4.05.2013.
50
Although not distinctively addressed as one of the EU core policy areas, 
media and communication policies are recognised as a legitimate field to 
be dealt with by several Directorates General of the Commission. 
Finally, acknowledging the complexity and interpretational richness 
of media policy issues as well as possible policy impasses at the EU level, 
an important question is that about harmonisation. How far-reaching are 
the implications for media systems and performance, of continuous inte-
gration of media regulatory functions of the nation state into the Euro-
pean Union, as well as adaptation and incorporation of European deci-
sions and strategies into domestic policy discourse and practice? Alison 
Harcourt (2005: 3) argues that there has been a rather high occurrence 
of convergence rather than divergence in media policy, not only between 
the larger member state countries, but also across the European Union. 
Yet, convergence in media policies does not automatically presupposes the 
harmonisation of media systems and performance. To what extent did the 
enlarged EU structures generate observable change in media policy both 
at the EU macro-level and the level of Eastern and Central European me-
dia regulatory institutions, regimes and systems will be studied in the next 
chapters. The sections below will attempt to bring together various stages 
and thematic angles of the EU media policy and tie these to the model for 
studying media and communication policy elaborated in the first chapter. 
Challenges and constraints will be examined in this context as well. 
2.2. A difficult terrain for ambitious projects 
Providing a short, condensed overview of EU media and communication 
policies is a demanding task. The highly complex character of the overall 
picture manifests itself in a diversity of actors, rationales, policy issues, 
information and outcomes that compose a fragmented field. Individual 
media policy issues and solutions are linked in a rather unsystematic, 
although not necessarily inconsistent way. As will be demonstrated in 
the next sections of this chapter, media-related problems and policy re-
sponses have emerged from a series of negotiations and compromises 
among the range of options limited by many factors: the EU mandate in 
the area of media and communication, conflicting national interests and 
approaches, politically sensitive media questions, cultural proximities, 
historical specificities and others. Thus, as a map depicting a mountain-
ous terrain shows that routes and connecting lines are largely allowed to 
be built on the safe ground of valleys, so also EU media policy has been 
exercised quite carefully through the least contentious terrain. Certainly, 
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technical sophistication allows for more ambitious projects: tunnels and 
viaducts that bridge steep hillsides of opposing mountains. This would 
certainly be the case of the EU media policy if supported as a priority 
field with the necessary intellectual and political investment. At the same 
time, the constraints are serious. 
David Ward (2008: 4) observes that the EU’s complex architecture, 
together with a restricted mandate based on the EC Treaty, are perhaps 
not most suitable foundations for the regulation of media and commu-
nication environments. Yet, the institutional layer of the EU media and 
communication policy does not only rest on competences derived from 
legally defined scope of possible policy actions. It is structurally shaped 
and consolidated by intended and accidental interactions along political 
cleavages (especially visible in the EP), national interests, cultural and 
historical proximities and most importantly, the constant scrutiny of the 
media. In an environment where the political success of EU institutions 
depends very much on effective media strategies, the need for news man-
agement provides a durable context of media regulation where in turn, 
the media do not act as partners in public relations but are approached as 
objects of communication policies. 
Drawing on the multiple, but also selective roles of the EU institu-
tions (including among others the initiation of law and policy, control 
of implementation, mediating between national and sectoral interests, 
negotiating) many scholars argue that the EU’s complex structure stimu-
lates a ‘democratic deficit’. This may be augmented, as some scholars 
argue (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007: 9) by a further element of tech-
nocracy. Some analysts observe that the EU is becoming a closed and 
self-contained bureaucratic system (Siedentop, 2001) unable to develop 
a demos that would make the institutions accountable directly to the pub-
lic (Ward, 2002: 9). Thus, the EU’s own legitimacy becomes based on its 
performance, and is conditional with regards to public support that may 
be withdrawn whenever public expectations are not met (Fossum and 
Schlesinger, 2007: 13). In the field of policymaking in particular, EU de-
cision-making system is perceived by citizens, in view of some scholars, 
as being too remote and too complex, not to mention the fact that core 
executive EU institutions are generally unelected (Sükösd and Jakubow-
icz, 2011:11). 
In addition to the democratic deficit, Sükösd and Jakubowicz (2011) 
distinguish other deficits in EU policy-making: 
 – legitimation deficit, 
 – identity deficit,
 – media deficit, 
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 – communication deficit, 
 – media policy deficit. 
The legitimation deficit manifests in a relatively weak cohesive forces 
of the EU to act as a ‘community’ or ‘union’ enjoying full legitimacy in 
the eyes of its citizens. On the other hand, the EU reached the point of 
intrusiveness into the operation of nation-states and “the lives of their 
people where there can be little expectation of popular support for fur-
ther steps without genuine emotional identification with, and commit-
ment to, the whole process” (2011: 15). The identity deficit can be attrib-
uted to the fact that for most of EU citizens national or regional identity 
remains a basic framework of a social, cultural and political identifica-
tion, formation of worldview and references. Not only do the EU citizens 
not share a common language but also collective cultural identity has not 
been constituted and shared at the supra-national level. The media deficit 
can be conceived at various levels of media structures and operation: 
at the level of performance of individual media organisations the defi-
cit manifests in insufficient coverage of transnational European politics, 
culture, and common issues of public importance. A media system level 
demonstrates that media structures in the EU still rely on national rather 
than transnational dimensions, not to mention the fact that pan-Europe-
an media institutions have rather an elite character and occupy a fairly 
marginal position in European media landscapes. The communication 
deficit refers to an inability of the EU institutions to convincingly justify 
political actions at the EU level and communicate this successfully to its 
citizens. The media policy deficit manifests itself mainly in a dominance of 
an industrial approach in regulating media landscapes. All these deficits 
are closely related with each other and present barriers to further Euro-
pean integration in the area of media and communication (Sükösd and 
Jakubowicz, 2011: 6).
Reflecting on constraints and conditions of media policymaking, it 
would be worth to contextualise them with current challenges the Union 
is facing at the important moment of its historical juncture. A number 
of analysts observe a manifold crisis of the EU. In political terms, an at-
tempt to anchor the EU to a constitutional framework failed due to the 
lack of popular support. Moreover, participation rates in European par-
liamentary elections have diminished gradually over the past 30 years. 
Future EU accession waves have been postponed for some years yet with 
the exception of a couple of single country cases like Croatia and Serbia. 
Another force that has been gaining influence recently is the financial and 
fiscal crisis: it urges the EU to rebuild the Economic and Monetary Union 
on stronger foundations, and introduce a centralised banking supervision 
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with improved budgetary and economic policies. In a competitive global 
environment, the EU struggles with dynamising and innovating its ma-
ture economies. Aging populations, growing debts and high social costs, 
pose demographic and political challenges that require a more consistent 
political response. Political leaders acknowledge that the work to be done 
is considerable and cannot be finalised without strengthening democratic 
legitimacy and accountability in the European Union (Monti, 2013), yet 
designing a concrete scenario for this difficult journey into a shaking and 
highly fragmented territory seems to be for now a mission-impossible task. 
Understandably, media and communication policy could not remain 
immune to such momentum conditions. Important shifts and modifica-
tions in the previous course of policy action were signalled by the change 
in the departmental structure of the Commission. In July 2012, the for-
mer DG Information Society and the Media (DG INFSO), was replaced 
by the DG for the Communications Networks, Content and Technology 
(DG CONNECT). The previous DG INFSO (2005–2012) was dealing with 
a variety of issues such as research, policy and regulation in the areas of 
information and communication, but the media were quite highly ex-
posed as a policy object approached by technological, economic, cultural 
and societal considerations. The DG Connect has been equipped with the 
responsibility to manage the 2012 Digital Agenda of the EU. Thus, its 
activities are and will be focused on the development and use of informa-
tion and communication technologies in order to create jobs and gener-
ate economic growth in the EU. This overall goal resonates well with the 
urgent EU effort of revitalising economies and stabilising financial struc-
tures. Concomitant aims of the DG Connect are centred on provision of 
better goods and services for all, and greater empowerment digital tech-
nologies can bring in the EU. Policy objects covered by the DG Connect 
are grouped in nine categories most of which refer to computing systems, 
electronic communication networks and the internet. The media are 
clearly not a priority in this departmental design, moreover the media 
issues dealt with in the unit Media and data are mainly seen in terms of 
creative and innovative media use and media convergence. It should be 
noted however that the DG Connect is not the only rightful place for an 
EU media policy. An important role in this respect is played by the DG 
Education and Culture (DG EAC), DG Competition (DG COMP), DG Jus-
tice (DG JUST) and to the lesser extent, by some other directorates. 
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2.3. Four symptoms of complexity 
As stated above, the EU media and communication policy is a highly com-
plex and composite phenomena. Four` symptoms of complexity include 
in particular:
 – policy actors’ interdependence,
 – polyvalent rationality,
 – complementarity and functional convergence,
 – knowledge and data asymmetries.
Policy actors’ interdependence
The institutional architecture of the EU is rich and tied together through 
a set of reciprocal relations. The European Commission representing the 
supranational interests of the EU, initiates legislation, often at the re-
quest of the Council representing the member states, or the Parliament 
representing the EU’s citizens (Humphreys, 2008: 153). The legislation 
encompassing directives, regulations, recommendations and decisions is 
ratified by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Intra-
institutional priorities vary according to thematic units and their specific 
agendas (Directorates General in the EC or thematic committees in EP), 
political affiliations (EP political groups representing more than 150 po-
litical parties) or national interests (represented in the Council). As de-
scribed above, the European Commission has been a key actor in the 
EU media policy. Although it has initiated media policies mainly by DG 
INFSO until 2012 and since 2012 by DG Connect, involvement of other 
DGs became crucial. Especially, the role of DG COMP (Competition) has 
been decisive as regards state-aid policies concerning the public service 
media. Also, the DG EAC (Education and Culture) has occupied an im-
portant position especially with respect to the Media 2007 Programme, 
Media Mundus Programme, Media Literacy initiative and involvement in 
the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diver-
sity of Cultural Expressions. Other DGs too have been frequently invited 
and consulted by the DG INFSO/DG Connect to represent their agendas 
during the development of new policy initiatives. These include in par-
ticular the DG JUST (Justice), DG MARKT (Internal Market and Services) 
and DG ELARG (Enlargement).
Despite its weaker legislative powers, the European Parliament has 
been intensely involved in media policymaking. Verhulst and Goldberg 
argue that the EP has more frequently initiated many aspects of EU media 
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policy than have the Commission or the Council (Verhulst and Goldberg, 
1998). These included, in particular aspects neglected by the EC due to 
its limited competencies: the policy on safeguarding media pluralism, 
public service media, community media and others. In addition to EU 
institutions, the EU media policy has been shaped to the certain extent 
by a relatively large number of formally independent but functionally 
interdependent actors and institutions. These include member states, 
international organisations – such as the Council of Europe, UNESCO; 
media industry consortia – such as the Association of Commercial Televi-
sion (ACT), European Newspaper Publishers’ Association (ENPA), Euro-
pean Publishers Council (EPC); pan-European groups – such as the Eu-
ropean Broadcasting Union (EBU), European Platform of Regulatory 
Authorities (EPRA), European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) and the 
International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), various interest groups and 
NGOs – such as the Open Society Foundations (OSF), Article XIX; expert, 
think tank and consulting institutions such as the European Audiovisual 
Observatory (EAO), European University Institute (EUI) and others. 
The environment of these institutional actors seems fairly diffuse and 
shaped by quite contradictory interests, at the same time they are linked 
together through the network of co-operative exchange acting simultane-
ously to other networks in different functional arenas (Ansell, 2000: 322). 
Although slightly different configurations of actors are brought together 
for individual media policy projects, the core group of principal actors 
is often the same. The institutional network of policy actors generates 
interactions with various outcomes. Institutional interdependence mani-
fests, on the one hand, in attunement and harmonisation of policy goals 
and objectives over various institutional levels (between DGs, between 
EP and EC, etc.) and over various functional arenas (e.g. competition, 
audiovisual policy, human rights). Other ‘positive’ ends include policy dif-
fusion, policy learning, and parametric adjustment (Grande, 2001: 10). 
On the other hand, policy projects have to be always compromised and 
thus designed in an enormously complex manner that may impede rather 
than facilitate implementation at the national level. Sometimes it may 
even lead to the policy deadlock. Moreover, the institutional actors not 
only follow diverging interests, they also compete: for resources, media 
attention, a broader support of smaller actors and the primary role in set-
ting and determining the policy agenda. 
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Polyvalent rationality
The polyvalent character of the media policy implies an involvement of 
multiple values in policy reasoning and justification. These values are 
rooted in various fields of social life where the media perform important 
and decisive functions. The values, provided they might be facilitated by 
the media operation and policy support, are expected to foster qualities 
that contribute to desired functional outcomes in the fields of technology, 
culture, economy and politics. A classical concept of rationality in policy 
studies refers to logical behavior based on rational choice. Determining 
whether a policy is rational is a matter of determining whether it effi-
ciently and effectively accomplishes its given goals (Thacher, 2004: 1). 
More generally, rationality refers to the way of reasoning which is logi-
cal and consistent with given rationales, firm convictions or beliefs and 
problematisation of, a given fragment of the social reality. In this sense, 
the concept of rationality in a media and communication policy is a poly-
valent phenomenon. Convictions based on various values (e.g. economic, 
cultural, political, technological) may indicate divergent, even conflict-
ing choices preceding a policy action. These choices may be perfectly 
rationale given the different logic and way of reality conceptualisation. 
Thus, for example, media qualities that guarantee economically efficient 
markets, may not necessarily be viewed as sufficient for guaranteeing 
a healthy democracy and a well-functioning public sphere. Along a simi-
lar vein, market-oriented deregulatory and culturally-oriented pro-regu-
latory rationales may be addressed by diverse (even contradictory) mea-
sures, but at the same time, both may be viewed as rational choices in 
their own rights. 
David Thacher (2004: 1) drawing on a work of John Rawls argues 
that good conceptions of policy goals are “those that satisfy a test of re-
flective equilibrium, in that they are consistent with a wide range of firm 
convictions”. We may question, elaborate and improve normative views 
by reflecting on their relationship to a variety of abstract and concrete 
commitments that we hold. Thus for example, the conviction that the me-
dia should freely develop in undistorted markets to offer a wide range of 
quality services to their users, may be re-examined in the light of the con-
viction about the legitimacy of public service media financed mainly from 
public sources (and thus, also having a huge impact on media markets). 
The PSM, to follow their audiences and comprehensively fulfill their re-
mit generating public value, are currently extending their activities to the 
online world and mobile platforms. This however is perceived by many 
as a form of competition distorting media markets. In 2009, the Commis-
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sion adopted a Communication on the state aid rules to public service 
broadcasters in the light of new technological developments (European 
Commission, 2009a). The Communication suggests to enforce a public 
consultation regarding significant new services launched by the PSM, 
thus allowing a broad examination of the relationship of these services to 
the market, other media players, and most importantly, value for society. 
This process will require balancing the convictions about the social need 
of public value generated through the PSM’s new services, with the ex-
pectations concerning a well-functioning market. 
The search for reflective equilibrium starts with identifying a set of 
considered judgments that serve as fixed normative points (Rawls, 1971: 
47 quoted in Thacher, 2004: 5). These are to be revised in light of other 
convictions and continuously accommodated or harmonised in a process of 
reflection to achieve consistent, even though polyvalent reasoning behind 
the policy goals set. Polyvalent rationality poses one of the most demand-
ing aspect of a media policy process, and certainly so with the respect to 
clarifying whether the communication media (in terms of their progressive 
development and accessibility by users) are seen as the main and primary 
goal of policy or whether they are perceived as instrumental to other policy 
goals – e.g. economic welfare, the growth of jobs, innovation, etc. 
Complementarity and functional convergence
Another important symptom of complexity in the EU media policy is its 
complementarity. It refers to such a policymaking process, in which policy 
means (mainly embodied in media and communication laws, regulatory 
mechanisms, self-regulation, monitoring, distribution of resources or dis-
semination of knowledge) are increasingly designed in a complementary 
manner. This process involves, although not at an equal stance, inter-
dependent policy actors, such as EU institutions, national media regula-
tory authorities, government ministries, professional and media industry 
organisations, NGOs, etc. (Klimkiewicz, 2010a). The complementary ap-
proach requires from policymakers to adjust the respective policy means 
(not necessarily the goals) to other functional fields. This may inevitably 
lead to the exclusion of some areas of implementation (or reduction of 
an interest in monitoring these), while others may be more easily pro-
moted as they could be smoothly converged with a surrounding thematic 
spectrum. Accordingly, some scholars have observed that the European 
Commission has been more preoccupied with the implementation of the 
provision on cross-border broadcasting than other provisions in the TWF/
AVMS Directives (Harcourt, 2005: 208). Yet, complementarity does not 
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only present limits in a policymaking process, it can be seen as an op-
portunity especially in terms of facilitating knowledge dissemination and 
transfer as well as integration of policies. 
Functional convergence is closely linked with complementarity. On 
the one hand, it is largely driven by a new technological environment, in 
which traditional media services and structures merge with new services 
and structures such as the Internet. On the other hand, functional con-
vergence implies the process of policy attunement: the objects of policy 
analysis and regulation become accepted as common in various public 
spheres (Sarikakis, 2008). Multiple media and communication services 
regulated by different sectoral policy in the past (e.g. broadcasting, tele-
communications), are more increasingly dealt with in a common ‘media 
and communication’ umbrella framework. Policy attunement therefore 
reaches different levels of governance: regional, national, supra-national.
Knowledge and data asymmetries
The policymaking process increasingly relies on research evidence, rel-
evant data and knowledge integration in order to support policymaking 
decisions and choices. P. Napoli and J. Karaganis point to the paradox 
between this growing demand of empirical knowledge (often encompass-
ing rigorous and large-scale empirical analysis) on the one hand, and 
limited public accessibility to of high quality data (Napoli and Karaganis, 
2010). Ideally, equal participation in a process of knowledge integration 
and sharing ensures a proportionate reflection of various perspectives on 
a policy problem. Such a proportionate participation however depends 
on access to relevant data and available knowledge or resources that suf-
ficiently support the particular perspective with necessary empirical evi-
dence. In current media policymaking, there are whole sets of large-scale 
or longitudinal data (in addition to publicly accessible statistical and 
other data) that are controlled, aggregated, tailored for specific purposes 
and often protected by private consulting or research institutions. These 
include such crucial data areas as audience and advertising shares, read-
ership, use of online services, media ownership and others. 
Another paradox that illustrates data and knowledge asymmetries 
stems from the fact that specialised knowledge supporting policy choices 
becomes increasingly available through digital databases or various net-
based institutions. Many of these are publicly available, whilst they are 
often reformatted and correlated with other data for specific purposes by 
private agencies. At the same time, the abundance of low quality infor-
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mation renders it difficult or eventually excessively time-consuming and 
expensive to filter and search for highly specialised and focused informa-
tion. Thus, existing knowledge and data asymmetries and resource imbal-
ances allow certain participants (more often industry than other types of 
organisations) to have a disproportionate influence over policy outcomes 
(Napoli and Karaganis, 2010; Harcourt, 2008b). An important catalyst 
for redressing this imbalance are EU rules on data transparency and the 
EU policy on open data. 
Within the area of media policymaking, valuable information on me-
dia landscapes and markets is being collated by various international and 
national organisations, including especially the European Audiovisual Ob-
servatory, MAVISE and IRIS databases covering mainly audiovisual media 
services. However, more focused, targeted and comparable data are often 
difficult to be extracted without the necessary background of specialised 
knowledge. One of the policy areas with relatively difficult public access 
to relevant data is media ownership. Media ownership and control play 
a crucial role in the internal differentiation of media structures. Usually, 
there are the ministries or regulatory authorities at the national level that 
are responsible for systematic monitoring of structural developments on 
media markets. Even though the information on ownership might be com-
pulsory for overseeing the fulfillment of licensing conditions, in many cas-
es it needs to be supported with additional relational background to find 
out not only ‘who owns’ but ‘who effectively controls’ particular media 
outlets. Research by Access Info Europe has found that the legal frame-
work in many EU countries is insufficient to guarantee full transparency 
of media ownership. Key information about media ownership is not col-
lected, either by media regulators or through disclosures required under 
company law (Open Society Foundations, Access Info Europe, 2012). Ali-
son Harcourt pays attention to two main drawbacks in national monitor-
ing practices (on which collection of information at the EU level depends): 
firstly, regulatory authorities and ministries are dependent upon provision 
of ownership information by the company. Secondly, accounts are not nec-
essarily made available publicly which restricts public scrutiny and inde-
pendent market analysis (e.g. by think tanks and academic research insti-
tutes) (Harcourt, 2008b). 
The symptoms of complexity result from the fact that various strands 
in EU media and communication policy developed along distinct phases, 
thematic clusters (audiovisual field, media pluralism, electronic commu-
nication, EU support for media production, the public service media and 
community media, media literacy, digital agenda for Europe and digi-
tal divide and others) and media levels (structural, content and perfor-
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mance-related policies). The next sections of this chapter will seek to 
present an overview of the EU media and communication policy initia-
tives with regards to various stages, and topics. They also attempt to re-
flect on various media levels in the policy process, that has traditionally 
distinguished content-related and performance-related aspects (such as 
the ban on hate speech, promotion of national, local, European works, 
protection of minors) and structural aspects (such as rules on media own-
ership, the PSM, community media, and subsidies for local media). The 
table and figure below depict an institutional and policy-actor framework 
for the EU media policy and a policy scheme illustrating various thematic 
areas and stages attributed to distinct media functions.
Table 3: Relevant policy units and issues concerning the media and com-
munication policy within the European Commission



































































































































Sources: Elaborated on the basis of the European Commission, various DGs and policies 
(available at: http://europa.eu/index_en.htm; retrieved 25.08.2013).
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An overarching regulatory rationale for multiple areas of the EU me-
dia policy has been freedom of expression and the media protected under 
Article 10 of the ECHR. Freedom of expression and the media has been 
recognised as a basic communication need and right, and increasingly 
acknowledged as a positive right (the citizen’s right to be fully and im-
partially informed). Media freedom and pluralism are also enshrined in 
Article 11 of the The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Figure 2: Five media functions attributed to relevant policy units and 
 issues within the European Commission
Sources: Elaborated on the basis of the European Commission, various DGs and policies 
(available at: http://europa.eu/index_en.htm; retrieved 25.08.2013).
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Union (European Parliament and the Council, 2010b).2 Moreover, with 
the Lisbon Treaty coming into force on 1 December 2009, the Charter was 
made legally binding. It is worth adding in this context that Article 11 of 
the EU Charter (unlike Article 10 of the ECHR) expressively emphasises 
that freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected. At the same 
time, the Charter does not establish new rights or any new power or 
task for the Union (European Union, 2012).3 It mainly assembles exist-
ing rights that were previously scattered over a handful of international 
sources. With regard to freedom of expression and the media, the Charter 
now can be used to assist in cases where EU law is in issue. In general, 
a vast array of problem areas of the EU media policy has grown in light 
of and compatibility with this principle. The section below identifies nine 
specific areas of media and communication policies that evolved over 
time across various topics and media levels. 
2.4.  United for competitiveness of European markets 
and cultures: TWF and AVMS Directives 
The EU audiovisual policy centered around the enactment of the TWF 
and AVMS Directives epitomises a hard balancing between harmonisa-
tion and discord, between a search for unity on the one hand, and accep-
tance of diversity, where unification proves unachievable. It also brings 
together two dimensions: the pragmatic and symbolic. The pragmatic is 
associated with a free and more symmetrical operation of audiovisual 
markets and players, whilst the symbolic is attributed to a pertinent way 
of correcting proportions between media representations of cultures on 
a global scale. Finally, it presents also a sort of battleground of three rival 
conceptions over the meaning of transnational audiovisual space: eco-
nomic (a support for unity in the transnational dimension), cultural and 
political (both reconciliation of unity and diversity in the transnational 
dimension).
One of the earliest phases of media and communication policies 
(1980–1989) was guided by a will to form a common, and thus also 
united European audiovisual space (mainly subsumed under TV broad-
casting and the film industry) and to protect this area against US media 
2 The first version of the Charter was published in the Official Journal in 2000. 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission (2000) Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union 2000/C 364/01. O.J. 18.12.2000 C 364/01–22.
3 TEU, Article 51(2); European Union (2012).
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imports. Karol Jakubowicz (2011: 275) observed that the original impe-
tus behind the legal development was in fact the hope that EC-regulated 
transfrontier television could promote the emergence of a common Eu-
ropean culture and identity. Philip Schlesinger (1995: 11) adds that the 
role of audiovisual media in constructing a European identity has been 
officially defined in opposition to a culturally invasive Other, namely the 
USA. The broadcasting media were perceived not only through their eco-
nomic function, but also through their potential to contribute to Euro-
pean integration, democratic structure, creation of European identity and 
protection of common European cultural values, thus political concerns 
were involved in the early stages of policy conceptualisation. 
The European Commission’s Green Paper Television without Frontiers 
(1984: 15) stated that the purpose of the Green Paper is to “demonstrate 
the importance of broadcasting (…) for European integration and, in 
particular for the democratic structure of the European Communities” 
(emphasis added by BK). In one of the working papers, prepared for the 
Commission and also quoted in the Green Paper, the following reasoning 
was offered: 
European unification will only be achieved if Europeans want it. Europeans 
will only want it if there is such a thing as European identity. A European 
identity will only develop if Europeans are adequately informed. At present, 
information via the mass media is controlled at a national level.4
Although one can certainly point to a weakness in linking the process of 
identity formation with creation of the media that could provide such 
a basis, this reasoning shows that in an early stage, cultural and sym-
bolic concerns occupied an important place in media policy objectives 
and rationales. This changed in the subsequent period (since the second 
half of 1980s). Paradoxically, many authors point out (Harcourt, 2005; 
Humphreys, 2008; Jakubowicz, 2011; Ariño, 2011), that it was only with 
the Maastricht Treaty (since 1992) that the EC gained a legal competence 
to deal with cultural matters. Even though, EU competencies in media 
policies (and cultural field in particular) have not been defined clearly in 
Article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty (Article 151 of the Amsterdam Treaty 
and now Article 167 of the Lisbon Treaty5), but instead attributed to nu-
merous complementary objectives. Thus, in the later period of the TWF 
4 European Communities, European Parliament (1982) Working Documents 
 1981–1982, Doc. 1-1013/18 of 23.02.1982 (PE 73.271/fin.), p. 10.
5 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) (European Union, 2010). 
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enactment, economic objectives became prioritised, although not isolated 
from cultural concerns.
The Television Without Frontiers (TWF) Directive was adopted in 
1989 to create conditions for the free movement of television broadcasts. 
The Directive also implied basic common requirements concerning adver-
tising, the protection of minors, and the promotion of European works. 
Alison Harcourt argues that the Directive was drafted in the spirit of the 
single market (2005: 199). Likewise, Peter Humphreys (2008: 155) sup-
ports this account with a suggestion that the TWF has to be seen for what 
it was: part of a single European market legislation. Though the Directive 
systematised and set priorities in regulatory regime for television content, 
it did not provide detailed harmonised European rules which remained 
primarily a member state competence. In other words, the member states, 
while required to ensure that broadcasters comply with the minimum 
program standards set out in the Directive, retained a significant degree 
of autonomy to apply stricter rules and regulations on those broadcasters 
licensed in their jurisdictions.
The Directive was modified in 1997. The revisions focused on re-
laxing the limits in teleshopping and regulating the free broadcasting of 
events of major social and cultural importance. This initiative is often 
perceived as the pursuit of public interest goals. It has largely grown from 
reactions of free-to-air broadcasters across Europe to the relatively suc-
cessful attempts of large commercial groups to acquire exclusive rights to 
broadcast important sporting events (Ariño, 2011: 338). The European 
Parliament has targeted the Commission and Council with an initiative to 
make certain major events of social and cultural importance (including 
prominent sporting events in the first place) accessible to all citizens on 
free-to-air, rather than on pay television. The agreement with the Council 
was made on a condition that relevant lists of events with social and cul-
tural importance are defined by the member states rather than at the EU 
level (Humphreys, 2008: 160).
In 2005–2007 the TWF Directive underwent far-reaching moderni-
sation and was renamed as the Audiovisual Media Services (AVMS) Di-
rective. The current version of the Directive contains a justification for 
the regulation that recognises important political, cultural and economic 
functions of the audiovisual media: 
Audiovisual media services are as much cultural services as they are economic 
services. Their growing importance for societies, democracy — in particular by 
ensuring freedom of information, diversity of opinion and media pluralism — 
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education and culture justifies the application of specific rules to these services 
(European Parliament and the Council, 2010a, Recital 5: 1).
The AVMS Directive has extended regulation to new media services and 
offered ‘a differentiated framework’ for regulation: more flexible rules ap-
ply with regard to non-linear, on demand services; while stricter rules in-
volve linear, ‘traditional’ broadcasting services. The new approach to reg-
ulation was prompted by a technological progress, changes in media use 
and transforming economic landscape (the number of channels  increased 
30 times since the first Directive was adopted and business models have 
changed fundamentally).
On the one hand, the Commission emphasised regulation of audio-
visual content under the principle of ‘technological neutrality’, on the 
other hand, the distinction has been made between linear services en-
compassing traditional broadcasting and non-linear on demand servic-
es on the grounds of user’s choice and control. The argument that it is 
the user who decides upon the moment in time when specific content is 
transmitted and chosen from an available catalogue, justified, in the view 
of the Commission, a differentiated regulation. As a result, some of the 
rules are common for both linear and non-linear services, some are ap-
plicable only for on-demand services, while stricter rules apply to televi-
sion services. In general, on-demand services became subjected to light 
touch regulation covering such aspects as: identification of the respon-
sible editor (Article 5), separation of advertising from editorial content 
(Article 9), prohibition of tobacco advertising, restrictions on advertising 
of alcohol to minors (Article 9), product placement (Article 11), recogni-
tion of sponsorship (Article 10), protection of minors (Article 12) and 
human dignity (protection against content inciting hatred on the basis of 
sex, religion, race and nationality) (Article 6), promotion of the produc-
tion and distribution of European works (Article 13). 
A higher tier of regulatory controls applicable to linear services cov-
ers most of the rules developed in the TWF Directive with some modifica-
tions. In general, linear services are subject to advertising rules (Articles 
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26), product placement (permitted in certain 
genres and under specific conditions) (Article 11) recognition of sponsor-
ship (Article 10) quota of European works and works produced by inde-
pendent European producers (Articles 16, 17, 18), short news reporting 
rules (Articles 14 and 15), protection of minors (Article 27) and human 
dignity (Article 6), identification of the responsible editor (Article 5), 
right of reply (Article 28). 
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There has been a strong recognition by the Commission that ‘no 
heavy regulation’ is needed to implement the Directive. Co- and self-
regulation are encouraged provided that the latter is state-entrusted. The 
Directive also recognises the importance of media literacy and encourag-
es the member states to monitor media literacy levels in light of the skills, 
abilities and competences of media users. Media pluralism has been men-
tioned explicitly in the AVMS Directive as one of the particular rationales 
along with freedom of information and diversity of opinions (all linked to 
democracy) that justifies the application of specific rules to audiovisual 
media services. 
The member states were given two years to transpose the new pro-
visions into the national law. In reality, many countries stretched this 
deadline over several years and as will be shown in the Chapter 4, new 
EU member states were well represented among the delayers. It is impor-
tant to remember that the Directive establishes only minimum require-
ments, leaving a larger scope for the stricter rules for member states. 
As Ariño observes, most of the states certainly applied stricter rules on 
broadcasting according to their national interests and culture (Ariño, 
2011: 332). 
2.5. Pan-European Media
Concomitantly with the legal efforts, the European policy has also dealt 
with the structural dimension of a pan-European media system. The selec-
tive means has mainly focused on support to pan-European audiovisual and 
website projects that would help to establish pan-European media outlets. 
The pan-European press landscape seems rather poorly developed in 
comparison with the examples of transnational press in other regions of 
the world, not to speak of the much more robust and widely used national 
press structures. Olivier Baisnée (2007) points out that the socially and 
numerically limited audience of the pan-European press does not mean, 
however, that it has to be neglected when considering the existence and 
vitality of the European public sphere. The limited pan-European press’ 
audience might well be the real public of the EU as can be drawn from the 
study on user profiles (Baisnée, 2007: 500). Some studies prove indeed, 
that not only trans-national and pan-European coverage of the news is 
much more intense in these outlets, but also that hit-rates of covered EU 
institutions are significantly higher in the pan-European than national 
outlets (Economisti Associati et al., 2011).
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A brief glance at the pan-European press reveals that it is comprised 
of a tiny number of international quality dailies targeting mostly eco-
nomic and political elites, and a smaller-scale, Europe-specific press out-
lets (most of them operating online). The first group of outlets grew out 
of regional markets to reach pan-European scope (Varga, 2011: 126). 
The publications in this group include dailies with a particular focus 
on finance, economics and international relations: the Financial Times 
(both in English and German), Wall Street Journal Europe (in English), 
the International Herald Tribune (in English), the weekly Economist (in 
English) and the monthly Le Monde Diplomatique (in French). Their Eu-
ropean circulation varies from 400,000 (The Economist) to 85,000 (Wall 
Street Journal Europe). These papers obviously do not focus exclusively 
on European matters, but a European dimension is often exposed more 
significantly than other geographic angles. Established by large-scale me-
dia companies, these outlets have not been direct subjects of EU media 
policy through financial support, but it is noteworthy that they construct 
an important discursive space where EU policies resonate, are exposed as 
the currents of visible activities (selected out of a wide array of the invis-
ible one), justified, questioned and refined. Moreover, the outlets as inte-
gral parts of larger media groups (e.g. News Corporation) present stake-
holders and actors involved in media and communication policy process 
negotiated at the EU level. 
In the Europe-specific group of outlets perhaps the most prominent 
place has been occupied by the largely known weekly European Voice, 
originated in 1995. Since its establishment, the European Voice positioned 
itself as more user-friendly and less specialised (in particular as it comes 
to use of language) than Europolitique/Europolitics, a daily newsletter, 
published since 1972 in Brussels. Despite aspiring to attract a more gen-
eral audience beyond Brussels, the newspaper’s paid circulation (around 
5000–6000 copies) amounts to only 30%, with the rest distributed to var-
ious EU administrative units and officers, including policy-makers (Var-
ga, 2011: 131). Since the end of 1990s, various web-based publications 
emerged with a potential to function as pan-European media, including 
news website EU Observer (2001), EU policy web portal EurActiv (1999) 
and online magazine Café Babel (2001). They have been supported with 
both public and private grants, sponsorship and advertising. The active 
policy role of the EU in respect to all these print and online activities has 
been rather limited and informal. After all, pan-European print and on-
line media present a fairly selective set in terms of topics portrayed and 
audiences served, particularly in comparison to television that has long 
been seen as a primary platform for forging a pan-European community 
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through pan-European TV media events and services as well as channels. 
But also in this field, the designed activities failed to reach the desired 
mainstream.
Until the early 1980s, television broadcasting in Europe has been 
structured almost exclusively through the national systems, and there 
has been a little space for pan-European projects with the exception of 
exchange of broadcasts and Eurovision. Since the 1980s, television in Eu-
rope has been going through a process of decentralisation and regionali-
sation on the one hand, and a process of transnationalisation on the other 
hand (Chalaby, 2002: 185). The process of transnationalisation can be 
viewed through the expansion of the international television trade, but 
also through the linking national television services at a supra-national 
level to offer pan-European broadcasting. It has been this broader context 
of change that encouraged European broadcasters to experiment with 
a pan-European offer. 
Paradoxically, the creation and use of transnational pan-European 
media has met less vivid response among European audiences than in 
other parts of the world despite the strong support coming from pan- 
European media policy initiatives. Jérôme Bourdon (2007) paints a skep-
tical picture of numerous media projects, including simultaneous broad-
casts and services, multinational and satellite channels that have all 
repeatedly failed to influence a European identity formation. The most 
active actor of these initiatives has been the EBU (European Broadcasting 
Union), established in 1950 in order to facilitate co-operation between 
member organisations – public service broadcasters (originally 23 broad-
casters signed the agreement). Responding to early EU policy ideas on 
creating a common European media space, the EBU launched the Eurikon 
project in 1982 and TV Europa since 1985 to 1986. These projects aimed 
to test a possibility for creating a pan-European satellite channel. Both ac-
tivities received the support of European institutions, including the Com-
mission and the European Space Agency (Bourdon, 2007: 271). 
Though these experiments failed, the EBU continued with efforts to 
establish a genuinely European news channel that dared to provide ag-
gregated news formats from various broadcasters in multiple language 
versions. The Lyon-based Euronews channel was launched in 1993 by 
11 members of the EBU, later joined by a further eight members (Cha-
laby, 2002: 190). Jérôme Bourdon argues that Euronews failed to meet 
the goal it was created for – to offer news with a European point of view, 
largely because the reference to Europe as a common space simply did 
not function (Bourdon, 2007). Another pan-European channel Eurosport 
has been more thematically focused and the European dimension has 
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served mainly as a geographical and territorial reference. Also in this 
case, the EBU was a launching partner of the News International in the 
channel’s onset in 1989. The partnership did not last long as NI withdrew 
shortly afterwards (Chalaby, 2002: 190).
One of possible and repeatedly used explanations for the failures of 
pan-European media structures would be the historical embeddedness of 
the European media systems in distinct linguistic, cultural and political 
environments. Continuing research conducted by Eurobarometer proves 
not only that Europeans prefer to learn about European matters from 
their national media systems rather than from pan-European media, but 
also that EU coverage attracts much less attention from audiences than 
other thematic clusters such as social issues, economics, sport, and na-
tional politics. Hannu Nieminen argues that one of the leading factor con-
tributing to the lack of a common normative approach in the construction 
of a common EU public sphere and transnational EU media, is the regu-
latory and political weakness of the leading EU institutions (Nieminen, 
2010). Richard Collins emphasises the lack of cultural proximity:
What principles of cohesion remain to bind together complex, large scale, mod-
ern social structures – and few are more complex and on a larger scale than the 
European Union – characterised by polyglot populations, cultural hybridisation, 
fissuring and penetration by exogenous symbolic systems? (Collins, 2007: 28). 
European cultural proximity serving as a potential glue to transna-
tional media systems seems to be rather weak given the uncertain self-
recognition by Europeans of the ‘European identity’ and stronger adher-
ence to national and regional cultures and languages. 
For these reasons, the issue of pan-European media has been dis-
cretely replaced in the EU’s policy agenda with the ‘European dimension 
of the media’ or ‘European media sphere’. These conceptual shifts dem-
onstrate that where structures are impossible a substance may come into 
a policy focus. An interesting comeback of the concept of a common Euro-
pean public/media sphere has marked the 2006 activities of the Commis-
sion on European communication policy. The White Paper on a European 
Communication Policy not only mentions the European public sphere, 
but observes that it has not been adequately developed due to the limited 
coverage of European issues. The paper therefore calls for the necessary 
creation of such a sphere that should incorporate inclusiveness, diversity 
and participation (European Commission, 2006). Three years later, the 
European Parliament used the concept of the ‘European media sphere’ 
to suggest a preparatory action for a new EU programme provisionally 
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called ‘Erasmus for journalists’. The rationale behind this initiative as-
sumed that if journalists will experience the situation in other European 
countries directly, the coverage of trans-national and European affairs in 
the media at various levels will be enhanced (Economisti Associati et al., 
2011: 88). The ‘European media sphere’ is thus very much related to po-
litical and cultural dimension of journalism and should not be confused 
with the concept of the ‘European media area’ that has been widely used 
to denote the single European media market in purely economic terms 
(2011: 88). The manifold activities supporting transnational European 
journalism are, however, not seen without controversies inside and out-
side journalistic communities. Some authors argue that the reciprocity 
links between European institutions and journalists (not to speak about 
media managers and owners) go beyond pure professional relations and 
amalgamate into forms of instrumentalisation in order to promote an EU-
friendly coverage. Voltmer (2013: 208) describes some of the practices 
where journalists are indirectly ‘paid’ or supported to boost coverage of 
EU institutions and issues. This includes for instance widely practiced 
free hotel stays and dinners (so called ‘freebies’) offered to Brussels cor-
respondents by EU institutions. In this sense, the European media sphere 
seems to be rather shaped by discretion than openly promoted (and suc-
cessfully enacted) policies. In consequence, it becomes a part of the pro-
cess where policy horizons are lowered in the pursuit of what is perceived 
as ‘realistic’ and ‘feasible’. 
2.6. EU support for audiovisual production
In addition to their legal dimension, EU audiovisual policies have been 
carried out through distributive means where subsidies have been allo-
cated to media production and dissemination activities in order to con-
tribute to competitiveness and strengthening of European audiovisual 
production in a global context. The legal basis for this intervention is en-
shrined in the Treaties where Article 167 (2) (European Union, 2012) 
envisages to support and supplement the member states actions in the 
area of the audiovisual sector. The first of four series of the MEDIA pro-
gramme were established in 1988 and adopted by the Council in 1990. 
The initial mission of the programme was to promote the production and 
dissemination of audiovisual works throughout the EU, with a specific 
focus on training, pre-productions, multilingualism of programmes, and 
easier access to venture capital (Venturelli, 1998; Boyer and Sükösd, 
2011). The last MEDIA 2007 programme (2007–2013) emphasised the 
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objectives of preserving European cultural diversity and the competitive-
ness of the European audiovisual sector in the framework of an open and 
competitive market. A new aspect of the latest MEDIA programme edition 
focused on the technological and market consequences of digital revo-
lution and strengthening the production structures of small businesses 
(Humphreys, 2008: 158). 
Noticeable in this respect would be to reflect briefly on the chang-
ing cultural objectives of the programme. Shalini Venturelli may sound 
provocative to observe that the MEDIA programme, in fact, has sup-
ported counter-unification as it has subsidised individual producers in 
member states who produce indigenous cultural forms (Venturelli, 1998: 
208). Interestingly enough, the MEDIA II programme (1996–2000) pro-
claimed more explicitly a focus on ‘non-national European’ production 
and signalled that in addition to supporting national cultural production, 
a transnational pan-European dimension is needed. To this end, the eval-
uation of the MEDIA programmes demonstrated that the strategic objec-
tives of reversing market trends and generating pan-European production 
and distribution mechanisms was not achieved (Boyer and Sükösd, 2011: 
234). In the fourth edition of MEDIA 2007 however, the ‘supranational 
dimension’ evaporates, and instead, a ‘European cultural diversity’ is pro-
moted as a quite enigmatic label for an audiovisual heritage to be sup-
ported in the spirit of ‘intercultural dialogue’.
Undoubtedly, the allocated subsidies gradually increased:
 – from the EUR 200 million (for the period 1991–1996),
 – to EUR 310 million (for the period 1996–2000),
 – to EUR 400 million (for the period 2000–2006),
 – to EUR 755 million (for the period 2007–2013).
Still these budgets count for rather modest than generous support 
when compared with expenditures in the audiovisual industry (not to 
speak about the support for audiovisual productions in some other parts 
of the world) or EU support in other policy areas. Moreover, as the 
amount of subsidies has to be agreed upon and negotiated by the Coun-
cil of Ministers, it is always contested by the member states. Humphreys 
(2008: 159) brings to the surface the national impulses of the three key 
EU national actors: the British and German governments have consist-
ently succeeded in lowering the amounts of subsidies demanded by the 
French government and others. At the same time, public support for 
quality audiovisual content enjoys one of the most enduring legacies 
in the European media policy. The report Fast-forward Europe: 8 solu-
tions to thrive in the digital world (EU Media Futures Forum, 2012) ad-
mits that global competition is fierce while Europe is still hampered by 
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cultural and linguistic specificities. Arguably, the future public support 
policies should aim at better co-ordination between national financing 
schemes promoting the creation and distribution of audiovisual works 
that go beyond national/regional borders (2012: 19). This message 
calls for greater harmonisation between the EU support and national 
policies, while also the role of technologies overcoming linguistic barri-
ers has been recognised.
The EU’s new programme Creative Europe envisages the allocation 
of EUR 900 million in support for the cinema and audiovisual sector 
(areas covered by current MEDIA programme) and almost EUR 500 mil-
lion for culture. More than EUR 210 million is also proposed for a new 
financial guarantee facility, which would enable small operators to ac-
cess up to EUR 1 billion in bank loans, as well as around EUR 60 million 
in support of policy cooperation and fostering innovative approaches 
to audience building and new business models. Yet it has been quite 
clear from changing models of media operations that the most vulner-
able element in current media industries is original and quality creative 
production that seems to depend more than ever on effective ways and 
channels of distribution. 
2.7. The Public Service Media 
The public service media have long occupied and still occupy (although 
to a lesser extent) a central position in audiovisual landscapes of many 
EU countries, especially as regards TV audience share (e.g. in Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden and the 
UK) (EAO, 2011). Understandably, PSM structures and performance have 
not only been shaped by national media and cultural policies, but also by 
EU decisions and regulations, particularly in the area of competition and 
state aid rules where the European Commission has direct competence. 
This has certainly been an ambiguous field of interference. It is interest-
ing to observe that while in the initial phases of EU audiovisual poli-
cies, PSM were seen as close allies of the EU institutions in their attempt 
to create common pan-European channels and services (mainly through 
activities endorsed by the EBU at that time), in the later period this elu-
sive symbiosis has been discretely replaced by policy neglect. This partly 
stemmed from a broader trend in the EU media policy where political and 
democratic media functions (and the PSM stood for institutions epitomis-
ing democratic expectations) were surpassed by cultural and economic 
objectives. Moreover, this period was marked by a profound transforma-
74
tion of broadcasting markets from public and national to private and 
transnational (Bardoel and Vochteloo, 2012: 303). 
However, the end of the 1990s brought a slight shift in policy si-
lence. The Protocol on the system of public broadcasting appended to the 
EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam, linked public service broadcast-
ing (PSB) with the democratic, social and cultural needs of each society 
and with the requirement to protect media pluralism.6 This allowed the 
member states to provide the funding of the PSM insofar as such fund-
ing has been used for the fulfillment of the public service remit, and has 
not severely affected trading conditions and competition in the Commu-
nity. Complaints which have been brought in the 1990s and a subsequent 
period by private broadcasters of ‘an unfair competitive regime giving 
privileges to the PSM’, provide compelling evidence of ambiguity in the 
interpretation of the Protocol and a growing tension between the wish 
to permit the PSM to realise fully their mission and the general rules of 
European competition and state aid policy. 
David Ward observes that the lack of a clear regulatory framework 
foreseeing the expansion of the range of services supplied by the PSM at 
the EU level, will continue to act as a source of contest between public 
and commercial operators as the debate about the funding and activities 
of PSMs is played out on the EU stage (Ward, 2008: 60). The media in-
dustry consortia have repeatedly emphasised a growing discrepancy be-
tween the mission statements and the actual activities of Europe’s PSM 
(ACT, AER, EPC; 2004), and “distortion of markets (due to collecting 
advertising revenues in addition to state aid) in excess of what is accept-
able to private operators” (European Publisher’s Forum, 2005). The fact, 
that the PSM is the third most subsidised ‘industry’ in Europe, adversely 
affects, in the view of the private stakeholders, the whole media market 
in Europe including the press and internet publishing, not only private 
TV and radio broadcasters (European Publishers Council, 2005). Peter 
Humphreys argues that the vast majority of rulings that the EC competi-
tion authorities have made regarding the development of new media ser-
vices by the PSM have been in their favour, thus supporting the principle 
of subsidiarity in the audiovisual sector (Humphreys, 2008: 170–171). 
Other authors observe however, that the Commission has gradually en-
couraged procedures that tend to narrow the public service remit in the 
new media to offerings not already available on the market (Bardoel and 
Vochteloo, 2012: 304).
6 Protocol on the System of Public Broadcasting in the Member States, 2.10.1997, 
O.J. 1997, C 340, p. 109.
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Whilst the Communication on public service broadcasting 2001 rec-
ognised the right of member states to support the PSM and the EC repre-
sentatives repeatedly reaffirmed the PSM’s right to make available social-
ly valuable content on other platforms, the Commission clearly suggested 
that there are limits and areas where public funding should not be used 
to support certain new media services (European Commission, 2001). 
David Ward notes, that online services of the PSM and their move into 
new platforms is likely to increase the conflict between the public sector 
and commercial operators (Ward, 2008: 78). There has been also a grow-
ing assertion in the important policy documents that the PSM through 
their activities and operations affect conditions on audiovisual markets. 
The Commission’s Green Paper Preparing for a Fully Converged Audio-
visual World: Growth, Creation and Values observes that an extension of 
the PSMs’ activities to the online world with applications or webpages is 
perceived by some actors as “a direct competition with their commercial 
offers, which do not benefit from public funding” (European Commission, 
2013a: 7). In these circumstances, the PSM – as ‘institutions distorting 
media markets’ – not only have to justify their activities and their very 
existence, but member states too are called to carefully re-consider their 
funding policies. In the 2009 Communication on the application of State 
aid rules to public service broadcasting, the Commission describes how 
the impact on the market should be measured and under which circum-
stances such an impact can be accepted:
In assessing the impact on the market, relevant aspects include, for example, 
the existence of similar or substitutable offers, editorial competition, market 
structure, market position of the public service broadcaster, level of competi-
tion and potential impact on private initiatives. This impact needs to be ba-
lanced with the value of the services in question for society. In the case of 
predominantly negative effects on the market, State funding for audiovisual 
services would appear proportionate only if it is justified by the added value 
in terms of serving the social, democratic and cultural needs of society, taking 
also into account the existing overall public service offer (European Commis-
sion, 2009a: 12–13).
Hence, the Communication proposes the member states to introduce 
an ex ante test. In such a test, the member states weigh the impact of 
a new media service launched by the PSM on the market against the pub-
lic or social value of this service for society. As a result, various EU states, 
e.g. the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands have implemented public val-
ue tests or a prior evaluation procedures for their PSM. In this sense, the 
PSM are not only increasingly affected by the EU state aid rules (Bardoel 
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and Vochteloo, 2012), but also a supra-national regulatory pressure has 
intensified in terms of clarifying and justifying PSM remit in a new media 
environment (Meier 2003; Bardoel and d’Haenens 2008; Ward, 2008). 
Prior evaluation and public value tests imply for the PSM, on the one 
hand, a greater investment in the measurement and parametrisation of 
new media services, on the other hand, closer liaisons with state adminis-
tration responsible for funding and supervision. This can potentially lead 
to exerting political influence over editorial decisions within the PSM 
(Bardoel and Vochteloo, 2012: 312). 
These trends champion a technocratic approach to PSM and pave 
the way to the quantification, parametrisation and weighing PSM output 
in terms of palpable social and public values. In other words, the policy 
shifts frame debates about PSM future with procedures, quantified values 
and translation of operations into ‘market impact’. It comes as no surprise 
that a response from other policy actors seeks a balance in a greater em-
phasis on the specific role and function of the PSM in European media 
landscapes conditioned by their editorial independence and autonomy. 
The High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism and the Euro-
pean Parliament in their recent policy documents highlight the necessity 
of maintaining the PSM and securing public funding for the fulfilment of 
their remit. European Parliament’s Resolution The EU Charter: standard 
setting for media freedom across the EU underlies “the fundamental role 
of a genuinely balanced European dual system”. The document observes 
that in a multimedia society with a growing number of commercially-
driven market players the PSM, funded by citizens through the state, pro-
vide high quality, accurate and reliable information for a wide range of 
audiences, also offering spaces for niches that may not be profitable for 
the private media (European Parliament, 2013d: Recital 8) The Resolu-
tion warns before ‘the current trend in some member states’ manifesting 
in PSM budget cuts or scaling down their activities as it reduces their 
ability to fulfil their mission. In short, the Parliament calls for reversing 
this trend and ensuring “stable, sustainable, adequate and predictable 
funding” (2013d: Recital 12).
The High Level Group’s Report A free and pluralistic media to sustain 
European democracy devotes one of its sections to ‘public service broad-
casting’ recognising differences in PSM operation between the North and 
South of Europe, as well as between the West and East, providing some 
set of normative features: such as institutionalisation over decades, sup-
port for civil society, a tool for distance education, enlightenment and 
the strengthening of national cohesion (HLGMFP, 2013: 38). The Report 
recommends that “there should be a provision of state funding for media 
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which are essential for media pluralism” (2013: 39). At the same time, 
the PSM should be subject to strict rules prohibiting governmental inter-
ference and placed under the supervision of an independent body repre-
senting all stakeholders (2013: 39). 
These soft policy initiatives prove that there is no wide agreement 
on the conceptualisation of the PSM in terms of ‘an impact on the digital 
market’ and as an exception to the rule of media market operations. A le-
gal obligation to render for internal pluralism within PSM services that 
has long shaped the European perspective on media policy does not seem 
to be less valid in a new communication environment. 
2.8. Media pluralism and structural regulation
The European supra-national approach to structural regulation on the 
grounds of protecting media pluralism has been largely overshadowed 
by content and performance-related regulation in the area of audiovisual 
policy. This is not to assert that media pluralism has not been the subject 
of vivid policy debates at the EU level, but to admit that the policy out-
comes were rather limited.
During the 1990s ‘media pluralism’ has been conceptualised by the 
European Commission merely through anti-concentration and media 
ownership policies. The fact that media pluralism served as a shorthand 
to economically diverse and competitive ownership structures was partly 
dictated by constraints in competences. These largely allowed the Com-
mission to focus predominantly on safeguarding competition and eco-
nomic plurality in the internal market, and thus influence the media sec-
tor through the internal-market and competition rules. In 1992, at the 
request of the European Parliament, the European Commission published 
a Green Paper: Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Mar-
ket. Its main purpose was to assess the need for Community action on 
the question of concentration in the media (television, radio, press) and 
to evaluate different approaches of the involved parties, with a possible 
outcome of media-specific pan-European regulation. Neither this docu-
ment however, nor the follow-up paper (1994) helped to successfully 
design and implement a possible 1996 draft directive on media plural-
ism/ownership that would have regulated the media as a specific sec-
tor. Underscoring the difficulty to propose any kind of harmonised rules 
between the EU member states on media pluralism, the Commission has 
withdrawn from this policy area emphasising the importance of other 
European actions. In this case, the strong lobbying of some member states 
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has not been insignificant in a discrete removal of the issue from the Com-
mission’s agenda. Evidently, (external, structural) media pluralism was 
not seen as a value to be generated through EU media policy instruments, 
but rather as an ‘added value’ to be addressed by other European (Coun-
cil of Europe) or national institutions. In this respect, media ownership 
regulation and mergers in particular, fall only under the EC Merger Con-
trol Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) 139/20047) at the EU level. It 
is important to remember that the regulation does not aim to reach goals 
and outcomes other than effective competition, which is why those media 
mergers subject to it are examined solely on the grounds of economic cri-
teria and through the framework of competition policy (Just, 2009: 100). 
Moreover, the Merger Control Regulation identifies media plurality as 
a national task, and thus, entitles ultimately responsible national authori-
ties rather than European authorities not to permit the merger on media 
plurality grounds (2009: 104).
The role of the media industry in distillation of policy approaches to 
media pluralism can be described as directing the issue towards a mute 
venue. Any policy, so is the case of media pluralism, is made in distinct 
institutional arenas or ‘venues’ (Baungartner and Jones, 1993; Princen, 
2011). Such venues do not only incorporate administrative units where 
the problems are being dealt with but also the perspectives in which the 
issues are framed. In the case of media pluralism, media industry asso-
ciations repeatedly attempted to prevent any new legislation at the Euro-
pean level (European Publishers Council, 2005). The publishing industry 
has also unitedly reminded the Commission that there has not been and 
there should continue not to be, a competence for the EU to intervene 
on matters of media pluralism other than its current rules on competi-
tion and merger regulation (ENPA, 2005). This position has been once 
again articulated in the ENPA’s position paper on Preserving Pluralism in 
a Rapidly Changing Media Market (ENPA, 2011). The paper seems to dis-
tinguish between a ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ approach to media pluralism. 
While the former is clearly seen as a possible legislative measure on media 
ownership (e.g. limiting ownership concentration), the latter is associated 
with a range of fairly diverging activities. Evidently, the paper argues with 
a strong tone that the EU has no competence to regulate media diversity 
with an exception of competition rules and that national media markets 
are so diverse that only member states are appropriately equipped to offer 
sound solutions. Positive actions though can involve the EU role, especial-
7 Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20.01.2004 on the control of concentra-
tion between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) 0.J. 29.01.2004 L 24/1.
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ly in the area of indirect subsidies. Thus, the EU should ensure that a zero 
or super reduced rates of the VAT for printed newspapers are maintained, 
and even extended to the newspapers in their digital formats (ENPA, 
2011: 3). At the same time, the ENPA questions public service remit in the 
digital environment and lists a limitation of PSM’s activities in Internet 
and mobile platforms among ‘positive actions’ promoting media pluralism.
More generally, a relatively strong influence of the industry has not 
been the only factor redirecting media pluralism towards the mute poli-
cy venue. Global pressures and regulatory changes taking place in other 
parts of the world, led to prioritising, especially by some DGs, the logic 
of global competitiveness of European media players. An influence of the 
WTO, but also a decisive deregulatory and liberalising trend in the US, 
pushed for reconsideration of external and internal media policy goals in 
the EU. Most importantly, the 1996 Telecommunications Act eased media 
ownership rules in the US. Countries like Brazil and India liberalised sig-
nificantly their media markets in the 1990s, and in China, the state has 
encouraged national media giant groups to merge, expand their corpo-
rate assets and sales revenues to achieve transnational competitiveness 
(Hong, 2011). Progressive relaxing of media ownership rules worldwide 
and the increased capacity of transnational media networks to use syner-
gies resulting from the digitisation of information and distribution via 
online and mobile platforms, redefined understanding of competitiveness 
in media and communication markets.
At the same time, other EU policy actors, the European Parliament 
in particular, have gradually sharpened their stance on media pluralism 
viewed largely as an important policy outcome in democratic societies. The 
European Parliament itself adopted quite an impressive number of reports 
some of which were developed into resolutions addressing various facets of 
media pluralism. Katharine Sarikakis emphasises that despite internal and 
ideological differences, the European Parliament did not find it difficult to 
reach consensus on two major issues: the definition of the problem itself 
and the action needed in terms of policy (Sarikakis, 2004). The constant 
reframing of the issue cultivated a fairly complex understanding of me-
dia pluralism, although there was a shared conviction that media owner-
ship occupies a central position as it is directly linked to the fundamental 
question of media control. One of the attempts to endorse complex media 
pluralism regulation at the EU level took shape in the Resolution on Media 
Concentration and Diversity of Opinions (European Parliament, 1992). Nei-
ther this initiative however, nor other renewed efforts of the Parliament did 
prove successful in the 90s. In the later periods, the Parliament addressed 
the issue of media pluralism in the context of some particular problems 
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in member states – as was the case of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy.8 One of 
the newest initiatives the Resolution on the EU Charter: standard settings 
for media freedom across the EU (European Parliament, 2013d) intends to 
reinforce the question of the competence and standard setting especially 
with the regard to Article 11 of the EU Charter. The Resolution does not 
explicitly mention media pluralism in its title, but focuses to a great extent 
on this issue. The European Parliament reminds the Commission that on 
several occasions in the past the EC has been asked to introduce media spe-
cific legal measures preventing concentration of ownership. The Parliament 
justifies these efforts by the specific role the media play in societies – me-
dia power may arise not only from monopoly pricing power but also from 
political influence. Thus, the Commission and the member states, should 
apply, in the view of the Parliament, media and competition rules setting 
lower thresholds in the media industry than in other markets to guarantee 
the access of new entrants (European Parliament, 2013d). 
The profound difficulty to firmly place media pluralism in the 
EU policy agenda (not only as an object of soft policies) is linked to what 
Sebastian Princen (2011) calls the dual challenge at the EU level: the 
first revolves around gaining attention for an issue. The second challenge 
manifests itself in building sufficient credibility for the EU to deal with 
the issue. Especially this latter type of challenge has been problematic 
with media pluralism. 
First, the question of competencies has to be considered in this re-
spect. As described above, the formal aspect of the EU’s legal compe-
tence has been questioned repeatedly by some actors, in particular the 
industry. On January 16, 2007 the Commission published a staff working 
document Media Pluralism in the Member States of the European Union 
(European Commission, 2007a). The Commission sustained a familiar ar-
gument against submitting a legal Community initiative regarding media 
pluralism on grounds of the absent competence. The document initiated 
the monitoring process of media pluralism alongside two actions: an in-
dependent study on media pluralism indicators (published in 2009) and 
Communication from the Commission concerning these indicators (never 
published). This already indicates that transferring of past commitments 
to present actions very much depends on discrete policy adjustments with 
veto players and changing external conditions resonating, in this case 
with prioritising a sustainable growth of digital economies. 
8 The Resolution on the risks of violation, in the EU and especially in Italy, of freedom 
of expression and information (European Parliament, 2004) did not refer to Italy only, but 
analysed problematic developments in other member states too.
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The new relevance of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights re-
opened once again discussions, especially when some recent cases in Eu-
rope (the hacking-phone scandal in the UK, the Hungarian media law) 
put media pluralism at stake. This new wave of interest on media plural-
ism includes a more prominent linkage of media pluralism with media 
freedom (as it is enshrined in the Charter) and marks a clear departure 
from encapsulating media pluralism as a sole problem of media owner-
ship and concentration. Hence, despite a general agreement that EU com-
petences to deal with media pluralism are patchy, many actors have af-
firmed that the European Union has not been, and cannot be, ‘neutral’ 
to this issue (CMFP, 2013: 10; European Parliament, 2013d; HLGMFP, 
2013; PEFMPNM, 2013). These arguments defending EU competencies 
by institutional actors and expert groups can be summarised as follows:
 – Democratic/political argument: The EU should be considered an ap-
propriate venue to protect media freedom and pluralism, not only 
because this is the substance of Article 11 in the Charter, but also 
because there is a direct link between media freedom and pluralism 
and EU democracy. This link justifies connecting the issue of media 
pluralism with guaranteeing the rights granted by the Treaties to EU 
citizens, in particular the rights of free movement and representative 
democracy (HLGMFP, 2013; CMFP, 2013). 
 – Cultural argument: The EU should use more extensively Article 167 (4) 
of the TFEU that allows possibly to support media pluralism/diversity 
on the basis of non-economic and cultural arguments. Also the mem-
ber states should contribute to these schemes with funding for media 
which are essential for pluralism (including geographical, linguistic, 
cultural and political pluralism) (HLGMFP, 2013; CMFP, 2013).
 – Economic argument: The EU should adopt minimum harmonisation 
rules on media ownership to improve the functioning of the single 
market. The legal basis for EU intervention in Article 352 TFEU could 
possibly lead to a revision of Treaties by introducing specific princi-
ples on media freedom and pluralism (HLGMFP, 2013; CMFP, 2013; 
European Parliament, 2013d).
 – Technological argument: The EU should take into account the increas-
ing merging of different channels of communication in various EU 
policy fields, including the definition of the relevant markets and 
enforcing a principle of network and net neutrality. Moreover, the 
dominant position held by some network access providers or Internet 
information providers should not be allowed to restrict media free-
dom and pluralism (HLGMFP, 2013).
82
 – Monitoring/operational argument: The EU should facilitate the cre-
ation of a network of national Media Regulatory Authorities (MRA) 
to share common good practices and quality standards in protection 
and monitoring of media pluralism (HLGMFP, 2013; CMFP, 2013). 
 – Finally, EU institutions can expressly ask the EU Agency for Funda-
mental Rights to monitor the media freedom and pluralism situation 
in the EU and report on this to the Commission and the Parliament 
(HLGMFP, 2013; CMFP, 2013). 
Expressing views of the Commission, Neelie Kroes (Vice-President 
of the EC and Commissioner for DG Connect) has offered a more mod-
est and cautious vision of the Commission’s competencies during the 
Pan- European Forum on Media Pluralism and New Media Wider? World? 
Web? Her model is to build on existing measures relating to media own-
ership transparency, independence of media regulators from state and 
industry, the right of reply and media literacy (PEFMPM, 2013). At the 
same time, the repeated reference to the Charter and the fact that the 
Commission frames the issue in broader terms than ownership inevitably 
raises the question of whether the Commission, more frequently encour-
aged by other policy actors, is trying to establish grounds for extended 
competencies (Just, 2009: 100).
Second, in addition to the case of competencies, the question of ca-
pabilities should be briefly examined. In this regard, media pluralism can 
be seen partly a victim of its ‘own’ complexity and diversity: too often ar-
guments have been made that a richness of perspectives in which media 
pluralism can be approached makes it impossible to elaborate a succinct 
distinct European legal instrument. An illustration from the EP’s Resolution 
on the EU Charter can be instructive. The concept of media pluralism, de-
rived from previous attempts to define the issue, resembles various layers 
that construct a quite heterogeneous structure, at the same time, the levels 
may function independently. In other words, media pluralism refers to the 
level of media ownership diversity, prohibition of censorship, protection of 
sources, issues related to pressures from political actors and market forces, 
transparency, working conditions of journalists, independence of media 
regulatory bodies, cultural diversity, the development of new technologies, 
unrestricted access to information and communication, uncensored access 
to the Internet, and the digital divide (European Parliament, 2013d).
Such a complexity translates into the question of an expertise and 
other organisational capabilities that allow policies to be designed and en-
acted. It can be seen as symptomatic that the Commission commissioned 
three important studies/reports regarding media pluralism to external 
groups of experts. The first The Independent Study on Indicators for Me-
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dia Pluralism in the Member States – Towards a Risk-Based Approach has 
developed a monitoring mechanism to detect and assess risks for media 
pluralism in a particular country (K.U. Leuven, 2009). Proposing a highly 
robust scheme of empirical assessment of various dimensions of media 
pluralism (political, cultural, geographical, type and genres, ownership 
and control) the study aims, at the first place, to collect empirical data 
according to analytical risk-based framework – offering the Media Plural-
ism Monitor (MPM). The interpretation of these data and a subsequent 
choice of regulatory action thus depends on a member state’s ‘risk appe-
tite’ or ‘risk tolerance’, “that being the amount of risk that one is willing 
to take in pursuit of value” (2009: 6). If a member state prefers to accept 
a higher level of risk, it can favour minimal regulation. The study certainly 
provides a step forward to break down the policy deadlock, but its highly 
flexible and robust structure (including a comprehensive User Guide) may 
pose challenges in its applicability. In 2013/2014 the DG Connect decided 
to support the pilot monitoring study implementing the Media Pluralism 
Monitor in nine selected EU countries. The already mentioned CMPF’s 
policy report on European Union Competencies in Respect of Media Plural-
ism and Media Freedom (2013) has been a product of two-years activities 
of the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom established at the 
European University Institute to analyse the issue of media pluralism and 
freedom at the EU. The report aims to offer a substantial review on previ-
ous policy activities related to media pluralism and propose new policy so-
lutions. Finally, a High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism was 
established in 2012, with a remit to provide a set of recommendations for 
the respect, the protection and the promotion of pluralism and freedom 
of the media in Europe. The results and findings of the group’s work were 
published in the report A free and pluralistic media to sustain European de-
mocracy (HLGMFP, 2013). What all these reports and assessments share, is 
the assertion that common, minimal pluralism standards are needed and 
justified at the EU level. At the same time, an endemic variety of national 
media systems shaped by population size, linguistic diversity, historical 
traditions, political arrangements, makes a strong case for restating na-
tionally/culturally/regionally differentiated policies. 
As stated above, new configurations of media power, inclusion of 
the Charter into the Lisbon Treaty and some of the new developments 
in European media landscapes, mobilised a new policy interest in media 
pluralism among new coalitions of civic organisations and expert groups. 
Two initiatives, employing quite different strategies, deserve closer at-
tention. The Pan-European Forum on Media Pluralism and New Media 
took place in June 2012. The event, organised in the European Parlia-
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ment, was framed in three questions Wider? World? Web? This helped to 
reposition media pluralism as a fresh issue that needs to be reexamined 
in light of new technological developments. The summary report identi-
fies various threats to media pluralism, in particular state intervention 
and undue influence (the case of the Hungarian media law), undue pri-
vate media power (the case of News International and the political influ-
ences of Rupert Murdoch), changing business models (lack of sources for 
original and quality reporting) and paradoxically, an enhanced consumer 
choice (departure of users themselves from diverse content). The report 
argues that although the member states are best placed to develop poli-
cies that will support media pluralism in their own country, the EU could 
play a more central role in ensuring that a threshold level of pluralism 
is maintained in all states (PEFMPM, 2013). The second initiative – the 
European Initiative for Media Pluralism – is a classical example of a bot-
tom-up policy action aiming at submitting a legal proposal for the EU 
Directive.9 The project, inspired by two organisations – the European Al-
ternatives and International Federation of Journalists, seeks to readdress 
media pluralism through the process of transnational participation of EU 
citizens. The idea is to collect the electronic signatures of one million citi-
zens supporting the legal proposal. The initiative is using strong words: 
the slogans ‘Media for all not the few’ and ‘Hands off the Media’ manifest 
that there is a strong pro-democratic and political purpose of the action.
Summarising this section of the chapter, it is hard to find any other 
media policy area that would raise so many discussions and attempts to 
introduce hard and focused policy means at the EU level and that would, 
at the same time, bring only soft and highly dispersed means. This per-
haps results partly from a high normativity and polyvalence of media 
pluralism. There is a broad agreement that the aim of media pluralism in 
public deliberation is to expand knowledge and overcome biases (Volt-
mer, 2013: 45) and that various forms of media financing and dispersion 
of control would contribute to authentic and deep diversity of perfor-
mance. At the same time, media diversity is conceived in fundamentally 
different ways when approached from economic, political, cultural and 
technological perspectives. The question is, of course, whether policy 
bridges can be built between these understandings and whether some 
cohesion can be achieved at the EU level.
9 The proposed legal document covers such areas as: anti-concentration media 
rules, the independence of media regulatory authorities, a definition of conflict of in-
terests with media ownership to prevent abuse of media power in special interests and 
rules enforcing transparency to identify the ultimate beneficial owners of media outlets 
(European Initiative for Media Pluralism, 2013).
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2.9. Convergence: from information society to the Digital 
Agenda for Europe
Unlike the cultural and political, the technological role of the media has 
been addressed until very recently by the EU institutions mainly as sup-
portive, contextual to the leading economic goals of the Union. Notwith-
standing, electronic communication and digital policies paradoxically 
gained a greater priority in policy actions than other thematic activities. 
Since the 1990s, the strand of emerging information society agenda 
played an increasing role in EU media and communication policy. The 
development of information or knowledge-based societies was seen as 
a key to economic development of the Union. A great enthusiasm and 
high expectations, linked with the visions of societies enriched by new 
knowledge capacities, were well-exposed in the Commission’s white pa-
per on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment and the Bangemann 
Report Europe and the Global Information Society (European Commis-
sion, 1994). The Bangemann Report described the information society 
as a structural change (and possible means to achieve so many of the 
 Union’s objectives), but the document critically assessed its fragmenta-
tion across the EU. Thereby, the report encouraged to master at the EU 
a risk of a potential creation of a two-tier society in which only part of 
the population would have access to new technologies (European Com-
mission, 1994). The proposed option for the EU in this regard envisaged 
regulatory changes that would support a competitive, Europe-wide mar-
ket for information services. It is important to add, that no public funding 
was foreseen for this goal, and the report emphasised largely a deregula-
tory action avoiding ‘dirigisme’ and ‘protectionism’.
By the end of 1990, a high-reaching vision of the information society, 
offering widely spread and proportionally used digital communication 
technologies, had been replaced by the technical concept of convergence. 
This was dictated mainly by the observed changes in media and com-
munication use: convergence across different media platforms brought 
multimedia and interactive services to European households. Also, the 
communication environment became more dynamic, unpredictable, elu-
sive, diverse and highly dependent on the users’ involvement. It became 
obvious that different regulatory models that have been applied to dis-
tinct media technologies and channels of delivery will have to change. 
The Commission’s green paper on Convergence of the Telecommunications, 
Media and Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regula-
tion (European Commission, 1997) offered various options for revamp-
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ing the regulatory model at the EU level. Concerned with promoting in-
vestment in the new media and IT industry, the DG Information Society 
tended to favour a new ‘horizontal’ regulatory model to cover existing 
and new services under one framework (Humphreys, 2008). This would 
have meant, that media content (e.g. audiovisual content regulated then 
by the Television Without Frontiers Directive) would come under a ‘tech-
nology’ neutral approach and be regulated together with new electronic 
communication networks and their services. Not surprisingly, this highly 
ambitious idea did not find many supporters at that time, and a major-
ity of policy actors would rather opt for evolutionary than revolutionary 
changes. Finally, the Commission separated the regulation of infrastruc-
ture (delivery of electronic communication) and content (European Com-
mission, 1999). In the 1999 Communication Principles and Guidelines for 
the Community’s Audiovisual Policy in the Digital Age the Commission 
stated: “(...) audiovisual content should be regulated according to their 
nature and not according to their means of delivery” (1999: 2). 
Yet the principles of technological neutrality and horizontal regula-
tion have served a blueprint for a new regulatory framework for electron-
ic communication that came into force in the member states in 2003. The 
principle of technological neutrality can be read in many different ways, 
sometimes in the context of international trade and  country-specific 
standards, but for the purpose of a new regulatory package in the EU, 
neutrality has been most notoriously understood as the principle under 
which the regulation should not favour one technology over the other, 
should be flexible and open to technological change and should endorse 
universal service to users irrespective of the technology used. The hori-
zontal approach to regulation has referred to the same regulatory princi-
ples that are to be applied to all transmission infrastructures, irrespective 
of the services carried over them, thus enabling the structuring of deliv-
ery systems along the activities line (Ariño and Llorens, 2008: 133–134). 
The new regulatory framework for electronic communication intro-
duced five directives: the Framework Directive (European Parliament and 
the Council, 2002a), the Access Directive (European Parliament and the 
Council, 2002b), the Authorisation Directive (European Parliament and 
the Council, 2002c), the Universal Service Directive (European Parlia-
ment and the Council, 2002d) and the Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications (European Parliament and the Council, 2002e). In addi-
tion, the EC issued a Decision on Radio Spectrum (European Parliament 
and the Council, 2002f). In general, the electronic communication pack-
age reflects a policy wish to universally integrate the EU population with 
new communication services, at the same time, the regulatory rationale 
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clearly demonstrates that the proposed technological arrangements aim 
to shore up economic goals. For instance, the Framework Directive em-
phasises a minimum approach to regulation: the regulation should only 
be imposed if competition policy proves insufficient or when market forc-
es do not satisfy the public interest and needs of consumers (European 
Parliament and the Council, 2002a). Unrestricted access and universal 
service are obviously powerful regulatory motifs: the Access Directive 
stipulates a fair and non-discriminatory access of users to all electronic 
communication networks and services (European Parliament and the 
Council, 2002b). The Universal Service Directive addresses the provision 
of a defined minimum set of services to all end-users. These include for 
instance, a possibility to impose ‘must-carry’ rules for broadcasting ser-
vices that are used as principal by a large number of end-users and meet 
‘general interest’ objectives (e.g. public service media) (Article 31, Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council, 2002d).
In 2009, the electronic communication package underwent mod-
ernisation, largely referred as the ‘Telecom Reform Package’. The reform 
included enactment of two amending directives (European Parliament 
and the Council, 2009a; European Parliament and the Council, 2009b) and 
the regulation establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic 
Communications (BEREC) (European Parliament and the Council, 2009c). 
The most important element of this reform was an attempt to overcome 
regulatory fragmentation and inconsistencies between national regulatory 
authorities. BEREC has been equipped with the competence to contrib-
ute to a better functioning of the internal market for electronic commu-
nications networks and services, to ensure consistent application of the 
EU regulatory framework and to develop and disseminate among national 
authorities the best regulatory practices. It is also worth to mention that the 
role of the Internet has been strongly reaffirmed as essential for “education 
and the practical exercise of freedom of expression and access to informa-
tion”, thus any possible regulatory restrictions in this environment are to be 
examined against the backdrop of the ECHR (European Parliament and the 
Council, 2009a). The reform also echoed the Lisbon Agenda in its focus on 
investment in new high-speed networks, innovation and strengthening the 
international competitiveness of the European Union. 
The Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE) was adopted in 2010 as an in-
tegral part of the Europe 2020 strategy to stimulate the digital economy 
and address societal challenges through the ICT (European Commission, 
2012a: 3). The use of the term ‘agenda’ is not accidental. It demonstrates 
a seriousness and principal place of digital development in the hierarchy 
of post-Lisbon EU policies. Needless to say, the EU experiencing a pro-
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found economic crisis, is forcefully searching for policies and visions that 
could restore a sense of collective purpose. The idea of a single digital 
market offers some kind of positive appeal as a possible integrative force. 
It provides a vision of Europe connected through fast-speed digital in-
frastructures, where the digital skills of users will swiftly improve and 
digital jobs grow. Yet, as the Communication from the Commission Digital 
Agenda for Europe – Driving European Growth Digitally observes critically 
“the EU is not positioning itself well enough to benefit from these digital 
developments” (European Commission, 2012a: 3). 20 years after the first 
strategic documents concerning information society have been published, 
the EC again warns of a risk of loosing global competitiveness and eco-
nomic growth. The implications for the communication media have been 
examined by the EU Media Futures Forum installed by Neelie Kroes in 
2012. The members of the group representing a whole value chain of 
the media business identified 8 bottlenecks hampering the digital devel-
opment of the media. These included, among others, an uncompleted 
digital single market, barriers to developing new business models and 
fragmented support policies to the audiovisual sector (EU Media Futures 
Forum, 2012). The scenarios for policy underlined the need to create 
a digital single market by 2015 (through the harmonisation of rules, and 
tax policies), the promotion of new business models and a more efficient 
and well-endowed European support programme for the creation and 
distribution of audiovisual works (2012: 17–19). 
The European Commission has been also vividly interested in the 
transition from analogue to digital broadcasting. In its ambitious plan 
designed in the Communication on accelerating the transition from 
analogue to digital broadcasting, the Commission set the deadline for 
a switch-off in all member states in 2012 (European Commission, 2005a). 
In 2013 however, only 22 of 27 member states have completed the digital 
switchover. Pay DTT services were available in 17 EU countries (Digi-
tal TV Europe, 2013). At the same time, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and 
Greece have scheduled to complete the switchover in 2013. 
Since the Digital Agenda has been endorsed as one of the policy pri-
orities, media convergence and its economic and social consequences 
have also generated a renewed policy interest in the Commission, espe-
cially the DG Connect. This was accentuated in particular in the Green 
Paper Preparing for a Fully Converged Audiovisual World: Growth, Creation 
and Values (European Commission, 2013a). The Green Paper is struc-
tured along three crucial lines: growth, creation and values. ‘Growth’ 
refers to the development of converged audiovisual markets. Still, the 
potential of connectable TV in Europe is not fully used and US players are 
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seen as those who address the EU’s fragmented market more successfully 
than some EU groups (2013a: 5). ‘Creation’ mainly addresses questions 
of content production, copyright, and financing models. Finally, ‘values’ 
manifest the Commission’s commitment to rules that support freedom 
of expression and media pluralism, the promotion of cultural diversity, 
protection of personal data as well as the protection of consumers, in-
cluding vulnerable groups such as minors and persons with disabilities. 
The Green Paper does not presuppose any action, but in following up, 
the Commission might explore regulatory and policy responses including 
self-regulation. In its invitation to the consultation process, the Commis-
sion emphasised its particular interest in views on the changing media 
landscape and borderless Internet, in particular on market conditions, 
interoperability and infrastructure, and implications for EU rules.10 
The new media environment is certainly more complex and unpre-
dictable than ever. It is also more elastic, chaotic and more easily adapt-
able to specific users needs, as the users are those who ultimately decide 
about how and what media infrastructures and services will be domesti-
cated. There is no doubt that changes in communication structures and 
use induced by digitisation are without precedent and go beyond a mere 
quality and quantity improvement (Ariño and Llorens, 2008: 141). There 
are though, many paradoxes that affect simultaneously policy decisions 
and choices. On the one hand, convergence and digitisation deeply pen-
etrate media structures, communication performance, various geographic 
and cultural levels. On the other hand, some expected trends have not 
reached the predicted scale and have not met social realities of media 
use. The audiovisual single market has been implemented for some years 
now, yet media systems in the EU member states still maintain the spe-
cific characteristics based on cultural, linguistic and political diversity. 
Analogically, the future and pace of the development of the single digital 
market will very much depend on the ability of EU users to get accus-
tomed to, create and reproduce a borderless digital media space. After 
twenty years of reiterated interest in regulating what has been once called 
the information society, now converged digital environment, regulators 
face significant uncertainties. This stems on the hand from the pressure 
to keep the pace with developments, promoting innovation and competi-
tion, on the other hand from ensuring that users benefit proportionally 
and universally from digital services (Ariño and Llorens, 2008: 141). 
10 Digital Agenda for Europe (2013) Public consultations on media issues (available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/public-consultations-media-issues; retrieved 
15.07.2013).
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2.10. Media literacy and digital divide
Media literacy has been broadly used in the media and communication 
policies of the European Union at least for a decade, and as a broad con-
cept completing information society policies even earlier. Peter Hum-
phreys (2008: 166) describes media literacy policies in opposition to 
top-down EU legislation and in terms of their nature, as soft, facilitative 
and supportive. This is certainly a justified view. Many scholars (Hum-
phreys, 2008; Harro-Loit, 2010) argue that media literacy actions have 
been inspired by the overall strategy for the EU development set by the 
2000 Lisbon European Council. The strategy underlined importance of 
the transition to a knowledge-based economy and society with the help 
of supportive policies. The goal of achieving a more competitive knowl-
edge economy induced also an encouragement to take better benefit from 
media digitalisation by societies, to invest in people and combat social 
exclusion.11 Thus, economic goals have met, in the case of media literacy, 
a more profound accentuation of social goals (social inclusion), political 
goals (the exercise of a well-informed citizenship) and cultural goals (the 
right to self-expression and intercultural exchange). At the same time, 
it should be borne in mind that the enduring legacy of media literacy is 
much longer and resonates well with previous goals framed by the con-
cepts of the information society and digitisation. 
The cumulative initiatives on media literacy designed by the Euro-
pean Commission in a follow-up to the Lisbon strategy were gradually 
stimulated by the involvement of the European Parliament. The Parlia-
ment has always taken more prominent stance on issues that were promo-
ted largely through a non-economic perspective, such as media pluralism, 
community and minority media, media transparency. A leading role in 
the Commission was played by the DG Education and Culture (EAC). Al-
ready in 2004, the Directorate differentiated eight competencies for life-
long learning among which ‘digital competence’ was listed ( Harro-Loit, 
2010). In 2006, A Media Literacy Expert Group was set up with the aim 
of analysing and defining media literacy objectives and trends, examining 
good practices at the European level and proposing actions in this field. 
Setting up and convening the expert group was a useful way for the Com-
mission to unpack a new thematic area and build credibility vis-à-vis ex-
ternal actors. In addition, the DG EAC launched public consultation in 
11 European Parliament (2013) Lisbon European Council 23 and 24.04.2000: Presi-
dency Conclusions (available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm; 
retrieved 17.07.2013)
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the last quarter of 2006 and commissioned a study Current trends and ap-
proaches to media literacy in Europe in May 2006. All these initiatives paved 
the way to the Communication from Commission A European approach to 
media literacy in the digital environment (European Commission, 2007b). 
In 2008, the Council and the European Parliament adopted respectively 
conclusions, and the Parliament endorsed its own report and resolution on 
media literacy in a digital world (European Parliament, 2008c).
The Communication (European Commission, 2007b) defines media 
literacy as the ability to access the media, to understand and to critically 
evaluate different aspects of the media and media contents and to cre-
ate communications in a variety of contexts (2007b: 3). Three separate 
branches can be distinguished in this exercise, pointing to three groups of 
competencies developed by media users:
 – the ability to access the media presupposes access to various media 
types, services, digital media forms, but also understanding differ-
ences between enabling infrastructures, platforms of delivery and 
the content they provide;
 – the ability to understand and to critically evaluate different aspects of 
the media and media contents refers to skills that enable media users 
to analyse, organise and critically evaluate received information, also 
in the context of knowledge of media type (e.g. commercial, public 
service), media ownership structures and economic conditions of me-
dia operations (including a conscious exposure to advertising). The 
Commission’s focus on understanding commercial communication 
does not only hint at the importance of advertising among content 
received (Koltay, 2011: 217), but also connects the concept of media 
literacy with a broader regulatory environment (in this case the rules 
on commercial communication forms in the AVMS Directive);
 – the ability to create communications in a variety of contexts is directly 
linked to the active use of the media and participation in virtual 
communities. It is closely connected with the basic communication 
need of self-expression, and as Mark Deuze observes – generally 
with our life in media that primarily depends on mediated self-
creation in the context of an always-available global connectivity 
(Deuze, 2011: 145).
Paradoxically, this relatively clear formulation of the concept does 
not easily translate into concrete policy actions. There are three reasons 
for this. First, a challenge of reduction can be mentioned. Recently, the 
concept of media literacy has undergone a quite intense scrutiny, yet there 
is still a struggle for a coherent understanding of the term (Tyner, 2010). 
Media literacy is encompassing an astonishingly large territory as it has 
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been linked with such processes as digitisation, convergence and mediati-
sation on the one hand, and globalisation and commercialisation on the 
other hand. Thus, any attempt to demarcate and select categories and 
approaches for preferential treatment will necessarily imply reduction. 
Second, there seems to be a challenge of motivation. Media literacy 
is essentially self-directing and self-governing quality: there are the media 
users themselves who decide what skills and competencies will they cater 
for and what is their motivation in developing quite unique exposure to 
the media. Thus, the question – what is needed in order to be a literate 
person in the digital communication environment? – is very much linked 
to the personal goals of users and these do not necessarily have to be 
congruent with the media goals, or political goals framed by approaches 
of relevant institutions. In this sense, any institutionally-inspired policies 
should find a broader resonance with actual media use.
Finally, in addition to abilities to access/receive information and cre-
ate content, Koltay also distinguishes competencies that are built around 
creative re-use of existing materials and contents (Koltay, 2011). The 
superabundance of communication forms and contents increasingly in-
volves various practices of selection, verification, search, scrutiny, repro-
duction and modification in new ways. This also becomes a part of media 
literacy with an indispensable recognition of intellectual property and 
copyright. 
Such challenges and potential limits of media literacy as a policy con-
cept direct actions of the EU institutional actors to the existing ‘catalogue’ 
of available set of rules and promoted standards. Hence, media literacy 
is echoed in manifold EU policy initiatives. In particular, the AVMS Direc-
tive refers to media literacy in its Recital 47 as a quality, that allows “con-
sumers to use media effectively and safely”. Effectiveness basically mani-
fests in taking advantage of the full range of opportunities offered by the 
media and new communications technologies, while safety is embedded 
in an ability to protect oneself from harmful or offensive material (Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council, 2010a). The AVMS Directive also sets 
out a reporting obligation for the Commission to measure levels of media 
literacy in all the member states.12 In 2009, the Commission endorsed the 
Recommendation on media literacy in the digital environment for a more 
competitive audiovisual and content industry and an inclusive knowledge 
12 Article 26: the Commission shall submit “a report on the application of this Di-
rective and, if necessary, make further proposals to adapt it to developments in the field 
of audiovisual media services, in particular in the light of recent technological devel-
opments, the competitiveness of the sector and levels of media literacy in all Member 
States”.
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society (European Commission, 2009b). The Recommendation seeks to 
encourage member states and their media regulatory authorities together 
with media industry, to develop and implement co-regulatory initiatives 
facilitating practices that help media users to be more knowledgeable in 
their search and use of information, content production and creation. 
In addition to these standard-setting initiatives, the DG Education and 
Culture (EAC) financially supports projects that meet following criteria: 
 – analyse media representations and media values in a multimedia 
perspective;
 – encourage the production and distribution of media literacy related 
content;
 – stimulate the use of the media in order to improve participation in 
social and community life;
 – intensify networking around media education related issues;
 – concentrate on the implementation of media literacy initiatives 
bridging the media industry and the education world, in a ‘hands-on’ 
approach.13
Since November 2000–2011, in the framework of the Lisbon Agen-
da, the Commission has organised three workshops on media literacy 
and provided EUR 3.5 million of financial support to some thirty projects 
(through the eLearning initiative). These projects generally aimed at cre-
ating networks for an exchange of knowledge and experience concerning 
media literacy. 
2.11. EU initiatives on community and minority media
One of the areas where media literacy can be forged through practical 
exercise is the sector of community media. Though specific definitions 
of community media vary, the concept generally refers to self-organised, 
participatory, non-profit media that address local communities and com-
munities linked by interest or identity (Coyer and Hintz, 2010). Minority 
media may be run by professionals and can eventually generate profit, at 
the same time they contribute to the creation of identity, promote com-
mon interests and preserve cultural and linguistic diversity. Structurally, 
both types of media compose a third sector in the EU media landscapes, 
challenging traditional conceptions of a dual system consisting of public 
service and privately owned commercial media.
13 Media Literacy (Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/media/media-litera-
cy/; retrieved 22.07.2013).
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Genuinely alternative in terms of their function and performance, 
minority and community media play a vital role in fostering media plural-
ism. How this potential is used and exercised in practice, depends heav-
ily on national policies of regulation, subsidies and control. Since the 
community and minority media have small audiences, they cannot ben-
efit from economies of scale. Rather, they could rely on high volunteer 
 activity stemming from a feeling of community of shared values and com-
mon interests (Gruffydd Jones 1998). 
In the European Union, the strength and structure of community me-
dia vary from state to state. In some countries, community media have 
enjoyed a relatively strong position in terms of regulatory safeguards, 
available services and funding. These include the Netherlands, Germany, 
France, Denmark. Also in the UK and Ireland, regulation supporting the 
development of community media has been introduced (European Par-
liament, 2007). In other countries, community media have been legally 
recognised, but public funding has not been provided or community me-
dia activities have been rather limited (European Parliament, 2007). The 
same applies to minority media, while the variety of media outlets and 
services, as well as their sustainability, very much depends on the legal 
and political recognition of particular minority groups. And this signifi-
cantly differs from country to country, where in some cases, national and 
ethnic minorities are not recognised at all, or only historical minorities 
are being acknowledged.
Community media have been more frequently recognised as a third 
sector of the media ecosystem inevitably strengthening pluralism and di-
versity by EU institutions. Still, a harmonised regulatory environment is 
largely missing at the EU level as media policies in this regard remain 
the responsibility of national authorities (Coyer and Hintz, 2010). In 
2007, the European Parliament published the study The State of Com-
munity Media in the European Union (European Parliament, 2007). The 
report describes the regulatory context and examines examples of com-
munity media as well as public policies that support them. The document 
calls for legal recognition of community media in media laws, designing 
regulation that provides access to licences in both analogue and digital 
environments, and offering financial support for the sector. The study 
was followed by the Report on Community Media in Europe (European 
Parliament, 2008a) that put forward motion for the Resolution on Com-
munity Media in Europe (European Parliament, 2008b). The Report in 
its explanatory note, defines the community media, provides a historical 
context and describes a status quo of the sector. It also links community 
media with media literacy in the affirmation of their training and produc-
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tion potential: the community media may strengthen individual skills and 
competences in media-related professions (European Parliament, 2008a). 
Likewise, the Resolution points out that the community media improve 
citizens’ media literacy, strengthen media pluralism and support a value 
of localism. Therefore, the European Commission and member states 
should legally recognise community media as a distinct group alongside 
commercial and public service media. The Resolution calls for a more 
pronounced support of community media and more active use of the EU 
funding schemes, through the implementation of a number of specific 
programmes, such as those of the European Regional Development Fund 
and the European Social Fund as well as the opportunities for educating 
and training journalists through the Lifelong Learning Programmes and 
others (European Parliament, 2008b). 
Certainly, an involvement of the community media themselves as 
policy actors in a policy-making process presented an important incen-
tive in this renewed interest in the sector contributing to the functional 
completeness of media systems. Also, a responsive and supportive policy 
climate of other international institutions such as the Council of Europe 
and UNESCO, played a facilitative role. A noticeable development has 
been the establishment of network organisations representing the inter-
ests of the ‘Third Media Sector’ in EU discussions and decision-making 
processes. Thus, the Community Media Forum Europe (CMFE) was cre-
ated in 2004 to represent the concerns of the sector in various working 
groups at the pan-European level, alongside other associations represent-
ing the public and the commercial media sectors, as well as media and 
civil society stakeholders.14 In addition, AMARC Europe – the European 
branch of the World Association of Community Broadcasters – was re-
created in 2006 and has joined the CMFE as a representative of the com-
munity media. Both associations have collaborated closely since then and 
have overlapping membership (Coyer and Hintz, 2010). More often than 
not, community media were able through these structures to get involved 
more actively in the policy-making process at the EU level, at least when 
it comes to an affirmation and a greater recognition of the sector. 
The minority media (the media of ethnic, cultural and linguistic mi-
norities) have also been gradually recognised at the EU level, in part with 
a connection to the value of cultural/linguistic diversity, and more gener-
ally, as part of the new post-Lisbon rights’ architecture. Consequently, the 
DG Justice has incorporated more prominently fundamental rights in its 
14 Community Media Forum Europe (available at: http://www.cmfe.eu/about-
cmfe; retrieved 22.07.2013).
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policy agenda. This agenda is relevant for the minority media especially 
in reference to Article 21 and 22 of the Charter. Article 21 prohibits any 
discrimination based on any ground such as “(…) race, colour, ethnic 
or social origin, (…) language, religion or belief, (…) membership of 
a national minority…”. Article 22 promotes the cultural and linguistic 
diversity of the Union (European Parliament and the Council, 2010b). 
The DG Justice paying greater attention to strengthening the culture of 
fundamental rights and mainstreaming fundamental rights, has devel-
oped some distributive policies to fund studies, conferences and other 
initiatives that either seek to examine representations of minorities in the 
media or support structures of minority media. Paradoxically though, few 
initiatives that started successfully in the 80s did not find continuation. 
These include for instance, the EBLUL (The European Bureau for Lesser 
Used Languages) that was established in 1982 and ceased to function 
in 2010 because the funding mechanism has not been suitable.15 Also 
Mercator, founded by the European Commission as a communication and 
media forum for the exchange of information and co-operation between 
communities speaking regional and minority languages has gradually 
limited its activities. Eurolang – the news portal for lesser used languages 
established in 2000 by the EBLUL moved to the facebook in 2010 to con-
tinue provision of the news from linguistic and national minorities in 
the EU. Some of these developments were discussed during the meet-
ings of the Intergroup for Traditional and Minority Languages, set up in 
the European Parliament in 2010. The Intergroup also called for a more 
specific EU policy on linguistic minorities, including support for newspa-
pers published in regional and minority languages. Some scholars argue 
though (Cormack and Hourigan, 2007) that indigenous linguistic minori-
ties have enjoyed a relatively privileged position within the media and 
language policies of the EU. In creating a ‘Europe of the Regions’, EU 
institutions have explicitly sought to support indigenous regional and mi-
nority identities (2007: 249). On the other hand, immigrant groups have 
relied primarily on satellite broadcasts of television services from their 
country of origin, with some exceptional cases, such as the participation 
of immigrant communities in community radio broadcasting initiatives in 
the UK, France and Germany (Cormack and Hourigan, 2007).
15 EBLUL (available at: http://eblul.eurolang.net/, retrieved 22.07.2013). 
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2.12. International trade and cultural diversity
Cultural diversity, although not directly pertaining to the media and com-
munication, has been an important concept deployed by EU institutions 
to defend the internal market and also a more symbolic cultural land-
scape, against perceived threats from global trade and as justification to 
the state, and EU support for creative and audiovisual industries (con-
tents and services in particular). At a more general level, cultural diver-
sity has been acknowledged as a core value of the European Union (Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the EU) and as a defining characteristic of 
humanity (UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 2005). More specifically, adequate rep-
resentation of different cultural values, lifestyles, languages and heritages 
in the mainstream media, development of minority media and minorities 
access to media services have been repeatedly considered to contribute to 
a culture of tolerance, media pluralism and consequently, consolidation 
of democracy. 
Cultural diversity as a principal imperative for media and commu-
nication policy has been supported by several rationales derived from 
the functions media play in societies. For example, political rationales 
reinforced cultural diversity as a quality closely connected with human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression and 
the media. Growing concerns of loss of cultural specificities and local her-
itage justified a progressive affirmation of cultural diversity by the EU at 
the international level (Ariño, 2011: 324). Yet, in the context of EU media 
policies, in particular the economic argument has occupied a dominant 
role. It has been broadly believed that ‘economic justification’ more eas-
ily meets the convictions of policy makers and as such, is more smooth-
ly translatable into governance, regulatory, institutional structures and 
practices. 
One of the most important periods for an active involvement of the 
EU in this matter were negotiations with the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) during the GATT and GATS Uruguay Round in the early 1990s 
and the Doha Round on the GATS in 2000/2001. By highlighting the 
importance of cultural diversity the EU attempted a countermanoeuvre 
to the free trade doctrine of the WTO (Puppis, 2008). The EU strived am-
bitiously to exempt cultural goods and services from these negotiations 
(Humphreys, 2008: 167). These moves implied differentiation among 
goods and services in the media and communication sector, and in conse-
quence, delineating two mechanisms: the GATT applying to cross-border 
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trade with cultural goods (including films, CDs, books, newspapers and 
magazines); and GATS concerning trade in services, in particular tele-
communication and broadcasting. In comparison with GATT, the impact 
of GATS, especially in the area of audiovisual services has been minor as 
only fewer than 30 countries committed to free trade in this sector (Pup-
pis, 2008: 411). 
It should nevertheless be recognised that the position of WTO as an 
international governmental organisation principally dealing with eliminat-
ing barriers in free trade has been remarkably strong. The involvement of 
the EU in the negotiations with the WTO has been a reasonable option to 
amplify the stance of European national actors and demonstrate a supra-
national dimension in policy bargaining. The EU augmented its efforts by 
mobilising another international governmental organisation – UNESCO. 
The ‘cultural exception’ in the EU policies has received political support 
from the side of UNESCO (Humphreys, 2008: 168), especially as regards 
the development of standard-setting and legally-binding provisions. 
The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (UNESCO, 
2001) manifested the first step in this process, offering general standards 
to national states to protect cultural diversity. The European Commission 
continued to advance the legally-binding project and in 2003, the Com-
munication Towards an International Instrument on Cultural Diversity was 
published (European Commission, 2003). Finally, in 2005, the Conven-
tion on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expres-
sions (CCD) (UNESCO, 2005) was adopted. Significantly, there has been 
widespread support for the Convention from the EU member states with 
France, characteristically adopting a leadership role (Humphreys, 2008: 
168), but it should be also added that the EU position was encouraged 
by a high number of stakeholders in the European cultural and media 
industries. 
The Convention represents a semantic and conceptual shift from the 
Declaration (McGoonagle, 2008) as the Convention focuses on diversity 
of ‘cultural expressions’ rather than on ‘cultural diversity’, thus seeking 
an enabling environment in which and through which diverse cultures 
can thrive. Tarlach McGoonagle argues that the Convention is clearly of 
symbolic and political importance: it reaffirms the principle of state sov-
ereignty in cultural matters and its universal approach to the diversity 
of cultural expressions counterbalances the predominantly commercial 
or trade-oriented approaches at the international level, e.g. under GATT 
and GATS (McGoonagle, 2008: 7). Some other authors though emphasise 
that a major shortcoming of the Convention is its normative and opera-
tional weakness. In contrast to the WTO agreements, the CCD does not 
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impose binding and enforceable obligations on the contracting parties 
but merely proclaims the right of states to protect and promote cultural 
diversity (Puppis, 2008: 418)
The EU commitments to cultural diversity have not been confined 
to external policy initiatives, but have been strengthened also internally, 
in particular under the Lisbon Treaty. Among relevant legal provisions, 
especially Article 167 (TFEU), former Article 151 of TEC, plays the prin-
cipal role. The Article states: “The EU shall contribute to the flowering 
of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and 
regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural 
heritage to the fore” (European Union, 2010). In addition, Article 22 of 
the Charter asserts: “The Union shall respect cultural, religious and lin-
guistic diversity” (European Parliament and the Council, 2010b). The 
Preamble of AVMS Directive abounds with references to cultural diversity 
in the European audiovisual sector, in particular in Recitals 4, 5, 7, 12 and 
48 (McGoonagle, 2008).
Supplementary to these legally-binding measures, the EU has con-
tinued to address cultural diversity as a salient issue in relatively recent 
policy documents. After series of consultations in 2006, the European 
Commission published a Communication concerning the European agen-
da for culture in a globalizing world (European Commission, 2007c). The 
Communication begins with a motto of Denis de Rougemont: “Culture 
requests a paradoxical pact: diversity must be the principle of unity, tak-
ing stock of differences is necessary not to divide, but to enrich culture 
even more. Europe is a culture or it is not”. The Communication once 
again proclaims the well-known slogan ‘unity in diversity’ stating that 
the originality and success of the EU results from its respect of varied and 
intertwined history, languages and cultures, while forging common un-
derstanding and rules which have guaranteed peace, stability, prosperity 
and solidarity (European Commission, 2007c: 3). These principles need 
to be even more prominently recognised in a globalising world where the 
exposure to more diverse cultures from throughout the world increased 
and against which, the EU’s identities need to gain greater intercultural 
cohesiveness. Thus, the EU must aspire to become an example of soft 
power founded on respect for diversity and intercultural dialogue. The 
Communication affirms the role of internal EU policies and programmes, 
but also external actions, such as the EU’s involvement in the UNESCO 
CCD. Thus, cultural diversity is seen as a vital element in international 
relations. 
Finally, the Communication from the Commission Promoting cultural 
and creative sectors for growth and jobs in the EU (European Commission, 
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2012b) exposes even more prominently the potential of European cul-
tural industries to generate soft power in the globalising world. The Com-
munication is a product of the post-Lisbon agenda, which is particularly 
visible in its language and logic. Cultural and creative sectors are seen as 
catalysts for innovation. Moreover, they play important role not only in 
a desired internal development of the EU, but are seen as key elements 
in global competition and as means of soft power. The Communication 
argues that countries such as China, South Korea and India make massive 
public investments to boost their economic potential and ‘soft power.’ The 
cultural and creative sectors in the EU are faced with a rapidly changing 
environment driven by a digital shift and globalisation, leading to the 
emergence of new players, the coexistence of very big structures with 
micro-entities (European Commission, 2012b: 4). These developments 
urge, in the view of the Commission, a number of initiatives and modes 
of funding to support EU cultural and creative industries with a potential 
global appeal. 
2.13. Harmonisation or discord?
The short review of the EU media and communication policies demon-
strates that there has been a fatal attraction between the two contradic-
tory pursuits. On the one hand, the will to harmonise and unite certain 
aspects and functions of media environments proved to push forward 
visions of European media space integrated through the internal mar-
ket, common rules on audiovisual media services, support (although 
quite unsuccessful) for pan-European media projects. On the other hand, 
a strong leaning toward nationally different and specific approaches ce-
mented a discord on the protection of media pluralism, state aid to the 
PSM and support to other media sectors such as print press or community 
and minority media.
European media and communication policy resembles a process of 
gradual creation of quite varied thematic ‘layers’ of action, regulation and 
proposed standards. These layers or strata are deposed on one another in 
the course of policy crystallisation and use. It is a multidimensional, poly-
valent and complex process that involves a wide array of actors, values 
and goals, at the same time, there are forces that make these layers more 
coherent and united, while also distant from each other and divided by 
a clear demarcation line.
Quite frequently, the confined attempts of harmonisation have been 
explained by the limited EU mandate in the area of media and communi-
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cation and conflicting national interests and approaches. Yet it seems that 
also other factors are at play. Most notably, these are uncertainties arising 
from tensions along following axes:
 – public versus private,
 – catch-all versus specialised problems and themes,
 – EU versus the rest of the world,
 – value orientations and logics of action.
One of the key uncertainties revolves around the question of in-
volvement of the public sector in media and communication environ-
ment dominated largely by private actors. The EU’s recent role as the 
premier promoter of digital agenda owes much to supporting the private 
sector to do the job, or in other words, to boost the possibilities of digi-
tal technologies and communication networks in various fields of social 
life. Yet, there is also a clear understanding that in the more competitive 
and finance-driven economy, the private sector tends to be less willing 
to bear risks that involve investment in innovation. In the challenging 
reconfiguration of media landscapes with new modes of media use, the 
private media and communication companies tend to invest more in con-
ventional rather than innovate technological solutions, and more in legal 
services securing business performance than in content production and 
journalism. At the same time, the role of the public sector is increasingly 
criticised by the private companies, especially in reference to the PSM. 
This results in many cases in a more cautious allocation of public funds 
to the broadcasting sector and questioning both financing from advertis-
ing as well as licence fees. The point then, is of course, how to overcome 
this hesitative approach and open up truly innovative possibilities of me-
dia and communication networks that constitute the European symbolic 
environments. Policy solutions need to be complex and at the same time 
simple, easily manageable and favouring users rather than network pro-
viders to overpass control of access, use and programming of content 
and services. Ultimately, the success of the digital agenda depends on 
users and their willingness to embark on a digital potential the commu-
nication networks offer. 
Secondly, there are uncertainties how to practically deal with ‘catch-
all’ policy problems and more specific issues. The catch-all themes, often 
accommodating numerous meanings, such as media pluralism, cultural 
diversity, media literacy, might be tempting at the conceptual level as they 
usually attract broad consensus of involved policy actors. However, there 
is a risk of translating these concepts into concrete policy actions. Issue 
boundaries fluctuate, when participants guided by different values and 
rationalities are activated, and the marginal elements of competing coa-
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litions increase (Zahariadis, 2013: 811). Incorporated in various policy 
streams and resonating in manifold policy documents, the catch-all issues 
proved to be more rhetorically ambitious than effectively implemented 
in policy practice. On the other hand, more specific concepts such as the 
internal market resulted in the selective treatment of media environments 
with one dominating function linked, in this case, to economic qualities 
and expectations. 
Thirdly, when prioritising issues and composing an agenda for the 
media and communication policies, the EU more frequently refers to 
the rest of the world, in particular the US, and recently also to China and 
India. Uncertainty that arises from this comparison manifests in a will 
to protect European media markets, cultural industries and heritage on 
the one hand, and to increase external competitiveness and export of 
European ‘excellence’ on the other hand. Although policy on promotion 
and protection of cultural diversity proved quite successful to maintain 
the European ‘cultural exception’, it is unclear how this course can be 
sustained in the future. Finally, one of the most challenging aspects of 
policy harmonisation has been a polyvalent approach to the media and 
communication environment. Uncertainty as how to balance, sometimes 
contradictory, values has paved the way for prioritising economic values 
in the EU media and communication policies. This also proved to be the 
least contentious option and a most comfortable policy choice that has 
not required a more sophisticated reconciliation of societal needs and 
interests. 
The EU has clearly shown the tendency to act rather as a landscape 
architect than a gardener in media environments. In terms of a policy 
rhetoric ambitions seem to be ponderous while succinct visions are often 
confined by the complexities of negotiations and actors. In fluid, unsta-
ble and transforming media and communication landscapes, the quiet 
gardening turned into a series of modest actions – yet guided by a clear 
and bold vision of the ultimate harmonious result – might more impor-
tantly contribute to creating communication environments meeting its 
users’ needs.
3. EU ENLARGEMENT AND MEDIA 
POLICY: A SUPERFICIAL 
SYNCHRONICITY
3.1. An Introduction: elusive boundaries and normative 
expectations
Interestingly, the EU enlargement has been one of the areas where the 
EU media and communication policy could be tested perhaps most com-
prehensively in a period of time clearly marked by following deadlines. It 
offered also a condensed framework of conditions that could potentially 
verify a normative integrity and balance of values, media policy choices 
rooted in various media functions as well as responsiveness to communica-
tion needs and rights. The EU has undergone several waves of enlargement 
since its creation. However, particularly the fifth enlargement – which the 
EU underwent in 2004 – has been considered as the historic one not only 
because the highest number of countries ever, joined the Union (including 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), but also because it was seen as an im-
portant act of a political will signifying the reunification of Europe after 
decades of geopolitical disjuncture. Although the accession policy towards 
the CEE has been generally described as a policy of conditionality, involv-
ing a bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2004: 662), this process has not only been defined by sharply 
applied technocratic procedures, but had a very strong symbolic relevance. 
Certainly, it cannot be seen in isolation from the preceding political change 
in the region, and subsequent absorption of the CEE countries by other 
international governance organisations – such as the Council of Europe 
(CoE), Organisation for the Economic Co-operation and Development 
OECD (OECD), not to speak about World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
Media systems and environments have always been defined by some 
boundaries, regardless of the fact whether these boundaries have become 
more permeable or contestable (e.g. by new forms of media use). On this 
point, an ‘elusive geometry of boundaries’ has shaped a largely varied 
response of the CEE countries to the media system change and EU ac-
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cession policy in the media and communication field. Firstly, boundaries 
have migrated in CEE more frequently than in other parts of Europe. This 
might be an explanation why it seems so difficult to rely on geographical 
coherence and contiguity, as well as shared historical, cultural, linguistic, 
ethnic, dynastic, political or religious roots, when it comes to the delimi-
tation of regional proximity. Secondly, the boundaries that have been dis-
solved in 1989, still continue to serve as a strong ‘mental reference point’ 
both in media and communication scholarship as well as in media and 
communication policies. The process of post-communist transformation – 
‘time of great changes’ – formed a distinguishing generational experience 
and a strong imaginative projection among both scholars and policymak-
ers. Thirdly, new boundaries were set with the fifth accession to the EU. 
These internally divided the CEE. The new layer of Europeanisation or 
European harmonisation has set apart – at least in terms of media policy 
priorities – media landscapes that were linked together by fragile ties of 
common historical experience.1
1 The CEE countries have participated in the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe, formerly the CSCE – Conference on Security and Co-operation in Eu-
rope) since the early 1970s, but their involvement was quite limited. The qualitative change 
came with the collapse of communism and re-arrangement of the organisation into the OSCE.



























































































































1.01.1993* 30.06.1993* 1.01.1995 21.12.1995 1.05.2004
HUNGARY 25.06.1973 6.11.1990 1.01.1995 7.05.1996 1.05.2004
POLAND 25.06.1973 26.11.1991 1.01.1995 22.11.1996 1.05.2004
SLOVAKIA 1.01.1993* 30.06.1993* 1.07.1995 14.12.2000 1.05.2004
Note: An apparently later membership of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in the OSCE 
and Coe in comparison with their neighbours results from establishment of the two inde-
pendent states from the previously single federal state of Czechoslovakia on 1.01.1993. 
Czechoslovakia has been a member of the OSCE since 1973 and the CoE since 1991.
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It is interesting to note, that a substantial part of scholarship origi-
nated in the region recognised the collapse of communism and subse-
quent changes, including accession to the European Union, as a unique, 
exceptional and quite isolated moment in history. To quote one of many 
similar assertions: “…CEE societies have been overtaken by a process of 
change that is perhaps of unprecedented magnitude and complexity in 
modern world history” (Jakubowicz and Sükösd, 2008: 9). The scale of 
media system re-invention certainly cannot be compared with more evo-
lutionary developments in other European countries. But the claim of 
uniqueness largely disregards simultaneous areas of change happening in 
other parts of the world, involving similar normative goals and questions 
concerning the media and communication environment, not to speak 
about globalising processes. 
One of the key underlying theoretical assumptions was that the me-
dia change in post-communist CEE countries was expected “to mirror the 
general process of democratic development and create an ‘enabling envi-
ronment’ for media freedom and independence” (Price and Krug, 2000; 
quoted after Jakubowicz, 2012b: 19). Thus, the substantial rearrange-
ment of media environments was not conceived as a force of its own, 
but largely through the lens of the normative ‘other’. It was the Western 
model – or as Colin Sparks puts it – the model in ‘originator countries’ 
(Sparks, 2008: 44) that served as a light house showing the right inevi-
table direction towards the reforms to be successfully fulfilled. This nor-
mativity has for the most part been taken for granted, pushing scholars 
to frame their questions primarily in terms of how well or how poorly 
real CEE media models measure up to the norm (Roudakova, 2008: 41). 
However as it became apparent from comparative studies, and most im-
portantly Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) influential work on comparing me-
dia systems, the ‘liberal model’ corresponding mainly with an ‘imagined 
Western model’ appeared to be only one abstraction from a relatively rich 
texture of relations between media and political systems. Moreover, the 
normative ‘Western’ model as it has been largely imagined in the bulk 
of scholarship, has not been, to a great extent, furnished with empirical 
features, but with constructs – standards and objectives – promoted by 
international institutions through the number of policy documents, politi-
cal recommendations and legal provisions.
Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the wave of normatively-
directed explanations was confronted with the ‘scholarship of disappoint-
ment’ addressing a problematic applicability of the Western model in CEE 
post-communist countries. Much of this criticism revolved around the 
concept of imitation (Splichal, 2001), or mimetic orientation (Jakubo-
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wicz, 2007), while other scholars continued to believe that the space 
for change has been occupied by “more traditional and indigenous CEE 
media philosophies” (Fabris, 1995). At the same time, several scholars 
pointed out that the impetus for the fundamental revamping of media 
environments in CEE was largely exogenous and imitative, given that 
the CEE post-communist countries copied (with various degrees of suc-
cess) institutional and regulatory designs from other European and North 
American countries (Jakubowicz, 2007: viii; Harcourt, 2012). This has 
been explained in some works through the framework of isomorphism 
(the tendency ‘to become alike’), mainly referring to the concept of insti-
tutional isomorphism, that can be further broken into three categories: 
coercive, mimetic, and normative (Downey, 2012; Harcourt, 2012). Co-
ercive isomorphism occurs when pressure is exerted by one organisation 
on another, while sometimes this pressure can be very subtle and can 
manifest itself through the relation of dependency (Downey, 2012: 117). 
Mimetic isomorphism may be seen as a product of uncertainty, when in 
new conditions models are applied that successfully function in other en-
vironments (2012: 117). Finally, normative isomorphism is largely linked 
to the adoption of professional norms and standards, and consequently, 
forms of action. In this regard, a frustrating tone of criticism concern-
ing various forms of policy and institutional imitation brings together 
all three versions of isomorphism. Some authors focused in their criti-
cal account on mechanical copying without an original input from imita-
tors (Sztompka, 2000), others demystified selectivity and superficiality 
and yet another criticised a ‘policy import’ without any reflective change 
(Jakubowicz and Sükösd, 2008). 
The field of a media policy, regulation and more broadly, media gov-
ernance, certainly implies adopting institutions, legal rules, regulatory 
models and mechanisms. The incentives for this adoption may be both 
external and internal, while with the changing context of globalisation 
and raising influence of supra-national forms of governance, external in-
fluences gain greater prominence. Alison Harcourt demonstrated that the 
CEE states have adopted European policy models – on paper – in order 
to attract resources and interact with policy makers at the European level 
(Harcourt, 2012: 138). Yet, it should be taken into account, that any at-
tempt of exporting policy models is to be always contextualised to the 
specific historical, cultural and political circumstances; and will always 
look differently on paper than on the local ground. Ultimately, the mean-
ings of institutions of public communication change as they travel from 
one place to another (Voltmer, 2013: 21). A dissonance between media 
and communication policies ‘on paper’ and ‘on the ground’ demonstrates 
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the pitfalls of a mechanistic understanding of how a policy is transposed 
or should be transposed. 
This chapter argues that a superficial harmonisation or synchronicity 
with the EU media and communication policy resulted not only from in-
hibiting internal forces inside the consolidating democracies of the young 
CEE member states but also from the absence of clear benchmarks, formal 
policy rules and mechanisms (especially in some areas) on the side of the 
EU. Moreover, simultaneous and lasting problems in the established EU 
member states (e.g. the concentration of media and political power under 
the Berlusconi governments in Italy; intervention of the former French 
President into the nomination procedure of heads of French public ser-
vice television) prove that the factual harmonisation and adaptation of the 
common media policy standards remains a continuous challenge for 
the members of the Union. Moreover, in some respects the EU media and 
communication policy, has been and is interpreted and practiced in many 
elastic ways by different member states as the media environments reflect 
quite specific cultural, geographical, political or historical conditions.
3.2. A policy of conditionality
Needless to emphasise, each of the subsequent waves of the EU enlarge-
ment emerged as product of specific historical circumstances. The fifth 
EU enlargement and pre-accession process followed historical political 
and economic changes in the CEE, in which the communication media 
were seen both as catalysts for the process of democratic consolidation 
as well as the end and objective of necessary policy changes. CEE media 
environments were not a tabula rasa (with an exception of certain seg-
ments) on which completely new and pure media structures could be 
built from scratch. So was the case of media policy models – the new 
ones were created as a form of reaction to the old one. This was largely 
a hybrid process, even though external and exogenous impetus (espe-
cially for legal and policy change) dominated over the internal incentives, 
especially during the initial period of transformation. At the same time, 
it should not be forgotten that this exogenous influence was generally 
welcome as an antidote to the ‘old system’. Legacies of media censorship 
and tight media control during the communist era led to a broad politi-
cal and public acceptance of deregulatory policies after 1989. There was 
a widespread agreement, that the best media policy is no policy, and that 
the ‘invisible hand’ of the market would be a perfect regulator and guar-
antee for media freedom and pluralism (Klimkiewicz, 2008). 
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It does not come as a surprise that various international organisa-
tions (the Council of Europe at the first place) made it a condition for 
the CEE states to bring their media legislation into line with European 
standards and to adopt the European model of PSM (Voltmer, 2013: 155). 
In addition, there was a great deal of financial aid flowing from Western 
governments and organisations in order to build democratic media struc-
tures (Harcourt, 2003). At the same time, the CEE countries extensively 
liberalising and deregulating their media environments at the beginning 
of 1990s, were caught up between the US and European Union over a fun-
damentally different view on regulation of broadcasting and audiovisual 
services (Harcourt, 2012: 141). While the ‘European’ model, promoted 
through the Council of Europe and the European Union, opted for the 
‘cultural’ protection of European audiovisual works and public support for 
the PSM, the American option endorsed the liberalisation of audiovisual 
media services under the General Agreement on Trade and Services. 
These two forces of external influences on the domestic media and 
communication policy have been present in the region already since the 
mid 1980s. The membership of the CEE countries in the Council of Europe 
marked an important move towards the ‘European’ model. The Council of 
Europe’s objectives concerning media and communication were histori-
cally linked to the democratisation of media systems in the CEE. One of 
the fundamental incentives in this respect has been a positive action ap-
proach with regard to freedom of expression and the media as guaranteed 
in Article 10 of the ECHR. European Court of Human Rights has increas-
ingly encouraged member states to ensure a citizen’s right to be fully and 
impartially informed, and to receive the information from diverse and in-
dependent sources (Voorhoof, 1998). Also an impressive volume of reso-
lutions, recommendations and declarations adopted by the Parliamentary 
Assembly and the Committee of Ministers referred repeatedly to the situ-
ation in CEE (Klimkiewicz, 2008: 85). The Council of Europe assisted the 
CEE with the implementation of its crucial legal instrument in the field of 
media and communication – the European Convention on Transfrontier 
Television (ECTT) (Council of Europe, 1989). Consequently, the signato-
ries needed to implement rules on: freedom of expression, reception and 
retransmission; transmission of European works; protection of minors; 
prohibition of pornography; prohibition of incitement to racial hatred, 
anti-Semitism and xenophobia; right of reply; advertising standards (lim-
its on advertising time, advertising breaks, prohibition on the advertising 
of certain products) and others. These provisions were very similar to 
those of the Television without Frontiers Directive (Harcourt, 2012: 144) 
transposed by the CEE countries before the EU accession in 2004.
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Table 5: Ratification and adoption of the European Convention 
on Transfrontier Television in the CEE member states
Ratification Entering 
into Force
European Convention on Transfrontier Television 1989* 1993




Notes: *opened for signatures.
The Council of Europe actively promoted standards of independence 
concerning both PSM and regulatory authorities. The activities of the 
Committee of experts on media concentration and pluralism (MM-CM) 
established in 1991 to conduct an in-depth examination of media concen-
trations, coincided with the drafting and adoption of new broadcasting 
laws in the CEE (Czech Republic – 1991, Slovakia – 1991, Poland – 1992, 
Hungary – 1996), aiming at the formation of a more diverse and plural-
istic media space (Klimkiewicz, 2008). Media pluralism has been recog-
nised as a central pillar of these regulations (2008: 86). 
The Council of Europe’s involvement in the setting standards and 
promoting policy solutions was based on political/democratic, cultural, 
educational and technological functions of the media, and provided an 
important normative basis for the EU to build on, not only when defin-
ing the EU’s own membership conditions for the new candidates, but 
also during the period of EU internal media policy debates preceding 
the accession negotiations. The EU accession process entailed the adop-
tion of EU rules and media policies (audiovisual acquis, competition and 
state aid policy) as well as incorporation of EU standards (formulated 
in Copenhagen criteria, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union) on the level of domestic law, political institutions and practices 
(Klimkiewicz, 2008). The diffusion of common political rules, norms and 
practices concerning media structures and performance has been secured 
by the process of conditionality under which the EU provided external 
incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions (Schim-
melfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 662). Wojciech Sadurski points out that 
the EU could dictate these conditions and terms because the candidates 
had a great interest in joining the ‘club’ (Sadurski, 2003: 43). 
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The formulation by the European Council of the criteria for member-
ship in Copenhagen in 1993, offered two normative dispositions in the 
context of media policy: political and economic. These were reinforced 
by the European Council in Madrid in 1995 by underscoring the imple-
mentation and institutional functions (Klimkiewicz, 2008). Fundamen-
tally, however, the role of the EU conditionality at this stage consisted 
in responding to the rapid change occurring in the CEE and functioned 
through co-operation and association agreements with CEE states, and 
by the major assistance programme, PHARE (Sadurski, 2003: 11). Al-
though conditionality would have been most effective and credible when 
based on a catalogue of succinct criteria, as well as clear enforcement and 
reward mechanisms, the Copenhagen criteria did not define the bench-
marks or the process by which EU conditionality could be enforced and 
verified (Sasse, 2003: 128). This has been particularly visible in the case 
of media-related issues where EU conditionality represented a set of more 
or less vague requirements that had to be met, although it has not always 
been sure whether it is the state or other institutions that are ultimately 
responsible for the enforcement of the conditions. 
Since 1997, the EU has employed ‘carrot and stick’ structural levers 
in the accession process to reward compliance and reprimand resistance 
(Sasse, 2003: 128). One of such levers was the EU’s principal monitoring 
instrument – annual Regular Reports – that helped the European Com-
mission systematically assess the fulfilment of the membership criteria in 
the period 1998–2003. In 2003, the Commission issued Comprehensive 
Monitoring Reports that closed the political component of the assessment 
and focused solely on acquis. By then, the Commision accepted the cred-
ibility of commitments made by the candidate countries in the ‘political’ 
area and encouraged the candidate states to complete the remaining con-
ditions of acquis. 
Media-related issues were not recognised and distinguished as an in-
dependent category in this evaluation. They were addressed fairly broad-
ly – as a human right (subsumed under ‘the freedom of expression’ and 
monitored under the section of ‘Human Rights and Protection of Minori-
ties’ as part of Political criteria), as an object of regulation, as structures 
and organisations, as a product of media performance (all in different 
sections of the reports). Principally though, the media and mediated com-
munication were most frequently assessed in two problem areas: the Co-
penhagen political criteria (with reference to freedom of expression) and 
acquis (mainly in the section of culture and audiovisual policy). These 
two areas will be briefly examined in the following sections.
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3.3. Monitoring of media-related issues under the political 
criteria
The political Copenhagen criteria stipulated that the candidate country 
must have achieved “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” 
(Klimkiewicz, 2008: 87). As these criteria were not based on the acquis 
as such, the Commission had to conduct its monitoring and assessment 
following a set of values and standards derived from non-EU documents, 
such as the ECHR (Sasse, 2004). These prerequisites perhaps help to ex-
plain why ‘freedom of expression’ was extracted from a wider and more 
complex body of communication rights (encompassing also cultural, eco-
nomic and social rights) and why media-related issues were operation-
alised within the category of civil and political rights only (Klimkiewicz, 
2008: 87). At the same time, the Regular Reports covered a wide variety 
of issues, which proves that the interpretation of freedom of expression 
oscillated around various themes, lacking precisely defined criteria for an 
empirical assessment.2 In some respects the Reports focused on funda-
mental matters regarding media freedom as was the case of a high gov-
ernment control over the PSM, criticised by the Commission in the case 
of Slovakia (Regular Report on Slovakia’s Progress Towards Accession, 
1998: 11), or legal provisions potentially impeding free speech in the 
case of Poland (Regular Report on Poland’s Progress Towards Accession, 
2000, 2001, 2002). In other cases, the Reports raised concerns about the 
economic and structural issues as was an example of a small number of 
radio stations in the case Hungary (Regular Report on Hungary’s Progress 
Towards Accession, 1998: 10) or the lack of stability in the television sec-
tor in the case of the Czech Republic (Regular Report on Czech Republic’s 
2 Following Regular Reports of the European Commission were analysed for this 
chapter: 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002 Regular Report on Czech Republic’s Progress Towards 
Accession; 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002 Regular Report on Hungary’s Progress Towards Ac-
cession; 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress Towards Acces-
sion; 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002 Regular Report on Slovakia’s Progress Towards Accession. 
In addition, the 2003 EC Comprehensive Monitoring Reports on the Candidate Coun-
tries’ Preparations for Membership were analysed in the case of: the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia. Finally, two Composite Reports of the European Commission 
on Progress towards Accession by each of the Candidate Countries were analysed for 
1998 and 1999. Since 2000, these reports were restructured into: Enlargement Strategy 
Papers of the European Commission on Progress towards Accession by each of the Can-
didate Countries. The four such strategy papers were analysed for: 2000, 2001, 2002 
and 2003 (available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/re-
ports_2000_en.htm; retrieved 4.01.2014).
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Progress Towards Accession, 2002: 28–29). The Reports also made an im-
pression of a quite particularistic treatment of some countries and some 
issues. Certain phenomena, for instance, attracted significant attention 
in the case of a given country (e.g. the development of private media in 
Hungary), while in other assessed countries these issues remained almost 
unnoticed (e.g. Slovakia or the Czech Republic). 
The media-related issues monitored under the label of ‘freedom of 
speech’ and the section of civil and political rights have emerged mainly 
from four problem areas:
 – legal provisions potentially impeding free speech (a legal dimension),
 – the extent of demonopolisation and robustness of media environ-
ments (a structural dimension),
 – political influences on the independence of media regulatory author-
ities (this area is reflected also in the section on acquis) and PSM, 
constrained conditions of PSM performance (a regulatory and politi-
cal dimension),
 – media performance and coverage (mainly with reference to elections 
and political communication, and a poor performance of the PSM) 
(a performance-related dimension) (Klimkiewicz, 2008).
The Regular Reports gave an uneven prominence to these groups of is-
sues. The first category that examined merely a legal dimension of free-
dom of speech, dominated monitoring in some countries. Poland has 
been an interesting case in this regard, as most of the Reports paid at-
tention to the slander laws offering politicians a higher level of the pro-
tection than would be a case with the general public. The 2000 Regular 
Report observed that this provision acted in some instances “as an im-
pediment to free speech” and that it contradicted “the concept within the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights that the broadest 
protection against insult is due to the citizen” (2000: 19). At the same 
time, other problematic practices resulting from the dependency between 
the media, politics and business remained largely unnoticed. Wojciech 
Sadurski writes about a generalised sense of frustration concerning the 
functioning of the institutions in Poland just before joining the EU (so 
after the monitoring exercise). The media as one of many institutions 
necessary for democratic consolidation were still seen not functioning 
particularly well: the public media have been and are controlled by the 
parties in the government, while private media have been and are vulner-
able to manipulations by the state and big business (Sadurski, 2003: 5). 
The Regular Reports observed similar defamation provisions in other 
countries (in Hungary, 2002: 29; in Slovakia, 2002: 28), but paid rather 
marginal attention to them. 
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Secondly, the Regular Reports employed a relatively selective view 
on structural development of media environments. Perhaps one of the 
reasons for this approach was that external investments and foreign own-
ership (including non-European) have been already present in most of 
the countries, and the media systems have been largely demonopolised 
and privatised already since the beginning of the 1990s. The 1999 Com-
posite Paper summarising achievements of all candidate countries, em-
phasised that “most candidate countries have a robust and lively media” 
(1999: 15). In the case of Hungary, however, a more detailed account of 
structural media developments was at place. This can be explained by 
the fact, that Hungary was the last of the four countries to implement Act 
I on Radio and Television Broadcasting (1996)3 revamping and ultimately 
demonopolising its media system. It is interesting to note, that the criteria 
evaluating the robustness of the Hungarian media system focused mainly 
on economic performance factors, such as a competitive pressure and 
competitiveness of the media market, broadcasting licence allocation to 
foreign consortia, a number of media outlets operating at different geo-
graphical levels of the media system (Klimkiewicz, 2008: 87–88). Other, 
non-economic, yet quite important aspects of media diversity, such as 
cultural diversity, view-point diversity, etc. were largely overlooked.
The problem approached in the third group of issues – political in-
fluence on media regulatory authorities and the PSM – has already been 
well known from extensive academic and think-tank research undertak-
en both before and after the accession (e.g. Sparks, 1998; Price et al., 
2002; Sükösd and Bajomi-Lázár, 2003; Jakubowicz, 2004b, Petković et 
al., 2004, Open Society Institute, 2005; Jakubowicz, 2007). The Commis-
sion aimed to investigate in the Regular Reports malpractices of political 
officials extorting political pressure on both regulatory authorities and 
the PSM mainly through the procedures of appointment. The ‘crisis’ of 
the PSM, as recognised in these reports, has been naturally connected 
with this area of concern. It should be recalled, that after 1989, the newly 
established PSM in the CEE were regulated by new broadcasting acts. At 
least in a normative sense, these aimed at achieving full independence 
from the State and party politics on the one hand, and partial indepen-
dence from market forces on the other hand (Klimkiewicz, 2008). These 
aspirations met many practical difficulties, which were partially reflected 
in the Regular Reports. In sum, the Reports devoted the most significant 
space to the crisis of the public service TV in Hungary and the Czech Re-
public (2008: 88). 
3 The Act was adopted on 21st December 1995 by the Hungarian Parliament.
114
The 2001 Regular Report on Hungary described difficult financial 
conditions of the Hungarian public service TV (MTV). In particular, the 
Report observed that the basic capital of the public television “has been 
reduced to one tenth, outstanding public debts have doubled and numer-
ous staff has been dismissed over the past two years in an attempt to 
render it more competitive” (2001: 20–21). These circumstances resulted 
not only in a significant drop in audience share (almost to 10%), but also 
threatened the fulfillment of public service remit requirements (Klimkie-
wicz, 2008: 88). Moreover, the abolition of television licence fee in 2002, 
by a legally questionable procedure (Open Society Institute, 2005: 794), 
disclosed the vulnerability of the public service television in its relation 
to ruling political parties (Klimkiewicz, 2008: 88). Although the Report 
touched upon one of the most vulnerable points in the transformed me-
dia environment in Hungary, an eventual remedy largely depended on 
a political calculus carried out among the ruling elites, and these decided 
that the political costs of remedy are higher than the costs of the resist-
ance. In the case of the Czech Republic, the 2001 Regular Report reflected 
on events that started with a strike of the public services television staff in 
December 2000 and ended with massive protests of the Czech public in 
January 2001. In December 2000, the Czech Council for Radio and Tele-
vision Broadcasting dismissed the Director General of the Czech public 
TV (ČT) and swiftly appointed a new candidate politically affiliated with 
the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). The employees responded to this situ-
ation with a strike and started to produce alternative news programming. 
The conflict itself was perceived by many citizens as a protest against po-
litical interference (Klimkiewicz, 2008: 89). On January 3rd 2001, several 
thousands of people gathered at the Václav Square in Prague to demand 
the resignation of the newly nominated Director General and to express 
support for the journalists on strike. Although some analysts argued that 
the protests were politically orchestrated, the situation reached the point 
that could no longer be left without a clear policy response. New legisla-
tion has since been adopted, enabling the election of the new Council for 
Radio and Television Broadcasting. As a result of these legal and institu-
tional changes, the composition of the new Council reflected a relatively 
wide range of political and civic organisations. The 2001 Regular Report 
appreciated these changes and stressed that the spirit, in which they were 
made should be maintained (2001: 16). In the case of Slovakia, the Regu-
lar Reports repeatedly argued that the ‘public service nature’ of the PSM 
should be ensured and improved (1999; 2000). The Reports did not spec-
ify though, what the ‘public service nature’ of the PSM means; whether it 
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is manifested in PSM performance, management, forms of organisation, 
financing, accountability or all these aspects together.
Finally, the assessment of media coverage and performance in the 
Regular Reports has been fairly scarce. The Reports paid attention selec-
tively to some chosen election periods and forms of political communica-
tion. The relevant data used for monitoring derived from other interna-
tional institutions (e.g. OSCE) or NGOs. In most cases, the Reports sought 
coverage by the PSM rather than private media, and coverage by televi-
sion rather than print or online. The 2000 Regular Report on Slovakia 
noted: “monitoring of state-owned television has indicated that the oppo-
sition is not given sufficient and objective coverage” (2000: 19). Likewise, 
the 2002 Regular Report on Hungary observed that “during the election 
campaign, the presence of Government parties was more evident in the 
PSM, while private media generally provided a more neutral coverage of 
events, as underlined by the OSCE…” (2002: 29).
The picture of media-related issues in the CEE emerging from the 
Commission’s Regular Reports under the section of political Copenhagen 
criteria, was painted rather cautiously (Klimkiewicz, 2008). The tech-
nique favoured a lose composition of points rather than drafting coherent 
territories of a more systematic assessment. The Regular Reports avoided 
strong criticism in order to sustain progress along the envisaged ‘road 
map’ (Sasse, 2004). Under the surface of the official rhetoric, there has 
been a lack of any comparison, reference to the similar problems and 
eventually proposed solutions from the established EU member states. 
Given the fact, that some of the similar problems to those hindering free-
dom of speech and the media in the CEE countries, remained unresolved 
in the older member states (e.g. Italy), can explain why the monitoring 
exercise followed a prescribed pattern rather than immersed deeper into 
media realities and potential remedies. A milestone, by which candidate 
countries met the political Copenhagen criteria (2003), stands symbolic 
rather than pragmatic in the area of freedom of expression and media 
pluralism (Klimkiewicz, 2008: 89). Many problematic issues indicated 
in the Reports (most notably an insufficient political independence of 
regulatory authorities and the PSM) have endured the enlargement mo-
mentum and continued to define the reality of media landscapes in the 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.4. Monitoring of media-related issues under 
the audiovisual Acquis 
The 1993 Copenhagen European Council indicated that the ability to 
take on the obligations of membership requires the adoption and imple-
mentation of the acquis. In addition, the European Council of Madrid 
highlighted the importance of ensuring the effective application of acquis 
through appropriate administrative and judicial structures (European 
Commission, 2000: 21). In the area of media policy, the transposition 
of acquis implied a legislative alignment with the principal legal instru-
ment of the day – the Television Without Frontiers Directive (the TWF 
Directive) (Klimkiewicz, 2008: 94). Given that most of the CEE countries 
have ratified and enforced the Council of Europe’s Convention on Trans-
frontier Television (ECTT) and have been involved in the ratification of 
its amending protocol before the monitoring of the audiovisual acquis 
started, the CEE were bound to succeed with fulfilling the EU conditions 
in this matter. However, despite easily visible similarities between the 
two documents, Karol Jakubowicz argued that the ECTT and TWF dis-
played differences in their fundamental philosophy:
In one, emphasis was placed on the social, cultural and political function of 
broadcasting, while the other was geared more to the economic needs of the 
market, though some of those provisions also had clear cultural implications 
(Jakubowicz, 2006: 3).
Nevertheless, the Commission deemed the ratification of ECTT by 
the candidate countries as one of the main benchmarks in their progress 
towards full transposition of the audiovisual acquis. Quite surprisingly, 
the relevant problem areas exposed in the Regular Reports did not fol-
low particular provisions of the TWF (with some exceptions), but often 
exposed broader areas of concern, including in particular: 
 – independence of regulatory authorities and some aspects of adimin-
istrative capacity (e.g. transparency concerning frequency allocation 
and distribution of support measures),
 – media ownership rules,
 – promotion of European and independent works and the proportion-
ality of measures promoting works in national languages (Klimkie-
wicz, 2008).
The monitoring of audiovisual acquis generally followed a route to-
wards progress. A cumulative success has been described in a gradual 
manner – the efforts of each candidate country were evaluated through 
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repeatedly used formulaic expressions: “progress in the audiovisual sec-
tor is very limited”, “no significant progress”, “a moderate level of align-
ment with the acquis”, “a substantial degree of alignment with the acquis” 
(Klimkiewicz, 2008: 95). In order to motivate more negligent candidates, 
the reports praised the diligent ones. The 2002 Regular Report on Slo-
vakia concluded: “Slovakia has made considerable progress, and has 
reached, overall, an advanced level both in terms of legislative alignment 
and administrative capacity” (2002: 97). Likewise, the 2001 Report on 
Slovenia emphasised that the 2001 Mass Media Act brings Slovenian leg-
islation into line with the TWF Directive (2001: 71).
The most problematic in this respect, appeared to be alignment pro-
cess in Poland. The 2003 Comprehensive Report warned, that “unless 
rapid action is taken to catch up delays in amending the Broadcasting 
Act, there is a risk that Poland will not fulfil these requirements and not 
be able to implement the acquis by accession” (2003, 46). The Reports 
did not explore the political reasons of this serious delay, most likely be-
cause the problems have not been unleashed at that time. The Polish 
legislative alignment with the TWF was seriously hampered by a disclo-
sure of a corruption scandal, widely referred to as Rywingate, which ulti-
mately resulted in the resignation of Leszek Miller’s government in 2004 
(Klimkiewicz, 2008: 95). The scandal revealed legislative manipulations 
of the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT) and Ministry of Culture 
that were backed by political and economic interests of the ruling elite. 
The proposed Draft Amendment to the Broadcasting Law was designed 
to prevent owners of the national dailies from cross-media ownership, in 
particular in the audiovisual sector, while the owners of other periodicals 
(e.g. weeklies) were allowed to acquire media outlets in other sectors. 
In such a shape the law strikingly disfavoured one of the largest media 
companies in Poland – Agora – the owner of the leading national daily 
Gazeta Wyborcza. Agora was approached to pay an immense bribe to ‘the 
group of power’ in order to modify the disadvantageous ownership rules. 
After the disclosure of the scandal, the Parliament appointed a special In-
vestigation Committee that disclosed several “worrying irregularities and 
manipulations concerning the legislative work on the Draft Amendment”. 
These circumstances led to the withdrawal of the problematic document 
from the Sejm,4 but also seriously delayed a legislative transposition of 
the audiovisual acquis as the Draft Amendment contained also provisions 
implementing the TWF (Klimkiewicz, 2008). 
4 The lower chamber of the Polish Parliament
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Rywingate and its political and legal consequences was not men-
tioned in the Regular Reports on Poland (in 2003 investigations were still 
pending), but the language of the assessment made it clear that the Com-
mission was concerned: “Poland must pay attention to ensuring a stable, 
predictable, transparent and effective implementation of the broadcast-
ing regulatory frameworks” (Comprehensive Report on Poland, 2003: 
46). The corruption scandal showed the extremely high risks of political 
interference into the legislative process: hazardous trade-offs that were 
designed to secure political and economic interests of the ruling elite 
almost retained the proceeding EU accession. Though the audiovisual 
policy has not occupied a priority position in a process of conditionality, 
it presented an important symbolic area focalising the very sense of an 
advocated change.
Not surprisingly, the Regular Reports devoted substantial space to 
the media regulatory authorities in the candidate countries, focusing 
mainly on their administrative effectiveness, capacities, competences, 
powers and composition (Klimkiewicz, 2008). In some cases the regula-
tory bodies were praised for their effectiveness (Regular Report on Po-
land, 1999), independence (Regular Report on Hungary, 2000), whereas 
in other cases, the Commission suggested that strengthening in terms 
of staff and equipment (Regular Report on Slovakia, 2000) is needed. 
A gradual adoption of rules on the European and independent works, as 
well as proportionality of measures promoting programmes in national 
languages was quite closely observed in a number of the Reports. The 
issue was not perceived as a problematic one and it did not raise a con-
tentious policy debate. When introducing new broadcasting laws in the 
1990s, many CEE countries have acknowledged that a national presence 
in the audiovisual sphere (through the contents produced originally in 
national languages) is crucial and should become a stable component of 
new regulatory designs. An obligation to adopt audiovisual acquis added 
a European dimension to it, not by replacing the national production quo-
ta, but by completing it proportionally (Klimkiewicz, 2008). 
To summarise the two sections above: conditionality seemed to work 
best when it resonated with domestic preferences and political aims (Sa-
durski, 2003: 14); or when it did not openly entered controversial and 
‘unwanted’ domains. EU conditionality certainly influenced domestic 
media policies not only ‘on paper’, but it was, at the same time, essen-
tially complementary and superficial in a process dominated by domestic 
policy priorities. Two forms of political risks marked the period before 
and after the EU accession. The focal point of the first risk reflects an 
ever-present calculus between the political costs of supra-national policy 
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adjustment and the costs of a domestic resistance. The second risk refers 
to various ‘translations’ of common policy principles. Policy conditions 
and principles that are not part of the EU legal system in a comprehensive 
manner – as is the case of the media and communication field – might 
not be equally shared by the member states themselves. While condition-
ality can impose some adjustment to these principles, if the conditions 
are not succinctly defined, there is a danger that in the post-accession 
period, practices and mechanism declining from the prescribed ‘norm’ 
will quickly reincarnate. Moreover, the credibility of conditionality can be 
significantly corroborated with ‘double standards’, especially in terms of 
what is generally required from the new member, or candidate states on 
the one hand, and tolerated in the case of the established member states. 
3.5. Post-accession developments
After the enlargement, policy harmonisation concerning relevant media 
issues became guided by accordant units within the Commission (such 
as the DG INFSO), while freedom and pluralism of the media protected 
under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights remained further examined 
by the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights. The 
Network was set up by the DG Justice and Home Affairs upon a request 
of the European Parliament to monitor fundamental rights in the member 
states in 2002–2006. The Reports (published for the years 2002–2005)5 
covered all actual member states. They focused mainly on cases, where 
fundamental rights (including the right to freedom and pluralism of the 
media) were abused or not fully respected, providing also positive in-
stances facilitating the use of these rights. The Reports were prepared on 
the basis of country reports provided by each member state and a sepa-
rated report evaluating the activities of the EU institutions. As the Reports 
have not bound the Commission in terms of policy response, they have 
mainly offered an analytical value. 
Notwithstanding this fact, an attentive reader would easily notice 
a broad and well-defined scope of issues in the area of freedom of speech 
and the media, as well as media pluralism. Some of these issues clearly 
identified areas of concern (the Italian ‘Gaspari Law’, growing inter- media 
concentration in Portugal, insufficient impartiality and independence of 
the Polish regulatory agency – National Broadcasting Council, unequal 
5 Following Reports of the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental 
Rights were studied for this chapter: 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 Report on the Situation of 
Fundamental Rights in the European Union and its Member States.
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obligations imposed on foreigners and Slovak citizens with regard to the 
Slovak Act of Periodic Press), others raised positive aspects and good 
practices (Reports on the Situation of Fundamental Rights in the Euro-
pean Union 2003, 2004, 2005) (Klimkiewicz, 2008). These included such 
practices as a requirement of ‘internal pluralism’ imposed on broadcasters 
in the Czech Republic, or control of media ownership consolidation in the 
UK, conducted in order to maintain a sufficient plurality of views (Syn-
thesis Report, 2003). Overall, the Reports demonstrated a human rights 
perspective – media freedom and pluralism was monitored as the right of 
an individual to be fully and impartially informed from diverse sources. 
The coverage of both, old and new member states showed, that despite 
national specificities, many problem areas are similar and might require 
harmonised solutions, or at least more formalised monitoring exercise at 
the European level (Klimkiewicz, 2008).
In the later period, the European Agency for Fundamental Rights 
(FRA) continued monitoring and reporting on human rights in the Eu-
ropean Union, although with a more targeted approach that minimised 
the evaluation of communication and media-related rights. The FRA had 
been established in 2007 as an independent expert body for the EU with 
a role to advise EU institutions and member states on fundamental-rights 
related issues when implementing EU law. With such a mandate, the FRA 
perceived its role as institution offering “added value to the EU’s insti-
tutional and political reality” (FRA, 2012: 27). In the first period of its 
activities (2007–2010), the FRA focused predominantly on raising rights 
awareness and the socio-legal assistance on selected fields of issues re-
volving mainly around the principles of anti-discrimination and equality. 
The year 2010 marked the first year of the European Union operating on 
the basis of a legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights. Not surpris-
ingly, the FRA responding to this development, employed more annual 
monitoring focused not only on FRA activities, but also human rights in 
the member states of the Union. 
The series started already with the FRA Report covering information, 
events and developments in the EU for the year 2009 (FRA, 2010). The 
Report set up the structure and composition of principal areas of focus 
followed in the next years. These selected and accentuated priority poli-
cies of DG Justice rather than corresponded to particular articles of the 
Charter. Thus, among the issues such as the questions of racial discrimi-
nation, child protection, immigrant policies and asylum, the information 
policy and protection of personal data; freedom of expression and the 
media, as well as media pluralism have not been distinctively exposed. 
The 2010 Annual Report of FRA published in June 2011 put the spotlight 
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“on the achievements and challenges of the EU and its member states on 
fundamental rights”. In this way, the logic of monitoring did not seek to 
detect cases, where fundamental rights were breached, or not respected, 
but rather to signal broader problem areas requiring further policy re-
sponse. The 2011 Report examined progress of the EU and member states 
as regards obligations under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU. The problem area that hints partially on the media and communica-
tion (although not from the perspective of media freedom and pluralism) 
brings into attention one aspect of information policies: the protection of 
personal data. The Report called for improved protection of personal data 
mainly in reference to geographical information services on the Inter-
net (Google Street View) and greater sensitivity regarding the publishing 
of personal information or pictures, especially of younger people (FRA, 
2012: 62). The 2012 Report published in 2013 forged ahead the prob-
lem of protection of personal data, especially with regard to the role of 
intermediaries. Although Google has not been directly accused of acting 
illegally, EU Data Protection authorities have expressed concerns about 
“insufficient information to its users” and “about the combination of data 
across services” (FRA, 2013: 86). It was, however, the ACTA international 
agreement, that gained probably highest exposure among the relevant 
policy issues covered by the Report. One of the reasons was that the two 
EU institutions – the Parliament and Commission – exhibited a fairly di-
vergent position on this matter. The Report noticed that the Commission 
conceived ACTA as fully in line with EU standards and without any in-
terference with citizens’ fundamental rights of freedom of expression and 
data protection. On the other hand, the European Parliament, receiving 
petitions from more than 2.8 million Internet users against ACTA rejected 
the agreement in the plenary session in July 2012. The Report quotes 
a negative recommendation concerning ACTA delivered by the EP’s Com-
mittee on International Trade: “the intended benefits of this international 
agreement are far outweighed by the potential threats to civil liberties” 
(FRA, 2013: 71). In consequence of the EP’s rejection of ACTA, neither 
the EU nor its individual member states can join the agreement. 
The year 2012 was also depicted by the FRA as a year of multiple 
crises in the EU and its member states (FRA, 2013). One of such crises 
examined briefly as a separate case was ‘a wider constitutional crisis’ 
in Hungary. The Report observed that a new constitution which came 
into force at the beginning of 2012, drew strong criticism both at home 
and abroad. One of most problematic areas of concern in the respect of 
this crisis was the exercise of government control over the media (FRA, 
2013: 23). The Report did not provide, however, a more detailed analysis 
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of this control, nor did it more broadly reflect on any regulations, prac-
tices and mechanisms curtailing freedom of the media in Hungary.
In general, FRA Reports stand in different direction than the Reports 
produced by the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental 
Rights, not only because of thematic selectivity. A main intention beneath 
the FRA’s exercise doesn’t seem to be a systematic monitoring of the most 
pertinent cases where fundamental rights of EU citizens were abused, not 
respected or not protected (including the right to freedom of expression 
and the media, and the right to receive information from plural sources), 
and to pair these with an adequate/inadequate reaction from the rel-
evant EU institutions. The FRA Reports are evidently designed to cover 
the problem areas where the EU or member states institutions acted, situ-
ations where action was missing, are largely left out of the scope of the 
analysis. Selective as they are, the Reports are political constructs signal-
ing the progress of the EU institutions in terms of a preoccupation with 
salient problems and policies employed to tackle these problems. As such, 
they hardly offer a systematic tool for the assessment of what can be seen 
as standards of the ‘political criteria’ (including the media and communi-
cation field) in the both established and young member states, and pro-
spective candidate countries. Since 2010, the Commission has prepared 
annual reports to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 
application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.6 The scope of the 
reports does not seem however to be comprehensive enough, especially 
with regard to freedom of expression and media pluralism. Other instru-
ments that could tie the monitoring of future with current members, is 
thus missing. This analytical gap puts under the question maintaining of 
standards that are politically used as a condition for EU accession.
The post-accession ‘Europeanising’ effect on the CEE communica-
tion and media environments and related changes will be studied more 
comprehensively in the next chapters focusing subsequently on audio-
visual policies, media pluralism, and the independence of media regu-
latory authorities and PSM. Yet, to provide some reflection on dealing 
with freedom of expression and the media, as well as with media plu-
ralism, it could be instructive to tackle upon some problematic cases 
that evolved after the EU accession in selected CEE countries. Given the 
absence of a comparative and credible tool for tracking and monitor-
ing media freedom and pluralism over a longer period time at the EU 
6 DG Justice (2014) Annual report (information on reports available at: http://ec.europa.
eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/application/index_en.htm; retrieved 4.01.2014).
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level, the dynamics of other indexes will be briefly analysed to extract 
most salient cases for further investigation. These include the Freedom 
of the Press reports compiled systematically across the world since 1980 
by Freedom House and the Press Freedom Index produced by Reporters 
Without Borders globally since 2002. Although these two evaluating in-
dexes were broadly criticised by media freedom experts for their weak 
methodologies, excessive reliance on experts’ views, a Western bias, and 
a focus on ‘old media’, they were, at the same time, seen as a valuable 
and long-term tool with acceptable statistical consistency, reaching often 
the same general conclusions (CIMA, 2010). Importantly, with no alter-
native studies reaching the same geographical and diachronic scale, the 
indexes offer a useful mechanism for comparisons of countries, issues, 
periods of progress or regress in analysing freedom and pluralism of the 
media, conditions of journalism and overall media environments mainly 
with regard to the political function of the media, although other func-
tions are being reflected as well. The table and figure below manifest the 
ranking of the CEE countries in Freedom of the Press index by Freedom 
House (FH) in years following the EU accession:
Table 7: Freedom of the Press ranking by Freedom House (2005–2013) for 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
CZECH 
REPUBLIC
22 20 18 18 18 18 19 19 19
HUNGARY 21 21 21 21 21 23 30 36* 36*
POLAND 20 21 22 24 24 24 25 25 26
SLOVAKIA 21 20 20 22 23 23 22 21 22
Sources: Freedom House: Freedom of the Press (2005–2013) (available at: http://www.
freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press; retrieved 19.09.2013).
Notes:  * Only Hungary was evaluated as ‘partly free’ in 2012 and 2013, other 
CEE countries were perceived as ‘free’ in 2005–2013.
In the Freedom of the Press methodology, zero or the lowest scores signal 
the highest level of media freedom. A score of 0 to 30 means that the 
country has a ‘Free’ media, while 31 to 60 signals ‘Partly Free’, and 61 to 
100 ‘Not Free’ (CIMA, 2010: 9). As can be seen from the table above and 
the figure below, the trends observed in the CEE countries, perhaps only 
with the modest exception of the Czech Republic, do not indicate a linear 
straightforward and unequivocal progress in freedom of the media after 
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EU accession. Certainly, the most striking developments were registered 
by the reports in the case of Hungary that moved from a score of 23 in 
2010 to 30 in 2011 and 36 in 2012 and 2013. This led to migration of 
the country from a category of ‘Free’ media into the category of ‘Partly 
Free’ in 2012. The qualitative jump in the FH’s evaluation was evoked by 
passing and amendment of a new Hungarian law in 2010. The legisla-
tion came into force in January 2011 and triggered widespread protests, 
both within Hungary and across Europe (Voltmer, 2013: 152), mainly 
due to excessive controlling powers over the media by a new regulatory 
authority. The second increase of scores can be observed in the case of 
Slovakia in 2009 and 2010. It stemmed from an enactment of the con-
troversial 2008 Press Act which, among other problematic provisions, 
required publishers to print responses to any “statement of fact that im-
pinges on the honor, dignity, or privacy of a natural person, or the name 
or good reputation of a legal entity”, regardless of whether the statement 
in question is accurate (Freedom House, 2011). The law was amended 
later on, although the controversial framing of ‘right of reply’ resulted in 
widespread practice of civil defamation cases where judges, politicians or 
business elites have claimed excessive damages and often collected over-
proportional financial compensation. This has not only severely affected 
Figure 3: Freedom of the Press ranking by Freedom House (2005–2013) 
for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
Sources: Elaborated on the basis of Freedom House: Freedom of the Press (2005–2013) 






























the financial conditions of the Slovak media, but in some cases, also pre-
vented the publication of journalistic material.
The next table and figure show the ranking of the CEE countries in 
Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (RWB) in years follow-
ing EU accession:
Table 8: Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (2005–2013) 
for Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia





9 5 14 16 24 24 14 16
HUNGARY 12 10 17 23 26 23 40 56
POLAND 55 60 57 48 37 32 24 22
SLOVAKIA 8 8 4 10 45 35 27 23
Sources: Reporters Without Borders: Press Freedom Index (2005–2013) (available at: 
http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html; retrieved 19.09.2013).
Similarly, as in the Freedom of the Press methodology, also with the 
RWB’s Press Freedom Index, an overall low score for a country is a good 
score. The total number combines scores from questions about killed, ille-
gally detained, kidnapped and tortured journalists, questions about cen-
sorship and self-censorship and others. Likewise with the previous index, 
trends observed in the CEE countries indicate various fluctuations instead 
of a steady improvement of media freedom after the EU accession. The 
developments in Hungary caused very similar score increases than in the 
case of Freedom House’s index: from 23 in 2010/2011 to 40 in 2012 and 
56 in 2013. The 2013 Report concluded: “Hungary is still paying the price 
of repressive legislation that has had a palpable effect on how journalism 
is practiced” (RWB, 2013). In the case of Slovakia, the Press Freedom 
Index demonstrated a sharper growth of the score than the FH’s index. In 
2009, the score increased from 10 to 45. Noteworthy, in 2007, Slovakia 
with the score 4 occupied one of top positions in the RWB’s ranking on 
a global scale. A quite radical change and the worst rank of Slovakia in 
the last 7 years, stemmed from the enactment of a controversial press law, 
discussed briefly above. The RWB’s Press Freedom Index also paid more 
prominent attention than the FH’s index, to surveillance of Polish journal-
ists by secret services in 2005–2007. This resulted in as high a score of 
Poland as 55 in 2005, 60 in 2006 and 57 in 2007.
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A fluctuation of ranking positions, and sometimes even sharp devia-
tions, clearly reflect the buildup of problematic issues as observed by in-
ternational organisations. Interestingly, some problematic developments 
occurred in all CEE countries after the EU accession, though they have not 
been bound by much similarity. This again proves a variety and different 
outcomes of media policymaking despite the geopolitical and historical 
commonalities of the region. The two most highly exposed instances in 
the FH and RWB’s indexes stand more symbolic for the process of policy 
harmonisation. The first considers the decisive role of courts in environ-
ments where there is a contrast between what had been envisioned by 
policy makers and the actual state of law enforcement (Anagnostou et 
al., 2010: 8–9; quoted after: Školkay and Ondruchová-Hong, 2012: 195). 
The second points to the decisive role of media regulatory authorities po-
tentially equipped with omnipotent powers by the governments.
3.6. Libel and the Gorilla scandal: The ‘silent’ case of Slovakia
In recent years, the courts have played a decisive role in affecting both 
journalistic performance and media and communication policy in Slova-
kia. Andrej Školkay and Mária Ondruchová-Hong point out that the courts 
Figure 4: Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (2005–2013) 
for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
Sources: Elaborated on the basis of Reporters Without Borders: Press Freedom Index 


































are the final arbiter in defining the limits of freedom of speech and the 
press (especially regarding libel, defamation, privacy, and breaking the law 
on government secrets) (Školkay and Ondruchová-Hong, 2012: 195). At 
the same time, the courts act – though in a more subtle way – as the fi-
nal arbiter of the media regulatory decisions taken by regulatory bodies 
(2012: 195). The role of the courts became even more accentuated with 
the passing of the controversial Press Act on 10 April 2008. The Act, widely 
criticised by international organisations (including Reporters Without Bor-
ders, Freedom House and OSCE), legalised an automatic right of reply to 
anyone regardless of whether defamation or insult occurred. The Act was 
amended in September 2011 shortly before the collapse of Iveta Radičová’s 
centre-right government. Most importantly, the amendment eliminated 
the ‘right of reply’ in the case of officials where disputed facts pertain to 
their public lives. Yet, an extensive use of civil defamation suits brought by 
judges, political and the business elite in recent years, cemented preventive 
concerns among journalists and media organisations at large. 
The 2013 Freedom of the Press Report on Slovakia (Freedom House, 
2013) observed that although defamation is not a criminal offense civil 
defamation suits claim exorbitant damages. Katrin Voltmer observes that 
even where libel laws are part of the civil code, excessive damage charges 
can be equally ruinous for the life and career of journalists (Voltmer, 2013: 
144). In the case of Slovakia, Prime Minister Robert Fico and the Supreme 
Court Chairman Štefan Harabin have collected hundreds of thousands of 
Euro from successful libel lawsuits over the past several years (Freedom 
House, 2013). These conditions have rendered investigative and politi-
cally-critical journalism a difficult challenge. The perception of a severe 
situation, in which the Slovak media find themselves resonates within the 
professional environment. Martin M. Šimečka, a prominent Slovak jour-
nalist compared in this respect the conditions of the media in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia: “Unlike in the Czech Republic, the Slovak courts 
frequently levy heavy fines for even minor inaccuracies in an otherwise 
faultless investigative text that a politician or businessman decides to sue 
over”.7 Voltmer describes this type of state interference into journalistic 
freedom as a very specific type of libel: seditious libel, or slander laws 
that criminalise criticism and negative coverage of state institutions and 
political leaders (2013: 144). Such a damaging practice has a strong 
and chilling effect especially on economically fragile media companies 
that cannot afford to cover the expensive costs of professional legal as-
7 Šimečka, M. Martin (2012) A Gorilla tearing down the system [in] Presseurop, 
1.02.2012 (available at: http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/1468351-gorilla-tearing-
down-system; retrieved 17.09.2013).
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sistance and eventually pay extremely high compensations for damages. 
Among a long list of libel cases, one deserves special attention, as its roots 
grew from the most explosive political corruption scandal in recent years.
In December 2011, a file coded ‘Gorilla’ was uploaded on a US-based 
server. The file was presented as a wiretap document produced by the 
Slovak Intelligence Service (SIS – Slovenská Informačná Služba)8 in 
2005–2006. The document contained operational transcripts of the con-
versations allegedly held in 2005 and 2006 between the representatives 
of the Penta Group – one of the biggest investment companies in Slovakia 
– and leaders of some political parties as well as important public offi-
cials, including e.g. former Minister of Economy and the Head of the Na-
tional Property Fund. Martin M. Šimečka described the substance of the 
conversations as “(…) the talk about how many millions which politician 
or party is to get for the privatisation of enterprises, especially in energy 
and transport”.9 Politicians invited by the Penta group discussed in detail 
deals on large privatisation projects, in which ‘friendly’ committees and 
selection procedures were agreed upon in an exchange for high paybacks 
to politicians and political parties. Politically, the files seemed to be most 
damaging for Mikuláš Dzurinda, the former Prime Minister and leader of 
the SDKÚ,10 but also other politicians, including Robert Fico, the leader 
of the SMER – SD11 had contacts with the group.
Tom Nicholson, an investigative journalist of Canadian origin work-
ing both for Slovak and international media, wrote a book Gorila describ-
ing his scrutiny of the Gorilla Affair and explaining corruption practices 
and intricate links between Slovak business and politics. In February 
2012, a court in Bratislava ordered Nicholson to abstain from publish-
ing the book and any related investigative material, on the grounds of 
injunctions brought by Jaroslav Haščák, a co-owner of the Penta group. 
Again, this was a case in which civil defamation laws were used to stop 
publishing information about political and business corruption. Numer-
ous organisations condemned the ruling. The Slovak P.E.N. Center con-
sidered the court decision as the implementation of censorship and, as 
8 SIS (Slovak Information Agency) is a state body with the mandate to defend the 
constitutional structure, public order and security of the state.
9 Šimečka, M. Martin (2012) A Gorilla tearing down the system [in] Presseurop, 
1.02.2012 (available at: http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/1468351-goril-
la-tearing-down-system; retrieved 17.09.2013)
10 SDKÚ – Slovenská Demokratická a Kresťanská Únia (Slovak Democratic and 
Christian Union) – a liberal conservative party.
11 SMER – SD – Smer – sociálna demokracia (Smer – social democracy) – a social 
democratic political party in Slovakia.
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such, an overt violation of freedom of expression.12 In June 2012, a court 
in Bratislava ruled that the book could be published. The Gorila promoted 
by the publisher as “The most expected book of the year” finally ended up 
on the bookshop shelves and was sold more than 50 000 copies, a remark-
able result for a relatively small book market as Slovakia. Since fall 2012, 
however, Nicholson has been sued in several defamation suits for libel in 
relation to the publishing of the book.
The revelation of the scandal spurred citizen demonstrations in Janu-
ary 2012 that were attended by several thousand protesters. Although 
the numbers might not seem impressive, this has been the first such a sig-
nificant event of public disapproval against the way democratic politics 
has been performed in the country since the Velvet Revolution in 1989. 
Tom Nicholson described the flavour of the protests in his book: “Nobody 
expected such a common bitterness caused by longstanding theft, decep-
tion and falsehood, but also lasting poverty of the country. It was a feeling 
that the country could long have been prosperous if not led by its fraudu-
lent leaders” (Nicholson, 2012: 181). The protests were expected to have 
a major impact on the March 2012 election, but the political outcome was 
not surprising – Robert Fico and Smer-SD came out as winners, securing 
a healthy majority for governing. 
The revelation of the Gorilla scandal and following developments 
contested the boundaries of Slovak politics, but also shed more light on 
consequences of a quite extreme use of libel laws on journalism and con-
ditions in which the media operate. The expectations were high, and in 
addition to more general goals – such as bringing more democracy to Slo-
vakia – they also revolved around a multitude of small actions – such as 
new web-based investigative projects fulfilling the very ideas of monitory 
democracy – a surveillance of political, business elites and the judiciary 
by journalists and ordinary citizens. Tom Nicholson expressed intentions 
on his part on his blog:
circumstances have put me in a unique position to continue reporting on Goril-
la and other high-level corruption stories: I have your trust and support, as well 
as a specific set of contacts accumulated through years on the job. With Slova-
kia’s mainstream media eliminating investigative reporting positions and rarely 
12 PEN International (2012) Slovakia: Bratislava Court prohibits journalist Tom Nich-
olson from publishing the book on ‘Gorilla Affair’(available at: http://www.pen-interna-
tional.org/pen-world/centres-news/; retrieved 20.09.2013).
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giving journalists more than a day to spend on stories, I believe that between 
us, we can come up with important stories that wouldn’t otherwise get told.13
Collecting financial support from online users and supporters, Nich-
olson established the association and facebook account Pod povrchom 
(Under the surface) to continue investigative journalism in a de-institu-
tionalised form.14 Despite the initiation of an official investigation in the 
‘Gorilla’ Affair in 2012, information largely available to the public has not, 
so far, offered any clear-cut explanations. Instead, in a muddy and dense 
space of information, contrary arguments and versions of the affair have 
been constantly fighting for primacy, and Nicholson and his sources con-
tinued to be discredited. Perhaps one of the reasons has been the relative 
silence of the case on the international arena, due to its ‘complicated’ and 
‘ambiguous’ character. The EU paid little attention to the case and a criti-
cal tone of international press freedom index organisations did not trans-
late into a significant assessment critique that could change the status quo.
3.7. The power of regulatory action: The ‘loud’ case 
of Hungary 
The controversy about Hungary’s new media laws that were passed in 
2010 and amended in 2011 can be viewed as an instance of more com-
plex regulatory control surrounding journalistic independence, media 
structures and persisting vulnerability of the PSM (Voltmer, 2013: 151). 
On the other hand, the high political exposure of the case prevented 
a more focused debate at the EU level on akin cases from other member 
countries. Putting the political spotlight on Hungary overshadowed less 
clear-cut, but still problematic developments limiting either media plural-
ism or journalistic independence and media autonomy in some other EU 
countries. 
In 2010, the Fidesz15 party led by Viktor Orbán won the elections 
with a two-thirds majority. This exceptional majority never experienced 
since 1989 was instrumental in enforcing a fast amendment to Article 
61 of the Constitution on 6 July 2010 that facilitated the adoption of the 
13 Nicholson, Tom (2012) Blog: Hunting Gorillas on the public’s dime (available at: 
http://nicholson.blog.sme.sk/c/293302/Hunting-Gorillas-on-the-publics-dime.html#
ixzz2ekqWWzXo; retrieved 20.09.2012)
14 Available at: https://www.facebook.com/podpovrchom.sk; retrieved 5.01.2014.
15 Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség (Hungarian Civic Union) is the largest na-
tional conservative political party in Hungary. 
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upcoming media laws rearranging substantially the regulation of print, 
broadcast and online media. The series of these laws started with Act 
LXXXII of 2010 on the Amendment of Certain Acts on Media and Tele-
communication published on 10 August 2010. The law established a new 
converged regulatory authority and reshaped the institutions governing 
and supervising the activities of the PSM and of the public service news 
agency (Lengyel, 2010). The new communications authority NMHH16 
came into shape as a merger of the former telecom regulator, the National 
Communications Authority (NHH) and the National Radio and Television 
Commission (ORTT). The pivotal role in the new institution was assigned 
to the Chairperson appointed by the Prime Minister for a renewable term 
of nine years. A panoply of powers exercised by the Chairperson has 
been remarkable: the Chairperson automatically becomes a candidate for 
the President of the Media Council (Médiatanács), a five-member body 
which supervises the NMHH; he/she also appoints the Director General 
of the Broadcast Support and Property Management Fund (with the com-
petence to manage the main body of the properties of the public service 
media companies) and nominates candidates for the position of CEO of 
the public service media. Already in September 2010, the OSCE – preced-
ing the actual adoption of remaining media laws – prepared an extensive 
analysis and assessment of both legislation in force and draft legislation 
on the media and telecommunications (OSCE, 2010). The document, 
prepared by Karol Jalubowicz, observed that “the package represents an 
equally far-reaching effort to put into place a new axiological, legal and 
institutional framework for media regulation and supervision” (OSCE, 
2010: 5). Although the document also analyses the texts of regulation 
– such as the Bill T/363 on Press Freedom and Basic Rules on Media Con-
tent that were never passed – it explains the essence of tenets of media 
regulation that were finally pushed forward in the 2010 Press and Media 
Act17 and the 2010 Mass Media Act.18 The OSCE criticism emphasised 
mainly two points: first, that the system for media content regulation 
(including Internet and ICT media content) reaches beyond the needs of 
a democratic system of social communication; and second, that a highly 
16 NMHH – Nemzeti Média és Hírközlési Hatóság (National Media and Communica-
tions Authority) (http://nmhh.hu/; retrieved 5.10.2013).
17 Act CIV of 2010 on the Freedom of the Press and the Fundamental Rules on Me-
dia Content published on 9 November 2010 in Magyar Közlöny (Official Journal) and 
amended in March 2011. The Act has been notoriously referred as the ‘Press Freedom 
Act’, although the official translation of the Act establishes the abbreviated version: Press 
and Media Act.
18 Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media published on 31 Decem-
ber 2010 in Magyar Közlöny (Official Journal) and amended in March 2011.
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centralised and politically controlled regulatory institution and regula-
tory system may have a serious chilling effect on media freedom and 
independence (OSCE, 2010: 5–6). 
Although the Hungarian government maintained that the media leg-
islation conforms to EU standards and its elements are drawn from exist-
ing regulations in other European and EU member states (CMCS, 2012), 
the critical accounts of other supra-national actors, in particular the Coun-
cil of Europe, European Parliament and the Commission, have steadily 
resonated in policy documents and statements issued since 2011. These 
clearly demonstrate a determined willingness of supra-national European 
actors to influence media law developments in Hungary and change the 
status quo. In January 2011, Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights visited Budapest to discuss the media 
law package. In the Opinion issued after the visit, the Commissioner ex-
pressed concerns about the compliance of some provisions with the CoE’s 
standards on freedom of the media. These included, among others:
 – appointments to the National Media and Communications Authority 
and Media Council (Articles 124–125 of the Mass Media Act),
 – appointments to the management of the PSM (Article 102 of the 
Mass Media Act),
 – vague criteria relating to the information and coverage that the me-
dia must provide (Article 13 of the Press and Media Act),
 – protection of journalists’ sources (Article 6 of the Press and Media 
Act).19 
Shortly after the Commissioner’s initiative, the European Parliament 
adopted the Resolution of 10 March 2011 on media law in Hungary (Euro-
pean Parliament, 2011), in which the Parliament raised concerns about 
undermining media pluralism by the new legislation, in particular per-
vasive and centralised governmental and political control over all media 
through the operation Media Regulatory Authority and Media Council. 
Interestingly, the Parliament linked the problematic legislative develop-
ments in Hungary with EU membership criteria: “…Copenhagen criteria 
for EU membership, as established in June 1993 at the Copenhagen Euro-
19 Council of Europe (2011) Opinion of the Commissioner for Human Rights on Hun-
gary’s media legislation in light of Council of Europe standards on freedom of the media, 
CommDH (2011) 10. Strasbourg 25 February 2011. (available at: https://wcd.coe.int/
ViewDoc.jsp?id=1751289; retrieved 6.10.2013). See also: Council of Europe (2011) 
Hungary should use Council of Europe’s standards to guarantee freedom of expression and 




pean Council, relating to freedom of the press and freedom of expression 
should be upheld by all EU Member States and enforced through relevant 
EU legislation” (European Parliament, 2011). The Parliament also called 
for revisions and reviews of the Hungarian law in order to ensure that it 
is fully “in conformity with EU law and European values and standards 
on media freedom, pluralism and independent media governance” (Euro-
pean Parliament, 2011).
The European Commission acted mainly through soft measures, is-
suing statements and letters calling subsequently for conformity of the 
problematic provisions with the EU law. In its first letter dated on 23 De-
cember 2010, the Vice President of the Commission and Commissioner 
for DG Connect Neelie Kroes referred mainly to the role of independent 
media regulatory authority that is expected to ensure the existence of 
a wide range of independent and autonomous media.20 The next letter 
focused on concrete provisions, in particular, an obligation of balanced 
coverage applicable initially to all media service providers – including 
print and online press. The Vice President expressed doubts about com-
pliance of the obligation with the fundamental right of freedom of ex-
pression and information enshrined in Article 11 of the EU Charter for 
Fundamental Rights, and with the AVMS Directive with regards to provid-
ers of audiovisual media services.21 The Hungarian government agreed 
to amend the legislation for the purpose of refining its scope. In March 
2011, the amendments were passed following negotiations with the 
Commission, although some non-governmental organisations claimed 
the changes did not meet the substance of criticism. In December 2011, 
Hungary’s Constitutional Court made decision 165/2011. (XII. 20.) AB22 
on the constitutionality of the new regulations. Most of the questioned 
rules were deemed constitutional, however the Constitutional Court an-
nulled several important measures. These led to the exclusion of print 
and online media from the scope of the sanctioning powers of the NMHH 
and deleting a provision limiting the confidentiality of journalists’ sources 
to stories serving the public interest (Freedom House, 2013). Still, criti-
cism continued both among non-governmental organisations as well as 
20 The letter of Neelie Kroes, Vice President of the European Commission to Tibor 
Navracsics, Deputy Prime Minister. 23 December, 2010 (available at: http://cmcs.ceu.
hu/resources-new-media-laws-in-hungary-0; retrieved 6.10.2013).
21 The letter of Neelie Kroes, Vice President of the European Commission to Tibor 
Navracsics, Deputy Prime Minister. 21 January, 2011 (available at: http://cmcs.ceu.hu/
resources-new-media-laws-in-hungary-0; retrieved 6.10.2013).
22 Decision 165/2011. (XII. 20.) AB of the Hungarian Constitutional Court on the 
Media Regulation.
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European institutions. The critical judgment focused on the one hand on 
the licencing practices of the Media Council that enabled media outlets 
owned by Fidesz-lined businessmen to easily expand their local services 
into regional ones.23 On the other hand, regulatory and legal issues re-
mained at stake. In one of the numerous reactions – on November 2012 
– Neelie Kroes pointed to issues that have not been solved through en-
forced amendments to the law so far:
In particular, I want to see immediate action ensuring the real independence of 
the Media Council; measures to reduce the excessive concentration of powers 
in the hand of the Media Council and better measures to ensure the effective 
independent functioning of publicly-funded media. Solutions can be found in 
co-operation with the Council of Europe – so let’s see them. In my view, the Me-
dia Council should also reconsider its practices for assigned radio frequencies.24
In February 2013, the Hungarian government submitted an Amendment 
based on negotiations between the Hungarian Government and the Coun-
cil of Europe. Pursuant to the Amendment, the President of the NMHH is no 
longer appointed by the Prime Minister but by the President of the Republic 
on recommendation of the Prime Minister (Nagy, 2013) and the position 
is limited to a single nine-year term. The amendment has also empowered 
professional interest groups and self-regulatory interest organisations to 
make staffing proposals as part of the appointment procedure. Another im-
portant aspect of change concerned a provision on the requirement of ‘bal-
anced reporting’. Under the previous law, radio and TV broadcasters were 
required to produce “diverse, comprehensive, factual, up-to-date, objective 
and balanced” coverage of issues that may be of interest to the general 
public.25 The substance of this requirement would perhaps not raise such 
a broad critique if not connected with the quite omnipotent powers of the 
regulatory agency. Provisions on balanced reporting are part of regulatory 
content obligations in various EU countries. For example, the Czech Act on 
Radio and Television Broadcasting imposes that:
23 Mertek Media Monitor (2013) Assessment of Media Council’s tendering and licenc-
ing practices (available at: http://mediamonitor.ceu.hu/2013/02/report-on-the-frequen-
cy-tendering-by-the-media-council-part-2/; retrieved 23.09.2013)
24 Kroes, Neelie (2012) My latest thoughts on Hungary and media pluralism (available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/kroes/en/blog/my-latest-thoughts-on-
hungary-and-media-pluralism-and-freedom; retrieved 23.09.2013).
25 Mertek Media Monitor (2013) Council of Europe and Hungarian Government agree 
on changes to media laws (available at: http://mediamonitor.ceu.hu/2013/01/council-of-eu-
rope-and-hungarian-government-agree-on-changes-to-media-law/; retrieved 15.10.2013).
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A broadcaster shall provide objective and balanced information necessary for 
opinions to be freely formed. Any opinions or evaluating commentaries shall be 
separated from the information having the nature of news.26
The amendment of the Act CIV of 2010 on the Freedom of the Press and 
the Fundamental Rules of Media Content resulted in the following for-
mulation: 
Linear media services engaged in the provision of information shall provide 
balanced coverage on local, national and European issues that may be of inter-
est for the general public (…).27
Krisztina Nagy observes that recent judicial practice has construed the 
criterion of the “balanced” quality of reporting as a wide umbrella con-
cept, thus it seems unlikely to expect a substantial qualitative shift in the 
new practical use of the provision (Nagy, 2013). The stance of the Coun-
cil of Europe, however, became more appreciative. Thorbjørn Jagland, 
the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe stated in January 2013, 
that Hungary meets its legal obligations with reference to amendments in 
media laws. Neelie Kroes continued to point to the remaining problems. 
At a seminar on media freedom and pluralism held in March 2013 in 
Dublin, Kroes sustained that “issues on media freedom in Hungary are 
not yet solved” and that “only a fraction of the Council of Europe’s recom-
mendations have been implemented”.28 Although the Hungarian case has 
been certainly most exposed in current media policy developments in the 
EU countries, it has not been perceived as a sole and isolated instance. 
Concerns over media freedom and the need for the EU action echoed 
at various meetings, seminars, expert groups involving examples from 
more countries (such as excessive media concentration in Bulgaria, press 
regulation in the UK). Since 2010, there has been a visible shift to address 
more comprehensively the citizens’ right to free expression and commu-
nication. Thus, the Commission criticism although based mainly on the 
conformity of the Hungarian media law with the AVMS Directive and 
26 Act No. 231/2001 of 17 May 2001 on Radio and Television Broadcasting and on 
Amendment to Other Acts, Section 31 (2) (available at: http://www.rrtv.cz/en/static/docu-
ments/act-231-2001/Act-on-RTV-broadcasting-reflecting-AVMSD.pdf; retrieved 5.11. 2013).
27 Act CIV of 2010 on the Freedom of the Press and the Fundamental Rules on Me-
dia Content published on 9 November 2010 in Magyar Közlöny (Official Journal) and 
amended in March 2011; Article 13.
28 Mertek Media Monitor (2013) Kroes calls for more changes to Hungary’s media 
laws (available at: http://mediamonitor.ceu.hu/2013/03/kroes-calls-for-more-changes-
to-hungarys-media-laws/; retrieved 15.10.2013).
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the acquis communautaire in general (notably in relation to the obliga-
tion to offer balanced coverage applicable to all audiovisual media ser-
vice providers) also transgressed towards the respect for the fundamental 
right to freedom of expression and information as enshrined in the Article 
11 of the Charter, the Council of Europe’s recommendations and the very 
essence of a possible interpretation and use of the new rules.
After a relatively long battle about the substance of media laws, 
the issue of fundamental rights, including the right to free expres-
sion and free media in Hungary returned again to the top of the EU 
policy agenda. On 11 March 2013, the Hungarian Parliament adopted 
the Fourth Amendment (CDLREF(2013)014) to the Fundamental Law 
( CDL-REF(2013)016 – consolidated version) that has been collective-
ly reprimanded by various European institutions. The Venice Commis-
sion of the Council of Europe was requested to examine the amend-
ment from the point of view of its compatibility with the Council of 
Europe’s standards (Council of Europe, 2013) and the European Parlia-
ment adopted the Resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of funda-
mental rights: standards and practices in Hungary (European Parliament, 
2013c). Both documents raise a number of issues (among others the rec-
ognition of churches, communist past, the protection of marriage) that 
are perceived as non-congruent with European standards on fundamen-
tal rights. Among them, the provisions are listed that ban political ad-
vertisements on commercial media channels during campaign seasons. 
These measures introduced by Article 5.1. of the Fourth Amendment to 
the Hungarian Constitution allow only public service media channels 
to provide political advertising during the electoral campaigns. Given 
the high popularity of commercial channels and quite centralised control 
over the PSM by NMHH, the expert opinions suggest that citizens’ access 
to important and free political information may in this way be limited 
(Council of Europe, 2013). 
Interestingly, the European Parliament framed its reasoning with the 
importance of “the Union’s objective of upholding and promoting its val-
ues in its relations with the wider world, as set out in Article 3(4) TEU” 
and the specific obligation “for the Union’s action on the international 
scene to be guided by the principles which inspired its creation, develop-
ment and enlargement: democracy, the rule of law and the universal-
ity and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms (21(1) 
TEU)” (European Parliament, 2013c). A decline from these principles can 
not only lead to an erosion of internal integrity of the EU, but can possibly 
corroborate the credibility of the member states and of the Union in terms 
of its external action. 
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The 2013 Resolution of the European Parliament on Freedom of press 
and media in the world paralleled this approach stating: “the EU can only 
be credible on the global stage if press and media freedoms are safeguard-
ed and respected within the Union itself” (European Parliament, 2013b). 
The EP also acknowledged “the general downward trend in the grading 
of the press and media freedom environments in various countries both 
within and outside Europe” and observed that “in recent years some me-
dia, notably in the EU, have come under scrutiny themselves for unethical 
and allegedly illegal behavior” (European Parliament, 2013b). Certainly 
any potential external action of the EU requires addressing problematic 
issues internally and demonstrating that the problems can be gradually 
solved. The Resolution also noticed that, while the EU addresses press 
and media freedom through several policies and programmes, it lacks 
a specific overall focus on the issue, as well as a coherent driving vision 
(European Parliament, 2013b). The DG Connect in response to this claim 
launched an initiative on Increased involvement of the European Commis-
sion in ensuring respect towards media freedom and pluralism that presup-
poses a follow-up action after several consultation processes in the area 
of media freedom and pluralism in 2014.29 Both EP’s resolutions enacted 
in 2013 urged the EU to play a more significant role in the candidate 
countries, as well as in relation to its immediate southern and eastern 
neighbourhood. The Resolution of 3 July 2013 specifically argued that 
similar obligations that are imposed on candidate countries under the 
Copenhagen criteria continue to apply to the member states and should 
therefore be assessed on a regular basis (European Parliament, 2013c). 
3.8. Conclusion: A new approach towards the media and 
communication rights in the next EU enlargement
In terms of media-related issues, the EU accession process has evolved 
since 2004 into a more rigorous and comprehensive exercise. The Europe-
an Commission has admitted that reasons for this shift stem from lessons 
learned from previous enlargements, in particular when it comes to the 
need to address the fundamentals first (European Commission, 2013b). 
‘The lessons’ demonstrated certainly the scrappy and underdeveloped na-
ture of benchmarks in the area of freedom of expression and the media, 




but also a quite passive stance of the EU institutions largely accepting 
the prescribed and imagined course of action towards the progress ul-
timately reaching the point of accession. Post-accession developments 
however proved that the EU found itself in a more turbulent environment 
challenged by instances of excessive concentration of political and media 
business power (European Parliament, 2004, referring mainly to Berlus-
coni and Italian case), unethical media behaviour (European Parliament, 
2013b, referring to News International’s hacking phone scandal), and also 
some regressive developments in the new EU member states (e.g. Euro-
pean Parliament, 2013a, referring to the Hungarian media laws). Hence 
it became quite clear that the ongoing policy of conditionality will need 
to lay on more solid building blocks, in particular a common institutional 
blueprint (once missing) and common patterns of practices. To ensure 
the expected change is rooted deeply in a social environment and not 
easily corroborated by storms of fast-changing polarised politics, it seems 
essential that important normative values (including respect for freedom 
and pluralism of the media) are internalised at various levels of a so-
cial system and collectively shared. A corresponding observation can be 
found in the conclusions of the Speak-up!2 conference organised by DG 
Enlargement in co-operation with the European Parliament in June 2013. 
The document emphasises that improving the situation in the candidate 
countries calls for the behavioural and cultural change in politics, the 
judiciary and the media itself (DG Enlargement, 2013c). In other words, 
equally important as the main policy instruments – the Strategy Papers 
and Progress Reports – seem to be support policies and soft measures of-
fering solutions that help to remove barriers and improve the quality of 
free media performance. 
Certainly, freedom of expression and the media has been more ex-
plicitly and intensely recognised by the EC and other EU institutions in 
the recent enlargement policy as a right and quality through which the 
political function of the media can be fulfilled. The geopolitical scope 
seems to be even more challenging than with the previous enlargements 
as the EU attempts to incorporate Turkey and the countries of the Western 
Balkans (including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montene-
gro, Serbia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) to com-
plete the Stabilisation and Association Process. To this extent, the DG 
Enlargement has perceived freedom of expression as a key indicator of 
a country’s readiness to become part of the EU. Independent and healthy 
media have been seen as vital watchdogs of political systems that are ex-
pected in turn to create the right conditions for operation of such media. 
Freedom of expression and the media has found various manifestations 
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in problem areas echoed in several enlargement policy documents, inclu-
ding  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council Enlargement Strategy and the Main Challenges (European 
Commission, 2011, 2012c, 2013b). These are summarised in the table 
below: 
Table 9: Media-related issues referred in selected DG Enlargement 
documents and Commission’s Enlargement Strategy Communications 
under ‘freedom of expression and the media’
Media-Related Issues 
Referred Under 











independence of the 
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– EU Enlargement: 
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Avoiding prosecutions of 
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– EU Enlargement: 
Speaking out








Reform of public service 
broadcasting




– EU Enlargement Fact 
Sheet: Safeguarding 
Freedom of Expression
– 2011–2012;  2013–2014 
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Investigative reporting – EU Enlargement: 
Speaking out
– EU Enlargement Fact 
Sheet: Safeguarding 
Freedom of Expression
– 2011–2012;  2013–2014 
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Avoiding political 
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 2012–2013; 2013–2014 
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Protection of journalists – Speak-up!2. 
Conclusions
– 2011–2012; 
 2012–2013; 2013–2014 
Enlargement Strategy










– EU Enlargement Fact 
Sheet: Safeguarding 
Freedom of Expression





 2012–2013; 2013–2014 
Enlargement Strategy
Improving internal 




Sources: Elaborated on the basis of European Commission, 2011, 2012c, 2013b; DG En-
largement (2013a, 2013b, 2013c).
The studying of these documents opens a quite different perspective of 
the EU’s assessment of freedom of expression and media-related issues, 
and thus also expectations from the candidate countries. One of the cen-
tral points in these assessments is the institutional blueprint conceived 
through the values of impartiality and independence of the media regu-
latory authorities (MRA). In the previous monitoring exercise, the Com-
mission paid attention mainly to the effectiveness, strength and capaci-
ties of the MRA which was closely connected with the implementation of 
audiovisual acquis. Various instances observed by the Commission and 
other institutions in the region, and a Hungarian regulatory approach in 
particular, resulted in paying closer attention to the MRA status, appoint-
ment procedures, and forms of political control and values that justify the 
MRA’s special status among state institutions. 
Defamation and libel laws were closely observed also before the 
2004 enlargement, however greater attention was paid to legal measures 
and provisions themselves than a practice in courts. The DG Enlargement 
has drifted more towards ensuring that judges do not use state or politi-
cal power to silence or self-censor journalists as has been already the case 
in some countries, including member state – Slovakia, for example. The 
143
reform of the PSM in transitional and post-transitional media systems 
has been a standard flag theme in the EU and pan-European media poli-
cies since the 1990s, while in the newest enlargement strategy a great-
er emphasis was put on the involvement of the EBU and co-operation 
with other PSMs in the EU to transfer the best practices and solutions, 
in particular financial autonomy and sustainability. The accentuation of 
a stronger, independent journalism and the role of investigative reporting 
has partly resulted from weak safeguards of journalistic autonomy in the 
region (including a lack of mature professional organisations), and partly 
from a broader flow of crisis in professional journalism generally, caused 
mainly by a drain of financial sources towards technological and legal 
investments. 
Political interference and control of media performance has been of 
major importance in monitoring, as some media developments both in 
established and young member states, exposed deficiencies limiting the 
democratic functions of the media. Among various gates of such interfer-
ence, the DG Enlargement considers the role of public and state-related 
advertising that may potentially support politically subservient media. 
Thus, transparent and non-discriminatory rules are needed to govern pro-
curing public sector advertisements (DG Enlargement, 2013c). An inter-
esting switch in comparison with previous enlargement assessments can 
be observed in the area of the economic performance of the media. While 
pre-2004 reports focused on the robustness of media landscapes, num-
ber of actors, and instruments encouraging foreign investments, the new 
approach emphasises challenges of informal economic pressure that can 
possibly silence the media and spread self-censorship (European Com-
mission, 2013b; DG Enlargement, 2013c). These include at foremost the 
lack of media ownership transparency and lack of effective competition. 
Again, the map of media-related issues covered by the DG Enlarge-
ment seems quite large and varied, yet the course of navigation focuses 
more clearly on the political and pro-democratic functions of the media, 
and where other values are tested (such as the economic competitiveness 
of the media), these are approached through the logic of the political 
system performance in which the communication media are seen to play 
a fundamental role. This transformed strategy is both outward and in-
ward looking: externally, it sends the message that freedom of expression 
and the media belongs to fundamentals in terms of standards and rights 
to be fulfilled before EU accession. Internally, it poses a requirement of 
instant and constant self-observation of the EU member states themselves 
in order to maintain credibility in the politics of conditionality and with 
respect to improvement.

4. SHAPING A EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL 
LANDSCAPE: TWO DIMENSIONS 
OF AVMSD
4.1. An Introduction: eroding boundaries of ‘audiovisual’
The EU has attributed a significant importance to the audiovisual sec-
tor for most than 30 years. The audiovisual policy was singled out from 
the broader media field for two reasons: first, justifications for regulating 
audiovisual media space were built on the Council of Europe’s approach 
manifested in Article 10 of the ECHR. Second, it has been recognised 
that other media sectors (e.g. print and online press) could potentially 
develop their services without relying on publicly owned frequencies and 
regardless of boundaries, as long as member states did not impose limits 
on their activities. In addition however, audiovisual services and televi-
sion in particular, were seen as strategic channels of communication prac-
tices that have a potential to generate a more cohesive European identity, 
European information space, and most importantly stimulate the cross-
border internal market. Thus, the ‘audiovisual strand’ in the media policy 
is characterised by hard legal instruments (directives – TWF, AVMS) and 
clearly defined implementation and monitoring procedures. 
The critics of harmonisation through the EU audiovisual policy how-
ever argue that the hard instruments aimed to ‘commodify and commer-
cialise’ democratic, political and cultural functions of the media (Kaitatzi-
Whitlock, 2008); while others more cautiously sustain that the audiovisual 
policy was underpinned also by cultural, political and democratic values 
(Ward, 2002; Humphreys, 2008). Moreover, in addition to recognising 
multiple media functions (although with various proportions), the EU au-
diovisual policy has amalgamated an external and internal EU dimension 
combined with national preferences. Jakubowicz (2011) observed that the 
EU audiovisual policy gradually evolved as a compromise between con-
trasting tendencies: for both economic and cultural reasons, the EU has 
sought in the WTO and GATS negotiations a safeguard for the ability of 
member states to protect their audiovisual markets. These external incen-
tives resonated with internal objectives, as described above.
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In response to the convergence and evolution of digital media land-
scapes, the adoption of the AVMS Directive widened and diversified the 
scope of the audiovisual regulation. At the same time, its primary focus 
has not been remodelled. In its first report on the application of the Direc-
tive, the Commission states: “The AVMSD is an internal market instrument 
that combines the right to provide audiovisual services with the right to 
freedom of expression and information and the protection of important 
public interest objectives” (European Commission, 2012d: 4). Thus, the 
AVMS Directive remains, at the foremost, the hard legal instrument for 
a free circulation of audiovisual media services, including on demand ser-
vices. Its main objective is to harmonise the internal market for audio-
visual media services, while the extent of harmonisation varies among 
specific problem areas that are designed in a complementary manner and 
synchronised. For instance, the rule of ‘one member state jurisdiction’ is 
promoted as a contribution to media pluralism in the Recital 34: 
In order to promote a strong, competitive and integrated European audiovisual 
industry and enhance media pluralism throughout the Union, only one Member 
State should have jurisdiction over an audiovisual media service provider (…)
(European Parliament and the Council, 2010a). 
Analogous complementary links may be identified in the case of media lit-
eracy (Recital 47), selfregulation and co-regulation (Recital 44), the right 
to information and wide access by the public to events of major impor-
tance for society (Recital 49), the right of persons with a disability and of 
an elderly to participate and be integrated in the social and cultural life of 
the Community (Recital 46). These examples demonstrate that the AVMS 
Directive not only accommodated various partial issues under the frames 
of the audiovisual policy, but integrated multiple rationales in one regula-
tory framework. Another question is however, how these ‘added values’ 
function in the Directive. The document certainly offers differentiated 
degrees of regulation combining rhetoric recognition (media literacy, me-
dia pluralism) with regulatory encouragement (promotion of European 
works by non-linear services) and regulatory obligation (broadcasting of 
European works by linear services). In addition, the AVMS Directive har-
monises some concepts (e.g. advertising spot), whereas in other cases it 
does not significantly affect the ability of member states to define specific 
requirements concerning national circumstances and traditions (e.g. con-
tent harmful for minors) (European Commission, 2012d). 
Hence hard economic and cultural (e.g. European quota) provisions 
are combined with soft instruments and measures responding to educa-
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tional function of the media (media literacy), political/democratic func-
tion (media pluralism), cultural function (cultural diversity). It should 
be remembered that the Directive mainly serves to regulate the content, 
not audiovisual media structures and performance, although the content 
regulation might affect the latter. For example, thanks to the provision 
on free circulation of audiovisual media services, relevant providers may 
decide to register in another country of origin, than the country targeted 
with their offers.
In the convergence era the familiar policy framing building on the 
strategic importance of the audiovisual media has been extended to 
the converged media services. The change in language signals a change 
in the perception of a media reality: for decades, broadcasting has been 
heavily institutionalised and thus also more easily captured by policy 
thinking and regulation. In the elusive and ever-changing digital land-
scape, converged media services go out of a hand both in terms of con-
ceptualisation and regulation. In this regard, the Commission sees its role 
in embracing and defining the services that are expected to meet certain 
qualities to satisfy European users’ needs. On this point, the Green Paper: 
Preparing for a Fully Converged Audiovisual World: Growth, Creation and 
Values asserts: “The Commission’s vision is to seize the opportunity of this 
changing technological environment to ensure the widest possible access 
to European diversified content for all Europeans and, the widest choice 
of high quality offers” (European Commission, 2013a: 3). 
While convergence and technological progress generate greater me-
dia choice, they also induce critical challenges. The audiovisual media 
constitute a complex landscape, access to which is increasingly navigated 
through digital intermediaries affecting the findability of the audiovisual 
content with particular characteristics. Thus, the findability very much 
depends on the users’ ability to identify the appropriate access website/
platform allowing them to retrieve the audiovisual content which meets 
the users communication needs, including an appetite for diversity and 
quality. How much these reflect a public value or balance various func-
tions the media play in societies, is an open question. Various forms of 
knowledge inequality (e.g. political, cultural) may rise as a result of vol-
untary consumption decisions, or contractual conditions the users en-
counter with providers. To what extent these should be subject to cor-
rective regulatory policies, will be reflected in the forthcoming policy 
considerations of the EU on the converged audiovisual world. 
Yet, in the converged media landscape it seems increasingly diffi-
cult to delineate and define audiovisual media services that fall under 
the scope of the AVMS Directive. The Recital 22 of the Directive speci-
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fies that these are the services that “cover mass media in their function 
to inform, entertain and educate the general public, and should include 
audiovisual commercial communication but should exclude any form of 
private correspondence” (European Parliament and the Council, 2010a). 
In addition Recital 23 states that “the term ‘audiovisual’ should refer to 
moving images with or without sound, thus including silent films but not 
covering audio transmission or radio services” (European Parliament and 
the Council, 2010a). With regards to non-linear or on-demand audiovi-
sual media services, the Directive however provides further explanation 
emphasising a ‘TV-like’ character of these services: 
It is characteristic of on-demand audiovisual media services that they are ‘tel-
evision-like’, i.e. that they compete for the same audience as television broad-
casts, and the nature and the means of access to the service would lead the user 
reasonably to expect regulatory protection within the scope of this Directive 
(European Parliament and the Council, 2010a, Recital 24).
Although a vast number of audiovisual media services can be more or 
less easily identified according to these categorisations, proliferating de-
velopments of hybrid offerings constantly erode the boundaries between 
‘press-like’ and ‘TV-like’ services. What makes them fundamentally dif-
ferent? And if the difference is diminishing, why do ‘press-like’ services 
fall under divergent regulatory patterns? And why e.g. couldn’t the PSM 
offer ‘press-like’ services? The Directive provides plenty of examples of 
services that are excluded from the scope of the regulation listing among 
them: “all services the principal purpose of which is not the provision 
of programmes, i.e. where any audiovisual content is merely inciden-
tal to the service and not its principal purpose” (Recital 22); “websites 
that contain audiovisual elements only in an ancillary manner” (Recital 
22); “audio transmission or radio services” (Recital 23); “electronic ver-
sions of newspapers and magazines” (Recital 28). Thus, the boundar-
ies in the definition are rather provided through enumerating examples 
than the  definition itself. The inner boundary between linear and non-
linear services falling under a different degree of the regulation, may 
raise similar concerns (Woods, 2008: 150).
The potential gaps and uncertainties stem very much from the chang-
ing and converging nature of the audiovisual sector. Though embracing 
constantly a larger territory of overlapping issues, the EU audiovisual 
policy – for the most part of its history – concentrated on two axes: on the 
one hand – free circulation of audiovisual media services within the EU 
internal market; on the other hand – cultural protection of the EU audio-
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visual media services. These two dimensions will be studied in the next 
sections of this chapter with respect to policy harmonisation in the CEE 
countries. 
4.2. European and independent works
Despite a relatively weak cultural proximity within the EU and an anemic 
transnational dimension of the media systems, the EU has shown a firm 
regulatory determination in the protection of European cultural expres-
sions and cultural diversity through European audiovisual contents. Gov-
erned by the logic of competitiveness in a global environment, cultural 
diversity has mainly been conceptualised and operationalised as the com-
petitiveness of European ideas, cultures, languages – and most crucial-
ly – the media and communication industries as a whole, on the global 
scene. Thus, supra-national content rules have been defined and used 
to protect the common European media space from foreign (mainly US) 
imports and to support European dominant media players. In this sense, 
the concept of cultural diversity justified measures concerning European 
works and independent production in the AVMS Directive. The promo-
tion of European works, co-productions and works made by independent 
producers has been increasingly perceived and interpreted as an essential 
contribution to nurturing of the cultural diversity both within and outside 
Europe, as a pertinent way of correcting the proportions between media 
representations of cultures on a global scale (Klimkiewicz, 2009b). 
In regulatory terms, the defining concept under which the European 
cultural expressions and representations are protected in the audiovisual 
media is European works. What does this expression mean? What makes 
the works European – the place of production or other distinctive charac-
teristics? The AVMSD (and earlier TWF Directive) in the Article 1 (n) rec-
ognises these services as works originating in one of the member states. 
Works originating in states which are not members of the EU but are party 
to the Council of Europe’s Convention on Transfrontier Television (ECTT) 
can also be considered ‘European works’. Works have to be “mainly made 
with authors and workers residing in one or more of the States referred 
to in those provisions” (European Parliament and the Council, 2010a). In 
addition, also works co-produced within the framework of agreements 
related to the audiovisual sector concluded between the Union and third 
countries can be acknowledged as ‘European works’. Finally, works that 
are produced within 
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the framework of bilateral co-production agreements concluded between 
Member States and third countries shall be deemed to be European works pro-
vided that the co-producers from the Union supply a majority share of the total 
cost of production and that the production is not controlled by one or more 
producers established outside the territory of the Member States (European 
Parliament and the Council, 2010a). 
Though this rich definition deals with multiple categories of works, 
the main criterion by which they are perceived as ‘European’ is the place 
of their production or a location of residence of their authors and workers 
involved. No other distinctive characteristics are involved, no any specific 
conditions refer to a European dimension in the content itself. Shalini 
Venturelli observes that “Clearly, none of these provisions accounts for 
the crucial distinction between audiovisual programming integrated into 
the multinational production and distribution chain, and programmes 
that are independent of this structure” (Venturelli, 1998: 205). In other 
words, the protection of what is defined as ‘European works’ in the AVMS 
Directive does not ensure by definition the desired representation of Eu-
ropean cultures. Such a representation can indirectly result from the cul-
tural embeddedness of producers and expectation of audiences, but is not 
conditionally linked with the definition per se. 
The Recital 32 of the Directive enables member states to establish 
a more detailed definition of European works for media service providers 
under their jurisdiction, in compliance with Union law and the objectives 
of the Directive. Consequently, e.g. France further specifies the concept of 
‘European work’ (Decree n° 90–66) by stating that, there is required, for 
each film, a minimum proportion of authors and workers to be residing 
in the European States concerned (Attentional, 2011a: 21). In addition, 
under French law, the producer not only needs to be established in one 
of those States, but also to have managers and a majority of its directors 
being nationals from those States (Attentional, 2011a: 21). Even with all 
these qualifications, the ‘European’ dimension of European works refers 
mainly to the nationality and place of residence of media professionals 
involved in the content production. In this way, it seems to protect not the 
cultural expressions of the European works per se, but the organisational 
and professional framework of their production.
With an exception of the Czech Republic, the other Central Euro-
pean countries introduced provisions on European works in their media 
or broadcasting laws before the formal start of pre-accession monitoring 
in 1997. The AVMSD was designed already within the EU in a new geo-
graphical shape with young members states from Central and Eastern 
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Europe. Although nothing signalled possible implementation problems, 
already in the pre-accession monitoring, the Regular Reports underlined 
repeatedly the institutional weakness of regulatory bodies responsible for 
implementation and monitoring of the Directive. Insufficient capacities 
of the regulatory bodies, political pressures and communication deficit 
led to serious delays in the implementation of the AVMS Directive in the 
case of Poland and Slovakia (in Poland at the end of 2012 and Slovakia 
at the beginning of 2013), while in the case of Hungary concerns were 
raised by the Commission about the political control over the National 
Media and Communications Authority that was established on basis of 
media laws passed in 2010. The communication deficit in the case 
of Poland led to the weak ability of the regulatory body (KRRiT – National 
Broadcasting Council) to translate successfully the objectives of the Di-
rective to the mainstream media, some of which reported the implemen-
tation of the Directive as an “attempt to regulate the Internet”. On the 
other hand, the implementation of the consolidated version of AVMSD 
served the Hungarian policy-makers as a strong argument for imposing 
the controversial practice of media outlets registration which has later 
been abandoned. Ultimately, the rules on registration and authorisation 
of media service providers were amended to comply with the Directive, 
allowing media service providers to register with the regulatory agency 
within 60 days of launching their services, rather than prior to doing so 
(Freedom House, 2013). These mismatches of reasons behind the na-
tional implementation of the EU regulation prove that in addition to sim-
ple transposition of rules within a given time frame, a decisive role has 
been played and continues to be played by political culture and political 
involvement, as well as by the ability or inability of regulatory bodies to 
build more durable and closer ties with media users.
4.2.1. A majority proportion of European works: Article 16
A quota system for European works was established in Article 4 of the Tele-
vision without Frontiers Directive (European Council, 1989). The AVMS 
Directive maintained largely the wording of this Article in Article 16 (1):
Member States shall ensure, where practicable and by appropriate means, that 
broadcasters reserve for European works a majority proportion of their trans-
mission time, excluding the time allotted to news, sports events, games, adver-
tising, teletext services and teleshopping. This proportion, having regard to the 
broadcaster’s informational, educational, cultural and entertainment responsi-
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bilities to its viewing public, should be achieved progressively, on the basis of 
suitable criteria (European Parliament and the Council, 2010a).
Although the quota system was quite contentious from its onset 
( McGoonagle, 2008: 187), a gradual consensus on the rules evolved 
among stakeholders and the Commission asserted a satisfactory progress 
in its following reports on the application of EU works promotion. Yet 
the widening of the AVMS Directive’s scope to non-linear audiovisual 
media services brought far less agreement both among the stakeholders 
and member states. Peter Humphreys noticed that “France sought for the 
quotas to be extended to on-demand services, while others like the UK re-
sisted such change” (Humphreys, 2008: 163). Ultimately, a compromise 
has been reached among the member states entailing that providers of 
on-demand services shall promote the production of and access to Euro-
pean works (Article 13, European Parliament and the Council, 2010a). As 
will be shown in the next section of this chapter, many countries, among 
them all the CEE member states studied empirically in this volume, opted 
for quotas in the case of on-demand services, thus, in fact applying the 
‘French solution’.
The member states are obliged to report on the implementation of 
Article 16 and 17 within their jurisdictions biannually. The reports on the 
application of Article 13 are due in each four years. The largest body of 
data generated in the reporting process is primarily statistical, although 
other factors influencing different national outcomes of implementa-
tion are also taken into consideration. These include: a legal analysis, 
monitoring and sanctions. In its First Report on the Application of the 
AVMS Directive, the Commission demonstrated that throughout the EU 
the average broadcasting time for European works increased from 62.6% 
in 2007 to 63.2% in 2008. Between 2005 and 2008 it remained stable 
at a satisfactory level (European Commission, 2012d: 6). In 2009, the 
average transmission time dedicated to European works by all reported 
channels in the EU-27 slightly increased to 63.8% and in 2010 – to 64.3% 
(European Commission, 2012e). Comparing the situation in particular 
member states, the average share of transmission time devoted to Euro-
pean works during the reference period varied between 44% (Ireland) 
and 83% (Hungary) in 2009 and between 47.4% (Slovenia and UK) and 
81% (Hungary) in 2010 (European Commission, 2012e: 9). Interestingly, 
young CEE member states are both among the countries with the lowest 
score (Slovenia) as well as among the countries with the highest score 
(Hungary). Václav Štetka observes that in 2004, just after the accession, 
the new member states achieved comparable results to those reached by 
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the EU-15 countries (Štetka, 2010). It seems, however, important to ob-
serve the dynamics of the average share of transmission time devoted to 
European works in the CEE countries. The table and figure below present 
the dynamics of these data between 2005–2010 in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
Table 10: The average share of transmission time devoted to European 
works in the CEE member states between 2005–2010 (in %)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
CZECH 
REPUBLIC
62.9 79.9 64.3 65.9 64.1 58.1
HUNGARY 71.9 76.9 68.5 75.3 83.0 81.0
POLAND 80.2 81.1 85 83.1 78.4 78.4
SLOVAKIA 63.8 62.3 66.5 67.3 71.7 68.2
Source: European Commission (2008; 2012g).
Figure 5: The average share of transmission time devoted to European 
works in the CEE member states between 2005–2010





























As can be seen from the table and figure presented, there is no unilateral 
trend of progress or decrease among the countries studied. Two coun-
tries – Slovakia and Hungary witnessed a growth of transmission time de-
voted to European works, while Poland experienced a slight drop and the 
Czech Republic also a more visible decrease. In comparison to the average 
EU-27 shares in 2009 and 2010, all CEE countries demonstrated a higher 
share than the EU average in 2009 and only the Czech Republic displayed 
a lower share in 2010 (58.1%). The high and relatively stable share of Eu-
ropean works especially in Poland and Hungary (around  75–80%) gives 
an impression that a crucial portion of audiovisual production offered by 
the channels covered in the monitoring originates in the EU countries.
These satisfactory results have to be put in a broader context of media 
structural developments, legal prerequisites and regulatory choices. First 
of all, it is worth seeing, how many channels have surpassed the required 
threshold of 50% and how many failed to reach that level. The table be-
low illustrates the number of channels in these two opposite  categories.
Table 11: The number of channels failing to achieve and complying with 
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77 67 (87%) 32 (47.9%) 35 (52.1%)
HUNGARY 39 25 (64.1%) 3 (12%) 22 (88%)
POLAND 73 58 (79.1%) 10 (17.0%) 48 (83%)
SLOVAKIA 34 26 (82.3%) 5 (19.2%) 21 (80.8%)
Sources: European Commission (2012h).
The table demonstrates that in 2010, in the two countries with the highest 
shares of European works (Poland and Hungary) the number of channels 
failing to achieve the required threshold was relatively low (in the case of 
Poland – 17%, in the case of Hungary – 12%). On the contrary, in the Czech 
Republic the number of channels elapsing the required portion of the Euro-
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pean production reached a remarkable high level (32 channels; 47%). Inter-
estingly enough, many of these channels do not target Czech audiences, but 
rather viewers in neighbouring countries (e.g. in Hungary: Comedy Central 
Hungary, HBO HU, MTV Hungary; in Poland: Comedy Central Poland, HBO2 
PL, HBO Comedy Poland, HBO PL, MTV Polska) (European Commission, 
2012h). A brief look at these data reveals that more open TV landscapes and 
liberal approach to granting licences to foreign broadcasters tend to be as-
sociated with lower shares of transmission time devoted to European works.
Another important aspect to mention in this regard are legal prereq-
uisites, such as the definitions of European works in terms of inclusion or 
exclusion of particular programme types. Total transmission time qualify-
ing for the application of the European quota excludes in the AVMS Direc-
tive “the time alloted to news, sports events, games, advertising, teletext 
services and teleshopping” (Article 16 (1); the European Parliament and 
the Council, 2010a). Many member states have transposed the definition 
directly into the national legislation in a form identical or equivalent to 
the Directive. These include Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. On the 
contrary, Hungary has opted in the past for a broader definition (more 
programmes included). This had a direct impact on the results achieved in 
measuring the share of European works, because the programmes excluded 
from narrow definitions are usually produced domestically, making it more 
difficult for broadcasters to comply (Attentional, 2011a: 22). Hungary did 
not exclude any programmes from the annual transmission time in 2009 
and 2010, and it is worth recalling in this context that Hungary reached the 
highest shares of European works in 2009 and 2010 among all 27 EU mem-
ber states. In these cases – the 50% requirement was based on the total 
amount of broadcasting time, making it easier for broadcasters to achieve 
a majority proportion of European works (Attentional, 2011a: 23). Substan-
tial changes in this practice were introduced with the enforcement of the 
Act CLXXXV on Media Services and Mass Media.1 Under Article 22 (7) 
the qualifying transmission time excludes: “news programmes, sports pro-
grammes, games, advertisements, teleshopping, political advertisements, 
public service announcements, sponsorship communications, public ser-
vice advertisements and the noninteractive teletext”.
Another affecting provision is the ‘where practicable’ clause.2 Despite 
attempts to modify and clarify the obligations of broadcasters through 
1 Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media published on 31 Decem-
ber 2010 in Magyar Közlöny (Official Journal) and amended in March 2011.
2 “Member States shall ensure, where practicable and by appropriate means, that 
broadcasters reserve for European works a majority proportion of their transmission time 
(…) (Article 16 (1), European Parliament and the Council, 2010a).
156
removing the phrase ‘where practicable’, the main institutional players 
involved in the following modernisations of the Directive opted for es-
sentially unchanged wording (McGoonagle, 2008). This has resulted 
in various practices among the member states opening the possibilities 
for the more or less flexible approach used by the national regulatory 
agencies. Some of the countries decided to define under what conditions 
a lower proportion will be accepted. In the case of Poland, a lower pro-
portion for the first transmission year of a new broadcaster, and lower 
thresholds for pay-TV and thematic channels were established in Article 
15 (4) of the 1992 Broadcasting Act. In addition, a possibility of lower 
shares applies also to programme services that are intended for national 
or ethnic minorities and a community using a regional language, as well 
as programme services transmitted solely via information and commu-
nication technology systems.3 Likewise, in Slovakia, national legislation 
allows the regulator to set a lower proportion in licences for the first-
time holders of licence and for broadcasters of monothematic (special 
interest) programme services (Attentional, 2011a: 25).4 The regulatory 
agency can also determine a gradual increase of the required share de-
pending on the economic situation of the broadcaster and accessibility of 
European works.5 In Hungary, the provisions on European quotas do not 
apply to “the local media service with the exception of community media 
service”6; “the media service which broadcasts its service exclusively in 
a language other than the languages of the Member States of the Euro-
pean Union”7 and “the media service which is exclusively broadcasted in 
countries outside of the European Union”.8 The Czech Republic seems 
to offer the most flexible rules in this regard as the 2001 Act on Radio 
and Television Broadcasting contains only a general reference to ‘where 
practicable’ and in addition, provides categories of broadcasters that are 
exempted from an obligation to reserve a majority of transmission time 
3 1992 Broadcasting Act (Ustawa o Radiofonii i Telewizji) adopted on 29 Decem-
ber, 1992, Official Journal 1993, No. 7, item 34, as amended (available at: http://www.
krrit.gov.pl/Data/Files/_public/Portals/0/angielska/Documents/Regulations/broadcast-
ing_act_28022013.pdf; retrieved 29.07.2013).
4 Act No 308 of 14 September 2000 Coll. on Broadcasting and Retransmission (as 
amended), Article 23(2). (available at: http://www.rvr.sk/_cms/data/modules/down-
load/1364909855_zakon_308-2000_ucinny_2013-01-01.pdf; retrieved 5.11.2013).
5 Ibidem.
6 Article 22 (1) d, Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media published 
on 31 December 2010 in Magyar Közlöny (Official Journal) and amended in March 2011.
7 Article 22 (1) c, Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media published 
on 31 December 2010 in Magyar Közlöny (Official Journal) and amended in March 2011.
8 Article 22 (1) e, Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media published 
on 31 December 2010 in Magyar Közlöny (Official Journal) and amended in March 2011.
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to European works. In addition to operators of local broadcasting, also 
broadcasters primarily aiming at non-Czech and non-EU audiences are 
exempted from the European quotas:
The obligations of the television broadcaster set out in Sections 42 to 44 hereof 
shall not apply to television broadcasters whose broadcasting is intended ex-
clusively for reception outside the Czech Republic and outside the territory of 
the Member States of the European Communities, which television broadcast-
ing is not directly or indirectly received by the public in the Czech Republic or 
in any of the Member States of the European Communities9
It is worth mentioning that the application of European quotas by 
linear broadcasters is also affected by schedule time requirements. For 
example, in Hungary, the broadcasters must ensure that relevant propor-
tions of European works are broadcasted during the transmission time of 
the different media services between 5.00 a.m. and 12.00 p.m.10
Analysing the European quota policy in context of the television scene 
in the Czech Republic, Václav Štetka (2010) argues that the fact that the 
Directive does not distinguish between domestic and non-domestic Euro-
pean programmes in its definition of European works, enables the broad-
casters to comply with the provisions of Article 16 without devoting even 
a minute to programmes from another European country. Accordingly, 
the Commission’s report Promotion of European works in EU scheduled and 
on-demand audiovisual media services (European Commission, 2012e: 9) 
observes that although the rule on promotion of European works in linear 
services is generally working well, it has “a limited effect on the circula-
tion of programmes throughout the EU as it does not ensure the distribu-
tion of non-domestic European works”.
This challenge is strengthened by the fact that some national reg-
ulatory models use quotas for national production or works produced 
originally in a national language, while any provisions on non-domestic 
European production are relatively rare. The Recital 70 of the AVMS Di-
rective invites member states to implement Article 16 in such a way that 
broadcasters are encouraged to include an adequate share of co-produced 
European works or of European works of non-domestic origin (European 
Parliament and the Council, 2010a). Notwithstanding, the proportion of 
non-domestic European works has still been low and made up only 8.1 % 
9 Act No. 231/2001 of 17 May 2001 on Radio and Television Broadcasting and on 
Amendment to Other Acts, Section 45 (2) (available at: http://www.rrtv.cz/en/static/docu-
ments/act-231-2001/Act-on-RTV-broadcasting-reflecting-AVMSD.pdf; retrieved 5.11.2013).
10 Article 22 (5), Article 22(1) e, Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services…
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of the total qualifying transmission time in 2010 (Attentional, 2011a: 
11). Even though in the young EU member states non-domestic Europe-
an works seem to be represented more prominently than in old member 
states (13.5% vs. 6.4%) (Attentional, 2011a: 11–12), legal implementa-
tion of Article 16 is in some countries paired with the protection of na-
tionally produced content, but not a requirement of a relevant proportion 
of non-domestic European works. In 2009, the European Court of Justice 
confirmed that member states may adopt measures to defend and pro-
mote one or several official languages as part of their cultural policy.11 
The table below offers comparison of rules promoting national works or 
works in national languages as implemented in national broadcasting 
laws in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
11 Case C-222/07, UTECA, 5.03.2009. (European Commission, 2012d: 6).
Table 12: Legal provisions in national broadcasting laws aiming to protect 
national works or works produced in national languages in the Czech 












NO – – –
HUNGARY YES Article 20 (1):
The media service 
provider
– shall allocate over 
one-third of its 
transmission time to 
broadcasting Hungarian 
works;
– shall allocate at 
least eight percent of 
its transmission time 
to broadcasting Hun. 
works that were ordered 













 – works 
originally made 











HUNGARY YES Article 20 (2) 
At least ten percent (of 
the total length of the 
programmes made avail-
able in a given calendar 
year in the form of 
on-demand audiovisual 
media services) shall be 
Hungarian works.
Article 20 (3)
The public media service 
provider shall be obliged 
to allocate over half of 
its annual transmission 
time to broadcasting 
Hungarian works.




life or culture 
of the given 
nationality 
in Hungary.
POLAND YES Article 15 (1)
TV broadcasters 
shall reserve at least 
33% of their quarterly 
transmission time for 
programmes originally 
produced in the Polish 
language, excluding 
news, advertising, tele-
shopping, sports events, 
















the basis of 
a script written 
originally in the 
Polish language 
and first regis-















The broadcasters are 
required to ensure the 
use of a national official 
language, the languages 
of national minorities 
and foreign languages in 
accordance with special 
provisions









Sources: Elaborated on the basis of national broadcasting laws in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia as quoted in the table.
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The table demonstrates that national provisions with the effect of 
promoting national works decidedly vary from a country to country. The 
Czech Republic does not impose any such measures in its broadcasting 
law, while Slovakia requires from broadcasters to use the official national 
language in accordance with other special provisions. Both Poland and 
Hungary apply a fairly similar quota system to promote national works. 
The broadcasters are obliged to reserve one third of their transmission 
time to national works in Hungary, while 33% in Poland. The differences 
can be observed with regards to the definition of ‘Hungarian works’ in 
Hungary (these may also include works produced in other languages pro-
vided that they concern the life and culture of nationalities in Hungary) 
and ‘programmes originally produced in the Polish language’ (referring 
to ‘European works’ originally registered in the Polish language and pro-
duced on basis of the script in the Polish language). Although implying 
a direct causal link between the legal promotion of national works and 
significant share of European works may be too far-reaching, the statisti-
cal data show that the largest share of European works in 2005–2010 
was achieved in Poland and Hungary – the countries that used the quota 
system for the support of national works.
The European Commission has repeatedly proclaimed that the effort 
to promote European culture through the policy on European works has 
been successful. To the certain extent, this success materialises in statisti-
cal results and the lasting (although not necessarily enthusiastic) support 
of stakeholders. The CEE countries have proved to meet the quota require-
ments comfortably above the EU average, but varied country outcomes 
seem to depend on additional factors: licencing policies, definition of Eu-
ropean works, more or less flexible treatment of the ‘where practicable’ 
clause, and measures on national works. The positive trends – reported in 
various EU policy documents – have been clearly constrained by several 
limits. First, Karol Jakubowicz (2011: 306) notices that despite the quota 
policy, there has been greater preference for US-originated content than 
non-domestic European works, and a clear preference for domestic and 
national over non-domestic content. Second, Tarlach McGoonagle pays 
attention to drawing general conclusions without analysing the substance 
of content. In other words, the statistical and quantitative data offer com-
fortable generalisations, but tell us little about the effectiveness of the 
quota policy at the level of content and stimulation of cultural creativity 
(McGoonagle, 2008: 202). The new reporting template being used since 
2010, has included also “linear and non-linear content analysis” (Atten-
tional 2011a; 2011b), but this did not provide a comprehensive pattern 
for studying the content in terms of its focus, cultural dimension, and cul-
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tural representation, but instead offered a quantitative viewing data and 
reference to a genre category. Actual viewing preferences (use, exposure) 
is certainly an important dimension completing the data on a mere trans-
mission (supply), and should be part of the regular monitoring. But suf-
ficient understanding of how the cultural aims of the audiovisual policy 
have been met through the implementing of a quantitative quota needs 
an analysis of qualitative characteristics of the content.
4.2.2. European works created by independent producers and recent 
works: Article 17 
In addition to promotion of European works at a general level, the AVMS 
Directive protects European works produced by independent producers. 
Under Article 17 of the Directive
Member States shall ensure, where practicable and by appropriate means, that 
broadcasters reserve at least 10% of their transmission time, excluding the time 
allotted to news, sports events, games, advertising, teletext services and tele-
shopping, or alternately, at the discretion of the Member State, at least 10% of 
their programming budget, for European works created by producers who are 
independent of broadcasters (European Parliament and the Council, 2010a).
Such a proportion must be achieved by earmarking an adequate propor-
tion for recent works – that are the works transmitted within 5 years of 
their production. The Directive does not explain how the term “adequate 
proportion” has to be understood by member states. In consequence, 
some of the member states have merely transposed the AVMSD word-
ing without interpretations (among them Slovakia), some defined the 
minimum proportions that broadcasters are obliged to reserve for recent 
works (among them Poland and Czech Republic) and some have required 
the entire proportion of works created by independent producers to be 
recent (among them Hungary). The table below summarises this large 
variety among the CEE member states.
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Table 13: Provisions on European works created by independent producers 
in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia







10% of Qualifying 
Transmission Time 
or 10% of 
programming budget





Production shall be 
recent
Section 43
Act No. 231/2001 
of 17 May 2001 on 
Radio and Television 
Broadcasting and 
on Amendment to 
Other Acts
HUNGARY 10% of Qualifying 
Transmission Time
All recent works Article 20 (1)
Act CLXXXV of 2010 
on Media Services 
and Mass Media, as 
amended
POLAND 10% of Qualifying 
Transmission Time





Act adopted on 
29 December, 1992, 
as amended
SLOVAKIA Choice between 
10% of Qualifying 
Transmission Time 




Appropriate share of 
recent works
Article 25 (1), 
(2) and (3) 
Act No. 308 of 
14 September 2000 
Coll. on Broadcasting 
and Retransmission 
(as amended)
Sources: Elaborated on the basis of national broadcasting laws in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia as quoted in the table.
Article 17 of the Directive establishes two alternative conditions for Euro-
pean works created by independent producers: broadcasters may reserve 
at least 10% of either transmission time or programming budget for in-
dependent productions. For the reason that the member states can delib-
erately choose between these two alternatives, the national regulatory 
responses have varied again. Some of the member states have chosen 
to apply the 10% proportion of transmission time (among them Hun-
gary and Poland), some offered a choice between transmission time or 
 programming budget (among them the Czech Republic and Slovakia). 
Until 31 December 2010, Hungary was the only country to apply both 
criteria to all channels (Attentional, 2011a: 32). This has changed, how-
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ever, with the adoption of the 2010 Act CLXXXV on Media Services and 
Mass Media.
Some divergence can also be observed with regard to the definition 
of ‘independent producer’. Recital 71 of the Directive proposes member 
states to take into consideration certain criteria that enable to define ‘in-
dependent producer’. These include: “the ownership of the production 
company, the amount of programmes supplied to the same broadcaster 
and the ownership of secondary rights” (European Parliament and the 
Council, 2010a). Although some member states did not introduce any 
definition and some used in their definition only one criterion proposed 
in the AVMS Directive, all CEE member states employed more than one 
criterion to define ‘independent producer’. As can be seen from the table 
below, most commonly used criterion for the definition is ownership and 
ability to control the producer through various forms of ownership ties. 
All country definitions refer to this criterion. In addition, the Czech Re-
public adopted the criterion of the programme supply, Poland and Hun-
gary the criterion of executive employees bounds and Slovakia the crite-
rion to exercise creative control over production.
Table 14: Definitions of ‘independent producer’ in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia







– not interconnected with 
a TV broadcaster in 
property terms, or 
– whose supply of works 
to a single television 
broadcaster does not 
exceed 90% of its total 
production over 3 years
– not interconnected 
through a person holding 
voting rights or an owner-
ship interest
Section 43
Act No. 231/2001 










– no interconnectedness 
over the owner with 
a qualifying holding (direct 
or indirect shareholding)
– executive employees or 
any of their close relatives 
not be bound by a 
work-related relationship 
Article 203 (12)
Act CLXXXV of 
2010 on Media 




OF A GIVEN 
 BROADCASTER
– not bound by 
employment relation with 
the given broadcaster
– not a broadcaster itself
– holds no stake in the 
broadcaster’s 
organisation, and in 
which neither the 
broadcaster nor any of its 
subsidiaries nor any 
companies associated 
in the same group hold 
a stake
– governing board 
members are not bound 
by employment relation 
with the given 
broadcaster and are not 
broadcasters themselves










– has capacity to exercise 
control over authors, 
production and 
equipment facilities used 
in the production and not 
influenced by the 
broadcaster
– not interconnected 
through ownership with 
the broadcaster
– independent  production 
are not programmes 
linked directly to 
broadcasting 
activities such as news, 
live transmissions of 
sporting events, games, 
advertising, teletext and 
teleshopping 
Article 24, Article 26
Act No. 308 of 





Sources: Elaborated on the basis of national broadcasting laws in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia as quoted in the table.
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The EU-average proportion reserved for independent productions broad-
cast by all reported channels in the member states was 34.1% in 2009 and 
33.8% in 2010 (European Commission, 2012e:10). This represents a vis-
ible decrease in comparison with the previous period. Independent works 
seem to be more prominent in old and large member states than in young 
and small (Attentional, 2011a). The table and figure below show that the 
share of independent works varies also across the CEE member states. In 
2010, Hungary achieved the highest proportion – 42.5%, while the Czech 
Republic the lowest share – 26%. 
Table 15: The average share of transmission time devoted to European 
works by independent producers in the CEE member states between 
2005–2010 (in %)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
CZECH 
REPUBLIC
33.9 35.0 32.2 40.7 30.9 26.0
HUNGARY 43.4 53.9 39.7 41.8 42.9 42.5
POLAND 26.7 26.0 25.0 29.0 31.0 30.8
SLOVAKIA 25.4 26.0 24.0 23.8 29.0 27.6
Source: European Commission (2008; 2012g).
Figure 6: The average share of transmission time devoted to European 
works by independent producers in the CEE member states between 
2005–2010





























The share of independent works slightly increased in Poland and Slo-
vakia; decreased in the Czech Republic and diverged in Hungary be-
tween 2005–2010. Given that a declining trend with respect to the level 
achieved in 2007 was reported by the Commission (European Commis-
sion, 2012e: 12) for the EU, only the Czech Republic represents a con-
gruent trend with these developments. On the other hand, only Hungary 
demonstrates a proportion of independent works above the EU average, 
the remaining countries (the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia) do 
achieve lower shares than the EU average.
4.2.3. Promotion of European works in on-demand audiovisual 
services: Article 13
The promotion of European works has always been seen as one of the 
essential AVMSD provisions, that needs to be extended to on-demand au-
diovisual services. Recital 69 of the Directive provides justification for this 
extension claiming that “on-demand audiovisual services have the poten-
tial to partially replace television broadcasting”, therefore they should 
promote the production and distribution of European works (European 
Parliament and the Council, 2010a). On the other hand, Recital 58 states 
that “on-demand audiovisual services are different from television broad-
casting with regard to the choice and control the user can exercise (…)”. 
This justifies requirement of a lighter regulation of audiovisual media 
services (European Parliament and the Council, 2010a). These two regu-
latory guidelines are reflected in the Article 13 (1):
Member States shall ensure that on-demand audiovisual media services pro-
vided by media service providers under their jurisdiction promote, where prac-
ticable and by appropriate means, the production of and access to European 
works. Such promotion could relate, inter alia, to the financial contribution 
made by such services to the production and rights acquisition of European 
works or to the share and/or prominence of European works in the catalogue 
of programmes offered by the on-demand audiovisual media service (Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council, 2010a). 
Article 13 (2) sets reporting obligations for member states to report ev-
ery four years on the application of Article 13. The deadline for the first 
reporting period was established as of 19 December 2011 in the AVMSD. 
Although by 2010, a majority of the member states have transposed Arti-
cle 13 into their national legislation, some CEE member states did so later 
(Poland and Slovakia). Thus, the data on on-demand audiovisual services 
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collected from national authorities for the Study on the implementation 
of the provisions of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive concerning the 
promotion of European works in audiovisual media services (Attentional, 
2011a; 2011b) and the Commission Staff Working Document (European 
Commission, 2012f) are fairly uneven and description of relevant promo-
tion practices in some member states virtually missing. Moreover, the 
legal analysis concerning the national implementation of obligations for 
the on-demand media services to promote European works seems to be 
very incomplete. The table below seeks to fill these gaps and offer a com-
parison of relevant measures in the CEE member states on the basis of the 
most recent legal rules.
Table 16: Legal obligations of providers of on-demand audiovisual services 
with regard to promotion of European works in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia















– the obligation to 
devote at least 10% of 
the total number of 
qualifying programmes 
of the catalogue to 
European works or to 
spend at least 1% of 
revenues to the 
production or the 
acquisition of European 
works
Section 7
Act No. 132/2010 















– the obligation to 
devote over 
one-quarter of the 
total length of the 
programmes made 
available in a given 
calendar year in the 
form of on-demand 
audiovisual media 
services to European 
works, and at least ten 
percent to Hungarian 
works 
Article 21 (2)
Act CLXXXV of 
2010 on Media 
Services and 












– the obligation to 
promote European 
works, including works 
produced originally in 
the Polish language (by 
proper identification of 
the programmes 
available in the 
catalogue or placement 
of materials promoting 
European works)
– the obligation to 
allocate at least 
20% of the content 
in their catalogue to 
European works 
including works 
originally produced in 
the Polish language
– the obligation to 
provide adequate 
visibility to such 
programmes in the 
catalogue 
Article 47f (1), 
(2), (3) and (4)
1992 Broadcast-
ing Act adopted 




– the obligation to 
reserve at least 20% of 




Act No. 308 
of 14 September 




Sources: Elaborated on the basis of national broadcasting laws in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia as quoted in the table.
Similarly as in the previous section, it would be instructive to reflect upon 
these regulatory obligations in the context of exemptions or reductions of the 
requirements by the national authorities. In Slovakia, national legislation al-
lows the regulator to set a lower proportion of European works “taking into 
account the economic situation of an on-demand audiovisual media service 
provider, the availability of European works or the focus of an on-demand 
audiovisual media service”.12 In Poland, the requirement of the programme 
12 Act No. 308 of 14 September 2000 Coll. on Broadcasting and Retransmission (as 
amended), Article 27a(2). (available at: http://www.rvr.sk/_cms/data/modules/down-
load/1364909855_zakon_308-2000_ucinny_2013-01-01.pdf; retrieved 5.11.2013).
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quotas does not apply to “the catalogues, in which only audiovisual pro-
grammes other than European works are provided to the general public”.13 
By 2010, only the Czech Republic fully implemented AVMSD regu-
lations concerning on-demand services, and thus was the only country 
among the CEE member states that provided factual data on the imple-
mentation of Article 13 for the Commission’s First Report on the Appli-
cation of Articles 13, 16 and 17 of Directive 2010/13/EU for the period 
2009–2010 (European Commission, 2012e). In 2010, 29 on-demand ser-
vices were reported in the Czech Republic, among which the quota obli-
gation applied to 24. The proportions of European works offered in the 
catalogues ranked from 10% to 100%, the average share being 51.3%. 
All services complied with the quota obligation set out in the legislation 
(European Commission, 2012f: 12).
Generally, the CEE member states have opted for the quota system 
in promotion of European works by on-demand services rather than re-
quiring financial contribution to the production or acquisition of Euro-
pean works (with the exception of the Czech Republic). The quotas vary 
from 10% in the Czech Republic to 25% in Hungary. So far, the infor-
mation on adopting the quota system by on-demand service providers 
has been scant. Observing the results achieved by the Czech providers of 
on-demand services, one can assume that meeting the quota conditions 
depends very much on a specific character of the service, and thus, com-
pliance may largely differ among providers.
4.3. Country of origin, free circulation of audiovisual media 
services and internal market
While the promotion of European production has mainly been perceived 
as guided by cultural objectives, free circulation of audiovisual media ser-
vices certainly fulfills economic objectives of audiovisual media policy, 
and is seen to contribute to the development of the internal market. Free 
circulation of media services supported by internal market rules finds 
practical application in the country of origin principle of Article 2 of the 
AVMSD (European Commission, 2012d: 4). Article 3 (1) requires from 
member states to ensure freedom of reception and no restrictions on re-
transmissions on their territory of audiovisual media services from other 
13 1992 Broadcasting Act adopted on 29 December, 1992, Official Journal 1993, 




member states (European Parliament and the Council, 2010a). This fun-
damental principle of free circulation of broadcasts has been implement-
ed by national broadcasting laws in the CEE countries in a quite differen-
tiated way as the table below demonstrates.
Table 17: Provisions on free circulation of audiovisual media services the 
in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
Country Provisions on free circulation 




“A broadcaster and rebroadcaster shall 
be entitled to broadcast programmes 
in a free and independent manner. Any 
intervention in the contents of the 
programmes is only admissible on 
the basis of law and within the limits 
thereof”.
Section 31 (1)
Act No. 231/2001 of 
17 May 2001 on Radio 
and Television 
Broadcasting and on 
Amendment to Other 
Acts
HUNGARY “Media services may be provided and 
press products may be published freely, 
information and opinions may be 
transmitted freely through the mass 
media, and Hungarian and foreign media 
services intended for public reception 
may be accessed freely in Hungary (…)”.
Article 3
Act CLXXXV of 2010 
on Media Services 
and Mass Media, as 
amended
POLAND “Reception of domestic and foreign 
programme services and on-demand 
audiovisual media services, intended by 
media service providers for reception by 
the general public, shall be free subject 
to compliance with the requirements set 
forth by the applicable law”.
Article 1 (2) 
1992 Broadcasting Act 
adopted 
on 29 December, 1992, 
as amended
SLOVAKIA “A broadcaster shall be entitled to 
broadcast programmes in a free and 
independent manner. Any intervention in 
the contents of the programmes is only 
admissible on the basis of law and within 
the limits thereof”.
Article 15 (1) 
Act No 308 
of 14 September 2000 
Coll. on Broadcasting 
and Retransmission 
(as amended)
Sources: Elaborated on the basis of national broadcasting laws in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia as quoted in the table.
As can be seen from the table above, none of the studied countries 
incorporated the Article 3 (1) in an identical or equivalent manner with 
the Directive in the national broadcasting laws. The closest wording to the 
171
AVMSD was adopted in Poland. Article 1 (2) recognises free reception of 
domestic and foreign programme services and on-demand audiovisual 
media services, but does not refer to the absence of restrictions on re-
transmissions on their territory from other member states.14 Hungarian 
law accordingly provides the legal safeguards for a free transmission and 
reception of Hungarian and foreign media services.15 The relevant provi-
sions in the Czech16 and Slovak17 laws rather tend to entitle broadcasters 
to broadcast their programmes in free and independent manner, but do 
not explicitly ensure freedom of reception and lack of restrictions on re-
transmissions from other EU countries. 
It has to be added though, that the principle of free circulation of 
audiovisual media services derives its legal endorsement from Article 
26 (TFEU) (ex article 14 TEC) that equips the EU with competencies 
to adopt measures establishing or ensuring the functioning of the inter-
nal market (European Union, 2010). Moreover, Articles 49 to 55 (TFEU) 
lay down the fundamental right to freedom of establishment (European 
Union, 2010). Referring to these legal grounds in the Treaties, Recital 
40 of the AVMSD recognises that media service providers should in gen-
eral be free to choose the member states in which they establish them-
selves. Acknowledging that the member states should be able to apply 
more stricter rules, the Recital 41 encourages the states to co-operate 
with one another in cases where a broadcaster under the jurisdiction 
of one member state provides a television broadcast which is wholly or 
mostly directed towards the territory of another member state (European 
Parliament and the Council, 2010a).
In order to briefly asses how the provisions enabling the free circula-
tion of audiovisual media services translate to structural conditions in the 
CEE countries, the table below presents a number of broadcasting chan-
nels targeting domestic and non-domestic markets in the EU.
14 Article 1 (2), 1992 Broadcasting Act…
15 Article 3, Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media…
16 Section 31 (1) Act No. 231/2001 on Radio and Television Broadcasting…
17 Article 15 (1) Act No. 308 on Broadcasting and Retransmission…
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Table 18: The number of broadcasting channels according to targeted 
countries in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in 2013
































Others (10): Russian 
Federation, the Arab 
world, The former 
Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Germany, 
France, UK
HUNGARY 561 504 (89.8%) 4 (0.7%) Romania (2)
Czech Republic (2)
POLAND 350 211 (60.3%) 3 (0.9%) Belarus (1)
France (1) 
North America (1)
SLOVAKIA 108 69 (63.9%) none none
Sources: Elaborated on the basis of European Audiovisual Observatory (2013) The 
MAVISE database: mavise.obs.coe.int (retrieved 13.11.2013).
In 2013, the largest number of channels was registered in Hungary – 
561. Many of these, however, are local and regional channels (89.8%). 
At the same time, the proportion of channels established in Hungary, but 
targeting non-domestic markets, has been very small – 0.7%. A similar 
situation can be observed in Poland (0.9% of channels), while the share 
of regional channels is less significant and accounts for 60.3%. Slovakia 
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represents the only country with channels established to target solely the 
domestic market.
The largest number of channels targeting other countries was regis-
tered in the Czech Republic (100 – 33.7%). Many of these, are however, not 
part of the EU broadcasting/media groups, but belong to US corporations: 
Cinemax HBO (25); CBS Action (3); Comedy MTV (3); Disney Children’s (8); 
HBO 2 and 3 (10); HBO Comedy (13); HBO HD (9); MTV (4). As can be 
seen from these examples, the most represented group is HBO (a subsidiary 
of Time Warner, the owner of TV Nova in the Czech Republic and TV Markí-
za with a controlling share on the market of commercial terrestrial televi-
sion in the Czech Republic and Slovakia18). It would be interesting to add in 
this context that the Czech Republic was the first CEE country to attract the 
US TV investment in the beginning of the 1990s and by then, developed 
into a ‘regional center’ of the US-based television industry (at that time 
owned mainly by the CME – Central European Media Enterprises). The EU 
accession and transposition of the aquis in the area of audiovisual policy 
has not fundamentally changed this setting. Shalini Venturelli (1998: 209) 
argued that the integrative function of the Directive facilitated the further 
domination of the audiovisual and broadcast markets by the multinational 
audiovisual industry originating primarily in the USA. In relation to the 
Czech Republic, and its role as a regional center for the integrated trans-
national circulation of audiovisual services connected to US corporations; 
this observation holds true with certain reservations. While in structural 
terms, the Czech TV landscape seems integrated better than its neighbours 
with other (mostly CEE) EU countries through transnational circulation 
of audiovisual media services, the content dimension is characterised by 
lower compliance in the area of protection of European works. Thus, while 
structures seem to be better integrated in a transnational EU setting, the 
content does not offer an integration through the European dimension and 
most of the non-domestic channels demonstrate lower prominence of the 
European production than is the case of the domestic channels.
4.4. Legal implementation and compliance with the AVMS 
Directive in the CEE countries: conclusions
The area of audiovisual policy belongs to policies covered by ‘traditional 
methods’ referring to legislation initiated by the Commission – the di-
rective – ratified by the Council of Ministers and the European Parlia-
18 See more on this issue in the Chapter 5.
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ment (Harcourt, 2008). One of the Commission’s role in this mechanism 
is to oversee the implementation, and as a part of this process, to submit 
 every three years to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the 
 European Economic and Social Committee, a report on the application of 
the Directive (Article 33, European Parliament and the Council, 2010a). 
A systematic approach to monitoring the implementation allows the 
 Commission to constantly observe national models of application against 
the changing conditions in the field of audiovisual media services, in par-
ticular in the light of new technological developments, the competitive-
ness of the sector and levels of media literacy.
In an attempt to better understand evolving models of implemen-
tation in the four CEE countries, the section below compares the legal 
implementation in the area of protection of European works and free 
circulation of audiovisual media services with the levels of compliance 
as measured within the standard frames of reporting on the AVMSD ap-
plication (protection of European works) and structural characteristics of 
the national audiovisual landscapes (broadcasting channels targeting do-
mestic and non-domestic markets). The first table summarises the legal 
implementation of the AVMSD in the four CEE Member States in the area 
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The table above uses various terms to indicate how selected provi-
sions of the Directive correspond with relevant measures in the national 
legislation. The term ‘equivalent’ denotes identical or equivalent transpo-
sition of the AVMSD’s rules or definitions. The term prescriptive indicates 
that national provisions are more specified, and thus may also include 
more limitations than the measures of the Directive. The term flexible 
illustrates a greater extent of flexibility in application of the provisions 
than prescribed by the Directive.
As can be seen from the table, there is a visible variety among the 
CEE member states considering the legal implementation of the AVMSD 
in the area of the protection of European works. Moreover, the CEE coun-
tries have rarely implemented provisions of the AVMSD in an identical or 
equivalent manner with the Directive. The few exceptions confirming this 
rule include: the definition of the qualifying time in all countries, the refer-
ence to the majority of European works in the case of the Czech Republic 
(with use of ‘where practicable’ clause) and provisions on recent works in 
Slovakia. In most cases, the studied rules seem to be slightly more or more 
prescriptive than required in the AVMSD. The most flexible rules were in-
troduced in the Czech Republic (the lack of schedule time requirements, no 
protection of national works, a choice of obligation in a definition of the ‘in-
dependent producer’, a relatively low quota for the share of recent works, 
a choice of obligations applicable to providers of on-demands services). 
On the contrary, the most prescriptive rules were implemented by 
Hungary that has opted for schedule time requirements, a relatively high 
quota on national works, a relatively high quota on recent works (all in-
dependent works) and more prescriptive and quota-based obligations set 
for providers of on-demand services. Poland, although less prescriptive 
than Hungary, seems to share many similar solutions with Hungary. For 
example, both countries do not use the ‘where practicable clause’ when 
defining the requirement of a majority of European works. Both countries 
also use a similar mechanism of protection of national works (around 
33% of transmission time) and prefer a more prescriptive than flexible 
definition of ‘independent producer’. Slovakia, on the other hand, shares 
more similar settings with the Czech Republic, although slightly more 
prescriptive. The Slovak broadcasting law does not impose, for instance, 
a quota of national works, but requires that broadcasters ensure the use 
of a national language, languages of national minorities and foreign lan-
guages in accordance with special provisions.
The legal implementation of the AVMSD in the area of free circu-
lation of audiovisual media services also demonstrates differences from 
country to country in the CEE:
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Table 20: Legal implementation of the AVMSD in the area of free circula-
tion of audiovisual media services 
Country Implementation 










other EU country 
but targeting 




Flexible (no reference to 
free reception)
No Yes, with some 
limitations
HUNGARY Less prescriptive (indirect 
reference to free 
reception)
Yes Yes
POLAND Less prescriptive (direct 
reference to free reception)
Yes Yes, to a limited 
extent
SLOVAKIA Flexible (no reference to 
free reception)
No Yes
Sources: Adopted and calculated on the basis of previous tables used in this chapter.
All studied countries have transcribed the provisions on free circulation 
of audiovisual media services (Article 3 (1) of the Directive) in a more 
flexible way than the AVMSD. While Hungary and Poland did include the 
recognition of free reception of audiovisual media services from other 
countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia merely entitled broadcasters 
to broadcast their programmes in a free and independent manner. The 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia also designed the rules 
applicable to services registered in other EU country, but targeting their 
national audiences. Finally, the next table summarises compliance with 
the AVMSD in the area of the protection of European works and free cir-
culation of audiovisual media services:
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Table 21: Compliance with the AVMSD in the area of the protection 
of European works and free circulation of audiovisual media services



























below the EU 
average
(26 % – 
decreasing)





HUNGARY highly above 
the EU average 
(81% – slightly 
decreasing)










POLAND highly above 


























Sources: Adopted and calculated on the basis of previous tables used in this chapter.
As all of the CEE countries complied with the content obligations pro-
moting European works in 2005–2010, the table above presents a com-
parison of the compliance at the national level with the EU average. The 
results for 2010 demonstrate that there is a large variety among these 
countries. Hungary reached the highest level of compliance almost in all 
categories (with the exception of the share of recent works). Also Poland 
manifests a high level of compliance with the only exception of its share 
of independent works (below the EU average). On the other hand, the 
Czech Republic reaches the lowest level of compliance, in all categories – 
below the EU average. The Czech Republic can be perceived at the same 
time as the only country with visible structures supporting transnational 
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circulation of audiovisual media services due to a significant share of 
channels targeting non-domestic markets.
Table 22: The model of legal implementation and level of compliance in 
the area of protection of European works and free circulation of audiovi-
sual media services in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia




HUNGARY Highly prescriptive High
POLAND Prescriptive High
SLOVAKIA Semi-flexible Moderate
Sources: Adopted and calculated on the basis of previous tables used in this chapter.
We can observe some correlation between the model of legal implemen-
tation and the level of compliance. Countries with more flexible models 
of legal implementation tend to achieve moderate levels of compliance, 
translating to achieving the required proportions of European works be-
low the EU average. At the same time the conditions facilitating the free 
circulation of audiovisual services seem to be best performed in the case 
of the Czech Republic with most flexible regulatory environment. Thus, 
quite logically, broadcasters established in various EU members states 
seem to seek the most flexible legal environment to offer their services in 
the internal market. On the other hand, the countries with more prescrip-
tive modes of legal implementation (Hungary and Poland) achieve higher 
compliance in the area of protection of European works that includes also 
a significant share of national works or works in national languages. In 
both these countries, the share of channels targeting non-domestic mar-
kets is fairly tiny (in both cases less than 1%). 
These considerations continue to support the view on the signifi-
cance of the national dimension. Although the CEE countries proved 
quite successful in implementing the legal and empirical-content dimen-
sion of the Directive, they demonstrate that the compliance is highest 
when supported by national measures (e.g. protection of national works). 
Moreover, the models of implementation do not lead to greater harmoni-
sation among the countries, as almost each of them uses different na-
tional standards. 
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In its Resolution on the Implementation of the Audiovisual Media Ser-
vices Directive covering the period 2009–2010 the European Parliament ob-
served that “the Member States have implemented the AVMSD in a par-
ticularly diverse manner” and that “the ‘country of origin’ principle, when 
properly applied, gives broadcasters important clarity and certainty about 
their operational arrangements” (European Parliament, 2013a). The Par-
liament also noticed that even though most member states comply with 
the rules regarding the promotion of European works, priority is still giv-
en to national works, whilst the percentage of independent works on TV 
is on the decline (European Parliament, 2013a). Both these remarks are 
reflected in legal implementation and application of the AVMSD rules in 
given areas, by the CEE countries.
In the past, the requirement of the promotion of European works 
in the TWF Directive has been viewed to a certain extent as an alien-
ated provision not synchronised well with the main objective of the Di-
rective – support for the internal market and circulation of audiovisual 
services across national borders. This argument was justified by the lack 
of explicit rudiments in the EU Treaty law for the Union to take action in 
the field of culture (deWitte, 1995; Craufurd Smith, 2004; McGoonagle, 
2008). On the other hand, these two axes of the EU audiovisual policy 
guiding the Directive seem perfectly logical at the conceptual level as 
explained above: both (protection of European production guided by cul-
tural values and the internal market – guided by economic values) sup-
port the competitiveness of European creativity, cultures, languages and 
media industries on the global scene. Why then does a brief analysis of 
legal implementation and compliance in the CEE countries seem to offer 
a quite ambiguous picture? Why do countries performing well in the area 
of protection of European production not employ structures supporting 
the free circulation of audiovisual media services? And vice versa: why 
do countries supporting more open audiovisual landscapes achieve lower 
shares of European works? 
The answer is self-explanatory: in both cases (the protection of Euro-
pean production and free circulation of audiovisual services) the results 
do not refer primarily to the European dimension: countries attracting 
transnational broadcasters with channels targeting other countries and 
linguistic communities (the Czech Republic) actually appeal to US-based 
corporations (most channels targeting non-domestic markets are of US 
origin). Likewise, countries achieving the highest share of European pro-
duction and demonstrating the most supportive legal implementation in 
this regard (Hungary, Poland) mostly protect national works. Thus in the 
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case of the CEE countries, both of these described sets of measures have 
been less effective in promoting the circulation of European works.
Whereas the CEE countries shared obvious and long standing con-
nections based on a common historical experience, path dependency and 
in some cases, cultural affinities, significant varieties can be observed in 
current policy landscapes. In the case of media and audiovisual policy, 
for example, solutions tend to be shared between Poland and Hungary; 
and the Czech Republic and Slovakia. This seems to be dictated not only 
by the market size and history of common geopolitical and cultural rela-
tions, but also by consequences of political choices made during the first 
period of media system transformation.
Finally, it needs to be mentioned that the Treaty of Lisbon entering 
into force in 2009, strengthened the legal basis for taking culture, as well 
as freedom of expression and media pluralism, into account in the EU 
actions, including the audiovisual policy under the AVMSD. Article 4 of 
the TFEU confirms that shared competence between the Union and the 
member states applies to such principal areas as the ‘internal market’ and 
the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’. Article 6 entitles the Union to 
carry out actions to support, co-ordinate or supplement the actions of 
the member states in areas such as ‘culture’. This competence is further 
described in Article 167 (4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union under which the Union takes cultural aspects into account in 
its actions, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity 
of its cultures (European Union, 2010). The consolidated version of the 
TEU and TFEU contains also the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the 
EU. By virtue of the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the Treaty on 
the European Union, the Charter has the same legal value as the Treaties 
(European Union, 2012). In this light, the Union’s actions in the area of 
audiovisual policy are to be in line with the Article 11 protecting freedom 
of expression and stating respect for freedom and pluralism of the media. 
All this represents a much broader legal ground for incorporating 
multiple values into the audiovisual policy and its main legal instru-
ment – the AVMSD. Accordingly, the Recital 16 of the AVMSD confirms 
that the Directive enhances compliance with fundamental rights and is 
fully in line with the principles recognised by the Charter (European Par-
liament and the Council, 2010a). In addition, the Directive refers to safe-
guarding various public interests, including: cultural diversity, the right 
to information, media pluralism, the protection of minors and consumer 
protection, and to enhance public awareness and media literacy (Recital 
12, European Parliament and the Council, 2010a). In turn, the protection 
of European works has been more frequently viewed not only as an exclu-
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sive area of audiovisual policy and one of the key objectives of the Direc-
tive, but also the crucial element of other thematic policy parcels such 
as media pluralism. The Media Pluralism Monitor, for instance, includes 
content-related indicators that refer explicitly to the protection of Euro-
pean works.19 These encompass e.g. the proportion of European works 
in TV broadcasting (C 1.1.), regulatory safeguards for European works in 
TV broadcasting (C 1.2.), promotion of European works in non-linear 
AVMS (C 1.3.), proportion of non-domestic European works in top TV 
programmes in the linear AVMS (C 1.6) and others. 
This exemplifies that value grounds for the EU audiovisual policy have 
differentiated and became composite in an ongoing architecture of rules 
and principles built in a complementary manner through the modernisa-
tion of the Directive and other evolving instruments. Yet, what seems less 
represented in this polyvalent melting, is coherence and primary focus 
on shared – European – communication needs. As follows, more relevant 
now than before seems to be the question how to transmute a reactive 
and protective policy strand into a more proactive approach representing 
the conscious and meaningful choice supporting the combined synergy of 
values instead of prioritising some at the expense of others.
19 Media Pluralism Monitor is an integral part of the Independent Study on Indica-
tors for Media Pluralism (K.U.Leuven et al., 2009) The Media Pluralism Monitor contains 




5. MEDIA PLURALISM: PUTTING ENDS 
AND MEANS AT THE RIGHT PLACE
5.1. Crystallising the normative view on media pluralism 
in European media policies: An introduction
For a relatively long period of time, media pluralism has been perceived 
as a complex and elusive issue both in media studies and media policies. 
At the same time, it has often been used in selective ways that edit out 
its important and relevant dimensions. This chapter aims to shed some 
light on the conceptualisation and operationalisation of media pluralism 
as a policy rationale. In particular, it will explore the regulatory frame-
work for media pluralism and the dynamics of the changing conditions of 
structural media pluralism in the CEE countries. 
First of all, it would be helpful to explore the conceptual frame of 
media pluralism. Notions of media pluralism, plurality, and diversity have 
been used in many contexts – as empirical ends to be achieved with cer-
tain policies, as normative principles, as a set of characteristics applicable 
to media systems at various levels, as communication needs and rights. 
Dietrich Westphal (2002) argues that the notion of diversity is charac-
terised by its neutral and thus general meaning, whereas the notion of 
pluralism is related and confined primarily to the media. Other authors 
emphasised a more value-free and empirically oriented meaning of me-
dia diversity, and evaluative and normative framing of media pluralism 
(Klimkiewicz, 2004b; Karppinen, 2013). Yet, in the course of recent years, 
media pluralism has been more prominently exposed as a policy rationale 
with a clearly normative and value-ridden angle. This normative layer is 
manifested in the belief that a condition of media pluralism is socially 
desirable and beneficial for the sake of functioning democracy, generat-
ing knowledge from diverse sources, the formation of a cultural identity, 
and the effective and competitive operation of markets. In other words, 
the normative view of pluralism does not encompass ‘everything’ or ‘any 
kind of diversity’ but such arrangement of diversity in a media system 
that facilitates performing the key functions which the media play in so-
cieties. In Karppinnen’s view (2013: 129) the argument that the notion 
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of media pluralism only serves as a smokescreen for deregulation and 
marketisation, underestimates the importance of alternative thinking in 
media policy. As described in Chapter 2, these strands at the EU level cur-
rently encompass protection against new configurations of media power, 
independence of media regulators from state and industry, defence of the 
PSM, public support for enabling technological structures, support for 
community and minority media, media literacy, and others.
A debate about media pluralism in the media policy is not a new 
phenomenon. At the pan-European level, one of the long-standing and 
developing vectors of action has been a positive approach to the interpre-
tation of Article 10 of the ECHR. In this sense, Article 10 has functioned 
not only as a guarantee against interventions by states in the field of free-
dom of expression and freedom of the media, but it has also encouraged 
ensuring the citizen’s right to be fully and impartially informed, and to 
receive the information from diverse and independent sources (Voorhoof, 
1998: 35–57). This approach has been supported by a large number of 
documents, many of which stressed the importance of the active imple-
mentation of Article 10 of the ECHR for the appropriate development of 
media pluralism and access to diverse sources of information. Most 
of these documents are not legally binding, but they do set down a num-
ber of principles and strategies suggested to member states for further 
implementation (Klimkiewicz, 2009b). The Council of Europe has gradu-
ally broadened its agenda on media pluralism since the 1970s, when the 
media landscapes in Europe underwent the first wave of major mergers 
and business failures in the press sectors. From the time of, the periods of 
the CoE’s involvement in media pluralism have been marked by several 
milestones articulated in the following recommendations: 
 – Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers No. R (94) 13 on Mea-
sures to Promote Media Transparency (adopted on 22 November 1994),
 – Recommendation of the Commitee of Ministers No. R (99) 1 on Mea-
sures to Promote Media Pluralism (adopted on 19 January 1999),
 – Recommendation Rec of the Committee of Ministers (2007) 2 on Me-
dia Pluralism and Diversity of Media Content (adopted on 31 Janu-
ary 2007).
It has to be mentioned in this respect that the CoE’s activities in this 
matter aimed to respond not only to the media market and technologi-
cal developments, but were linked to historical circumstances most im-
portantly articulated in the process of democratisation (including media 
systems) in Central and Eastern Europe. Sustained democratic premises 
induced both the Committee and Assembly to repeatedly call member 
states’ attention, in order to adopt recommended measures protecting 
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various aspects of media pluralism, and ultimately unfreeze implementa-
tion idleness (Klimkiewicz, 2009b). 
With the successive waves of the EU enlargement and entry of the 
CEE countries into the legal and policy space of the EU, the CoE’s role in 
promoting media pluralism has diluted to a certain extent, while the role 
of the European Parliament came to the forefront, especially after the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. However, going back, intensified Parlia-
ment’s activities on pluralism can be observed already in the mid 1990s. 
At that time, the Parliament pushed forward the idea to harmonise na-
tional restrictions on media concentration, and in consequence, to en-
able the Community to intervene in acts of concentration which endan-
ger pluralism on a European scale. After the double rejection of the draft 
directive by the College of Commissioners, parliamentarians themselves 
admitted that media pluralism is ‘without doubt the biggest failure of the 
EP’ (Sarikakis, 2004: 132). A new opening of media pluralism issue by 
the EP came with the fifth wave of the EU enlargement and Berlusconi 
case in 2004. In its Resolution on the risks of violation, in the EU and es-
pecially in Italy, of freedom of expression and information (European Par-
liament, 2004) the Parliament examined the situation in selected mem-
ber states (including new members) and Italy in particular, to underline 
the necessity to refocus media pluralism policies, taking into account the 
principle of democracy and the conception of EU citizenship. Finally, 
the new Parliament’s and non-governmental actors’ initiatives on media 
pluralism described in Chapter 2 demonstrate that the newest wave of 
interest has been prompted by some problematic cases in the member 
states (Hungary’s 2010 media law; the UK’s hacking phone scandal and 
the following debate on media reform), a need to strengthen EU credibil-
ity in its external actions (regarding new enlargement process and global 
actions), and last but not least – technological and economic develop-
ments leading to the reconfigurations of media power.
The protection of media pluralism proved to be a difficult task espe-
cially with regards to EU competencies and developing hard policy instru-
ments (directives) by the EU in the 1990s. On the one hand, political and 
economic interests of some member states diverged, on the other hand, 
highly varied media market conditions (population, size, regional and 
cultural diversity, languages spoken, etc.) made it difficult to come up 
with one scheme of rules. Moreover, the recent enlargements of the Union 
incorporating the CEE countries with relatively young media  markets and 
policy models shaped by intense reforms in a compressed time frame 
(Klimkiewicz, 2009a) made it even more challenging to implement har-
monising rules. Karppinen observes that the malaise of diversity (inter-
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ests, actors, states, views and approaches) in dealing with media diversity 
actually leads to nonpolicy or silent policy (2013: 139). This however 
seems to apply only to hard policy instruments as soft policy concerning 
media pluralism has been in place for some time at the EU. The next sec-
tions will reflect on these initiatives and will test national policies in the 
CEE countries in respect to media system developments following three 
crucial dimensions of structural media pluralism.
5.2. Structures of control, function and space
Both in policies and media studies, media pluralism has been approached 
at various levels: a macro level of media systems (diversity media struc-
tures, ownership patterns, entry costs and conditions), a meso level of 
media institutions and performance (diversity of professional practices, 
employment structures, transparency), and a micro level of media con-
tents (diversity of sources, genres, viewpoints, representations) (Klimkie-
wicz, 2009b). Media pluralism has also been interpreted through concep-
tual dichotomies or alternatives such as proportional/open, organised/
spontaneous, polarised/moderate, evaluative/descriptive or reactive/in-
teractive/proactive, but most significant in terms of policy development 
has been the distinction on external and internal pluralism. ‘External’ 
stands for diversity located outside a particular media entity (and thus 
may be generated through various media outlets each expressing a dif-
ferent point of view), while ‘internal’ is seen to reside inside the media 
organisation or unit, and basically reflects differentiation of contents and 
services offered (including diversity of values, interests, representations 
and views expressed). Although a direct causal link between the exter-
nal and internal pluralism has not been unanimously proved (e.g. Ward, 
2006), in media policies various initiatives on media pluralism revolved 
mainly around its structural domain (including ownership in particular). 
Katrin Voltmer (2000: 5) argues that 
the relevance of structural diversity derives from the assumption that it is close-
ly related to performance diversity in that particular structural conditions of 
media systems guarantee or, at least, foster the production of a diverse and 
generalistic information quality, whereas other institutional settings impede 
the public representation of a broad plurality of political viewpoints.
Structural pluralism, very generally speaking, refers to a condition 
where diverse independent media entities exist within a system and are 
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arranged together in a particular way. This has most often been exem-
plified by the existence of a wide range of media outlets, organisations 
and services reflecting various points of view and information, recognis-
ing diverse cultural representations and values, and offering different 
ways of social interests’ formation, interaction and use. Such framing 
also implies an existence of diverse ownership and forms of control, not 
only in terms of various entities owning media outlets, but also presup-
posing different ‘types’ of media ownership naturally linked with differ-
ent media functions, such as public, private, non-profit, minority, etc. 
(Klimkiewicz, 2010b). 
For a few years now, however, basic assumptions about structural 
media pluralism have been losing conceptual clarity, and some even ar-
gue – raison d’être. A rapidly changing media environment extended with 
the Internet (not only as a platform of delivery but a universe of its own) 
has become fluid, fragmented, abundant in communication flows. An ex-
cessive diversity, and at the same time, opaque or superficial diversity of 
media structures and contents reaches users through their choice, filter-
ing, navigation, participation, networking. This does not make the us-
ers, though, immune from new configurations of media control and gate 
keeping. Forms of limitations revolve around contractual conditions of 
operators offering various media services, lack of comprehensive infor-
mation about the choice the users can enjoy, technical incompabilities, 
the commercial use of personal data etc. Natali Helberger argues that 
diversity of supply does not automatically translate into diversity of ex-
posure; quite the contrary – more supply can also result in less diversity 
(Helberger, 2012: 69). 
Likewise, the traditional view on structural media pluralism becomes 
more complicated. Some analysts argue that structural policies are becom-
ing quite obsolete in fluid media environments. Mara Einstein analysing 
US media diversity policies argues that structural regulation of the media 
is simply inadequate to produce an abundance of varying voices available 
through the media (2004: 211). In short, if the aim is to create diverse 
content and make it more accessible to users then the content should be 
regulated, “not everything around it” (2004: 211). Steven Barnett warns 
that in current technical and industrial circumstances, well-resourced jour-
nalism is under threat and there is little point in promoting structural so-
lutions, when the very structures themselves are in danger of extinction 
(2010: 8). In other words, monopolistic or oligopolistic media structures 
might be perfectly acceptable if these are tied to content regulations which 
ensure that the civic and democratic values of journalism will be priori-
tised above the interests of share-holders and corporate profits. 
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All these concerns and observations clearly show that policy thinking 
about structural media pluralism reaches new avenues and the issue re-
mains substantive both at national and EU levels. The Commission’s Staff 
Working Document Media pluralism in the Member States of the European 
Union (European Commission, 2007a: 5) endorses a ‘broad understand-
ing’ of media pluralism: “Although pluralism of ownership is important, it 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for ensuring media pluralism. 
Media ownership rules need to be complemented by other provisions”. 
The Document further observes: “Ensuring media pluralism, in our un-
derstanding, implies all measures that ensure citizens’ access to a variety 
of information sources, opinion, voices etc. in order to form their opinion 
without the undue influence of one dominant opinion forming power 
(2007a: 5)”. The Commission recognises among these measures volun-
tary rules for media to ensure the independence of journalistic output; 
rules preventing politicians to influence media coverage; control mecha-
nisms for media concentration; programme requirements of broadcasters 
(especially PSM); and others. At the same time, the Commission observes 
that media pluralism analysis has most often been limited to external 
pluralism, in particular media ownership rules (2007a: 12). For all that, 
the document does not offer any concrete policy position, nor does it 
signalise possible rules that could mark new areas of the Commission’s in-
volvement. The initiative clearly sets up analytical and monitoring tools, 
but does not envisage hard policy follow-up. 
The recent conclusions of the European Council on media freedom 
and pluralism in a digital environment (Council of the European Union, 
2013) demonstrate that the Council does not support a visible and deci-
sive shift in the current soft policy approach performed by the Commis-
sion. The role of the member states is much more clearly promoted by the 
Council. It encompasses ensuring independence of media regulatory au-
thorities, media transparency, protection of journalistic sources and pre-
venting the possible negative effects of excessive concentration of media 
ownership (2013: 3). In a different manner, the role of the Commission, 
as seen by the Council, is merely limited to support of the projects pro-
tecting journalists and media professionals, and monitoring media plural-
ism. Interestingly, the conclusions also emphasise ‘non-legislative’ actions 
concerning the operations of audiovisual regulatory authorities. Unlike 
in the case of the member states, the Council does not mention the issue 
of independence of the regulatory authorities, although the Commission 
has been increasingly active in this field, not only due to the situation in 
Hungary. In 2013, the Commission opened public consultation on the 
independence of audiovisual regulatory bodies with a purpose to collect 
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views and possible options for strengthening independence through pol-
icy instruments, including a possible revision of Article 30 of the AVMS 
Directive. This issue will be more broadly discussed in Chapter 6.
Independence of media regulatory authorities, media transparency, 
protection of journalists from various kind of pressures as well as pre-
vention against excessive economic control over the media, are certainly 
important conditions of the structural media pluralism. All of these are 
reflected in the number of indicators developed by the Independent Study 
on Indicators for Media Pluralism in the Member States: Towards a Risk-
Based Approach (K.U. Leuven et al., 2009) announced in the Staff Work-
ing Document. The study offers legal, economic and socio-demographic 
indicators for pluralism of media ownership and control, pluralism of me-
dia types and genres, political pluralism, cultural pluralism, geographi-
cal pluralism and pluralism of distribution (K.U. Leuven et al., 2009). In 
2013, the Commission decided that the study together with accompany-
ing monitoring tool (Media Pluralism Monitor) will be implemented by 
the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom established at the 
European University Institute. This will provide a good opportunity to 
implement enormously complex and large-scale measurement methods 
to follow, among others, the structural conditions of media pluralism.
Such a broadly defined scope of media pluralism certainly extends 
the possibility of empirical assessment in this book. Yet, as will be argued 
in the following sections of this chapter, three dimensions play a principal 
role in the understanding the structural trends in pluralism, especially in 
media landscapes that underwent a profound transformation in a rela-
tively short time as has been the case of the CEE countries. If, as is gener-
ally assumed, structural pluralism refers to the way diversity is organised 
on a macro-level of the media environment, then the three dimensions 
with a crucial role for differentiation of media structures include: the di-
versity of media control, diversity of media functions and geographical/
cultural diversity. 
First of all, structural media pluralism may be generated through 
a balance between multiple centres of media control. These may not be 
necessarily identical with the ownership structures, although the own-
ership and financial control over the production and operation choices 
(including complex technological conditions and investment needed) 
definitely play the most influential role as it comes to the development of 
media networks. The centres of control crystallise inside the ownership 
structures (in particular around a power to make strategic decisions), 
but are also dependent on delivery platforms, journalistic and content 
producer autonomy, and more generally, regulatory constraints. It might 
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therefore be useful in this context to focus on what degree the multiple 
competing centres of media control mutually balance themselves. For ex-
ample, a strong tendency of ownership consolidation in the press system 
may be balanced by regulatory constraints, and subsidy mechanisms for 
alternative press and editorial independence safeguarded by self-regula-
tory measures.
Second, structural media pluralism combines different functions the 
media play in a society. These are linked with media activities generat-
ing economic profit, public value, well-informed citizenship and opinion 
formation, entertainment, cultural representations and expressions. Un-
derstanding how different functions evolve in time and how they balance 
or complement each other in the overall media system helps to paint the 
whole picture of structural pluralism. For example, the declining strength 
of public service media vis-à-vis commercial and private media financed 
predominantly from advertising can demonstrate an increasing inclina-
tion towards commercial and entertainment functions.
The third important dimension is one of geographical/cultural di-
versity. Commonly, it combines spatial structures (organisation of media 
operations and institutions at transnational, national, regional and local 
levels) and cultural and societal structures (response of media contents 
and services to the unique needs and interests of local and regional com-
munities, nations, transnational audiences). The geographical dimension 
of structural media pluralism can help to understand how media struc-
tures balance themselves at different geographical levels (e.g. local and 
regional vis-à-vis national media structures), whether the strength of the 
structures at one level increases in comparison over the others and what 
is the general trend either in terms of centralisation or decentralisation of 
the media environment. 
Media regulation plays a crucial role in harmonising various forms 
of control, media functions and geographical levels. Structural regulation 
seems to generate the most complex type of media pluralism, because 
it attempts to engineer the whole environment within which media as 
institutions, outlets and services, operate (Hitchens, 2006: 65). It should 
also be noted in this context that ‘structural media pluralism’ as a concept 
used within the framework of ‘structural regulation’, especially in Ameri-
can tradition, was adapted from the economic and competition law per-
spectives to media market analysis (Klimkiewicz, 2010b: 907). As such, 
it has often been analysed and described through the lens of economic 
operation and competition policy. Economic prerequisites (e.g. multiple 
owners as defined by competition law) do not necessarily guarantee me-
dia pluralism ready-to-be-used by potential media users (2010b: 908). 
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All in all, media control and hegemonic influences are not only exercised 
through ownership patterns and structures, but a whole set of dependen-
cies (e.g. political) that cannot always be translated into a marketable 
value. Rachel Craufurd Smith et al. (2012: 7) observes that it is recog-
nised in Europe that the media not only need protection from state con-
trol and influence but that citizens, media users and governments may 
need protection from powerful private media companies. The fact that 
structural media regulation cannot be simply identified with a narrowly 
understood protection of economic competition on media markets, does 
not seem to raise much disagreement in the media policy environment 
and certainly, media-specific approaches have been used widely in many 
European countries. There, however, seems to be also another visible 
trend in the media and communications policy discourse, calling increas-
ingly for empirical proof and metrics (especially quantitative methods 
of measurement) that would justify and clearly demonstrate the need to 
sustain or implement media-specific regulation to control media own-
ership structures (and concentration in particular) (Napoli, 2007; Just, 
2009). Several such measurements and policies have been implemented 
recently in the USA (Diversity Index in 2003); UK (the public interest 
or plurality test, 2003); Italy (measuring the integrated communications 
market, 2004) and Germany (new approach to weighing the influence of 
various media by the KEK, 2006). None of the CEE countries implement-
ed a formalised index for the measurement of structural media diversity, 
although the protection of media pluralism has taken a variety of, often 
hybrid, forms. This issue will be examined in the next section. 
5.3. Protecting media pluralism in the CEE countries
The notion of media pluralism played an essential role in re-arranging 
media systems in the CEE after 1989. New regulatory frameworks that 
have come into effect largely in the 1990s varied in their responses to 
this objective. Most commonly, novelised or amended national press laws 
have not addressed structural media pluralism in any particular or ex-
plicit way, nor were press specific measures introduced to measure own-
ership concentration in a media system. The common approach was to 
rely simply on the operation of general competition rules as the previ-
ous forms of the press control (licencing, censorship) have been legally 
abolished. In addition, most countries of the region (Poland was the only 
exception), did not introduce a regulatory basis for the press privatisation 
that would imply some differentiated forms of ownership or subsidies 
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strengthening, e.g. small or local newspapers. There were virtually no in-
struments other than the general competition rules to influence the take-
overs, mergers and acquisitions that followed the first press privatisation 
period (Klimkiewicz, 2009a: 145). In a different vein, the radio and tele-
vision landscapes have been subject to more complex forms of regulation, 
and basically all broadcasting laws inscribed gradually the goal to protect 
or promote media pluralism. The CEE countries subsequently employed 
composite rules that allow structural plurality/diversity considerations to 
be envisaged in company with general competition rules when review-
ing mergers of broadcasters holding licences or ownership conditions 
of licence applicants. In addition, the laws have required some forms of 
ownership and financial transparency, provided for monitoring measures, 
included must curry rules and preferential treatment (in some cases even 
financial support) of community, minority or social broadcasters. In some 
cases, cross-media ownership rules were introduced. The section below 
will offer a comparative analysis of these composite measures protecting 
media pluralism in national broadcasting laws.
As described in Chapter 3, the issue of media pluralism in the CEE 
was exposed relatively high on the political agenda during the 5th EU 
enlargement, and it defined media policy discourse in the post-accession 
period as well. The CEE-specific problems related with media pluralism 
resonated in various EU policy documents. The Final Report summarising 
the debate of the Group on Media Pluralism at the Liverpool Audiovisual 
Conference devoted to revision of the TWF Directive, observed: “New 
member states tended to have different notions of what pluralism means 
than the older members of the Union. There is a danger of applying 
double standards when dealing with media pluralism issues” (Working 
Group 5, 2005: 1). The Staff Working Document (European Commission, 
2007a) paid attention in particular to the intercommunity dimension of 
transnational investment arguing that various sectors of media markets in 
CEE are dominated by large transnational companies. The document ad-
dresses concerns that such undertakings may use their market power to 
the detriment of small, national publishers and broadcasters (2007a: 10).
The AVMS Directive (European Parliament and the Council, 2010a) 
refers to media pluralism directly or indirectly in various parts of the doc-
ument (e.g. Recitals 5, 8, 34 and 94). Relevant provisions are linked to 
relatively different ends of media pluralism. Recital 5 underlines diverse 
functions and importance of media services for societies, in particular 
ensuring diversity of opinion and media pluralism. Recital 8 deems to 
prevent a dominant position and undue media power that may be ulti-
mately detrimental to media pluralism. Recital 34 refers to pluralism of 
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information as a fundamental principle of the Union. Finally, Recital 94 
recognises that instruments chosen by member states in the process of 
implementation of the Directive should contribute to the promotion 
of media pluralism. Thus on the one hand, the end is to stimulate con-
tent and service diversity, on the other hand, prevention of controlling 
media power. As Craufurd Smith et al. (2012) observe, these may call 
for an incompatible course of action. However, in the normative sense, 
any content diversity is not the primary goal of pluralism policies as is 
not the prevention of any controlling media power. The point is to limit 
such media power that potentially leads to biased coverage or bypassing 
certain issues for commercial or political reasons, or that seeks to influ-
ence politicians to secure particular private interests at the expense of 
public interest. The media power mobilising civic interest in order to e.g. 
protect the environment or promote a healthy diet in schools, responds 
to public concerns and hence, does not pose a direct risk to media plu-
ralism. As it stands, the Directive does not impose any form of media 
pluralism measurement/monitoring by the member states. Reference to 
media pluralism reinforces other provisions such as content provisions, 
jurisdiction by one member state, etc. The AVMSD implementation pro-
cess has not normally included pluralism considerations, but the context 
of the enhanced debate at the EU level, many accompanying activities 
and new measures introduced in some EU countries, put the issue of 
pluralism into a new light of policy interest. 
In the CEE countries, media pluralism measures have resulted from 
a cumulative recognition, and subsequent amendments to the initial 
broadcasting laws. These do not bring clear-cut answers to the question 
what kind of media diversity would be best tailored to the media land-
scapes in the region, and respond with differing angles to observed de-
velopments in national media markets. In general, media pluralism provi-
sions can be divided into three large categories:
 – general recognition of media pluralism as an important value justify-
ing regulatory decisions,
 – internal pluralism provisions,
 – external pluralism provisions.
The table below summarises provisions belonging to the first category.
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Table 23: General recognition of media pluralism as a regulatory rationale 









*TASK OF THE 
COUNCIL (RRTV)
Section 4 (2)
“The Council (…) supervises 
the maintaining and further 
development of plurality in 
the programme portfolio and 
information offered in the 




17 May 2001 
on Radio and 
Television Broad-








“The diversity of media 
services is a particularly 
important value. The 
protection of diversity shall 
also include the avoidance of 
the formation of ownership 
monopolies and any 
unjustified restriction of 
competition on the market. 
The provisions of this Act 
shall be interpreted in 
consideration of the 
protection of diversity”.
Act CLXXXV of 
2010 on Media 
Services and 
Mass Media, as 
amended
POLAND *TASK OF THE 
COUNCIL 
(KRRiT)
Article 6 (1) 
KRRT shall “…ensure an open 




adopted on 29 
December, 1992, 
as amended




The Council takes care of 
maintaining plurality of 
information in news services 
of broadcasters…”
Act No. 308 of 
14 September 




Sources: Elaborated on the basis of national broadcasting laws in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia as quoted in the table.
The table demonstrates quite varied approaches in general recognition 
of media pluralism. Principally, media diversity is recognised as a funda-
mental principle in the 2010 Hungarian Act on Media Services and Mass 
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Media.1 The Act does not only acknowledge the particularly important 
value of the ‘diversity of media services’, it also suggests that all provi-
sions of the Act will be interpreted in consideration of the protection of 
diversity. The Act refers to “the avoidance of the formation of ownership 
monopolies and any unjustified restriction of competition on the market” 
but suggests that other aspects of diversity are included as well. With 
a lack of more precise definition of ‘diversity of media services’, the con-
cept remains quite evasive and vague, and as such leaves a wide discre-
tion to the National Media and Communications Authority (NMHH) in 
interpreting this value for the purpose of the regulatory intervention. 
In the case of other countries (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia), 
media pluralism is seen as a possible end of regulatory policies and a con-
crete task of the national media regulatory authorities. This task is though 
framed quite differently from country to country. In the Czech Republic, 
the Council is expected to cater for “plurality in the programme portfo-
lio and information offered”, which accents the connectedness between 
structural decisions on licensing with the ‘internal dimension’ of a vari-
ety of programmes and services offered by broadcasters. In Poland, the 
Council should ensure the “open and pluralistic nature” of broadcasting 
which may afford a relatively large discretion in interpreting its ‘pluralis-
tic nature’ through various possible dimensions – content, genre, owner-
ship, function, etc. In Slovakia, the Council is expected to take care of 
maintaining “plurality of information in news services” of broadcasters, 
thus plurality more narrowly relates to news and current affairs content.
Although internal media pluralism does not stand for the main fo-
cus of this chapter, the table below summarises measures concerning the 
media content dimension in order to contextualise these with structural 
measures.2 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The internal pluralism provisions are based on the premise that all 
relevant viewpoints, opinions are to be represented in the programming 
offer of a broadcaster. These might require certain content conditions 
e.g. proportional representations of certain types and genres of program-
ming that will support an exposure of views and opinions (news, public 
interest content). In Hungary, the broadcasters with significant market 
power are obliged to broadcast news programmes, seen as important con-
tribution to supply diversity. In Slovakia, broadcasters are expected to en-
sure diverse programming output, consisting in particular from contents 
and services important for the public interest. Both these obligations stem 
from the assumption that news and public interest content might be un-
derrepresented by broadcasters without preventive regulatory safeguards. 
In media regulatory policies, the premise of balanced news and in-
formation has often been associated with the claim for internal diversity 
(e.g. fairness doctrine). In journalistic practice, however, a mere techni-
cal confrontation of opposing views and claims does not necessarily gen-
erate valuable internal diversity. Article 13 of the 2010 Hungarian Act 
on Freedom of the Press and the Fundamental Rules on Media Content3 
obliges the linear media services engaged in the provision of information 
to provide balanced coverage. As shown in Chapter 3, this provision in its 
former wording raised many objections from various international organi-
sations, especially due to the large scope for interpretation by the regula-
tory agency. A very similar measure applies to all broadcasters under the 
2001 Czech Act on Radio and Television Broadcasting4 that obliges the 
broadcasters to “provide objective and balanced information necessary for 
opinions to be freely formed” and to ensure that “principles of objectivity 
and balance are complied with in news and political programme units”.
In terms of possible regulatory interventions, the most feasible are 
measures on internal pluralism that help to finalise decisions on granting 
or extending the licence. In the Czech Republic, the regulatory authority 
is expected to asses the proposed programme structure, while consider-
ing available content diversity in the broadcasting landscape. In Slovakia, 
the regulatory authority takes into account both “a balance of program-
ming output” and “contribution to the cultural development and a well-
informed public, as well as the development of original production”. 
External pluralism measures are usually more complex than rules 
on internal diversity and may employ various considerations concerning 
media ownership, transparency, must-carry rules, and support for com-
munity and socially valuable media. The table summarises sets of these 
provisions in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
3 Act CIV of 2010 on the Freedom of the Press and the Fundamental Rules…









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Katrin Voltmer (2013: 46) argues that externally diverse media often 
compensate for the structural barriers of mainstream media to provide al-
ternative discourses and serve those groups of users that seem to be less at-
tractive to affluent advertisers. The table above demonstrates that the mea-
sures incorporated in the national broadcasting laws in the CEE countries 
can be divided into four groups. The largest category of measures includes 
those provisions that tend to limit media power and control of dominant 
players in broadcasting markets. Rachel Craufurd Smith et al. (2012: 12) 
point out that “the greater the degree of sophistication and discretion in-
volved, the greater the likelihood of uncertainty for industry and ‘agency 
capture’ ”. Thus, the best methods avoiding these risks involve establishing 
fixed ownership limits. Among the countries studied, only Hungary intro-
duced such media specific ownership thresholds, in addition to competition 
law and policy. Major linear media service providers cannot initiate a new 
media service or acquire a share in a company providing media content if 
their annual audience share exceeds 35% or 40% of a joint audience share 
for linear radio and media service providers.5 However, in comparison with 
the former Act I of 1996 on Radio and Television Broadcasting which was 
in force until 2010, the scope of cross-ownership limitations has shrunken. 
The previous Act did not permit cross-ownership involving the press sector: 
the owner of a national newspaper could not have a controlling share in 
a media provider operating in national broadcasting and vice versa. The 
change in the 2010 Act is considered as an indirect consequence of digitisa-
tion (OSF, 2012b: 66). It is important to add in this respect, that unlike in 
the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, the Media Council (Médiatanács) 
of the NMHH is authorised to monitor media market concentration, even-
tual distortions on the media markets and abuses of a dominant position. 
The measurement involves mainly audience shares.
The Czech Republic and Slovakia introduced limits on cross-media 
ownership setting a restriction on the number of operating licences. Under 
the Czech broadcasting law, the broadcaster can hold only one licence for 
a nation-wide analogue or digital TV or radio. The law also prevents cross-
ownership between the operator of an electronic communications network 
and the holder of a broadcasting license.6 At the same time, there are no 
restrictions on cross-media ownership involving potential mergers between 
print and broadcasting sectors (OSF, 2013a: 62). In Slovakia, the rule of 
granting one licence only to a broadcaster of a national or multi-regional 
TV or radio, is paired with limits on cross-ownership pertaining to eventual 
5 Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media…
6 Act No. 231/2001 of 17 May 2001 on Radio and Television Broadcasting…
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mergers or cross ownership between broadcasters and publishers “of a daily 
newspaper distributed in at least 50% of Slovak territory”.7 With the digital 
switchover process, broadcasters with nationwide coverage were allowed 
to operate thematic channels under the 2007 Act on Digital Broadcasting.8 
In comparison with other CEE countries, Poland seems to employ the 
most relaxed rules on cross-media ownership and concentration. Actually, 
the 1992 Broadcasting Act9 limits only monomedia or horizontal concen-
tration.10 A broadcasting licence may not be awarded if transmission of 
a programme service by the applicant results in achieving a dominant po-
sition by the applicant in a given area. Also, the broadcasting licence may 
be revoked on the same grounds. Yet, the Broadcasting Act does not ex-
plicitly define “a dominant position in the mass media in a given area”. It 
is the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection,11 which provides for 
an interpretation of such a position. This is understood as a position that 
allows an entrepreneur to prevent efficient competition on the relevant 
market, entailing that the market share exceeds 40%. In compliance with 
the 1992 Broadcasting Act, the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT) 
evaluates, whether a particular applicant may achieve such a dominant 
position considering above all the main goals of the Act, that is the open 
and pluralistic nature of broadcasting.
Craufurd Smith et al. (2012: 13) note that companies that attract 
more than 30% of the television audience are presumed to exert too great 
an influence on public opinion. The thresholds set up in the national broad-
casting laws (in some cases in combination with competition laws) in the 
CEE countries surpass this limit. This only proves that while certain media 
specific ownership rules are in place, these are largely more permissive 
than the rules used in many EU countries. Moreover, the current regulatory 
regimes seem to support the status quo on the broadcasting landscapes that 
took shape during the first licence-granting processes in 1993–1996. These 
enabled some major broadcasters to safely divide broadcasting markets and 
control their significant shares, practically from their onset at the beginning 
of the 1990s. Although the issues of preventing media concentration have 
been discussed repeatedly with introducing or considering new policies, 
7 Act No. 308 of 14 September 2000 Coll. on Broadcasting…
8 Act No. 222 of 29 March 2007 Coll. on Digital Broadcasting of Programme Ser-
vices and Providing other Content Services by Digital Transmission.
9 1992 Broadcasting Act adopted on 29 December, 1992…
10 Mono-media or horizontal media concentration refers to integration of capital or 
ownership within a single media sector activity such as the print press, TV broadcasting, 
online news, etc.
11 Act on Competition and Consumer Protection adopted on 15 December 2000, 
Official Journal, 2000, No. 122, item 1319, as amended.
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these hardly led to a greater certainty to offering clearer definitions, less 
discretion on part of regulatory authorities, simpler procedures and thresh-
olds adjusted to the converged media landscapes. In Hungary for example, 
the cross-media ownership rules (previously involving publishers of news-
papers) were eased with the 2010 media law, but at the same time, the 
Media Council was equipped with greater competence to decide on matters 
of media concentration. Accordingly, the recommendations and opinions of 
the Media Council bind the Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH) un-
der the 2010 Act on Media Services and Mass Media. In Poland, the policy 
document Polish State Strategy for the Electronic Media for 2005–2020 pre-
pared by the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT), proposed limits of 
maximum 30% of market share for those broadcasting licence holders and 
publishers of daily newspapers (both on national and local markets) that 
apply for new licences (both on local and national markets) (KRRiT, 2005: 
A5). This proposal was never implemented due to opposition from com-
mercial broadcasters. Thus, the new Regulatory Strategy for 2011–2013 of 
the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT, 2011:26) merely lists among 
the objectives of the Council support for the pluralism of media ownership 
(existence of diverse, autonomous and mutually independent media, fi-
nanced from various sources) without specifying conditions concerning the 
media (including cross-media) consolidation and mergers.
The second important category of rules relevant for structural media 
pluralism concerns specific media types financed from non-commercial 
sources. These are recognised as ‘community media’ in Hungary and ‘so-
cial broadcasters’ in Poland. The Hungarian 2010 Act on Media Services 
and Mass Media defines community media as services provided to satisfy 
the special needs for information and to enable access to cultural pro-
grammes for a certain social, national, cultural or religious community, or 
for residents of a given settlement or region. Also the services providing 
most of their programming in accordance with the objectives of the PSM 
are understood as community media.12 The community media are eli-
gible for funding from the Media Service Support and Asset Management 
Fund. In Poland, the 1992 Broadcasting Act exempts social broadcasters 
from fees payable for awarding or altering the licence. A social broad-
caster is defined as a broadcaster who promotes learning and educational 
activities, charitable deeds, and respects the Christian system of values 
and strives to preserve national identity in the programme services. Such 
a broadcaster cannot transmit advertising and teleshopping and spon-
12 Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media… Article 66.
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sored programmes and may not charge any fee for transmission, retrans-
mission or reception of the programme service.13 
Must carry rules were introduced in national broadcasting laws of 
all studied CEE countries, often in combination with digital acts or digi-
tal switchover acts. These stipulate usually the obligation to carry public 
service channels and locally-oriented channels. Last, but not least are 
provisions on media transparency that can be seen as an essential com-
ponent of structural media pluralism. Stolte and Craufurd Smith note 
that the availability of accurate and up-to-date data on media owner-
ship lies at the very heart of any media pluralism regulation, as it would 
be impossible to limit excessive media concentrations without the tools 
to transparently identify them (Stolte and Craufurd Smith, 2010). Yet, 
media ownership transparency has also an important public dimension: 
not only should the specialised public agencies (such as media regulatory 
authorities) be equipped with a mandate to access the relevant owner-
ship data, also media users should be able to know who owns the media 
they use. This would oblige media companies to publicly disclose and 
share such data in a clear, easily accessible and free-of-charge form. As 
table 24 demonstrates, media transparency rules in the CEE countries 
mainly revolve around an obligation to notify media regulatory authori-
ties about broadcasters’ ownership, eventual changes, financial situation 
and plans for concentration and mergers.
In Poland, the Chairman of the National Broadcasting Council may 
require a broadcaster to provide materials, information and documentation 
to the extent necessary for the purpose of supervising the broadcaster’s 
compliance with the provisions of the Act and the terms of the broadcasting 
licence.14 Under Article 37a of the 1992 Broadcasting Act, media service 
providers are required annually, to deliver to the National Broadcasting 
Council their financial statements prepared in a form specified by the Act 
on Accounting (1994).15 The purpose of this requirement is to review the 
financial and economic conditions of broadcasters including advertising 
revenues, financial results (profits and loses), ownership structure and cap-
ital concentration. In practice, a detailed analysis of financial statements 
by the National Broadcasting Council may appear to be problematic as the 
quote from the annual report of the National Broadcasting Council shows: 
“(the financial statements) do not always give complete knowledge on the 
economic and financial situation of broadcasters and about the achieved 
13 1992 Broadcasting Act…, Article 4 (1).
14 1992 Broadcasting Act…, Article 10 (2).
15 1994 Act on Accounting (Ustawa o Rachunkowości) adopted on September 29, 
1994, Official Journal, 1994, No. 121, item 591, as amended.
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results of their broadcasting activity” ( KRRiT, 2003: 10). In Slovakia, media 
ownership transparency is taken into account in the process of extending 
the licence term. The purpose of this process is to consider the contribution 
to the development of a media market.16 Likewise, in the Czech Republic 
the transparency of ownership in the applicant’s company is taken into 
account in the process of decision-making leading to granting the licence 
by the Council. In Hungary, media transparency rules are an integral part 
of the process of notification. The providers of media services are subject 
to registration by the Office of the National Media and Communications 
Authority (NMHH). Under Article 41(6) the data recorded in the registers 
concerning “the names, contact information of media service providers, 
press product founders and publishers, as well as the names and titles of 
the media services and press products” are publicly available.17 It is worth 
mentioning though, that this publicly available information does not in-
clude data on ultimate ownership. The Mapping Digital Media report on 
Hungary concludes: “Most of the major media outlets’ websites indicate the 
owner. Thus citizens can learn through publicly available information who 
the owners of the media are” (OSF, 2012b: 71). It should be noted though 
that the name of the company does not always indicate the ultimate owner 
and other important information that may be relevant in the context of 
media ownership such as active political involvement of the owner. Under 
the Hungarian media law, different rules of disclosure apply to providers 
of linear services and providers of on-demand services and press products. 
The providers of linear services are required to provide
data on the size of direct or indirect ownership stake held by the notifier or by 
any other person with a qualifying holding in the notifier undertaking, in any 
undertaking providing media services, or applying for media service provision 
rights, within the territory of Hungary.18
Thus, even though the providers of linear services have to disclose more 
detailed data on media ownership, these are merely collected by the NMHH 
and not automatically disclosed to the public in an easily  accessible form.
As can be seen from this brief analysis, the broadcasting laws in the 
CEE seem to be relatively permissive in ownership policies and consolida-
tion. They also allow for too much discretion on the side of regulatory 
authorities to limit eventually the size of media companies, mergers or 
decide about revoking licences. Media ownership details are often opaque 
and do not allow an automatic disclosure or identification of the ultimate 
16 Act No. 308 of 14 September 2000 Coll. on Broadcasting…, Article 52 (3).
17 Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media…
18 Ibidem, Article 42 (1)e.
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owner of particular media outlets. Besides, the changes in ownership are 
constant and complex. The transparency rules largely function within the 
media regulatory authorities, but do not automatically ensure the access 
of the public to the full datasets free of charge. 
The next section of this chapter will focus on three dimensions of 
structural media pluralism: diversity of media control/patterns of media 
ownership; diversity of media functions and geographical diversity. 
5.4. Diversity of media control: patterns of media ownership
An important precondition of structural diversity is a diversity of play-
ers – newspapers (both print and online), TV channels, radio stations 
and other media services that users identify as distinct entities offering 
different types of content services. Media entities (usually institutions) 
and their operations are most often aggregated according to ownership 
links and controlled by the owners. Relatively similar ownership pat-
terns might however result in various levels of service diversity: some 
owners invest in media outlets that reflect a broader range of viewpoints 
and cultural representations, others make specific uses of their media to 
achieve political and economic benefits (Klimkiewicz, 2010b: 908). Own-
ership patterns intersect with horizontal levels of media sectors (such as 
print, broadcasting and Internet) and vertical production and distribu-
tion chains (news production, advertising, distribution). Current media 
business structures make it more difficult to paint ownership borders of 
media entities as most influential players engage in manifold alliances, 
joint ventures, networks and forms of co-operation that lead to diffusion 
of control and require a reconciliation of multiple interests (2010b: 908). 
The interrelation between politics and economic interests of the me-
dia is seen as one of the most serious threats to media pluralism. The 
Commission in the Staff Working Document on Media Pluralism observed: 
“Given the important role that the media play in disseminating informa-
tion about the economy and political actors and their activities, there is no 
European Member State where political and/or economic actors do not try 
to influence media coverage according to their own interest” (European 
Commission, 2007a: 6). Thus, diversity of ownership is seen not only as 
a condition ensuring a diverse range of information sources and various 
forms of organisational structures, but also as a condition preventing an 
excessive political power and political influence of the media owners. The 
next two sections of this chapter will elaborate on the question of foreign 
ownership in the CEE countries and media ownership types, with a par-
ticular consideration of the question of media ownership consolidation. 
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5.4.1. Foreign and domestic media ownership: does it matter? 
Very few media scholars and professionals in the region would probably 
claim that the new media structures that developed after 1989 decreased 
media pluralism and diversity in general. But an interpretation of empirical 
currents, especially as it comes to power of media structures, do not offer 
clear-cut views of steady progress. This refers particularly to the question 
of foreign media ownership. It has been common knowledge that one of 
the most distinguishing features of the media systems in the CEE is for-
eign ownership, especially in the sector of the print press. Foreign capital 
brought to Central and Eastern Europe the necessary investment needed 
for revamping media landscapes and old production routines. Foreign in-
vestors also helped to assimilate Western managerial practices in CEE sister 
companies and improved production technology (Jakubowicz, 2007). This 
has been seen as ‘a natural course’ of media development that could even-
tually be reproduced in other parts of the world. John Downey observes 
that transnational capital in the CEE media sector can be characterised by 
the theory of mimetic isomorphism (2012: 117). Uncertainty of the CEE 
media environments resulted in copying successful business models from 
Western countries. Indeed, transnational owners proved to be very cautious 
in experimenting with genuinely new projects. They have rather tended to 
‘clone’ and bring to Central European markets the types of products that 
met commercial success in their respective countries. But explaining this by 
the high uncertainty in the region might be exaggerated. The CEE countries 
implemented relatively permissive regulatory frameworks to attract rather 
than discourage, foreign investors. Bound by membership in the Council 
of Europe, EU pre-accession negotiations and the significant proximity to 
the Western part of Europe, the fresh and unfurnished media environments 
constituted a relatively attractive ground for foreign capital and innovation 
in media services. The CEE countries did not impose any limitations on 
foreign ownership in the sector of the print press, and some constraints in 
broadcasting markets have been gradually lifted in order to comply with 
the premises of the internal market. 
Indeed, from the perspective of EU internal market, division on ‘for-
eign’ (EU based) and domestic ownership becomes pointless. After EU 
accession, not only did all CEE countries lift barriers on EU non-domestic 
ownership, but some decided to lift or considerably weaken rules on for-
eign (non-EU) ownership as well (Klimkiewicz, 2009a). At the same time, 
Katrin Voltmer observes that foreign ownership is felt as a form of cultural 
domination in countries of the region, which – for better or worse – are be-
ginning to develop their national identities by distancing themselves from 
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the West (Voltmer, 2013: 172). The issue of ‘foreign media ownership’ 
has also gradually gained greater political exposure in national political 
discourses, signifying economic and cultural influence. The Commission’s 
Staff Working Document: Media Pluralism in the Member States of the Euro-
pean Union (2007a: 9–10) paid attention to the issue of cross-border con-
centration distinguishing its two dimensions: an international dimension 
and intercommunity dimension. While the first is related to the increas-
ing influence of non-European investors in Europe (mostly US-based), the 
second refers mostly to Western companies significantly investing in 
“the countries that joined the Union in 2004 and 2006”. Although the Doc-
ument notes that non-domestic owners do not necessarily pose a threat to 
media pluralism, the lack of legal safeguards at place and insufficient edi-
torial independence from the owner may effectively curtail freedom of ex-
pression and information. In addition, the vast presence of transnational 
conglomerates may be seen as detrimental to domestic media businesses, 
may lead to growing commercialisation and may also make national com-
petition regulation more harder to enforce against foreign undertakings. 
The table below presents the rules on foreign ownership in the audio-
visual sector before and after EU accession.
Table 26: Rules on foreign ownership in the broadcasting sector in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
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Sources: Elaborated on the basis of national broadcasting laws in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia as quoted in the table.
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Before EU accession, the most restrictive regulation concerning foreign 
ownership had been implemented in Poland. The share of capital of for-
eign owners on broadcasting markets could not exceed 33% until 2004. 
This threshold in fact resulted in a prominent presence of domestic TV 
owners, two of which built successively their media businesses around 
the flagship TV channels – Polsat (Polsat Media group owned by Zyg-
munt  Solorz) and TVN (owned by the ITI group originally established 
by Mariusz Walter and Jan Wejchert). After EU accession, Poland main-
tained limits for foreign non-EU ownership and Slovakia kept provisions 
encouraging an adequate ownership participation of persons with Slovak 
citizenship. 
Studying the dynamics between foreign (transnational) and domes-
tic (national) structures in the CEE countries demonstrates how self- 
-sustainable a media system is in its particular environment and how much 
it depends on external resources (financing, know-how, human capital). 
The lack of self-sustainability can be enhanced or counterbalanced by ap-
propriate policy approaches and choices. These have been used to a very 
limited extent by the CEE countries as regards the print press sector, and in 
some countries – the Czech Republic in particular – also in the broadcast-
ing sector. The dominance of foreign ownership in the press markets can 
be exemplified by the lists of the top press companies (measured by the 
level of revenues) in the CEE countries. In Hungary, in 2011 the top six me-
dia companies were foreign, including a Finish publishing group Sanoma, 
and the Swiss-owned Ringier. In the Czech Republic, in 2011 the top posi-
tions among publishing companies were occupied by Ringier Axel Spring-
er, MAFRA (Rheinisch Bergische Verlagsgeselschaft – RBV) and Passauer 
Neue Presse (Verlagsgruppe Passau), in Slovakia by Ringier Axel Springer 
and RBV.19 In the audiovisual field, significant revenues were generated 
by US-owned CME (Central European Enterprises), now a subsidiary of 
Time Warner, which controls the top commercial TV channels in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. The top positions of the two leading broadcast-
ing companies in Hungary – RTL Klub (owned by Bertelsmann) and TV2 
(previously the US-owned and Luxembourg based MTM-SBS company, 
now ProsiebenSat1) resulted from the opening the Hungarian market to 
commercial broadcasting in 1996, thus establishing a three-tier structure 
involving two commercial TV channels with foreign ownership and the 
public service broadcaster MTV. In Poland, one of the top positions among 
media companies is occupied by Canal+ (owned by the French Vivendi) 
developing operations through its leading digital platform.
19 WAN (2012) World Press Trends (available at: http://www.wan-ifra.org/micro-
sites/world-press-trends; retrieved 23.12.2013).
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The asymmetric development of the ownership structures in the 1990s 
has gained more fluctuating dynamics in last 10 years. Szabolcs Tóth ob-
serves that “The level of foreign ownership in Hungarian media has been 
unhealthily high since the mid 1990s. This started to change in the last 
couple of years” (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2012). Cer-
tainly, some shifts in media ownership signal the rise of domestic resources 
both in terms of financing and know-how. Václav Štetka even argues that 
domestic tycoons are back on the ground and local business elites looking 
to influence politicians, are buying into the media sector (2013). A num-
ber of media ownership changes or initiatives in the region epitomise this 
trend. One of them was the entry of the Slovak investment group J&T 
(established by Patrik Tkáč and Ivan Jakabovič) into the ownership of the 
second most popular private TV channel TV Joj and in 2010 into control 
of the daily Pravda (previously owned by the Daily Mail group). At the 
end of 2013, Patrik Tkáč with the Czech businessman Daniel Křetínský 
acquired the business activities of Ringier Axel Springer in the Czech Re-
public, including the Czech press wholesaler První novinová společnost a.s. 
(PNS), and a leading tabloid Blesk.20 In Poland, similar developments rep-
resent a takeover of Axel Springer’s daily Dziennik by the Infor company 
in 2009 and the daily Rzeczpospolita by the Polish businessman Grzegorz 
Hajdarowicz in 2011. In the Czech Republic, the coal baron Zdenĕk Bakala 
acquired the weekly Respekt in 2006 and a financial daily Hospodářské no-
viny, together with the weekly Ekonom in 2008. In addition, the owner of 
the largest media buying agency in the country, Jaromír Soukup, controls 
a media empire which includes several news and lifestyle magazines as 
well as the fourth largest television channel, TV Barrandov (Štetka, 2013). 
In Hungary in 2005, the businessman Gábor Széles launched a commer-
cial cable television channel Echo TV and the Echo News Agency, and pur-
chased the liberal daily newspaper Magyar Hírlap, and converted it into 
a conservative newspaper (OSF, 2012b: 68).
By contrast, there have been other examples that illustrate a contrary 
development – the growing ownership participation of large scale trans-
national media groups in some media activities in the region. In 2007, the 
TV market leader Markíza became wholly owned by the U.S. conglomer-
ate Central European Media Enterprises (CME – now ultimately owned 
by Time Warner), which had previously controlled 50% of the channel. 
20 Press Release: Ringier Axel Springer Media AG: Entrepreneurs Daniel Křetínský and 





Before that, Markíza had been heavily influenced by the unofficial Slovak 
co-owner and politician Pavol Rusko (OSF, 2013b: 63). Following a series 
of collusions with the Czech partner and protracted arbitration between 
the CME and the Czech State, CME settled its 100% of ownership in the 
leading private broadcaster Nova in the Czech Republic in 2005 (Downey, 
2012: 120). In Poland, the largest radio network RMF was bought by the 
German publishing giant Bauer in 2006 from its Polish owner. In 2012, 
the largest news portal in Poland onet.pl (owned before by the ITI group) 
was acquired by Ringier Axel Springer. Finally in 2013, Canal+/Vivendi 
merged its digital platform Cyfra+ with the competitive digital platform 
n owned before by the ITI group. These shifts exemplify that the dynam-
ics between foreign (transnational) and domestic (national) media own-
ership structures in the CEE countries is brisk and uneven, dictated by 
a growing self-sustainability of national media environments on the one 
hand, and refocusing priorities of the transnational media companies on 
the other hand.
Although research has not offered a clear diagnosis of the influence 
of foreign ownership on structural media pluralism, three different ways 
may be mentioned in which transnational companies are likely to modify 
the diversity of media structures or services. Firstly, the takeover of media 
companies by foreign owners may more easily lead to reaching trans-
actions among large transnational entities with prioritising the supra-
national and regional interests rather than paying due respect to the com-
munication needs of national audiences. Secondly, transnational media 
networks and entities tend more often than domestic companies to mul-
tiply the same business models and products across national boundaries, 
thus reducing the type of structural diversity being rooted in a specific 
national, cultural and geographical space (Klimkiewicz, 2009a). Thirdly, 
in the search for greater precaution, conformity and synergies with activi-
ties in other national markets, the transnational companies may tend to 
avoid contents that bear political risks or more ambitious journalism. 
With regard to transnational takeovers and strategic alliances, the 
transnational owners have gradually invested in particular sectors of me-
dia markets to acquire controlling positions. In 2007, among the seven 
largest paid-for daily newspapers in the Czech Republic, foreign com-
panies controlled 90% of circulation, and in 2013 88% of the circula-
tion.21 This high proportion was largely shared between the three German 
21 This share will certainly decrease since December 2013, as the leading Czech 
tabloid Blesk together with other Czech media businesses of Ringier Axel Springer were 
bought by Czech businessman Daniel Křetínský and Patrik Tkáč, the co-owner of the 
Slovak J&T investment group.
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publishing groups: Ringier Axel Springer, Rheinisch Bergische Verlags-
gesellschaft (RBV) and Verlagsgruppe Passau (Passauer Neue Presse), 
each specialising in a different type of the press (tabloid, quality daily, 
regional press). In Slovakia, foreign owners controlled 70% of print press 
circulation among the top seven paid-for dailies in 2011. This share was 
divided between two German publishing groups – Ringier Axel Spring-
er and RBV. In Hungary the proportion of foreign ownership among the 
top seven paid-for dailies reached 83% in 2011 and 82% in 2013. Two 
publishing groups – Ringier and the Hungarian subsidiary of the Daily 
Mail Group (Lapcom)22 shared this high proportion. Poland seems to be 
the only country where the share of foreign owners measured through the 
sold circulation of the seven largest paid-for dailies reached 45% in 2013 
which accounts for less than a majority. This proportion was shared be-
tween Ringier Axel Springer and Verlagsgruppe Passau.
Strategic partnerships and acquisitions can be well illustrated by the 
case of Ringier and Axel Springer. Ringier AG established in 1833 in Swit-
zerland entered the CEE press markets in 1991. The company quickly 
acquired a position of the market leader in the segment of dailies in the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and later Hungary. Axel Springer established 
in Germany in 1946, entered the CEE press markets in 1989 starting op-
erations in Hungary and in 1994 in Poland. Both companies focused on 
various segments of the press markets, but reached greater competitive 
proximity with the launch of the tabloid Fakt in Poland in 2003 and the 
tabloid Reggel in Hungary in 2004. Changing media business models and 
the necessity of digital investments led to consideration of a strategic 
partnership in the CEE. In 2010, Springer and Ringer finalised a large 
merger that aimed to integrate their CEE activities and generate synergies 
across Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Serbia. The 
combined operating potential of the company became immense: the joint 
venture started to control the leading tabloid in each country, as can be 
seen from the table below: 
Table 27: Leading companies in the sector of paid-for daily newspapers
Before 2010 After 2010
CZECH REPUBLIC Ringier Ringier Axel Springer
HUNGARY Ringier Ringier
POLAND Axel Springer Ringier Axel Springer
SLOVAKIA Ringier Ringier Axel Springer
22 In January 2013, Lapcom was sold by the Daily Mail Group to the Eliott Group.
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John Downey notices that within such a structure each national subsid-
iary harnesses the power of the other to cement their dominance in press 
markets in the CEE (2012: 132). The merger between Ringier and Axel 
Springer was accepted in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, but 
in 2011 was stopped by the Hungarian Media Council. The opinion of 
the Media Council is binding for the Hungarian Competition Office under 
Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and the Mass Media. Article 70 
of the Act entitles the Media Council to examine the facts concerning 
media markets in order to prevent media market concentration and iden-
tify media service providers with significant market power.23 The Media 
Council justified its decision stating that the merger would significantly 
infringe upon the right to diverse sources of information. In comparison 
with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, Hungary represented the 
only press market where both companies enjoyed a high presence in simi-
lar press segments before the merger: Axel Springer has published eight 
regional dailies and the business daily Világgazdaság, as well as a num-
ber of women’s, home, cooking, puzzle and youth magazines altogether 
amounting to more than 60 print and online titles. Ringier’s portfolio 
has comprised more than 30 titles including the broadsheet Népszabad-
ság, tabloid Blikk and sports daily Nemzeti Sport. Despite the merger was 
blocked, both companies still plan the combination of activities in Hun-
gary. It is worth mentioning in this context that Hungary is seen as one of 
the strategic CEE markets together with Poland and Slovakia, where the 
merged Ringier Axel Springer intends to further develop their operations. 
As mentioned earlier in this section, Axel Springer sold its Czech print 
businesses to the Czech and Slovak businessmen, in order to refocus its 
further expansion on a digital fundament that has not been well devel-
oped in the Czech Republic.24 
The multiplication of the same business models and products has 
been manifested by several transnational companies operating in the re-
gion. Ringier acting before the 2010 merger in Hungary, the Czech Re-
public and Slovakia, succeeded in launching or acquiring leading national 
tabloids. Although the tabloids have appeared under different titles (Blikk 
in Hungary; Blesk in the Czech Republic and Nový Čas in Slovakia), they 
were tailored to replicate the Swiss model – Blick. All of them provide 
23 Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media…
24 Press Release: Ringier Axel Springer Media AG: Entrepreneurs Daniel Křetínský and 





akin content categories, and follow an entertainment-oriented logic, thus 
resulting in the same format and style of journalism. Similar examples are 
represented in the Polish tabloid Fakt published by Axel Springer since 
2003, and modelled after the AS flagship title Bild Zeitung, or numer-
ous cloned magazines printed mostly by Bauer, Ringier Axel Springer and 
Burda in Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia (Klimkiewicz, 
2009a). Verlagsruppe Passau operating mainly on local and regional press 
markets in the Czech Republic and Poland reproduced chaining of news-
paper titles under one brand, thus offering sections with unified content. 
Central European Media Enterprises owning commercial TV stations with 
a national coverage across the region ‘transplanted’ the model of an en-
tertainment-focused TV from the US ground. In terms of contents offered, 
these TV channels predominately focus on US entertainment production, 
complementing it with other domestically produced genres – such as the 
news. It would be wrong, however, to assume that transnational com-
panies multiply only commercial/entertainment media models. In 2006, 
Axel Springer established in Poland a quality daily newspaper Dziennik 
(modelled after the AS quality daily Die Welt) to compete with a successful 
and domestically owned Gazeta Wyborcza. The daily survived only three 
years though, compelled to merge with another daily Gazeta Prawna (pub-
lished by Infor) in 2009. It seems understandable that at the dawn of the 
21st century the copying of media business models and types of services 
presented a cheaper and safer option than experimenting with more risky 
online and digital services (at that time many successful activities were 
introduced by relatively small or medium size domestic groups). Yet, a few 
years later the necessity of investing in cross-media activities and appro-
priate bridging of content production with digital distribution became un-
avoidable. Transnational companies attempted to respond to these trends 
through various forms of cross-media expansion. Several examples can be 
mentioned in this respect. In Poland, the German press publisher Bauer 
stepped into the radio and online sector through the acquisition of the 
major commercial radio station RMF FM in 2006 and the subsequent ac-
quisition of the RMF-related horizontal portal interia.pl in 2008. As Poland 
was the only country in the region where the publisher of daily newspa-
pers could potentially acquire TV stations (other countries of the region 
introduced limits on cross-ownership in the print and broadcasting sector 
as discussed above), Axel Springer took the necessary steps in 2007 to buy 
25.1% of shares in TV Polsat owned by Zygmunt Solorz. The Polish Office 
for Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) however rejected the 
application arguing that despite acquiring only 25.1% of the shares, 
the influence of Axel Springer deems to be more significant due to the 
221
fact that without the approval of the FMV (a subsidiary of Axel Springer) 
important decisions concerning TV Polsat could not be taken. In 2012, 
the largest news portal in Poland onet.pl (owned before by the ITI group) 
was acquired by Ringier Axel Springer. In terms of popularity of use, only 
google achieves better results in Poland than onet.pl. 
It would be interesting in this respect to reflect on structural and own-
ership changes in the sector of telecommunication and follow some initia-
tives introduced by the telecom operators. As in other EU countries, the 
telecom field underwent a process of internationalisation – both in terms 
of the outlook and strategies of its key commercial protagonists (Simpson, 
2008). CEE’s telecom markets were historically highly national- centric 
and foreclosed markets due to the monopolistic positions of state opera-
tors. After the wave of privatisation, Central European telecom markets 
became largely restructured. Again, strong transnational corporations 
helped to increase productivity, efficiency, and most importantly build 
the necessary infrastructure for converging telecom services. The new 
structures cemented leading positions of two principal players: France 
Telecom/Orange (controlling through TP S.A. the fixed telecommunica-
tion market in Poland) and Deutsche Telekom (controlling through Mag-
yar Telecom the fixed telecommunication market in Hungary and through 
Slovak Telecom the market in Slovakia). Both companies also control the 
leading mobile operators in the region – Orange and T-mobile co-operat-
ing on the use of LTE technology. The incumbents i.e. the former monop-
olist operating telecom infrastructures succeeded also in offering a range 
of new audiovisual and content services, most importantly IPTV (under 
such brands as T-Home in Hungary, Magio in Slovakia or Neostrada with 
TV in Poland), thus positioning themselves to challenge the interests of 
cable and digital platform operators mostly owned by transnational com-
petitors such as UPC or Canal Plus. In addition, the telecom operators 
more actively immerse in the online content production, thus moving 
steadily from an exclusive operation of distribution networks. In 2005, 
Slovak Telecom (subsidiary of the Deutsche Telekom Group) bought 
the information and news portal zoznam.sk enjoying a high degree of 
popularity among Slovak Internet users. The website attracts the second-
highest monthly traffic in Slovakia (OSF, 2013b: 59). In 2005, Magyar 
Telecom as part of a rebranding strategy (full introduction of T-brand in 
Hungary) established the web portal T-online (Axelero’s successor) that 
was renamed in 2007 as origo.hu.25 According to the measurement of the 
25 Magyar Telecom (2013) Company History (available at: http://www.telekom.hu/
about_us/about_magyar_telekom/company_history; retrieved 25.12.2013).
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Medián web audit company origo.hu has been the most popular online 
news and current affairs provider in Hungary in  2007–2011 (OSF, 2012b: 
25). In Poland, Telekomunikacja Polska/Orange has operated the web 
portal wp.pl (Wirtualna Polska) since 2001, although in October 2013 the 
portal was sold to the another web portal o2 owned by the private equity 
company Innova Group.26 In 2013, Wirtualna Polska was the second most 
popular news and current affairs portal.27 At the EU level, the incumbents 
are advocating for more national consolidation to strengthen their com-
petitive potential transnationally. The European Commission however 
prefers cross-border consolidation. The CEE telecom markets may be seen 
as a practical epitome of this view. 
Finally, transnational companies may tend to avoid contents that 
bear political risks and uncertainties. In this sense the question of ‘for-
eign’ media ownership has been politically sensitive in Central and East-
ern Europe. Again, research has not offered unambiguous answers to the 
question as to how significant political influence of transnational owners 
is. Certainly, there is no evidence to suppose that political links made for-
eign owners more keen to exert pressure on news production than is the 
case of domestic owners. There may be obvious commercial rationales 
for that: greater political polarisation and more clearly defined political 
interests and preferences in media contents might result in a decline of 
sales (Klimkiewicz, 2009a: 52). Thus, economic factors largely dictate 
high political discretion and prudence. Karol Jakubowicz observed that 
(…) on the whole, foreign owners have not been as involved in political infight-
ing as local media players and this also presents a potential that they promote 
impartiality in news coverage, thus frustrating their journalists who consider 
local political issues important (2007: 222). 
This view comes up with perceptions of staff journalists in some 
newspapers (acquired by transnational owners) that criticised the trans-
formation of opinion-forming dailies into ‘light’ titles filled with informa-
tion lacking deep analysis and reflection.28 At the same time, some po-
litical leaders – such as Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland – dared to address 
26 Forbes (2013) O2 kupuje Wirtualną Polskę za 375 mln złotych 23.10.2013 (avail-
able at: http://www.forbes.pl/o2-pl-kupuje-wirtualna-polske-za-375-mln-zlotych, 
 artykuly,165259,1,1.html; retrieved 25.12.2013).
27 Measurement by Gemius in October 2013 (available at: http://www.wirtualne-
media.pl/artykul/najpopularniejsze-serwisy-tematyczne-w-pazdzierniku-2013-roku; 
 retrieved 25.12.2013).
28 Świątek, K. (2004) „Sprasowana prasa” (Pressed Press) in Tygodnik Solidarność 
16.01.2004 No. 3. 
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foreign ownership in the political discourse and namely – as a political 
problem, that is derived from the economic and symbolic colonisation of 
the national public sphere by foreign media owners. This view resonates 
with e.g. Czech media experts that expressed their skepticism with regard 
to the consequences of foreign ownership for the national media land-
scape after the second great wave of concentration on the Czech daily 
press market (Waschková Císařová, 2007) and defended the legitimacy 
of the last Czech-owned media (Klukan, 2007). Political prudence and 
the discretion of transnational owners manifests itself mainly during the 
momentous regulatory/political changes as was the case of an enforce-
ment of the Hungarian media law package in 2010. The transnational 
media companies, including Ringier, Axel Springer and RTL, remained 
relatively silent about the changes and did not bring up their stance on 
controversial issues (such as the omnipotent power of the regulator) into 
the forefront of the public discussion.
5.4.2. Patterns of media ownership and ownership consolidation
Referring to the strategies and goals of the owners, Voltmer (2013: 168) 
distinguishes between two types of ownership: profit-seeking and policy-
seeking ownership that lead to different kinds of biases. Profit-seeking 
owners are mainly concerned with the economic profits and in conse-
quence, they can take on any political stance or pursue a relatively im-
partial editorial line, but would take decisive steps when their business 
interests are affected by particular policy proposals. This type of owner-
ship can be illustrated in the CEE countries by large transnational com-
panies such as Ringier Axel Springer, CME, RTL/Bertelsmann, and Ver-
lagsgruppe Passau. In contrast, policy-seeking owners use their media 
to promote a particular political idea or party, occasionally even when 
this is against their economic interests (Voltmer, 2013: 168). This type 
of ownership can be characterised by media groups that are keen to sup-
port certain political options, which does not automatically mean they 
stick to them forever. In practice, some policy-seeking owners act with 
greater discretion as is the case of the ITI group in Poland (supporting 
the Civic Platform party29), others articulate their political endorsement 
more stoutly. The group of policy-seeking owners also includes media 
ownership by foundations or private persons under the strong control or 
influence of political parties or movements. Among these, there are the 
29 Civic Platform – Platforma Obywatelska – PO – a center-right political party in 
Poland. 
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examples of Hungarian daily newspapers with various political orienta-
tions including a leftist daily Népszabadság30, or the rightist daily Magyar 
Nemzet, supporting the Fidesz party. In Poland, the media belonging to 
the network of Radio Maryja (radio Maryja, TV Trwam, the daily Nasz 
Dziennik) are formally owned by the Catholic Foundation Lux Veritatis, 
but controlled by a Catholic priest Tadeusz Rydzyk supporting the right-
wing Law and Justice party31. 
In addition to these, a third type of owners can be defined as 
warranty- seeking owners that aspire to establish or buy media outlets in 
order to hold ‘politicians in check’ with regard to other businesses they 
control. These owners treat their media instrumentally and as a possi-
ble political leverage. Such strategy might result in promoting views that 
may be contradictory to the economic interests of the media, but are ful-
ly congruent with the economic interests of their owners. There are nu-
merous examples illustrating this category. In Hungary, Gábor Széles, 
the owner of powerful industrial Ikarus group owns cable Echo TV, the 
Echo News Agency, and daily newspaper Magyar Hírlap. Two other busi-
nessmen Zsolt Nyerges and Lajos Simicska, controlling – among other 
businesses – the diversified holding construction company Kögzép are 
active on the advertising market, and Simicska bougth the daily Metropol 
from the Swedish Metro International Group in 2011. The growing media 
structures of the Czech coal baron Zdenĕk Bakala, the Polish business-
man Grzegorz Hajdarowicz and the Slovak investment group J&T were 
just discussed in the previous section. In addition, the case of Slovak 
businessman Ivan Kmotrík can be mentioned. Kmotrík owns the printing 
company Grafobal, the football club Slovan and has various shares in 
energy-related businesses. In the media sector, Kmotrík acquired a news 
channel TA 3 and a press distribution network. 
Finally, the last category can be distinguished as connection-seek-
ing owners. This group is represented by large incumbent companies or 
digital platform operators predominantly focusing on building infrastruc-
tures and economic solutions boosting the dissemination and distribution 
of content. These owners quite recently started to invest in the produc-
tion of content mainly to compete with the media networks that in turn 
more increasingly invest in technologies or get into partnerships with 
30 In 2006, the Ringier Publishing House acquired a majority interest (67.7%). To-
day, Ringier owns a 70.77% stake in Népszabadság. Ringier (2013) Népszabadság (avail-
able at: http://www.ringier.com/en/products/hungary/newspapers/nepszabadsag; 
 retrieved 25.12.2013).
31 Law and Justice – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PIS – a national conservatice politi-
cal party in Poland.
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independent delivery systems. The media content production is second-
ary to distribution activities – the main purpose is to connect through as 
many platforms as possible. The entities that represent this group include 
 Orange, T-mobile, Slovak Telekom. Some instances manifest that the cat-
egory of connection-seeking owners overlaps with all other categories as 
is the case of Slovak Towercom cotrolled by the J&T group. Towercom 
was the dominant analogue terrestrial operator in Slovakia, and later was 
awarded with all three terrestrial multiplexes by the Telecommunication 
Office of the Slovak Republic (TÚSR – Telekomunikačný Úrad SR) (OSF, 
2013b: 54), thus becoming in fact a monopolist in the area of digital 
broadcasting distribution. 
The report of the High Level Group on Media Freedom and Plural-
ism A free and pluralistic media to sustain European democracy (HLGMFP, 
2013: 16) recognises as one of the challenges to media freedom and plu-
ralism in member states “the concentration of ownership of commercial 
media and the influence this might have in the political space”. Especially 
three such conditions are mentioned in the Report:
 – ownership in the hands of ruling politicians,
 – concentration of all media in a country within the hands of a single 
owner,
 – or (especially in small countries) concentration of all media in the 
hands of foreign owners (2013: 16). 
The conditions of media concentration defined in this way may seem 
quite exceptional, but as guidelines – they detect the main vectors of 
threats to media pluralism derived from structural and ownership devel-
opments, and in particular, media ownership consolidation. 
Justin Schlosberg points out that one of the stumbling blocks in deal-
ing with threats to media plurality concerns “the inherent difficulties in 
measuring media market shares in a converged environment with print 
news markets facing structural decline” (Schlosberg, 2013: 5). The Fea-
sibility Study for the Preparatory Action “Erasmus for journalists” (Econo-
misti Associati et al.,2011) uses three indexes to measure concentration 
on national media markets in different media (press and TV) sectors. 
The C4 refers to the concentration ratio, which aggregates the share in 
the market of the largest companies. The C4 stands for the widely used 
four-firm concentration which represents the market share of the top four 
companies. In the table below, the variables have been calculated on the 
basis of the number of existing titles and their average circulation level 
per issue (2011: 80). The second index applied in the study is most fre-
quently used Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). It calculates a compa-
ny’s share of a market as its percentage of the total revenue generated by 
226
all firms serving the market. However, shares may be also measured in 
other ways. Each company’s share is squared and the sum of the squared 
shares for all companies in a given market represents the HHI (Wild-
man, 2007: 153). An amount between 1000 and 1800 indicates a moder-
ate concentration, and above 1800 the highly concentrated market. The 
Noam Index is derived from HHI, but in addition to market power, it also 
takes into account the available diversity manifested in the number of 
alternative voices available (Economisti Associati, 2011: 80).
Table 28: Concentration in the press and TV markets of selected 
CEE countries
Concentration in the circulation 
of paid-for-dailies (2009)
Concentration in the audience 
share of TV channels (2009)
C4 HHI NOAM C4 HHI NOAM
CZECH 
REPUBLIC
77% 1791 199 79% 2113 116
HUNGARY 35% 560 101 – – –
POLAND 57% 801 130 67% 1210 44
EU 
AVERAGE
43% 793 129 60% 1196 60
Sources: Adapted from Economisti Associati et al., 2011.
The table shows that the level of concentration in the press markets 
is higher in the two studied CEE countries – the Czech Republic and Po-
land (Slovakia was not included in the sample) than the EU  average. 
The highest concentration characterises the Czech market (77%, HHI – 
77%), while the lowest can be observed in the case of Hungary (35%, 
HHI – 560). As regards the TV market, both Poland and the Czech Re-
public exhibit higher levels of concentration than the EU average. The 
HHI index measured for the purpose of the study suggests that the press 
market in the Czech Republic is moderately concentrated, while the TV 
market is highly concentrated. In the case of Poland, the HHI value shows 
the relatively competitive press market, and the moderately concentrated 
TV market. The report commissioned by the Polish Broadcasting Council 
(KRRiT) (Indicator, 2012) Pluralism in the Polish electronic media (Plu-
ralizm w polskich mediach elektronicznych) uses the calculation of rev-
enues shares, audience shares and advertising shares. The findings lead 
to slightly different conclusions than in the Feasibility Study – the authors 
emphasise that Polish TV market is highly consolidated, the concentration 
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though does not significantly influence the development of the TV market 
(2012: 21). The study conducted by Marína Urbániková demonstrates 
different values for the HHI in the case of the Czech Republic and Slova-
kia.32 The study reaches the conclusion, that both the Slovak and Czech 
daily press markets are highly concentrated with the amount of 2390 
for Slovakia and 2829 for the Czech Republic. Likewise, the TV markets 
in both countries achieve a significantly high concentration amounting in 
the case of the Czech Republic to 3172 and Slovakia 3500.33 The different 
values produced by both studies show how important and decisive role in 
application of measurement methodologies is played by the defining of 
a relevant product market, choice of calculation indicating market shares 
(share in the total revenues, audience shares, share in production capaci-
ties, share in advertising, etc.) and finally, the available data. 
To examine the issue of consolidation from a slightly different angle 
it would be instructive to reflect on recent developments and changes in 
the print press and TV markets in the region and contextualise these data 
with the dynamics of media ownership changes and reflection on other 
media sectors.







2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013*
Blesk 1992 Ringier Axel 
Springer





303 302 292 256 240 222 206 185
Deník 2001 Passauer 
Neue Presse
– 322* 287* 248 224 204 181 163
Právo 1921 Borgis 161* 152* 144* 138 128 120 111 104
Aha! 2006 Ringier Axel 
Springer
101* 125* 114* 107 100 89 82 64
Sport 1953 Ringier Axel 
Springer





73 70 70 59 50 43 42 38
32 Slovak Press Watch (2010) Je koncentrácia vlastníctva slovenských médií problé-




Sources: Elaborated from WAN, World Press Trends 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 
2007 (available at: http://www.wan-ifra.org/microsites/world-press-trends; retrieved 
26.12.2013), and Czech Audit Bureau of Circulation ABC CR (available at: http://www.
abccr.cz/en/; retrieved 26.12.2013).
Notes: * The data refer to September circulation in given years
** Rheinisch Bergische Verlagsgesellschaft
The average sold circulation of top-paid-for dailies has been signifi-
cantly decreasing in the Czech Republic. The sale of paid-for-dailies in 
all specific groups (tabloids, quality and regional dailies) has declined 
proportionately, at the same time the group of most affected newspapers 
includes the tabloids Blesk, regional chain Deník and quality daily Lidové 
Noviny. Paradoxically, Právo displays one of the most moderate decline, 
remaining so far the Czech-owned newspaper in the control of Zdenĕk 
Porybný, its former and current editor-in-chief. In terms of ownership, the 
Czech Republic press market resembles a classic oligopoly. Three main 
owners Ringier Axel Springer, RBV and Verlaggruppe Passau control the 
respective shares. The next table demonstrates the proportion of sold cir-
culation (indicating ownership consolidation) controlled by each of these 
groups in 2007 and 2011:
Table 30: Proportions of circulation shares controlled by the three largest 
publishing companies in the Czech Republic
2007 2011








PROPORTION OF THE THREE LARGEST PUBLISHING 
COMPANIES (% of circulation)
81.2% 83.9%
Sources: Calculated on the basis of the data from WAN and ABC CR (as quoted above).
As can be surmised from these calculations, the combined proportion 
of the three top publishing companies slightly increased – achieving 
an exceedingly a high level of consolidation at 84% in 2011. Between 
2007 and 2011, the shares of Ringier Axel Springer increased most sig-
nificantly reaching 43% in 2011. The shares of RBV rose to 23%, while 
the proportion of Verlagsgruppe Passau decreased to 18%. In this vein, 
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the level of consolidation by the three largest publishing groups increased 
in the Czech Republic, with Ringier Axel Springer leading the group and 
cementing its dominant position even stronger.




2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013*
Blikk Ringier 246 233 232 210 196 183 164 147
Bors Lapcom/
Hid Radio
62 67 76 89 86 83 74 71
Népsza-
badság
Ringier 152 128 112 94 78 66 57 50
Kisalföld Lapcom 78 77 76 73 70 69 68 66
Nemzeti 
Sport





72 66 60 53 50 46 41 39
Vas Népe Pannon Lapok 
Társasága
57 56 54 53 50 47 46 44
Sources: Elaborated from WAN, World Press Trends 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 
2007 (available at: http://www.wan-ifra.org/microsites/world-press-trends; retrieved 
26.12.2013), Hungarian Audit Bureau of Circulation MATESZ (available at: http://
matesz.hu/).
Notes: *Mid-year data.
Hungary has not been an exception in the overall trend of declining 
circulation of print daily newspapers. It is worth noticing though, that 
this process has a diversified impact on particular titles, and even seg-
ments. The most affected newspaper has been Népszabadság. The sold 
circulation of this newspaper decreased from 152,000 in 2006 to 50,000 
in 2013. Other national quality dailies have also been exposed to severe 
declines. At the same time, ownership in this segment has been more 
varied than in the case of the Czech Republic, though linked to politi-
cal interests. The circulation of tabloids diminished gradually with less 
extreme results. Finally, leading regional daily newspapers preserved 
the most stable position in comparison with other titles. Paradoxically, 
these represent the segment of the daily press market that is usually 
perceived as the most fragile. As the Feasibility Study (Economisti As-
sociati et al., 2011) observed, the Hungarian daily press market seems 
least concentrated from all the CEE countries studied in this work. Rela-
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tively significant shares in sold circulation are controlled especially by 
three publishing groups – Ringier, Lapcom and Axel Springer (operating 
mainly on the regional dailies’ market). 
Table 32: Proportions of circulation shares controlled by the two leading 
publishing companies in Hungary
2007 2011









PROPORTION OF THE TWO PUBLISHING COMPANIES 
(% of circulation)
43.7% 37.3%
Sources: Calculated on the basis of the data from WAN and MATESZ (as quoted above).
The table comparing the proportions of circulation controlled by Ringier 
and Lapcom shows that the level of consolidation generally decreased 
from 43.7% to 37.3% between 2007–2011. The share of Ringier de-
creased from 32.9% to 25%, while Lapcom achieved a higher concentra-
tion in 2011 than in 2007 amounting to 12.3%.






2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013*
Fakt 2003 Ringier 
Axel 
Springer






































72 62 64 58 51 48 43 40
Sources: Elaborated from WAN, World Press Trends 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007 
(available at: http://www.wan-ifra.org/microsites/world-press-trends; retrieved 
26.12.2013); Polish Audit Bureau of Circulation – ZKDP – Związek Kontroli Dystrybucji 
Prasy (available at: http://www.zkdp.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=categ
ory&layout=blog&id=8&Itemid=4&lang=pl; retrieved 26.12.2013).
Notes:  * The data refer to September circulation in given years
 ** The daily Dziennik and Gazeta Prawna were merged in 2009, thus creating 
a new consolidated title Dziennik Gazeta Prawna.
The size of the Polish print press market is larger than all the markets of 
the other CEE countries examined in this book together. These empirical 
conditions shape more diversified ownership patterns and a greater pres-
ence of domestic owners in the case of Poland. Yet, the decline of sold 
circulation of paid-for-dailies is significant especially in the sector of qual-
ity daily newspapers. The circulation of Gazeta Wyborcza dropped from 
434,000 in 2006 to 202,000 in 2013 and Rzeczpospolita from 173,000 in 
2006 to 91,000 in 2013. The dramatic developments in the segment of 
quality daily newspapers urged a merger between Dziennik-Europa-Polska-
Świat, owned by Axel Springer, with Gazeta Prawna, owned by Infor in 
2009. Both titles tough maintained different news websites –  dziennik.pl 
and gazetaprawna.pl. The decline in tabloids’ circulation proved less pro-
found, albeit Ringier Axel Springer – the publisher of the most popu-
lar tabloid in Poland Fakt – decided to invest in the most popular news 
website onet.pl in 2012 to prepare for a future remodeling of content 
production. The Polish Office for Competition and Consumer Protection 
(UOKiK) approved the acquisition although, should the relevant market 
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be defined as news market regardless of platform delivery, the transaction 
might raise concerns: Ringier Axel Springer controls the largest circula-
tion share in the daily press market and onet.pl shares among news portals 
fluctuated between 40–30% in recent years. It is worth noticing in this 
respect, that unlike in Hungary, the segment of regional daily newspapers 
experienced a relatively high decline in circulation between 2006–2013. 
This issue will be further examined in the next sections of this chapter.
Table 34: Proportions of circulation shares controlled by the leading 
publishing companies in Poland
2007 2011


























Sources: Calculated on the basis of the data from WAN and ZKDP (as quoted above).
The proportions of shares controlled by the largest publishing groups 
in Poland do not indicate such a high level of consolidation as was the 
case of the Czech Republic, and all the more, the position of the lead-
ing owner in the segment of daily newspapers – Ringier Axel Springer 
(amounting to 15.7% in 2011) is less dominant in terms of shares than 
the position of Ringier in Hungary (amounting to 25% in 2011). The 
combined share of the three largest publishing groups – Ringier Axel 
Springer, Agora and Polskapresse reaches around 37% – a similar propor-
tion than the one achieved by the two leading publishing groups in Hun-
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gary. Recognising that 15% circulation share by one player in a particular 
market represents a limit above which ownership concentration may be 
viewed as potentially detrimental to media pluralism (Craufurd Smith et 
al., 2012; Schlosberg, 2013), the Polish daily press market stands as quite 
a balanced and moderately diverse daily press landscape. 













185 179 172 150 145 136 118 107
SME 1993 Petit Press/ 
RBV34
76 65 60 59 58 53 47 41





65 59 64 58 60 55 54 48
Új 
Szó***
1948 Petit Press/ 
RBV
25 25 25 24 23 21 21 20
Korzár 1998 Petit Press/ 
RBV
33 30 27 25 23 20 18 16
Šport 1953 Šport Press 55 55 25 25 – 20 – –
Sources: Elaborated from WAN, World Press Trends 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007 
(available at: http://www.wan-ifra.org/microsites/world-press-trends; retrieved 
26.12.2013); Slovak Audit Bureau of Circulation ABC SR (available at: http://abcsr.sk/; 
retrieved 26.12.2013).
Notes:   * The data refer to September circulation in given years
  ** The data refer to July 2012
 ***  The daily published in the Hungarian language for the Hungarian national 
minority composing almost 10% of the Slovak population.
Contrary to Poland, Slovakia represents the smallest press market in the 
region. The decline of circulation affected mainly the largest daily news-
papers – both the tabloid Nový Čas and the quality daily SME. The most 
stable position and smallest losses characterise the daily Új Szó published 
in the Hungarian language for the Hungarian minority. This can be partly 
explained by the fact that Új Szó has strong links with the community it 
34 RBV owns 50% in the Petit Press group, the other half is controlled by the Slovak 
owner.
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targets, and is also supported by subsidies from the Slovak Ministry of 
Culture along with other press titles serving national and ethnic minori-
ties in Slovakia.
The position of two leading publishing companies – Ringier Axel 
Springer and Petit Press (owned by RBV) – indicates a slight increase of 
consolidation on the daily press market between 2007–2011. In 2011, 
Ringier Axel Springer controlled a high share of 36% in that market, 
while Petit Press 25%. The proportion of both companies exceeds 60% in 
a market which stands for high concentration as proved in the study of 
Marína Urbániková, mentioned earlier in this section.35
Analysisng media ownership consolidation, it is important to reflect 
on the extensions of activities of legacy media outlets and owners into the 
Internet and digital world, including delivery platforms. The provision of 
news migrated (although not exclusively) to the Internet and online ser-
vices. Barnhurst and Nerone observe that in times, when professional de-
signers construct entire pages on a computer screen, the ultimate control 
of the newspaper resides in corporate ownership (Barnhurst and Nerone, 
2002: 10). Thus, a reflection on online media structures helps to contex-
tualise the structural analysis of legacy media. An important precondition 
of the fast development of online newspapers and news websites is Inter-
net penetration. The Gemius report Do you CEE? The overview of the Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe internet market in 2011 points out that although 
the most advanced CEE markets could be considered as saturated with 
respect to Internet penetration, there is still a long way to go to reach the 
35 Slovak Press Watch (2010) Je koncentrácia…
Table 36: Proportions of circulation shares controlled by the two leading 
publishing companies in Slovakia
2007 2011
TOTAL CIRCULATION OF PAID-FOR DAILIES 
(in 000)
513 381






PROPORTION OF THE TWO PUBLISHING COMPANIES 
(% of circulation)
58.3% 60.3%
Sources: Calculated on the basis of the data from WAN and ABC SR (as quoted above).
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highest European standards (Gemius,2011). The table below shows in-
ternet penetration in the CEE countries studied and online adspend share 
in comparison with the EU average in 2013 and 2012.
Table 37: Internet penetration and adspend share in the Czech Republic, 





per internet user 
in EUR (2012)
Adspend share  
(2012)
CZECH REPUBLIC 69% 45% 17%
HUNGARY 57% 19% 23%
POLAND 59% 26% 19%
SLOVAKIA 67% 19% 6%
EU AVERAGE 69% 55% 26%
Sources: Adapted from Gemius (2013).
The table suggests that although Internet penetration increases steadily, 
it is still lower than the EU average. In terms of adspend per Internet user, 
only the Czech Republic can be compared with the EU average, while the 
adspend share generally seems to be significantly lower in all the other 
CEE countries than the EU average. This shows, that the CEE online mar-
kets still bear a lot of possibilities in investment and modifications, which 
certainly resonates with some expansion strategies of the legacy media 
owners. The table below summarises top online news providers and the 
most popular newspaper sites in the region.
Table 38: Top online news providers and most popular newspaper 
websites in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in 2011
Most popular online news 
providers

















HUNGARY origo.hu (news portal)
index.hu (news portal)
hir24.hu (news portal)






















SLOVAKIA azet.sk (news and information 
portal)
zoznam.sk (news and informa-
tion portal)
sme.sk (online daily)












Sources: Elaborated from WAN, World Press Trends 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007 
(available at: http://www.wan-ifra.org/microsites/world-press-trends; retrieved 
26.12.2013); Gemius (2011), OSF (2012b, 2012c, 2013a, 2013b).
From the comparison of these categories it may be inferred that on-
line newspaper sites lost dominant positions in the provision of news 
via the Internet and there are, in most cases, news/information portals 
without their print counterparts that occupy leading positions. In some 
cases, these are connected to publishing companies in their ownership 
structures as is the case of onet.pl owned by Ringier Axel Springer or 
novinky.cz belonging to the Borgis group, thus consolidating their own-
ership control. Other cases – such as origo.hu – show that new actors in 
the news content production represented in this case by the incumbent 
Magyar Telecom might prove successful. In terms of most popular online 
newspapers, the data do not unequivocally point to the group of tabloids 
or quality dailies, the visiting of titles from both categories seems quite 
proportionality distributed. At the same time, it is worth adding that top 
positions of newspapers with the highest circulation are more or less re-
produced in their online editions with one reservation: the dominance of 
tabloids does not seem so strong.
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The available studies on media concentration discussed above sig-
nal that the consolidation of broadcasting markets in the CEE region is 
more profound than is the case of print press markets. The table below 
illustrates the share of the three top broadcasters in the CEE countries, 
including public service broadcasters.
Table 39: The share of the three top TV broadcasters in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (in %)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
CZECH 
REPUBLIC
93.2 93.8 93.8 92.8 90.5 86.5 82.5 77.6
HUNGARY 78.2 75.9 73 71.3 65.7 60.9 56.4 54
POLAND 84.9 85.4 86.5 86.5 85 81.7 78.4 75.9
SLOVAKIA 78.6 71.9 70.9 74.1 73.7 73.8 70.7 68.7
Sources: Elaborated on the basis of European Audiovisual Observatory (2011) 
2011 Yearbook – Television in 37 European States, Strasbourg; 2009 Yearbook; 
2006 Yearbook.
Figure 7: The share of the top three TV broadcasters in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
Sources: Elaborated on the basis of European Audiovisual Observatory (2011) 2011 Year-




























The calculation of the proportion in the audiovisual markets includes the 
audience share of all channels operated by one broadcaster. Thus, 
the share of public service TV broadcaster combines the shares of all 
channels operated by the broadcaster. The share of the three dominant 
broadcasters aggregates the shares of all channels offered by these broad-
casters to audiences. 
As can be seen from both the figure and the table, the audience share 
of the three top TV broadcasters seems to be relatively high in all coun-
tries, although we may observe varied dynamics of decline depending 
very much on the position of public service television and its ability to 
adapt to the new digital environment with the offer of thematic digital 
channels. Practically, in all CEE countries, the three largest broadcasters 
control the market, in Poland and the Czech Republic (where public ser-
vice TVs enjoy greater popularity) reaching around 76%, in Hungary 54% 
and Slovakia 69% in 2010. 
In the Czech Republic, the television market continues to be dominat-
ed by the private channel TV Nova (belonging to CME), which achieved 
an audience share of 28.9% in 2011 (Nova experienced a 13% decline 
since 2006). The public service broadcaster Czech Television (Česká Tele-
vize – ČT), had a total audience share of 27% (ČT1, ČT2, ČT24 and ČT4). 
The private channel TV Prima (owned by the Modern Times Group) oc-
cupied third place with a share of 17.4% in 2011 (Prima experienced 
a decline from 20.2% in 2006).36 It is worth noticing though, that the 
combined share of all three broadcasters in fact increased in 2011 reach-
ing 83.76% and increased also in 2012 amounting to 84.2%. This can be 
explained by the launch of additional thematic channels by all broadcast-
ers (e.g. Fanda for women by Nova in 2012, or Prima Cool for men by 
Prima).
The Hungarian market has been dominated by two private channels: 
RTL Klub (RTL Group) and TV2 (ProsiebenSat1), that have continued to 
control the biggest audience shares since the second half of the 1990s. 
RTL Klub remained the market leader in 2011 with 27.9% while TV2 had 
19.5%. The public channels M1 and M2 had a combined market share in 
2011 of 11.6% (down from 18.6% in 2006) in 2011.37
In Poland, the public service broadcaster TVP continues to occupy 
a strong position in the audiovisual market, although recent years marked 
significant losses. All the TVP channels reached 36% of audience share in 
36 MAVISE (2013) (available at: http://mavise.obs.coe.int/country?id=9#section-
10; retrieved 27.12.2013).
37 MAVISE (2013) (available at: http://mavise.obs.coe.int/country?id=16; retrie-
ved 27.12.2013).
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2011. The three most popular TV channels mirror the market positions 
of the three leading broadcasting groups to which they belong: the most 
popular channel TVP1 achieved a share of 17.4%, TVN (belonging to the 
ITI group) a 15% share and Polsat (the flagship channel of the Polsat 
group) a share of 14.5%. All the dominant broadcasters offer a variety 
of thematic and specialised channels. In 2012, TVP operated 12 national 
channels altogether (including three HD channels) and 16 regional ser-
vices.38 The TVN group provided 12 channels (including 4 HD channels), 
while the ITI group (the owner of TVN) controlled a total of 24 chan-
nels.39 The group Polsat Cyfrowy fully controls one of the digital plat-
forms in Poland with the same name and 14 channels (including 2 HD 
channels). Polsat Cyfrowy also bought the Info-TV-FM company owned 
by NFI Magna Polonia in 2011 to become the only operator of a mobile 
TV multiplex in Poland. This significantly strengthened the position of the 
group vis-à-vis its competitors both on the market of digital broadcasting 
and mobile telephony as the Polsat group controls also the mobile tel-
ecom operator Polkomtel. The Canal+ group (a subsidiary of the French 
group Vivendi) controls 24 channels (of which 13 are HD) and the second 
digital platform nc+ that was formed from the merger of Canal+ and the 
digital platform n sold from the ITI group in 2013. Finally, it is worth add-
ing that the combined share of the three leading broadcasting groups – 
TVP, TVN and Polsat – dropped in 2012 in comparison with the previous 
years and reached a level of 66.6%. 
The television structures in the Slovak Republic resemble the Hun-
garian model in which the public service television controls significantly 
smaller shares than commercial broadcasters. The leading channel TV 
Markíza and TV Doma (both belonging to CME) reached a 34% of audi-
ence share in 2011. The second commercial channel, TV Joj (and allied 
channel Joj Plus) had a combined audience share of 23.8% in 2011.40 
It is noteworthy in this respect, that the J&T group owning TV Joj also 
controls the operator of all digital multiplexes in Slovakia – Towercom. 
In addition, through a subsidiary company it runs the daily Pravda, and 
currently became involved in the acquisition of the Ringier Axel Springer 
activities in the Czech Republic. The public service channels of STV had 
a combined share of 12.2% (approximately half of the audience share 
38 MAVISE (2013) (available at: http://mavise.obs.coe.int/country?id=24;  retrieved 
27.12.2013).
39 Ibidem.
40 MAVISE (2013) (available at: http://mavise.obs.coe.int/country?id=28; retrieved 
27.12.2013).
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they held in 2004).41 The launch of some digital thematic channels proved 
relatively successful, while others failed to attract a sufficient audience. 
The patterns of media ownership in the CEE countries – with few ex-
ceptions – demonstrate a high or moderate concentration in various seg-
ments of media markets that has been a product of more profound con-
centration waves and takeovers, as well as clustering of business activities 
in the pre-EU-accession period. The dynamics of consolidation seems to 
be quite stable (the calculations do not display significant increase or de-
crease of concentration), at the same time, changes of ownership are fast 
and often not fully transparent. Various vectors of these changes may be 
detected – such as increasing takeover of media activities in various sec-
tors by domestic business elites or entry into cross ownership involving 
online media or digital platforms by large transnational owners. So far, 
the scarce policy responses focused only on some disapprovals of mergers 
(e.g. Hungary in the case of a merger between Axel Springer and Ringier 
or Poland in the case of the takeover of shares in the TV Polsat by Axel 
Springer), or licencing, but have not covered more systematically media 
transparency, questions of the political influence of the owners or rem-
edies preventing the owners from influencing editorial independence. As 
Justin Schlosberg notices: “measures such as independent boards with 
powers over editorial appointments have a track record in media merger 
conditions” (Schlosberg, 2013: 8).
5.5. Diversity of media functions: genres and policy measures 
Functional pluralism is generated by different functions the media fulfill 
in a society, reflected most explicitly in various models of performance 
and financing mechanisms. The way how the media are financed, to 
whom they are accountable, what performance objectives they follow 
and what is the main purpose of their operation, set the defining lines 
between commercial entertainment oriented structures (e.g. tabloids, 
commercial/entertainment TV channels), the PSM, private news and in-
formation oriented media (e.g. quality daily newspapers, news websites, 
TV news channels), community media and thematically specialised me-
dia (e.g. thematic TV channels or websites focusing on history, travel, 
fashion, etc.). In the debates about media pluralism, there are views that 
principal premise of media plurality is to provide diverse, alternative 
41 MAVISE (2013) (available at: http://mavise.obs.coe.int/country?id=28; retrieved 
27.12.2013).
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viewpoints and information, and this is generally a domain reserved for 
news and current affairs genres. Thus, functional media diversity should 
focus on the diversity of the news media, while other genres and thematic 
fields should be left out of the scope of media policies. The counter argu-
ment is that other forms of content, entertainment, religious or cultural 
programmes, for example, can be equally important in conveying politi-
cal and social information and that we require access to diversity across 
all programme genres (Craufurd Smith et al., 2012: 9). Then, as dis-
cussed above, media pluralism is a concept that unites response to, and 
an acknowledgement of, various communication needs – also those that 
affect the construction of individual and collective identities. These may 
certainly lead to an expression of divergent political interests and forms 
of political involvement. 
Summarising the functional change in media structures over the past 
decades, Jens Lucht and Linards Udris (2010: 15) point to the decline of 
quality newspapers, tabloidisation, and changing media structures that 
negatively affect media content, including a growing occurrence of scan-
dals, strategies of personalisation and entertainment, capture of political 
coverage. To briefly examine these functional changes in the CEE coun-
tries, it would be instructive to pay attention to these proportions among 
media structures offering more entertainment – focused content and 
news and current content. This can help also to understand (to a certain 
extent) whether market imperatives and high ownership concentration in 
particular resonates with the growing significance of the tabloid media. 
In the domain of the print press, a possible indicator that can be used 
in this respect, is a comparison of the circulation shares of national tab-
loids and quality daily newspapers over a certain period of time.
Table 40: The proportion of circulation of tabloids and quality daily news-





































1,672 34.3 31.3 1,138 38.4 33.8
HUNGARY 1,331 23.2 16.2 1,237 21.5 11.3
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POLAND 3,946 18.0 22.2 2,810 20.2 18.7
SLOVAKIA 513 46.4 25.7 381 50.2 28.4
Sources: Calculated on the basis of WAN 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007 (available at: 
http://www.wan-ifra.org/microsites/world-press-trends; retrieved 26.12.2013) and 
national Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC CR, MATESZ, ZKDP and ABC SR).
The table above demonstrates that in 2007, the circulation share of tab-
loids surpassed the share of quality dailies in all the CEE countries with 
the exception of Poland. This can be explained by the fact, that in 2006 
a new quality daily was launched – Dziennik-Europa-Polska-Świat – by 
Axel Springer. In 2011, when the daily was already merged with Gaze-
ta Prawna, the proportion of tabloids (20.2%) exceeded quality dailies 
(18.7%). Between 2007 and 2011, the market shares of tabloids in-
creased slightly in all countries with the exception of Hungary. At the 
same time, national quality dailies registered even a greater loss in the cir-
culation share in Hungary between 2007 and 2011. This proves the rela-
tive popularity of regional dailies that exhibit less significant losses in 
the sold circulation than is the case of the other two categories. To sum 
up, tabloids seem to be less vulnerable to a general trend of circulation 
decline than the quality papers, also because they are less affected by the 
decline in advertising. The double decrease – in sales and advertising – 
has made quality newspapers more fragile vis-à-vis advertising from the 
state, state companies or political parties. In terms of policy remedies, 
such structural changes invite a reconsideration of public support for the 
print/online press. Publishers and newspaper associations, especially in 
West-European countries, have called recently to maintain a zero or re-
duced VAT rate for printed newspapers, and their digital formats as well 
(ENPA, 2011). A brief scrutiny over the public support for the press in 
the CEE region shows that while direct subsidies are almost exclusively 
limited to ethnic and national minority press and some specialised titles 
(for instance with educational goals), the indirect subsidies practically 
imply a reduced VAT for the sale of newspapers, and are used in all the 
CEE countries with the exception of Slovakia that introduced a flat VAT 
rate. Albeit in comparison with the Western part of the EU where the pub-
lic support for the print/online press sector takes many different forms 
(Nielsen and Linnebank, 2011), the approach in the CEE region seems 
rather minimalistic.
One of the most commonly used structural arrangement supporting 
functional diversity, especially across the EU, has been the provision of 
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the public service media. This issue will be discussed more closely also with 
consideration of the role of commercial broadcasters in the chapter six. 
5.6. Geographical diversity 
The geographical dimension of structural media pluralism can be attrib-
uted to a balance of media structures at different geographical levels. The 
dynamics between local/regional and national media structures indicates 
what is the position of the structures at both levels over some period of 
time. It might also reveal how centralised/decentralised a particular me-
dia system is and what is the vector of these forces. A prominent role of 
the regional media, and the press in particular, in preserving and foster-
ing media pluralism has been recognised in numerous scholarly works 
(Drok 1998, Alger 1998, Hallin and Mancini, 2004). The segment of re-
gional and local press often serves as a primary source for other regional 
media (TV, radio, online). Rich and well-developed regional media may 
compensate for a lack of external diversity on the highly concentrated 
national markets. 
Regional and local press had a long and lively history in the CEE re-
gion before World War II. Its reconstruction after 1989, became marked 
by a challenge of fragility, especially in some countries of the region. This 
has not only been gradually caused by the declining role of the regional 
press in a new media ecosystem offering online local and community ser-
vices, but also because of the fact that traditional local and regional press 
markets appeared to be relatively vulnerable to ownership concentration, 
structural chaining and syndication of the content (Klimkiewicz, 2009a). 
In most CEE countries a significant number of regional newspapers was 
sold to foreign owners in large packages at the beginning of the 1990s (in 
Poland to the French Socpresse company, at that time owned by Robert 
Hersant, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia mainly to VGP, in Hungary 
to Axel Springer and WAZ). During the second half of the 1990s, regional 
press markets gravitated towards consolidated structures (Klimkiewicz, 
2009a). These structures have been gradually cemented through the ac-
quisition and subsequent merging of competing titles and the ultimate 
chaining of newspapers belonging to one or two groups. 
Verlagsgruppe Passau (VGP) operating in all the CEE countries stud-
ied in this volume with the exception of Hungary stands out as an in-
structive example in this respect. In the Czech Republic, the group gradu-
ally absorbed daily newspapers in the regions of Bohemia (1992–2000), 
Moravia and Silesia (2001), thus virtually dominating not only news 
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production, but also print services (through the network of its own print 
plants) and distribution system (Klimkiewicz, 2009a: 54). The consolida-
tion strategy implied in the first wave takeover of structures, and in the 
second run content syndication under the common chain brand – Deník 
(The Daily). In this way, VGP became a monopolist publisher on the re-
gional daily press market in the Czech Republic. A similar strategy was 
applied in Poland, though the Polish regional press market ended with 
two publishing groups dividing the segment geographically (Polskapresse 
and Media Regionalne). In the fall of 2007, (several months after the 
birth of the Deník chain in the Czech Republic), Polskapresse (the Polish 
subsidiary of VGP) introduced a new product named Polska (Poland), 
combining six previous and 12 new editions in a unified national proj-
ect with injections of varied regional, and unified international content 
provided by the British Times.42 Slovakia also experienced chaining of 
regional titles. Economic necessities and market size urged the Petit Press 
group43 to come up with two options – the regional weekly MY (published 
in 22 local editions) and the daily Korzár (published in various local edi-
tions). Vlasta Hochelová emphasises that regional and local newspapers 
chained by the Petit Press are probably of the best journalistic quality 
when compared with other titles in the same segment, but the dailies are 
strongly affected by an unification of content (Hochelová, 2007: 29). In 
comparison with the other CEE countries, Hungary represents the most 
diverse market of regional and local daily press. The number of publish-
ers is higher than in the other countries, although the largest shares of 
circulation are controlled by two transnational groups – WAZ and Axel 
Springer. 
Table 41: The level of press decentralisation in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (measured as a proportion of paid-for 
regional dailies’ circulation and paid-for national dailies’ circulation)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
CZECH 
REPUBLIC
22.2 22.1 26.7 27.8 25.8 23.2 20.6 19.4 19.0 18.2 18 17.9
HUNGARY 52.5 52.9 52.0 51.3 51 49.3 51.4 53.4 52.7 53 54 60.7
42 Polskapresse (2013) Polska (available at: http://www.polskapresse.pl/kat/79.
html?ses_pp=519f98c026fb7eb6492500786d5fe9a4; retrieved 28.12.2013).
43 Petit Press was previously owned by VGP (50%), currently by RBV (50%).
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POLAND 59 48.8 48.3 39.3 36.4 31.8 29.8 34.7 33.8 35.7 34.2 32.3
SLOVAKIA 13.5 9.3 10.2 12 11.5 9.3 8.1 7.3 7.4 7.4 13.2 11.3
Sources: Calculated on the basis of WAN, World Press Trends 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 
2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002 (available at: http://www.wan-ifra.org/
microsites/world-press-trends; retrieved 26.12.2013).
The relative strength and sustainability of the regional daily press in 
a particular media system displays its decentralisation and potential to 
offer information from diverse sources for local and regional communi-
ties. The table and figure below provide a measurement of decentralisa-
tion calculated as a proportion of circulation of paid-for regional dailies 
and paid-for national dailies during the period 2000–2011.
The highest level of centralisation characterises the Slovak daily press 
market. Slovakia is undoubtedly the smallest market in the studied re-
gion – exposed more as other countries in the group – to a shortage of 
resources, more costly media production, dependence on external forces 
and vulnerability (Puppis, 2009: 10–11). In 2009, regional daily news-
papers comprised only 7.4% of the total circulation of daily newspapers 
published in Slovakia. This small share started to increase in two recent 








































Figure 8: The level of press decentralisation in the Czech Republic, 
 Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
Source: Calculated on the basis of WAN, World Press Trends 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 
2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002 (available at: http://www.wan-ifra.org/
microsites/world-press-trends; retrieved 26.12.2013).
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est daily Új Szó published for the Hungarian minority. On the other hand, 
in Hungary the proportion between regional and national dailies seems 
to be quite balanced, and in recent years even leaning towards a stron-
ger position of the regional dailies (amounting to 60.7% of the regional 
dailies’ share in 2011). The Czech and Polish daily press markets, experi-
enced particularly increasing centralisation between 2000–2011. This pro-
cess seemed to be most intense in the case of Poland, where in 2000 the 
circulation of regional and local dailies (59%) surpassed the circulation of 
national dailies (41%). In 2006, the share of regional dailies stood only for 
30%, then slowly increased and again decreased reaching 32% in 2011. 
The presented data manifest that the regional press markets are fluctuant 
in the region, while the centripetal drives prevail over centrifugal, with 
the exception of Hungary. The centripetal tendencies include a decreasing 
number of regional daily newspapers, decreasing circulation of regional 
dailies, and most importantly, an increasing level of centralisation, con-
centration of media ownership and chaining. The CEE countries are not 
an exception in comparison with some other West-European counterparts, 
where ownership concentration among local news publishers is advancing 
more rapidly than is the case of national press publishers. What is differ-
ent though, rests on the proportionality. In the CEE region, the fast pace of 
mergers at the regional level led to a geographical dominance exploiting 
given possibilities with a very minimal focus on new inventions. On the 
other hand, due to economic reasons, the only financially-viable alterna-
tive revolves around a quite rich system of municipal press that is bound 
by high political dependency on the local politicians. 
The policy responses to this course of developments have been scat-
tered and in terms of tactics, varied across the countries. The lack of 
media-specific regulations (with the exception of Hungary) aside from 
the broadcasting laws, has limited interventions to reviews of mergers 
and chaining by national competition authorities. These sometimes used 
different approaches to relevant market definitions that led to divergent 
outcomes in relatively similar cases. In the Czech Republic, the National 
Competition Authority (ÚOHS) scrutinised the cases after two merger 
waves of the Vltava-Labe-Press (a subsidiary of VGP) in 1992 and 2001. 
The proof of the abuse of a dominant position on a relevant market could 
not be found, as the relevant media market was basically conceived as 
a geographical wholesale – in other words comprised of both – nation-
al and regional dailies (Šmíd, 2004). In Poland however, the Office of 
Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) approached differently 
the case of the VGP merger between the regional dailies published in 
Wrocław in 2003. The definition of a relevant market favoured the region-
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al dimension. A sound application of competition law can certainly serve 
as a precondition, but not a guarantee for a diverse regional media land-
scape. Therefore, it is often emphasised that competition and media con-
centration law has a complementary nature (Institute of European Me-
dia Law, 2005: 15). At the same time, the harmonisation of competition 
approaches towards the media markets at the EU could bring a com-
mon normative ground in determining pluralism measures in the CEE 
region. Justin Schlosberg (2013) argues that the most effective means 
of regulating the geographical dimension of pluralism might be a cross-
market share limit combined with a series of subsidiary policies aimed at 
promoting local plurality. These can include provisions preventing local 
media owners from engaging actively in politics, subsidies to support 
 entry-level journalism jobs, co-operative and alternative news start-ups 
and legislative amendments to enable local newspapers to acquire chari-
table status (Schlosberg, 2013: 10–11).
5.7. Searching the right means for complex ends: Conclusions
The shaping of media structures by policy means represents one of the 
most demanding aspects of media policymaking. A proportional deploy-
ment of possible corrections relies heavily on the hurdles of empirical 
metrics and assessment. Philip Napoli argues that difficulty in translating 
complex concepts such as diversity or pluralism into empirical measures 
may ultimately produce results that undermine the role of these prin-
ciples in media policymaking rather than support them, and moreover, 
there are limits to what research can effectively capture (Napoli, 2007: 
xviii). This proved more than apparent at the EU level of policymaking, 
concerning media pluralism. 
Arguably, also at the national level, matching principles with mea-
sures brought highly varied priorities and different results. In the area of 
policies, the broadcasting and media laws in all CEE countries generally 
recognised the importance of media pluralism. In Hungary, the pursuit of 
media diversity is acknowledged as essential in justifying the interpreta-
tions of the media law. In other countries (the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Slovakia), media pluralism stands for a possible end to regulatory policies 
and concrete task of national media regulatory authorities. At the same 
time, regulations differ in terms of translating these premises into legal 
rules covering the various areas of media pluralism. As regards internal 
pluralism measures, Hungary and the Czech Republic introduced provi-
sions on balanced news that in the case of Hungary, evoked reactions 
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from international institutions.44 In addition, the Hungarian media law 
contains a requirement of news provision applicable to providers of linear 
media services with significant market power, and the Slovak broadcast-
ing law stipulates a diversity of news provision and public interest provi-
sion in the case of all linear broadcasters. In Poland, similar measures 
apply only to the PSM. Most of external pluralism measures are reactive 
in their character and relatively permissive especially as regards media 
ownership policies and consolidation. The Czech Republic and Slovakia 
introduced limits on cross-media ownership setting a restriction on the 
numbers of operating licences. In Hungary, the cross-media ownership 
rules were relaxed in the 2010 media law, but concurrently, the Media 
Council was equipped with a stronger competence to decide on matters of 
media concentration. In comparison with these solutions, Poland seems 
to employ the most permissive rules on regulation of media ownership 
and concentration. At the same time, Poland applied the most restrictive 
rules on foreign ownership in the broadcasting market before the EU ac-
cession. Some of these country specific settings translate into shapes and 
structures of media landscapes. 
Foreign media ownership remains relatively dominant in the CEE re-
gion and media sector markets display a relatively high consolidation (in 
comparison with their Western counterparts), albeit there are important 
differences among the particular CEE countries. For instance, the Czech 
market represents a classical oligopoly where the market of daily newspa-
pers is divided among three strong transnational press groups. Hungary 
is characterised by the most diverse ownership, especially with regards 
to the segment of regional and local newspapers. Poland’s media sector 
markets display the strongest presence of domestic owners and in the 
broadcasting sector, Poland has been the only country in the group that 
lacked strong foreign competitors on the television market. Still and all, 
the media ownership tapestry modifies constantly and rapidly, becoming 
often opaque for ordinary users. Some shifts in ownership patterns signal 
the rise of domestic resources both in terms of financing and know-how. 
By contrast, there have been other changes that illustrate a contrary de-
velopment – the growing ownership participation of large scale trans-
national media groups in the region. 
What is interesting for our purpose comes with defining the end of 
policies focusing on media pluralism: what do we expect from remedies 
correcting media diversity? Is it the increased choice of media services for 
consumers? Or is it a creation of an environment free of structural imped-
44 This issue is discussed in the Chapter 3.
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iments that might favour media capture and lead to serious imbalances 
in media functions, forms of control and geographical levels on which 
and through which media operate? Who are the primary beneficiaries of 
media pluralism? Consumers, citizens or media users? Media pluralism is 
directly linked with communication needs that cannot be conceived only 
in economic and commercial terms. Thus, the crucial aspect in a process 
of policymaking is putting the ends and means at the right place: the ends 
should ultimately determine the use of means, not be adjusted to the 
available and most comfortable means. 
This also impacts setting priorities: in some countries, policymakers 
might be concerned about the growth of foreign media ownership as the 
media system is becoming more vulnerable and dependent on external 
sources. Other countries may pay more attention to a high level of cen-
tralisation, depriving media structures of original and locally produced 
content. Yet, other countries might pay less attention to concentration on 
their internal markets in order to let their companies maintain competi-
tiveness on transnational markets, and as long as other measures are at 
place that might balance a growing structural consolidation. In Germany 
for instance, mergers are being allowed between publishing companies 
in the case of market dominance, as long as editorial independence is 
guaranteed (Just, 2009: 102). The problem is however that such ac-
companying measures might not necessarily be used in other countries 
where these companies operate. The harmonised EU approach towards 
media pluralism should allow for an integration of various country pri-
orities and at the same be firm in the principles on which the notion of 
media pluralism is built.
Regulating poor or endangered media diversity only by ex-post in-
terventions (following e.g. mergers or chaining) might be as limited in 
terms of effectiveness as handling ex-post with decreasing biological or 
cultural diversity. Critics of preventive measures however claim that ex-
ante actions can put media companies at risk of unduly penalising in-
novation and competitiveness, and would lead to immediate divestment 
(Schlosberg, 2013: 5). Such arguments sound highly convincing in media 
environments that experienced profound and radical transformation in 
a compressed period of time as is the case of the CEE. On the other hand, 
organic growth can be just as damaging to the public interest (Craufurd 
Smith et al., 2012: 19). Ellen P. Goodman proposes proactive instead of 
reactive policy enactments, considering subsidies and various kind of sup-
port that should work to promote demand as well as supply (2007: 375). 
The demand side of media pluralism necessarily points to an involvement 
and empowerment of media users, and the adoption of media literacy. 
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Media users are often challenged by fast-changing markets (Tambini, 
2011: 11), and for various reasons, they might not explore the whole 
variety of media offerings. In this sense, a more comprehensive and pro-
found approach to media transparency could offer the very first step in 
structural pluralism policies.
The three dimensions of structural media pluralism studied in this 
chapter (control-related, functional, geographical) demonstrate, on the 
one hand, trends in the CEE media landscapes, on the other hand, these 
dimensions present features of a potential diversity. Full usage of plural-
ism depends on multiple factors such as users’ ability to access differ-
ent platforms and contents, to receive and critically digest contents and 
 services, to contextualise, to meaningfully use the knowledge about me-
dia ownership, media functioning in a society, and to interact with media 
services in various ways (Klimkiewicz, 2010b). Thus, putting the ends 
and means at the right place, opens the question what media structures 
would facilitate the use of potential media pluralism. 
6. INDEPENDENCE OF MEDIA 
REGULATORY AUTHORITIES 
AND PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA
6.1. A dynamic relationship between independence 
and external dependency: An Introduction
Media regulatory authorities (MRA) and the public service media (PSM) 
constitute important ‘defining centres’ in the infrastructure of public com-
munication (Klimkiewicz, 2013). In normative terms, MRA are perceived 
as ‘operational’ or ‘assisting’ in the process of developing an autonomous 
media system that gains independence from its social environments, and 
thus can facilitate deliberative legitimation process (Habermas, 2006). 
The PSM are expected to provide universal access, diversity of perspec-
tives in which the common world presents itself, and to offer a space 
of constant bargaining over the definition and common understanding of 
social reality (Arendt 1958; Keane 1991). The concepts of independence 
and autonomy play a crucial role in this respect: they serve as principal 
rationales justifying a specific status of the MRA and PSM. The principles 
of independence and autonomy ensure that an influence of the state and 
market, as well as their institutions (including e.g. government, parlia-
ment, commercial entities), are reduced to the minimum so that both the 
PSM and regulatory agencies are allowed to fulfill their mission with full 
professional autonomy (Klimkiewicz, 2013: 189). 
Manuel Puppis and Martino Maggetti (2012: 77) argue that the 
MRA became key policy actors in media and communication governance 
especially following privatisation of state-owned companies in telecom-
munications and broadcasting markets in Europe. In the CEE, the MRA 
were created in the 1990 most often in a way of cloning the chosen West 
European model. In both cases, the regulatory authorities have accumu-
lated increasing responsibility in governing broadcasting landscapes and 
the operation of both private and public broadcasters. A significant share 
of policymaking in the field of media and communication has thus been 
carried out by and delegated to organisations that are not democratically 
elected, at the same time that are not expected to be directly account-
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able to elected politicians (Puppis and Maggetti, 2012: 77). The current 
strands of the EU media policy hint at this institutional reinforcement 
with greater recognition of the role of MRA (e.g. in the AVMSD) and 
especially, with the emphasis on the concept of MRA independence. In 
a similar vein, the concept of PSM autonomy, especially with regard to 
remit and financing, has been used to delineate areas of EU policy con-
cerning the PSM and state aid.
Autonomy can be seen as a form of independence from external con-
trol, influence, sources, support, etc. More precisely, both autonomy and 
independence would refer to a capacity of the MRA and PSM to achieve 
their goals regardless of the influence and resources of the external do-
mains, including the political realm, media market (with a special role of 
advertising) and a socio-cultural environment (in particular articulated 
through claims and support of various social groups) (Klimkiewicz, 2013: 
190). On the contrary, external dependency would define conditions un-
der which the capacity of the MRA and PSM to achieve their goals is 
contingent upon the influence and resources of external domains (2013: 
190). When linked with practical actions and operations, the close rela-
tion between the two binary oppositions is tested against the normative 
and evaluative views of the institutions in question. For example, the 
PSM are perceived as institutions that are best equipped to fulfill their 
mission when they are professionally autonomous and independent from 
external pressures. At the same time, the PSM are highly dependent on 
support from audiences – both in terms of viewing and contribution to 
its very existence through the system of licence fees. Puppis and Maggetti 
argue (2012: 78) that the MRA represent public sector institutions that 
are disaggregated from the public administration and enjoy a degree of 
autonomy even though they cannot be fully independent. As observed in 
the study on Indicators for independence and efficient functioning of au-
diovisual media services regulatory bodies for the purpose of enforcing the 
rules in the AVMS Directive (hereafter the INDIREG study), independence 
can be understood as a dynamic variable in relation to various possible 
dependences stemming from particular interests (Hans Bredow Institute 
for Media Research et al., 2011: 19). 
Most obviously, the MRA and PSM do not operate in a cultural vacu-
um, hence the way how autonomy and external dependency function in 
a given society does not depend only on technical dimensions (appoint-
ment procedures and management, accountability, financing mechanisms 
and performance), but also on cultural precepts: these include collective 
perceptions, attitudes and behavior (Klimkiewicz, 2013). In other words, 
actual fulfillment of MRA and PSM autonomy is strongly shaped by cul-
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tural values and practices, including the political culture (Humphreys, 
1996). Moreover, global media and policy flows generate some common-
alities and interdependencies, in a normative understanding of indepen-
dence for example. Here especially, the role of the EU seems important as 
will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
The autonomy of the MRA implies that they – as devices of media 
governance – are created and given responsibilities by legitimate pub-
lic institutions proportionally representing a given society (Klimkiewicz, 
2013). Their status should be constituted in such a way, that it guarantees 
independence from governments and other political institutions (for ex-
ample political parties), and media and communication entities (such as 
AVMS providers). The MRA are expected to carry out their work in full 
autonomy, impartially and transparently, in accordance with their profes-
sional remit (defined by the administrative, supervisory, rule-making and 
monitoring functions), eliminating a potential risk of political or economic 
interference (2013: 191). There are, however, various limitations in these 
normative expectations. First of all, autonomy and independence can nev-
er be absolute, but have to constitute themselves against the limits set 
by e.g. socio-cultural, historical, political factors. The MRA accommodate 
manifold interests in society, therefore they would hardly achieve factual 
independence from individually or collectively formulated values. For ex-
ample, deciding about the eventual programming sanctions to be imposed 
on the grounds of broadcasting insulting certain ethnic groups or ridicul-
ing religious practices, the MRA have to take into account two conflicting 
rights – the right to freedom of speech and expression, and the right not 
to be discriminated. An eventual decision will, in most cases, reflect such 
cultural factors as the ethnic and religious composition of a society and its 
cultural tradition (Klimkiewicz, 2013).
The PSM’s special status might be conceptualised through competi-
tive and complementary relationship with other actors in the media land-
scape. The competitive function arises with respect to the amount and 
share of viewing, but also from other aspects of PSM operation such as 
quality, innovation, professionalism, standards of performance, social rel-
evance, serving a variety of interests, etc. (Blumler and Hoffmann-Reim, 
2002: 202). In a competitive relationship, autonomy is compromised by 
what is expected by audiences, and also by the extent to which the PSM 
have to rely on mass audience (when they are e.g. co-financed from the 
advertising). The complementary function arises from the narrowing 
imperatives of the market, and on the other side, from the significance 
for a society at large of preserving the values that other actors (private 
broadcasters in particular) tend to neglect (Blumler and Hoffmann-Reim, 
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2002). In other words, a side-effect of the operation of media markets 
is that they fail to produce and offer the overall quality of media ser-
vices that users would desire. The two most important reasons why this 
happens are first, that broadcasting can have adverse ‘external effects’ 
(e.g. amplifying violence in society) and second, that good broadcasting 
is a ‘merit’ good (just as education) (Graham 1999: 19). In addition, an 
important complementary dimension stems from a basic principle of de-
mocracy. The creation and sustenance of ‘common knowledge’ is a vital 
element in the functioning of a democracy. In order to be agreed solutions 
have to be derived from a common understanding (Graham 1999: 6) and 
‘enlarged’ opinion-forming that involves incorporation of other people’s 
views and preferences (Arendt, 1969). In normative terms, autonomy is 
compromised in a complementary relationship, by this ‘enlarged men-
tality’ that validates public opinion, and in consequence also the repre-
sentation of collective interests. Organised pressure groups are only one 
aspect of these limits, others might be illustrated by indirect formulation 
of claims, interests and preferences of various identity groups defined by 
e.g. ethnicity, gender, language, social position, etc. (Klimkiewicz, 2013). 
The next section of this chapter will elaborate more closely on the issue 
of independence of MRA in EU media policy.
6.2. Independence of MRA in the EU media policy 
In a wider context of the EU policy, the independence of the MRA finds its 
legal grounds in contributing to the safeguards of Article 11 (Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU) and enactment of Article 288 TFEU (Euro-
pean Union, 2012) that sets the directives binding to the member states but 
leaves the choice of form and method of implementation to the national 
authorities (Hans Bredow Institute for Media Research et al., 2011: 7). 
Most obviously, the regulatory bodies are responsible for the implementa-
tion of the AVMSD, and in addition, also in authority to incorporate non le-
gally binding policy standards and principles. The AVMSD refers to the role 
of the MRA in two Recitals and Article 30. Recital 94 stipulates that mem-
ber states are free to choose the appropriate instruments for the implemen-
tation of the Directive according to their legal traditions and established 
structures, including the form of their competent independent regulatory 
bodies, in order to carry out their work impartially and transparently (Eu-
ropean Parliament and the Council, 2010a). Recital 95 encourages close 
co-operation between competent regulatory bodies. The condition of co-
operation is guaranteed more explicitly in Article 30 of the Directive:
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Member States shall take appropriate measures to provide each other and the 
Commission with the information necessary for the application of this Direc-
tive, in particular Articles 2, 3 and 4, in particular through their competent 
independent regulatory bodies (European Parliament and the Council, 2010a).
Article 30 does not specifically acknowledge the independence of audio-
visual regulators, and does not require from member states to guarantee 
this independence. It is worth noting in this respect that the draft version 
of the Directive prepared by the Commission in 2005 included Recital 
47 which addressed explicitly the independence of regulatory bodies:
Regulators should be independent from national governments as well as from 
audiovisual media service providers in order to be able to carry out their work 
impartially and transparently and to contribute to pluralism. Close cooperation 
among national regulatory authorities and the Commission is necessary to en-
sure the correct application of this Directive (European Commission, 2005b).
This wording was however questioned by some member states that 
perceived it as a form of an ungrounded intervention stepping over EU 
competencies. As a result, a moderate version of Article 30 was agreed 
upon. The solution nonetheless, has not cleared up limitations that have 
become already apparent in pre-accession negotiations, where the Com-
mission lacked a binding instrument to require the independence of me-
dia regulatory bodies established in the CEE countries.1 As described in 
Chapter 3, the pre-accession Regular Reports devoted substantial space to 
media regulatory authorities in the candidate countries, focusing on vari-
ous aspects such as administrative effectiveness, capacities, competences, 
powers and composition, often referring to the issue of independence. 
At the same time, the Commission could not use a legal leverage to de-
mand the MRA’s independence more formally. The Commission had to 
deal with the same obstacle in the case of expressing an opinion on the 
new Hungarian media law and the establishment of a regulatory author-
ity controlled by the Prime Minister. Instead of relying on a legal tool, the 
Commission had to use soft policy instruments and political pressure – as 
noted in Chapter 3. 
These practical cases led to a reconsideration of possible policies 
and broadening the scope of policy knowledge on the issue. In 2009, 
the Commission commissioned the Study on Indicators for independence 
1 DG Connect (2013) Public consultation on the independence of the audiovisual reg-
ulatory bodies: the questionnaire (available at: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/
public-consultation-independence-audiovisual-regulatory-bodies; retrieved 31.21.2013).
256
and efficient functioning of audiovisual media services regulatory bodies, 
conducted by the Hans Bredow Institute, in order to collect a detailed 
legal description and analysis of the MRA, an analysis of the effective 
implementation of the legal framework and the identification of key 
characteristics constituting an independent regulatory body (Hans Bre-
dow Institute for Media Research et al., 2011: 5). The study found out 
that in some EU countries either the legal set-up does not guarantee that 
regulatory bodies exercise their powers independently or that regulatory 
bodies are formally independent, but not in practice.2 Other studies or 
reports emphasised the importance of a pan-EU approach harmonising 
standards of MRA independence. The Report of the High Level Group on 
Media Freedom and Pluralism highlighted – as part of its recommenda-
tions – that regulators should be independent, with appointments be-
ing made in a transparent manner, with all the appropriate checks and 
balances. In addition the Report proposed the creation of a network of 
national  audio-visual regulatory authorities similar to the model estab-
lished by the electronic communications framework (HLGMFP, 2013: 7). 
The Study on European Union competencies in respect of media pluralism 
and media freedom by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom 
(CMPF), emphasised in a similar vein that a lack of harmonisation in this 
area contrasts strongly with the electronic communications framework. 
An agreement on harmonised solutions would be justified by the fact that 
some member states already have a single body supervising both elec-
tronic communications and audiovisual media services (CMPF, 2013).
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in March 2013, the DG Con-
nect launched a public consultation on the independence of audiovisual 
regulatory bodies. The main objective of the consultation was to collect 
views and opinions from various stakeholders and reconsider an eventual 
possibility of strengthening the condition of independence through policy 
measures, including a possible revision of Article 30 of the AVMSD. The 
consultation process was closed in June 2013.3 The DG Connect prepared 
a form of questionnaire in which the background of the initiative was 
explained. The Commission received 68 responses from various actors 
including citizen, producers’ associations, the PSM, media regulatory au-
thorities, NGOs, media companies, and ministries. Among these, only one 
2 DG Connect (2013) Public consultation on the independence of the audiovisual reg-
ulatory bodies: the questionnaire (available at: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/
public-consultation-independence-audiovisual-regulatory-bodies; retrieved 31.12.2013).
3 DG Connect (2013) Public consultation on the independence of the audiovisual regu-
latory bodies (available at: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/public-consultation-
independence-audiovisual-regulatory-bodies; retrieved 31.12.2013).
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response was submitted from CEE regulatory authorities – from the Pol-
ish National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT). Following the completion of 
the public consultation, the European Council published Conclusions on 
media freedom and pluralism in the digital environment (Council of the 
European Union, 2013). The document clearly divides the role of mem-
ber states and the Commission as regards the independence of the MRA. 
While member states are invited to ensure the independence of their 
regulatory bodies, the Commission is encouraged to strengthen, through 
non-legislative actions, cooperation between member states’ audiovisual 
regulatory authorities (2013: 3). This formulation (to which the Commis-
sion reported reservation) clearly signaled disagreement of the Council 
on possible legislative initiatives by the Commission. Hence, the future of 
the initiative proposed by the Commission seems rather uncertain.
6.3. Independence of the MRA in CEE
An empirical assessment of MRA independence is built on the conceptual 
distinction between formal and de facto independence (Hans Bredow In-
stitute for Media Research et al., 2011: 28) or formal and informal inde-
pendence (Puppis and Maggetti, 2012: 80). Formal independence derives 
from prescriptions constituting the MRA in law, in particular from de-
fining its status (including establishment, appointment procedures, and 
accountability), organisational design and procedures of operation (in-
cluding management, tasks and competences, financing, performance). 
Formal independence needs to be completed by de facto independence 
which refers to the practical implementation of all safeguards for formal 
independence as well as the overall compliance with formal provisions 
(Hans Bredow Institute for Media Research et al., 2011: 28). This section 
of the chapter aims at an empirical assessment of formal MRA indepen-
dence in selected CEE countries in line with current EU policies seeking 
harmonisation in this particular field. The assessment will examine the 
dynamic relationship between independence and external dependency in 
a given historical, cultural and geopolitical context, thus also the condi-
tions of practical – informal – implementation will be briefly described. 
Two ‘technical’ dimensions of this particular relationship were chosen as 
a primary focus: appointment procedures and accountability.
The current position of the MRA in the selected CEE countries has 
crystallised along specific historical currents and the growing importance 
of shared regulatory trends in Europe. The establishment of new MRA 
in CEE countries took place at the unique historical juncture in which 
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democratic transition met with successive membership in the Council of 
Europe and European Union. The creation of the MRA among many other 
institutions building the administrative skeletons of transitioning states, 
was largely inspired by exogenous forces. The theory of institutional iso-
morphism suggests that if an apparently successful model of a regula-
tor exists, it is likely to be copied (Hans Bredow Institute for Media Re-
search et al., 2011: 14). In the CEE countries, the French model proved 
to be most successful in this regard. In Poland, the National Broadcasting 
Council – Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji – KRRiT) was established by 
the 1992 Broadcasting Act. One of the main prerequisites for revamping 
the regulatory structure was the decomposition of former dependencies 
and relations of control between institutions of political power, regulatory 
units and the media. The National Broadcasting Council was designed ac-
cording to the French model of Conseil supérior de l’ audiovisuel (CSA) to 
reflect the institutional components of representative democracy: four of 
the KRRiT’s nine members were to be appointed by the Sejm (the Lower 
House of the Polish Parliament), two by the Senate and three by the Presi-
dent. Since then, the KRRiT’s competencies have encompassed granting 
and revoking broadcasting licences, participating in broadcasting policy 
formation, nominating members of the Supervisory and Program Coun-
cils who oversee the operations of the PSM, and scrutinizing the activity 
of broadcasters (content and audience in particular) (Klimkiewicz, 2013: 
197). In the Polish Constitution enacted in 1997, the National Broadcast-
ing Council has been recognised as one of the organs of state control and 
protection of rights.4 The Constitution defined the tasks and competences 
of the KRRiT in general terms, and also outlined its composition and 
incompatibility rules. Thus any potential future change in the law would 
have had to respect and be adjusted in accordance with constitutional 
provisions.
The institutional model in the Czech Republic and Slovakia has roots 
in the first Federal Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting (Fed-
erální Rada pro rozhlasové a televizní vysílání – FRRTV) established in 1991 
by the 1991 Act on Radio and Television Broadcasting.5 Milan Šmíd argues 
that following foreign models was a common method used by politicians 
in the transitional period. Likewise in Poland, the new Czechoslovak regu-
latory authority was designed according to the prototype of the French 
CSA (Šmíd, 2011). The Federal Council was composed of nine members 
4 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland (Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) 
adopted on 2 April, 1997, Official Journal, 1997, No. 78, item 483, Articles 213–215, 
(http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm retrieved 3 January, 2014).
5 Act No. 468/ 1991 of 22 November 1991 on Radio and Television Broadcasting.
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who were appointed by three bodies: three by the Federal Assembly, three 
by the Czech national parliament and three by the Slovak Parliament. In 
this way, the plurality of appointment aimed at reflecting diverse interests 
in the operation of the Council. In 1993, Czechoslovakia was split into 
two independent states and the Federal Council was dissolved at the end 
of 1992. Its competencies were transposed to the Czech Council for Ra-
dio and Television Broadcasting (Rada pro rozhlasové a televizní vysílání – 
RRTV) and Slovak Council for Broadcasting and Retransmission (Rada pre 
vysielanie a retransmisiu – RVR6). Contrary to the Federal Council, however, 
both national bodies have been since then appointed by one source – the 
Czech national parliament (Česká národní rada) and the Slovak national 
parliament (Národná Rada SR). Accordingly, the representation of diverse 
interests in society has been channeled only through the parliamentary 
structure. In Hungary, the regulatory body for radio and television broad-
casting was established by the 1996 Broadcasting Act.7 Between 1996 and 
2010 the Hungarian National Radio and Television Authority (Országos 
Rádió És Televízió Testület – ORTT) was appointed from nominations del-
egated by various political parties. The 1996 Act stipulated that the Au-
thority is comprised of at least 5 members nominated by the Parliament 
factions. Moreover, Article 32 (1) explicitly stated that the Authority is an 
independent legal entity under the supervision of the Parliament. With the 
2010 Act on Media Services and Mass Media, the former activities of the 
ORTT and NHH (Nemzeti Hírközlési Hatóság – National Communications 
Authority) were merged under a newly created body – the National Me-
dia and Communications Authority (Nemzeti Média és Hírközlési Hatóság 
– NMHH). As described in Chapter 3, this regulatory change leading to 
significant centralisation of powers over the overall media landscape and 
political control over the appointment procedures by the governing party 
and Prime Minister, evoked a decisive reaction from the Council of Europe, 
the OSCE and the European Commission. 
The table below summarises provisions concerning general recogni-
tion of the independence of the MRA in the CEE countries.
6 The Council was first established under the name The Council of the Slovak Re-
public for Radio and Television Broadcasting.
7 Act 1 of 1996 of Radio and Television Broadcasting.
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Table 42: General recognition of the independence of media/audiovisual 
regulatory authorities in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 



















The Council members should 
carry out activities besides 
their capacity in the Council 
in a way which could not 
damage or challenge the trust 
in the independence and 
impartiality of the Council
Act No. 
231/2001 of 17 













General Article 109 (1)
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independence
Act No. 308 of 
14 September 





Sources: Elaborated on the basis of national broadcasting laws in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia as quoted in the table.
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The legal and general recognition of MRA independence does not 
guarantee factual autonomy in achieving the goals and ends without exter-
nal interferences. It does though provide a useful indication how the prin-
ciple of independence is valued by policy makers, and how much is it ex-
posed in legal acts and attached to the concept of regulatory bodies. As can 
be seen from the table above, the principal recognition of independence 
of the MRA in broadcasting and media laws in the region has not been an 
automatic and universally shared safeguard protecting the regulators from 
external influences. Polish and Slovak broadcasting laws do not contain 
an explicit recognition of MRA independence. It should be added though, 
that the Slovak Statute of the Council for Broadcasting and Retransmission 
(RVR) defines the Council as a “collective and independent body (…)”.8
The 2001 Czech Act on Radio and Television Broadcasting links the 
issue of independence with the activities of the Council and in particular, 
the trust of the general public. Thus independence and impartiality is 
seen as an important condition of public trust that should be maintained 
by the practical activities of the Council’s members. In comparison with 
other countries in the region, it is the 2010 Hungarian Act on Media 
Services and Mass Media that accords the greatest prominence to the 
principle of independence. First, independence is recognised generally as 
a feature of the National Media and Communications Authority defined 
by Article 109 (1). Secondly, independence refers to the performance of 
tasks by the Authority. Moreover, the Act also sustains that the Media 
Council may not be instructed with respect to their activities. At the same 
time, it is important to contextualise these safeguards with the appoint-
ment procedures and the control of political institutions to understand 
the full scope of regulatory autonomy and its limitations. Moreover, the 
concentration of powers in the hands of the Authority’s chair has a strong 
effect on the operation of the whole body, as will be discussed below.
The next aspect of independence studied in this section is the ap-
pointment of the MRA. In normative terms, such procedures should 
guarantee a composition of membership that will be independent from 
political and business interferences, and at the same time, will “repre-
sent collectively the interests of society in general” (Council of Europe, 
1996). Thus, on the one hand, the MRA membership mandate requires 
autonomy, on the other hand external dependency in terms of the plural-
istic representation of social interests. The table below summarises five 
elements of appointment procedures in the selected CEE countries includ-
ing membership (number, composition of the body), appointment and 
selection procedure, term, the position and election/nomination of the 
Chairperson and conflict of interests rules.9




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To grasp the role of appointment procedures in shaping the MRA’s au-
tonomy, it is worth starting from the composition of the membership. As 
the table demonstrates, the number of members varies highly – from five 
in Hungary and Poland to 13 in the Czech Republic. Interestingly, the 
Czech Republic and Poland started from the same level – nine members – 
using the CSA model. A higher number of members might better reflect 
various interests in a society that can be defined more broadly than solely 
in political terms. On the other hand, a lower number of members might 
guarantee a higher degree of efficiency and internal cohesion. In both 
cases, advantages highly depend on the appointment and selection pro-
cedure itself. The key roles in this process are in all the studied countries 
played by national parliaments. There are however, important nuances. 
In Poland, the nomination of the KRRiT members by the Parliament 
and President, both elected through general elections, potentially cre-
ates a balance of powers. In practice, appointment decisions relating to 
the regulatory body have raised turbulent disputes and often, criticism. 
Puppis and Maggetti argue that regulators tend to be more independent 
in countries where political uncertainty is higher (Puppis and Maggetti, 
2012: 80). In Poland on the contrary, a relatively fast circulation of politi-
cal power and subsequent changes in the central administration proved 
to bring about an appetite for a more direct control over the composition 
of the regulator. Although the constitutional provisions protect the rep-
resentative composition of the National Broadcasting Council and elimi-
nate party membership of the KRRiT members,10 the Constitution does 
not sharply define the number of the Council members and the length 
of their terms. This has been used by politicians not only to change the 
number of the KRRiT members, but also its very composition (especially 
in the case of the 2005 law change and subsequent attempts to re-arrange 
the composition and competencies of the KRRiT).11 
In the case of the Czech Republic, the tasks, performance and com-
position of the Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting (RRTV) are 
10 Constitution of the Republic of Poland 1997…, Art. 214
11 In December 2005, the newly elected right wing government prepared the Act 
on transformations and modifications to the division of tasks and powers of state bodies 
competent for communications and broadcasting (adopted on 29 December 2005, Of-
ficial Journal 2005, No. 267, item 2258), which reduced the number of KRRiT members 
from nine to five. Although the rationale behind the Act was the establishment of a new 
super-regulatory body – the Office of Electronic Communications (Urząd Komunikacji 
Elektronicznej – UKE), most critics of the project underlined that the Act merely changed 
the composition of the National Broadcasting Council, Supervisory Councils of the Polish 
Television and Radio, and in consequence, management boards of both PSM institutions. 
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stipulated by the 2001 Act on Radio and Television Broadcasting.12 The 
Council’s competencies encompass granting and revoking broadcasting 
licences, overseeing the operation of retransmission and monitoring com-
pliance with the law and conditions of the licences. The current appoint-
ment procedures have been in place since the pre-accession period and 
demonstrate a departure from the initial model inspired by the French 
solution of balancing political powers. The 13 members of the RRTV are 
formally appointed by the Prime Minister but nominated by the Chamber 
of Deputies. Thus, the Council membership continues to reflect the distri-
bution of power in the Chamber of Deputies (OSF, 2013a: 79). Although 
the RRTV has in the past couple of years been considered less politically 
biased, the procedures for the appointment leave room for political inter-
ference (2013a: 79). In the case of Slovakia, the Council of Broadcasting 
and Retrasmission (RVR) has been composed of nine members appointed 
by the National Council of the Slovak Republic. The law guarantees that 
nominations for membership may be delegated by MPs, and professional 
and civic associations in the fields of: media, culture, science, education, 
sport, religion, etc.13 In practice, however, many members have indirect 
links to political parties (OSF, 2013b: 76).
While the MRA in Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia are respon-
sible for the regulation of broadcasting and on-demand audiovisual ser-
vices, and structurally they are accompanied by relevant bodies respon-
sible for electronic communications, the Hungarian case presents the only 
converged regulator among the studied CEE countries. Merging of struc-
tures and responsibilities resulted in the creation of an institution that 
covers a remarkably large field of supervision. Its main tasks comprise 
ensuring the functioning and development of the communications mar-
ket, safeguarding the interests of the users, fostering the development of 
fair and efficient competition within the electronic communications sec-
tor, and compliance with the law and licence conditions. Thus, the scope 
of supervision covers communication and media services as well as press 
products. The National Media and Communications Authority (NMHH) 
has a fairly complex structure: it is comprised of the NMHH President, the 
Media Council (Médiatanács) and the Office.14 Among these, the Chair-
person enjoys overarching powers, covering appointments of the Director 
General of the Office, two Vice-Presidents, Director General and Deputy 
Director of the NMHH. In addition, the Chairperson appoints the  Director 
12 Act No. 231/2001 of 17 May 2001 on Radio and Television…
13 Act No. 308 of 14 September 2000 Coll. on Broadcasting and…
14 Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services…, Article 109 (3).
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general of the Broadcast Support and Property Management Fund and 
nominates candidates for the position of CEO of the public service me-
dia. As a result of the compromise reached with the Council of Europe, 
the amended version of the 2010 Act stipulates that the Chairperson is 
appointed by the President of Hungary for a period of nine years, on 
the recommendation of the Prime Minister who considers the nomina-
tions made in the course of consultations with various organisations.15 
The members of the Media Council are elected by the Parliament – with 
a two-thirds majority of the votes.16 Even after changes, these procedures 
still continue to transpose centralised political control into the structure 
and operation of the regulatory body. 
The conflict-of-interests rules constitute an important aspect of the 
appointment procedures as they paint the contours of public expectations 
towards the regulators. The provisions in all the CEE countries gener-
ally demonstrate that active politicians are excluded from appointment to 
media regulatory councils. Many examples of nominations to the MRA, 
however, prove that MRA members have been politically active before or 
after the terms, or co-operated actively with those political parties that 
pushed forward their nominations (OSF, 2012b; OSF, 2012c; OSF, 2013a; 
OSF, 2013b; Hans Bredow Institute for Media Research et al., 2011). The 
second large group covered by incompatibility rules includes media own-
ers, top media management, and in some cases, also experts advising 
media companies. This category also appears among conflict-of-interest 
rules in all studied laws.
The next section of this chapter will reflect on mechanisms of ac-
countability. Normative prerequisites with this regard are related to a sim-
ple question: to whom are the MRA accountable? What kind of account-
ability (administrative, legal, political, social) plays a leading role? Does 
this role in turn, define specific features of MRA appointment procedures 
and management? While administrative accountability involves answer-
ability to superiors, legal accountability is directly linked to the rule of 
law (Goetz and Gaventa, 2001: 7). Political accountability can be defined 
as the elected officials’ obligation to answer to the public, and of public 
servants to the elected officials (Blind, 2011: 7). Social accountability is 
generally seen as a bottom-up process, encapsulated in a variety of initia-
tives of direct and indirect civil society and citizen engagement in public 
affairs aiming to exact accountability (Ackerman, 2005: 16). 
15 Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services…, Article 111A.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The table above examines two aspects of accountability: reporting obliga-
tions and procedures of dismissal. Although reporting obligations clearly 
involve answerability to superiors (thus manifesting administrative ac-
countability), the fact that in all studied countries, the MRA annual re-
ports are to be submitted and also accepted by the Parliaments, proves 
that the process is dominated by political accountability. In Poland, the 
President is also involved in this process. In case of rejection of the annual 
report by both the Sejm and the Senate, the term of office of the KRRiT 
members expires, but only if this decision is approved by the President. In 
Polish political practice, with its relatively fast pace of exchange of politi-
cal power in the past, political affiliation of the President often differed 
from the parliamentarian majority. However recently, since the President 
has represented the same party as the government, the annual report was 
rejected in 2010 and the whole regulatory body dismissed. In the case of 
Hungary and Slovakia, the procedure of the MRA dismissal is not directly 
related to the acceptance of the annual report. In Hungary, the Chairper-
son (President) or members of the Media Council may be dismissed if they 
are placed under guardianship affecting their legal capacity albeit the law 
does not specify the term ‘guardianship’. In Slovakia, the RVR members 
can be dismissed only under the circumstances of a conflict of interest as 
defined by law, or when they are convicted of a crime or they cannot fulfill 
their duties for more than six months. The measures collected in Table 43 
and examples given reveal a clear asymmetry between a strong preference 
for political, rather than legal, administrative or social accountability.
To summarise: although the issue of MRA independence comprises 
many aspects of the MRA’s status and performance (e.g. appointment, use 
of powers, accountability, financing), two dimensions seem to be particu-
larly important. Puppis and Maggetti (2012: 80) define them as politi-
cal and economic independence. While political independence refers to 
the ability to select policy objectives without influence from the govern-
ment, economic independence points to the ability to use instruments of 
policy without economic restrictions and industry influences. Against this 
background, especially political independence has been limited in various 
ways in the studied CEE countries, most notably through appointment 
procedures and accountability measures.
6.4. The EU policies concerning the PSM 
In normative terms, PSM has long been perceived as a constitutive element 
of functional diversity in classical Europe-born media system arrange-
ments. This type of structural diversity is generated by different functions, 
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the way in which they are balanced and complement each other. It is im-
portant to add in this respect that Recital 13 of the AVMSD acknowledges 
the co-existence of private and public audiovisual media service providers 
as a feature which distinguishes the European audiovisual media market 
(European Parliament and the Council, 2010a). PSM integrating competi-
tive and complementary functions, are to offer a set of qualitative pri-
orities, differing from the market-driven media. This difference is not so 
much congruent with genres and areas of programming, as with functions, 
gratifications, standards and quality, as well as with its reputation for ac-
cessibility to public concerns and responsiveness to public needs (Blumler 
and Hoffmann-Reim, 2002). In addition to genre provisions (informa-
tion, entertainment, education), qualitative priorities should reflect such 
important social and cultural functions like cultural self-determination, 
innovation, trans-national appeal, imaginativeness, and an ability to illu-
minate controversy, authenticity, social relevance, expressive richness and 
integrity (Blumler and Hoffmann-Reim, 2002: 207). 
These functional attributes delineating performance and remit of the 
PSM paint contours of autonomy. In other words, conditions under which 
the PSM operate determine quality and autonomy of performance and 
fulfilling the special functions generating public value. One of such piv-
otal conditions are financing mechanisms. Financing in particular, should 
reflect independence from the political environment and especially the 
government, as well as the market. It should guarantee accordingly 
managerial and professional autonomy. As regards the PSM, longstand-
ing practice in various European countries contributed to a broad ac-
ceptance (not without controversy) of various forms of funding includ-
ing a flat broadcasting licence fee, taxation, state subsidies, subscription 
fees, advertising and sponsoring revenue, specialised pay-per-view or on-
demand services, the sale of related products such as books, videos and 
films, and the exploitation of the PSM’s audiovisual archives (Council 
of Europe 2009b). At the same time, being a public institution in law 
and governance, the PSM are seen to best preserve their managerial and 
professional autonomy through primary funding from public sources – in 
particular a flat broadcasting license fee (Klimkiewicz, 2013: 194). This 
type of funding does not only prevent an undue influence of the govern-
ment in terms of establishing a direct amount to be transferred in a form 
of subsidies, grants or other similar forms, it also secures a long-term 
approach to the PSM’s future planning, which annual funding from state 
budgetary sources would not allow (2013: 194).
In this sense, the question of PSM funding conceptually captured by 
the state aid policy regime supervised by DG Competition, became one 
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of the long-term themes underpinning the EU’s policy with a growing 
significance for the future of the PSM. EU policy concerning the PSM 
has been briefly discussed in Chapter 2. This section will describe more 
closely issues that resonate with the question of autonomy and subse-
quent analysis of the position and strength of the PSM in the selected 
CEE countries. Mark Wheeler points out that in applying state aid rules, 
wherein public subsidies are seen to unfairly distort the market, to the au-
diovisual sector, DG Competition has become an increasingly active play-
er in intervening in European television markets (Wheeler, 2010: 51). 
In doing so, the policy perception of the PSM in audiovisual landscapes, 
has progressively been filtered through economic values and competition 
rules guided by economic logic. As observed in the chapter one, media 
systems and environments fulfil various functions (including economic) 
that respond to communication needs. Normatively, these are not all sub-
ordinated to the economic function. In EU media and communications 
policy, however, certain strands show that prioritising economic values 
and functions transgresses into the domain of institutions that were set in 
the past to operate outside economically defined markets. In ideal terms, 
the PSM were not perceived to be part of the market, but as a comple-
mentary structure correcting a failure of the market. In practice however, 
competitive functions have grown from the PSM’s general appeal and 
popularity among audiences especially with the development of the pri-
vate broadcasting sector. 
As mentioned in the chapter two, the 1997 Protocol of Amsterdam 
ensured funding for the fulfilment of the public service remit but under 
the condition, it does not distort market competition and the competi-
tive balance between public and commercial broadcasters is preserved. 
As the Protocol referred explicitly to ‘broadcasting’, not the ‘media’ or 
‘media services’, the interpretation of PSM activities on new platforms 
brought by technological advancement stood under question. The reso-
lution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States, meeting within the Council of 25 January 1999 concerning 
public service broadcasting, reaffirmed that the fulfilment of the mission 
of public service broadcasting requires that it continues to benefit from 
technological progress (Council of the European Union, 1999). The sub-
sequent communications from the Commission on this issue reaffirmed 
this approach (European Commission, 2001; 2009a). But already in the 
2001 Communication the limits and areas were mentioned where public 
funding should not be used to support certain new media services. In the 
2009 Communication, the Commission encourages the member states to 
implement clearer instruments – such as tests – to weigh the impact of 
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new media services launched by the PSM on the economic market against 
the public or social value of this service for society. Thus, the states are 
supposed to introduce mechanisms that will enable identify when public 
value (supported by public funding) surpasses economic values of effec-
tive competition. 
The European Commission has become involved with several state 
aid cases concerning the funding of the PSM. Mark Wheeler argues that 
DG Competition hardened its stance against the PSM and their anti- 
competitive effect in terms of market distortion (Wheeler, 2010). In the 
case of Danish TV 2 and the Dutch NOS DG Competition required the re-
payment of funding received by the PSM; in the case of the German ARD 
and ZDF and the Irish RTE and TG4, the PSM were subjected to refined 
commitments requiring them to define more strictly their public service 
obligations and be responsive to proportionate financial regimes. As re-
gards the CEE countries, in February 2008, Poland’s largest commercial 
broadcaster the TVN group consulted the European Commission in order 
to suggest an examination of the use of state aid by the Polish public ser-
vice television (TVP S.A.) and compliance of TVP’s operation with the EC 
competition rules. The main argument used in the claim was grounded on 
the fact that the legal definition of the public remit is not precise enough 
and TVP S.A. can finance commercial activity as if this were a public 
mission (Masłowska, 2008). The TVP S.A. established separate accounts 
for the task of fulfilling the public service mission and for commercial 
activities. The National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT) has reported on 
these mechanisms in its annual reports (e.g. KRRiT, 2003). Nevertheless, 
the TVN group maintained that the realisation of the public mission by 
TVP S.A. is not sufficiently monitored and the KRRiT is merely limited 
to analysing statistical data (Masłowska, 2008). TVP S.A. in its letter to 
the Commission, submitted on the occasion of the Commission’s review 
of the communication on state aid to PSM, explained the conditions and 
competition on the audiovisual media market in Poland, referred to the 
dual system of financing introduced in Poland at the beginning of 1990s 
and extracted tasks and duties forming public service mission (Telewizja 
Polska, 2008). With regard to the TVN claim, TVP S.A. expressed the opin-
ion that complains of commercial broadcasters confirm that they “aim at 
weakening the position of public media in Poland and in doing so, they 
would try to involve European institutions to support them” (Masłowska, 
2008). As a consequence of the EC examination, the KRRiT in co-opera-
tion with the TVP has started to work on a Charter of TVP’s duties with 
a more precise listing of audiovisual services for the next 5 years. The 
Charter is expected to be publicised in 2014.
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All these cases prove, that the operation, financing and in conse-
quence also autonomy of the PSM have been conceptualised in more tech-
nocratic terms. As Mark Wheeler notices, the rigid employment of state 
aid, however, fails to take into account the social, cultural and democratic 
functions of the PSM and the need to separate these areas in media and 
communication environments which have become increasingly defined 
by competitive commercial services (Wheeler, 2010: 60).
6.5. Changing conditions of the PSM in the CEE 
The current state of the PSM in the CEE region has resulted from a specific 
historical juncture and increasingly important converging of pan-European 
trends. Recently, these trends have accentuated the decline in normative 
certainties, especially as regards the function of the PSM in a new com-
munication environment (Klimkiewicz, 2013: 195). Moreover, new chal-
lenges have arisen around growing regulatory pressure from the European 
Commission in terms of clarifying the PSM remit and financial mechanisms 
(Meier 2003; Bardoel and d’Haenens 2008; Ward 2008), and new political 
choices inspired by commercial incentives (removal of advertising in Spain 
and France) or populist reasons (abolition of the licence fee in Hungary and 
a policy debate about similar solutions in Poland and the Czech Republic).
In CEE, the PSM have been created more than 20 years ago as part 
of a far-reaching media system reform in conditions of ‘compressed’ time. 
This compression was caused by the fact that the PSM were exposed rela-
tively early to competition with their private counterparts (Klimkiewicz, 
2013). The period of ‘inventing’ and ‘reinventing’ the PSM appeared to 
coincide with a development of commercial broadcasters imposing their 
own commercial logic and way of action. At the same time, three limita-
tions can be extracted that affected conditions of autonomy and inde-
pendence of the PSM in the CEE countries.
First, the ‘new’ PSM preserved the institutional continuity of the 
former state media. Katrin Voltmer (2013: 153) describes them as huge 
bureaucratic organisations that were hopelessly overstaffed, inefficient 
and governed by an attitude of subservience to their political masters. To 
quote the Mapping Digital Media Report on the Czech Republic, the pub-
lic service radio (Český rozhlas – ČRo) and television (Česká televize – ČT) 
are still perceived to a certain extent as “legatees of the communist state-
administered institutions” and as “institutions trying to lose their reputa-
tion as politically manipulated, inefficient media giants” (OSF, 2013a: 
31). Second, although there was a CEE domestic option to create a three-
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level broadcasting system composed of the public, private/commercial 
and social/civic media, a solution inspired by the will to copy the legal 
and institutional framework of the West-European dual model prevailed 
(Ociepka 2003). Third, the starting point of PSM institutional birth in the 
CEE countries (1990–1995) coincided with an enhanced criticism and 
PSM crisis in the Western part of Europe. Karol Jakubowicz argues that 
the internal reform and adoption of the normative West European PSM 
pattern has been put under question before successfully completed and 
before an alternative self-regeneration option was conceived. In the given 
historical circumstances, the West European pattern has appeared obso-
lete, born in a quite different historical time and different social, political, 
cultural and technological conditions – and now in acute need of a redefi-
nition of its rationale and purpose (Jakubowicz 2004: 67). 
These three circumstances determined quite a specific course of ac-
tion, in which the PSM has not developed as a formally autonomous sys-
tem (as in the case of the professional model described by Humphreys 
1996: 155–158), but a more inclusive system combining a ‘Western’ nor-
mative model as a point of reference with political control (mainly over 
appointments in management structures), legal norms granting profes-
sional autonomy and commercial prerequisites (Klimkiewicz, 2013: 196). 
As the legal embeddedness of the PSM shows, legal measures describing 
status of the PSM are more or less satisfactory, but political culture and 
the way rules are used and implemented in practice generates a whole set 
of political dependencies, in particular when it comes to the appointment 
procedures of the PSM boards, management and supervisory bodies, and 
political decisions about sources of finding.
One of the dimensions exposing the strength of public service televi-
sion over a longer period of time is audience share in the whole audiovi-
sual landscape. Once monopolist broadcasters, nowadays public service 
TVs occupy a much smaller proportion of the market. There are, however, 
significant differences among the countries studied and course of changes 
in this respect. The table below shows the average daily share of pub-
lic service channels in the region. It may be added in this respect, that 
the proportions of average daily share do not substantially differ from the 
proportions reflected in prime time audience share. 
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Table 45: Proportion of public service TV channels in audience share (%) 
in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia between 1999–2010




32.1 31.2 29.2 29.4 29.7 30.5 29.8 30.8 31.8 30.6 27.9 27.8
HUN-
GARY
18.1 15.2 16.9 16.9 19.2 19.1 17.6 18.6 16.6 15.0 13.4 13.5
POLAND 51.1 46.2 48.1 50.5 52.5 51.1 51.6 49.8 46.6 44.5 43.1 42.2
SLOVA-
KIA
18.1 18.0 20.2 21.0 21.8 24.6 25.0 24.7 22.6 22.0 20.8 17.4
Sources: Calculated on the basis of European Audiovisual Observatory (2011) 
2011 Yearbook – Television in 37 European States, Strasbourg; 2009 Yearbook; 
2006 Yearbook.
Figure 9: Proportion of public service TV channels in audience share (%) 
in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia between 1999–2010
Sources: Calculated on the basis of European Audiovisual Observatory (2011) 









































As can be seen from both the table and figures, two groups can be 
distinguished among the countries studied. The first is represented by 
public service TV in Poland. The second group is comprised of countries 
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with a weaker position of public service TV channels including the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. In Poland, TVP became a cardinal play-
er in the national advertising market and leader in television audience 
share, thus posing itself as a main rival to commercial channels, at the 
beginning of the 1990s. This superior position has ensued from two rea-
sons. First, TVP enjoyed a relatively high audience loyalty. Second, unlike 
in the case of the press, the broadcasting regulation imposed limits and 
control on the broadcasting market (Klimkiewicz, 2013). As explained in 
the chapter five, until 2004, foreign investors were allowed to hold only 
minority shares (up to 33%) in the Polish broadcasting media. In conse-
quence, the absence of influential foreign investors contributed to a divi-
sion of the television market into two parts: one covered by the strong 
public broadcaster and the other dominated by two strong private com-
panies – Polsat and TVN, each owning several channels. In recent years 
however, the share of other companies (offering mostly thematic chan-
nels) significantly increased. It has to be also emphasised that the most 
recent results depicting the annual audience share of TVP demonstrate 
a significantly weaker position in the market and amount only to 32%.17 
Most recently, Slovak public service broadcaster STV also experienced 
heavy losses in audience share at the expense of private commercial and 
thematic channels attaining only 12% of audience share.18 The Mapping 
Digital Media Report on Slovakia observed that the main reason for this 
decreasing viewership has been the successful strategy of the commercial 
broadcasters, and namely extending the main news programmes in time 
slots controlled earlier by the STV (OSF, 2013b: 27). The pressure from 
commercial broadcasters has certainly been more evident in the CEE re-
gion, as the advertising market has shrunk and migrated to other plat-
forms, mainly the Internet. Albeit the pressure also took other forms than 
marketing and programme strategies as the case of the examination of 
state aid to TVP by the European Commission illustrated. 
To fully understand the strength of public service TV in an overall 
audiovisual landscape, attention has to be paid to autonomy in terms of 
financing schemes. The next figure shows the proportion of funding from 
the license fees – as a source – independent both from commercial mecha-
nism as well as from the government subsidies. 
17 MAVISE (2013) (available at: http://mavise.obs.coe.int/country?id=24;  retrieved 
27.12.2013).
18 MAVISE (2013) (available at: http://mavise.obs.coe.int/country?id=28;  retrieved 
27.12.2013).
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Figure 10: Proportion of licence fees in revenues of public service chan-
nels (%) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia between 
1999–2010
Sources: Calculated on the basis of European Audiovisual Observatory (2011) 
2011 Yearbook – Television in 37 European States, Strasbourg; 2009 Yearbook; 
2006 Yearbook.
Table 46: Proportion of licence fees in revenues of public service chan-
nels (%) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia between 
1999–2010
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
CZECH 
REPUBLIC
65 60.5 51.4 64.7 66.7 67.2 61.3 65.1 72.6 73.9 79.2 80.4
HUNGARY 19.5 19.7 15.9 28.5 – – 34.5 33.6 31.2 30.9 32 44.5
POLAND 29.2 29.2 30.1 30 32.4 32.1 28.0 27.0 24.6 20.5 16.9 12.2
SLOVAKIA 55.5 66.5 62.1 65.6 – – – 43.6 44.2 52.6 54 –
Sources: Calculated on the basis of the European Audiovisual Observatory (2011) 










































Again, two groups of countries emerge from this comparison: the first group 
includes the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The public service TVs in these 
countries, have seemed to enjoy relatively stable and continuous funding 
from the licence fees. In the case of the Czech Republic, the proportion of 
licence fees has been comparable with financial mechanisms in some West 
European countries – such as France, the UK, and Germany. The stable 
and relatively sufficient funding also contributed to a balanced although 
not highest audience share in the period of 1999–2010. The Slovak STV 
underwent several reforms, both in terms of financing and organisational 
structure, most recently leading to the institutional merger of three STV 
channels and nine SRo (Slovenský rozhlas – Slovak Radio) stations under 
one brand. In January 2011, a single public service broadcaster was creat-
ed under the name of Radio and Television of Slovakia (Rozhlas a televízia 
Slovenska, RTVS) (OSF, 2013b: 26). All these changes so far, however, have 
not contributed to better STV performance in a viewership.
The second group is represented by – Poland and Hungary – two quite 
opposite cases demonstrating practical difficulties in terms of achieving 
financial autonomy. In Poland, license fee revenue has oscillated between 
30%–17% of TVP’s total revenues during the last 20 years. Thus, most of 
its activities were financed from advertising, sponsoring and other com-
mercially related sources. The advertising funding encourages the PSM to 
spend only the minimum required to keep the largest possible audience 
watching, and to successfully compete with private commercial counter-
parts (Graham et al., 1999). In the case of Poland, this situation resulted 
in a vicious circle: the viewers have not opted for paying licence fees, 
because public service television has spent too much time on advertis-
ing and programmes similar to what commercial broadcasters offer; pub-
lic service television, on the other hand, has not succeeded in collecting 
substantial revenues from licence fees to make itself independent from 
advertising sources (Klimkiewicz, 2013: 202). In consequence, the pure 
pressure to achieve ratings has eroded the ability of public service tele-
vision to secure its professional autonomy. In the case of Hungary, the 
change of financial mechanism was caused by the political choice. The 
abolition of the television license fee in 2002 led to the implementation 
of financing directly from the state budget. Consequently, annual state 
allocations to the MTV budget rendered MTV performance dependent on 
political decision-making and choices. Moreover, political and financial 
vulnerability contributed to a drop in audience share (to around 10%). 
It is worth acknowledging that these trends weakening the position 
of the PSM correlate, to a certain extent, with challenges the European 
PSM are undergoing at the moment. However, public service media and 
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especially TV seem to be still in a worse position in some CEE countries. 
This is not only due to commercial pressures, difficulties with defining the 
PSM remit but also due to political choices and sometimes populist rea-
sons (the abolition of licence fee in Hungary and the policy debate about 
similar solutions in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia). 
6.6. Conclusions
A policy theme integrating in this chapter two separate and at the same 
time normatively interrelated fields – the independence of the MRA and 
autonomy of the PSM – has been one of the most challenging in terms 
of harmonising the EU and national approaches. Unsuccessful efforts of 
the Commission to legally recognise the value of MRA independence dem-
onstrated a strong willingness of the states to control this institution and 
its embeddedness in national media environments. An empirical assess-
ment of selected technical dimensions of MRA independence in the CEE 
countries has shown a range of varied arrangements. Although many of 
these originated in the adoption of West European models (most notably 
the French CSA), the evolving picture drifted towards nationally specific 
solutions often reflecting the political system and cultural and historical 
context. As regards general recognition of MRA independence and appoint-
ment procedures, legal safeguards varied largely from a country to country. 
In all cases however, the MRA have been interwoven into a complex set of 
relations with the political system, determined by political culture, demo-
cratic consolidation and political manners. The accountability dimension 
has been heavily dominated by political accountability, not providing parity 
or stability between administrative, legal and social accountability. 
In the area of the autonomous operation of the PSM, the European 
Commission has championed a technocratic approach to the PSM mainly 
through state aid policies administered under DG Competition. This pre-
vailing approach settled frames of debates about the PSM (and also about 
their future) in economic and competition field, thus weighing PSM out-
put in terms of palpable social and public values, against ‘market impact’. 
PSM financing has been a crucial element of the negotiated autonomy of 
the PSM which have more frequently been perceived as a complementary 
rather than competitive structure in the media environment as a whole. 
An empirical assessment of the changing conditions of the PSM in the CEE 
has demonstrated an overall trend of a weakening the PSM both in terms 
of audience share and financing. Bardoel and d’Haenens (2008) describe 
a growing critical attitude among governments and politicians towards 
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the PSM resulting from a frustration and inability to build a more clien-
telistic partnership. “The forced tango that national politics and public 
broadcasters have danced for many decades” is being discreetly replaced 
by partnership with private media promising “to be less critical and cyni-
cal towards politics than PSB” (Bardoel and d’Haenens 2008: 339). Yet 
CEE experience shows that politicians were relatively successful in building 
clientelistic relationships with the PSM, at the same time they tended to 
weaken the PSM generally and reduce their autonomy, especially through 
financing mechanisms. This can be illustrated by the example of the ab-
olition of licence in Hungary, or inaction concerning licence fees by the 
Polish politicians who seemed to accept the PSM financing from advertis-
ing. Overreliance on the advertising sources of  financing, however, has cre-
ated tensions with the fulfillment of the public service provision and led to 
complaints by commercial broadcasters to the European Commission.
Closer and more symmetric relations between the PSM and their au-
diences will be an important condition in the process of regaining the 
PSM’s symbolic capital and their relative weight in entire media environ-
ments in the CEE region. A part of the problem lies in the fact that rela-
tions between the PSM and society could hardly be institutionalised and 
that society is not an established actor as such (Bardoel and d’Haenens, 
2008). At the same time, only with greater inclusion and participation of 
audiences and media users in various aspects of PSM performance and 
policy, can the PSM equip themselves with a stronger functional legacy, 
more balanced accountability and autonomy against political and eco-
nomic influences. Moreover, this can also empower the PSM at the EU 
level where increased tensions between the PSM and commercial media 
are moving from the national levels. Without a clear strategy seeking 
support and alliance with PSM users, the considerable changes which the 
PSM will have to undergo, can bring an unpredictable result. 
The role of national political systems and the EU will be crucial in 
this process, especially as regards the questions of PSM and MRA au-
tonomy. There is certainly a demand for more autonomous and transpar-
ent institutions occupying central positions in the infrastructure of public 
communication. This does not pose a new demand but a demand cen-
tered around those aspects of public communication that have long been 
neglected for various reasons (Klimkiewicz, 2013: 208). ‘Classical’ public 
service purposes and regulatory expectations are still valid. But they have 
to meet the communication needs of new media users and respond to the 
new social conditions of increasing mobility, virtual networking, social 
fragmentation, growing uncertainty, global competitiveness, including 
competitiveness of cultures and ideas (2013: 208).

7. BETWEEN AN ORGANIC GROWTH 
AND GARDENING: HARMONISATION 
OF THE POLYVALENT MEDIA POLICY. 
CONCLUSIONS
A rise of new forms of communication and new media architecture once 
again in history dramatically changes the way the media function in so-
cieties. The new media have a tremendous potential to create a universe 
of their own, pervading more profoundly into community and individual 
lives. In these new communication environments, the users simultaneous-
ly switch among platforms, services, and ways of interactions, in search 
of contents meeting various communication needs. Depending on the 
available media structures, their accessibility and conditions of use, users 
gain more autonomy in choice and control over the services they select. 
At the same time new media systems and environments, through their 
resources and relations with other fields of social actions, play important 
roles and functions determining what communication needs, and – in 
what ways – will be met. This constitutes a most fundamental challenge 
in media and communication policy that seeks to shape the structures 
and practices of the media. Following these observations the questions 
emerge: What media functions are most beneficial for the harmonious 
development of societies? What functions should be given priorities over 
the other? How can a right media balance and sustainable environment 
be achieved? Through an organic growth or gardening?
The normative model of the polyvalent media policy presented in this 
work aims to explain the process of balancing and harmonising various 
functions which the communication media play in contemporary societ-
ies. It proposes a reconsideration of normative grounds for policymaking 
in a wider context of the interplay of policy arguments and rationales 
(technological, cultural, educational and knowledge-generating, econom-
ic and political) rooted in various social fields rather than seeing policy as 
a battlefield between economic and cultural/political values. This implies 
extracting various policy strands affecting macrostructures – media sys-
tems or media environments – that are arranged in particular ways. As 
such structures are always deeply rooted in a particular historic, cultural, 
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economic, political context and path dependencies, revealing common 
grounds and regularities often lacks a clear approach. Instead of capturing 
specific policy outcomes through large sets of statistical data, this book 
sought to comprehend the processes and mechanisms of media-policy be-
ing made at the EU level and their harmonisation at the national level. 
In this respect, EU policy scope concerning the media and commu-
nications grew considerably in the areas of audiovisual policy (TWF and 
AVMS Directives), pan-European media, EU support for audiovisual pro-
duction, the public service media, media pluralism, convergence and the 
digital agenda, media literacy and digital divide, community and minor-
ity media, international trade and cultural diversity and others. In ad-
dition to a proliferation of thematic areas, policy processes also became 
more complex. The symptoms of this complexity include: policy actors’ 
interdependence, polyvalent rationality, complementarity anf functional 
convergence and knowledge and data asymmetries. In other words, the 
polyvalent character of media policy has implied an involvement of mul-
tiple values in policy reasoning and justification, diffussion and growth 
of interdependent policy actors and a constant complementing and at-
tunement of various functional fields. The symptoms of complexity re-
sult from the fact that various strands in EU media and communication 
policy developed along distinct phases, thematic clusters and media lev-
els (structural, content and performance-related policies). At the same 
time, an overarching media policy rationale grounded on the principle of 
freedom of expression and media pluralism became more profoundly an-
chored in the EU normative framework, as with the Lisbon Treaty coming 
into force on 1 December 2009, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union was made legally binding. 
While acknowledging the polyvalent character of the EU media and 
communications policy an important question appears about harmonisa-
tion. In this respect, the contours of harmonising efforts strike one as be-
ing elastic and adaptable to national reservations. On the one hand, the 
EU accomplished synchronised standards and procedures in such areas as 
the internal market, common rules on audiovisual media services, sup-
port schemes for EU audiovisual production and for pan-European media 
projects (although these were quite unsuccessful). On the other hand, 
nationally specific approaches blocked EU initiatives on media pluralism, 
the independence of media regulatory authorities, support to other me-
dia sectors such as the print press or community and minority media, 
and a more complex approach towards the PSM. The specificity of supra-
national versus national policy-making certainly implies varied and sub-
sidiary levels of the policy enactment. Ideally, these should be built on the 
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anchored core of norms that are not nationally negotiable, and secondly 
on country-adaptable priorities. In the media and communication policy 
field, the core norms would most probably be based on general principles 
of communication rights. The negotiable principles might be adapted to 
country-specific needs and characteristics such as size, geographical loca-
tion, ethnic and demographic structure, cultural and historical tradition. 
Yet, one of the most challenging aspects of harmonisation has been 
the extracting of these levels from the polyvalent character of the media 
and communications policy, and in particular an uncertainty as how to 
balance, these sometimes contradictory values. Thus, the least conten-
tious policy options have paved the way to prioritising economic values 
and recently – the digital agenda – which became the main pillar in the 
array of EU thematic policies. The use of the term ‘agenda’ is not acciden-
tal. It demonstrates the seriousness and principal place of digital commu-
nication in the hierarchy of post-Lisbon EU policies, and also a dominant 
vector for redirecting media policies diffused across various thematic 
fields. Experiencing a profound economic crisis, the EU is placing hope 
in policies and visions that could restore a sense of collective purpose 
and would not necessarily require a more sophisticated reconciliation of 
societal needs and interests. 
 Interestingly, the EU enlargement has been one of the areas where 
the EU media and communication policy could be tested quite compre-
hensively in a condensed period requiring a transposition of EU standards 
and fulfillment of EU conditions by the candidate countries. This process 
could verify a normative integrity and balance of values, potential media 
policy choices rooted in various media functions as well as responsiveness 
to communication needs and rights. The CEE countries selected for the 
assessment in this volume (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Po-
land) present an intriguing case. The scale of media systems re-invention 
after 1989 in conditions of compressed time stands as relatively unique 
in comparison with more evolutionary developments in other European 
countries. Yet the impetus for the fundamental revamping of media en-
vironments in CEE was largely exogenous, leaning towards the adoption 
of foreign institutional and policy designs. Although membership in the 
European Union and Council of Europe, and gradual transposition of ac-
cession standards, played a quite important although not ultimate role 
in democratic transitions and media change, an assessment of the pre-
accession EU policy on media-related issues showed that the CEE countries 
accomplished a superficial harmonisation. This resulted not only from in-
hibiting internal forces inside the consolidating democracies of the young 
CEE member states but more importantly, from an absence of clear formu-
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lation of core values in media policy and benchmarks on the side of the 
EU. The transformation of media structures in the CEE did not follow a lin-
ear route where subsequent steps logically build on each other. A number 
of relatively recent cases in CEE (the controversial use of a libel law by 
judges in Slovakia, the Hungarian media law, lack of independent media 
regulatory authorities) demonstrate that national responses may corrode 
transnational attempts when the collective purpose becomes weak. This 
has been reflected in media freedom indexes demonstrating that the situ-
ation of media freedom and pluralism has not fundamentally improved in 
the CEE countries after the EU accession. Moreover, problematic develop-
ments occurred in all CEE countries after the EU accession, though they 
have not been bound by much similarity. 
These lessons exposed the scrappy and underdeveloped nature of 
benchmarks in the area of freedom of expression and the media in the EU 
enlargement policy. The EU institutions, and the EP in particular, realised 
that a quite passive stance in the pre-accession period may later lead 
to more turbulent developments showing signs of regress in the field of 
media freedom and pluralism. The experience from the 5th enlargement 
also made it clear that essentials – such as media freedom and pluralism – 
should be anchored at the core of the EU polyvalent media policy and 
not merely substituted by a focus on economic criteria. Hence it became 
quite clear that the ongoing policy of conditionality will need to lay on 
more solid building blocks, in particular a common institutional blueprint 
(once missing) and common patterns of practices.
The EU audiovisual policy continues to form a core media policy 
strand singled out from a broader media field by the fact of implementing 
hard policy instruments – the TWF and AVMS Directives. It also stands 
for the longest history in comparison with other thematic fields. Guided 
by various rationales including economic, cultural, political and techno-
logical (although with different proportions), the audiovisual policy in-
tegrates, in addition, an internal and external EU policy dimension leav-
ing room for maneuver by member states. Though embracing constantly 
a larger territory of overlapping issues, the EU audiovisual policy – for the 
most part of its history – concentrated on two axes: on the one hand – 
free circulation of audiovisual media services within the EU internal mar-
ket; on the other hand – cultural protection of the EU audiovisual media 
services. These two dimensions were assessed with respect to policy har-
monisation in the CEE countries. It should be emphasised in this context 
that the process of implementation of the AVMSD found its locus in the 
heart of the audiovisual policy, becoming at the same time more system-
atically driven.
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Whereas the CEE countries shared obvious and long standing con-
nections based on common historical experience, path dependency and 
in some cases, cultural affinities, the current policy landscapes, includ-
ing audiovisual policy and implementation of AVMS rules, bring to light 
significant differences. In general, all of the CEE countries complied with 
the content obligations promoting European works in 2005–2010, albeit 
there has been a large variety among the countries. Hungary reached 
the highest level of compliance above the EU average, while the Czech 
Republic demonstrated the lowest level of compliance below the EU aver-
age. Concurrently, the Czech Republic appeared to be the only country in 
the group with visible structures supporting the transnational circulation 
of audiovisual media services due to a significant share of channels tar-
geting non-domestic markets. These differences seem to be dictated not 
only by market size and a history of common geopolitical and cultural 
relations, but also by consequences of political choices made during the 
first period of media system transformation.
The area of media pluralism, unlike audiovisual policy and the imple-
mentation of the AVMSD, has constituted a complex and elusive territory 
for EU media policy mainly due to the difficulty in reconciling and balanc-
ing various rationales under one commanding and coherent premise. The 
issue of media pluralism demonstrated that the visions and directions 
in policies very much depend on how complex media environments are 
perceived, conceptualised, and what values and functions are prioritised. 
New configurations of media power have not fundamentally challenged 
the structural dependencies between the media and political and eco-
nomic system described by Sandra Ball-Rokeach. These relations are rela-
tively symmetrical in the sense that the survival and welfare of the media 
system is as contingent upon the resources of the political and economic 
systems as the survival and welfare of the economic and political systems 
are contingent upon the resources of the media (Ball-Rokeach, 2006: 4). 
The interdependencies that give rise to the necessity of co-operation be-
tween the media, political and economic system also give rise to conflicts 
as each party in these relations tries to maximise its power position vis-
à-vis the other by increasing exercise of its control in areas that make 
the other parties more dependent (Ball-Rokeach, 2006: 5). This has been 
apparent in many problematic cases that developed in Europe in recent 
years including the case of Silvio Berlusconi and the concentration of 
political and media power in Italy, the UK’s hacking phone scandal re-
vealing the enormous influence of Murdoch’s New International on the 
UK’s  political system and also the implementation of new media law in 
Hungary in 2010, in which the media regulatory authority became sub-
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ordinated to the Prime Minister and governing political party. In all these 
cases, symmetrical relations between the political, and economic systems 
and the media have been infringed as one of these domains (in the case 
of UK the media, in Hungary the government) pursued to increase its 
control over the others. 
It is important to add that the media users’ domain has not developed 
the same symmetrical relations with the media as the users participated 
in communication structures mainly through the political or economic 
system. A new media architecture brings the potential of change in these 
structural patterns although it should be recognised that increased media 
choice, possibilities of filtering, navigation, participation and network-
ing, as well as an excessive diversity and content abundance bear serious 
limits, These revolve around the contractual conditions of operators of-
fering various media services, lack of comprehensive information about 
the choice the users can enjoy, technical incompabilities, the commercial 
use of personal data etc. Thus, the normative view of pluralism should 
not encompass ‘everything’ or ‘any kind of diversity’ but such an arrange-
ment of diversity in a media system that generates symmetrical relations 
not only between the media, political and economic system but also me-
dia users and facilitates performing the key functions the media play in 
societies in a sustainable way. 
In media policy this certainly implies incorporation of such policy 
strands that contribute to a sustainable diversity of the media systems 
such as the independence of media regulatory authorities, media trans-
parency, protection of journalists from various kinds of pressures as well 
as prevention against excessive economic control over the media. Chapter 
five demonstrated that the EU policy in these regards has been limited 
to monitoring and soft measures as well as promotion of standards. To 
understand how the CEE countries resonate with these policy standards 
and how media structures changed over time, the empirical assessment 
involved studying the three dimensions with a crucial role for the dif-
ferentiation of media structures: the diversity of media control, diversity 
of media functions and geographical/cultural diversity. A comparative 
analysis showed that outcomes both in terms of policies, as well as media 
structures, are different in the studied countries. 
In the field of policies, this variety manifests itself in diverging ap-
proaches to media ownership concentration (e.g. the use of cross-media 
ownership limits in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while in Poland 
monomedia concentration limits apply), recognition and support for the 
community media or social broadcasters, and rules on internal plural-
ism. At the same time, it is worth mentioning that the broadcasting and 
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media laws in CEE seem to be relatively permissive in ownership policies 
and consolidation. They also allow for too much discretion on the side 
of regulatory authorities to limit eventually the size of media companies, 
mergers, or decide about revoking licences. Media ownership details are 
often opaque for media users and do not allow an automatic disclosure 
of the ultimate owner of particular media outlets. Besides, the changes 
in ownership are constant and complex. The transparency rules largely 
function within the media regulatory authorities, but do not automati-
cally ensure the access of the public to full datasets free of charge. 
In the field of media structures, the CEE countries employed var-
ied approaches to foreign media ownership and transnational investment 
that presents one of the most distinguishing features of CEE media land-
scapes. Although the foreign ownership prevails in various CEE media sec-
tors, in some countries domestic owners dominate particular media seg-
ments (e.g. the segment of quality daily press or TV broadcasting market 
in Poland, digital delivery systems in Slovakia). The patterns of media 
ownership in the CEE countries – with few exceptions – demonstrate high 
or moderate concentration in various segments of media markets that 
has been a product of more profound concentration waves and takeovers, 
as well as the clustering of business activities in the pre-EU-accession 
period. In recent years, the dynamics of consolidation seems to be quite 
stable (the measurement did not display a significant increase or decrease 
of concentration), at the same time, changes of ownership are fast, brisk 
and often not fully transparent. Various vectors of these changes may be 
detected – such as the increasing takeover of media activities in various 
sectors by domestic business elites or entry into cross ownership involv-
ing online media or digital platforms by large transnational owners. 
In terms of functional diversity, the media which is focusing on en-
tertainment financed from commercial sources, seem to perform better 
and be less vulnerable to current economic challenges than is the case of 
the quality daily press or public service media. This double decrease – in 
sales and advertising – has made quality newspapers more fragile vis-à-
vis advertising from the state, state companies or political parties. Finally, 
an assessment of geographical diversity showed that there are significant 
differences among the countries regardless of market size. For instance, 
the highest level of decentralisation in the market of daily newspapers 
characterises Hungary, not Poland as could be expected from the differ-
ence in market size. The regional press markets proved to be fluctuant 
in the region, while centripetal drives prevail over centrifugal, with the 
exception of Hungary. The centripetal tendencies include a decreasing 
number of regional daily newspapers, decreasing circulation of regional 
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dailies, and most importantly, an increasing level of centralisation, con-
centration of media ownership and chaining.
The media policy strands integrated in the chapter six seem to be 
one of the most challenging in terms of harmonising EU and national 
 approaches. The legal recognition of MRA independence that could con-
tribute more formally to a structural rebalancing of political and economic 
influences on media structures proved to be too contentious. A strong will-
ingness of the national states to control this institutional setting for media 
regulation hampered the Commission’s efforts. An empirical assessment at 
the level of the CEE countries showed a range of arrangements concerning 
the legal recognition of MRA independence, although in terms of the ap-
pointment procedures and accountability, a strong dependency on the po-
litical system was identified in all countries. The EU approach to the PSM 
has been dominated by the economic and competition perspective, setting 
the frames of action and debate in weighing PSM output by palpable so-
cial and public values against ‘market impact’. A more strict application 
of financing in relation to the public service remit has increasingly been 
demanded from private commercial broadcasters trying to secure their po-
sitions against a fragmented advertising market. An empirical assessment 
of changing conditions of the PSM in the CEE has demonstrated an overall 
trend of weakening the PSM both in terms of audience share and financing 
mechanisms. This trend, stimulated very much by political choices, can 
only be balanced by empowering PSM users. Only with a greater inclusion 
and participation of audiences and media users in various aspects of PSM 
performance and policy, can the PSM equip themselves with a stronger 
functional legacy, more balanced accountability and autonomy against 
political and economic influences. Moreover, this can also empower the 
PSM at the EU level where increased tensions between the PSM and com-
mercial media, are moving to from the national levels.
New forms of communication and new media architecture not only 
fundamentally transform the functions media play in various fields of so-
cial life, they also rearrange dependencies and interrelations within these 
fields. In addressing the new conditions in making the polyvalent media 
policy faces a challenge of putting the ends and means at the right place. 
This will require redirecting and rebalancing the current strands of policy-
making and rationales towards a more prominent recognition of commu-
nication needs in perspective of media users as opposed to the interests of 
actors representing the economic and political domains. In such a process 
an organic growth of the media should be carefully combined with non-
intrusive gardening – so that the diversity and survival of the most valu-
able media ‘species’ is protected. Normative concerns continue to be valid 
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in this respect. The imposing of ‘one media policy size’ to highly varied 
national media landscapes would be misplaced. Yet in terms of standards 
and meaningful guidelines it is worth acknowledging that we are certain-
ly able to distinguish between better and worse quality, between media 
systems that better respond to the communication needs of a country’s 
citizens and those that do not allow users’ demands and needs to be met 
or limit them for various economic and political reasons. Thus, the art of 
policy harmonisation is to follow the route from one of exercising control, 
to building social trust. 
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